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How can we explain the variation of Corporate Responsibility (also known as CSR 
and Corporate Citizenship) – business’s voluntary engagement for social and 
environmental ends above legally mandated minimum standards? This thesis develops 
a political-economic explanation for CR’s temporal and cross-national variation. It 
argues that Corporate Responsibility has elective affinities with economic 
liberalization and market liberalism, and functions as a material and symbolic 
substitute for institutionalized forms of social solidarity. The erosion and dismantling 
of Institutionalized Social Solidarity (ISS) is associated with the rise of CR. The 
dynamics of the response may be country or Variety of Capitalism specific. Both 
employers and state officials have an interest in compensating for the hardships of 
liberalization and the weakening of institutionalized social solidarity. One way in 
which they seek to legitimate the market vis-à-vis their ‘stakeholders’ and the 
electorate, and justify themselves vis-à-vis their own conscience, is through Corporate 
Responsibility. Those in the engine rooms of contemporary capitalism want to 
perceive themselves as serving the common good. This is true irrespective of capitalist 
‘varieties.’ Using Corporate Responsibility Associations (CRAs) as a proxy for the 
institutionalization of CR, the thesis tracks the growth and spread of CR across Europe 
and beyond. Chapters illustrate the co-evolution of CR and Thatcherism in the UK 
since the late 1970s; the rise of CR and the decline of Organized Capitalism in 
Germany since the mid-1990s; the conversion and contestation of EU-level CR since 
 the 1990s; and CR’s spread and variation across the OECD. The thesis concludes by 
reflecting on the outlier case of New Zealand, on the transnational networks of CR, 
and on the ambivalence of responsible business in contemporary capitalism. CR is not 
only part of the solution to pressing problems, but – as a complement to market-
liberalism and a substitute for institutionalized social solidarity – part of the problem 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
The Political Economy of Corporate Responsibility 
Across Europe and Beyond, 1977-2007 
 
I. Introduction 
The 1980s were tough times for British workers. Margaret Thatcher’s unleashing of 
capitalism left social wreckage and mayhem in its wake, making the 1960s and 1970s 
seem like capitalism light. Yet Thatcher’s forceful installation of a market-driven 
order did not precipitate a straightforward profit- or shareholder orientation in the 
British business community, as is commonly thought. As power shifted to employers, 
prominent businessmen committed themselves to Corporate Responsibility. Hector 
Laing, Lord Laing of Dunphail (1923-2010) was one such businessman.  
 Laing was Chairman of United Biscuits, a close friend and outspoken 
supporter of Thatcher and her policies, and a leading advocate of Corporate 
Responsibility in the UK. Again and again, Laing implored other businesspeople to 
join him and others on this quest. Despite his position as Chairman of one of Britain’s 
largest companies, he insisted that he had not forgotten those less privileged than he: 
  
I support this Government’s policies – they have given business back its 
 freedom, along with the discipline of failure if it is unprofitable. But freedom 
 demands responsibility and if we want to continue to enjoy our freedom, we 
 must demonstrate that a buoyant economy and business success go hand in 
 hand with a caring society; that as our profits increase so too does our 
 contribution to improving the condition of disadvantaged areas and people 
 (Laing, 1990: 18) 
 
Existing scholarship provides little guidance for understanding the rise of Corporate 
Responsibility in Thatcherite Britain. Researchers are so focused on the tug-of-war 
between activists and corporations that they have lost sight of CR’s political-economic 
and institutional context.  
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 By now, pretty much everyone acknowledges that “CSR is booming.” Even the 
skeptical Economist wryly remarks: “The movement for corporate social responsibility 
has won the battle of ideas” (The Economist 2008: 3; 2005: 4). In just a few decades, 
companies’ extralegal engagement for social and environmental ends has moved from 
obscurity to center stage. Corporate Responsibility is now the received wisdom: 
activists, managers, entrepreneurs, employees, politicians, policymakers, and 
international organizations have embraced its rhetoric and practice. Numerous public 
figures1 have given CR their stamp-of-approval.2A growing number of scholars and 
entire scholarly journals are devoted to studying and promoting it.3 There is 
disagreement over how to practice CR. But there is little disagreement over whether or 
not to do it. In what has become a universal script, responsible corporations engage in 
voluntary, positive-sum, win-win partnerships and cooperation with stakeholders, 
minimizing their negative externalities and maximizing their positive impact. The 
majority of large multinational corporations have adopted ‘codes of conduct’ with 
explicit reference to Corporate Responsibility. According to observers, CR “is real and 
substantive and deserves to be taken seriously by anyone interested in business, 
politics, or the relationship between the two” (Vogel, 2005: x). Moreover, “In many 
cases, corporations are behaving in a far more ethical or responsible fashion than they 
once did” (Soule, 2009: 27-28). Neither the economic turmoil unleashed by the 
                                                 
1 Including: Kofi Annan, former Secretary-General of the United Nations; John Gerard Ruggie, the 
originator of the term embedded liberalism; and unbeknown to most, the late Milton Friedman, Nobel 
laureate in economics. 
2 Milton Friedman is well-known for his quip that the social responsibility of business is to increase its 
profits: managers are unjustified in re-distributing shareholders’ money, and lack the state’s legitimacy 
for conducting social policy. In 2005, Friedman debated the issue of Corporate Responsibility with John 
Mackey and TJ Rogers, and concluded that his disagreements with Corporate Responsibility advocates 
were semantic. This is because Corporate Responsibility is said to increase, not detract from, 
shareholder value. See “Rethinking the Social Responsibility of Business: A debate featuring Milton 
Friedman, Whole Foods’ John Mackey and Cyprus Semiconductor’s TJ Rogers” Reason Online 
December 2005. 
3 At the time of writing, English-language CR journals include: The Journal of Corporate Citizenship, 
Business Ethics: The Magazine of Corporate Responsibility, Business Ethics: A European Review, 
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, Stanford Social Innovation Review. 
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collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 nor the Gulf of Mexico oil spill fiasco by a 
corporation previously deemed “most responsible in its sector” have dislodged CR 
from the forefront of the public imagination. Impressive as the rise of CR is, many 
aspects of political-economic reality are hard to reconcile with the above account. 
Corporate law “is said to be witnessing ‘the end of history.’” According to Adam 
Winkler, the progressive, public, stakeholder-protection/social-responsibility school4 
has been vanquished by the conservative, private, shareholder-wealth maximization 
school of corporate legal thought,5 the very same school another scholar has termed 
“Corporate Irresponsibility.”6 While the literature on Corporate Responsibility has 
grown prodigiously, it is of little help for making sense of these puzzles: how is it 
possible that CR has triumphed in the battle of ideas just as the “conservative, private, 
shareholder-wealth maximization school of corporate legal thought” has vanquished 
the “progressive, public, stakeholder-protection/social-responsibility school”? How 
can corporations behave “in a far more ethical or responsible fashion than they once 
did” amidst disintegration social compromises and an increasingly distribution of 
income and life chances? Moreover, why is there significant cross-national variation 
of Corporate Responsibility, a low-cost ideology/practice that purports to benefit all 
                                                 
4 Stakeholder approaches draw on the work of Richard E. Freeman, who claims that companies are 
responsible not only to their shareholders, but to “any group or individual who can affect or is affected 
by he corporation” [Freeman, 1984, cited in Melé (2008: 64)].   
5 “The long battle between the conservative, private, shareholder-wealth maximization school of 
corporate legal thought and the progressive, public, stakeholder-protection/social-responsibility school 
is now over. The victor, it is claimed, is  the conservative school, also known as the ‘nexus-of-contracts’ 
approach, which holds that corporations should be run for the exclusive benefit of shareholders (what is 
often termed ‘shareholder primacy’). To contractarians, the state’s role in corporate governance is 
primarily to provide efficient default rules from which shareholders can choose to depart, and the few 
mandatory rules that do exist to restrain corporate behaviour are subject to evasion by choice of form. 
The terms of corporate activity are thus effectively set by markets, not by law. Progressive corporate 
law, with its preference for state-imposed mandatory  rules to limit excessive pursuit of profit and its 
promotion of employee, customer, and community voice in corporate governance, has been vanquished 
(Winkler, 2004: 109-110) 
6 Mitchell (2001) 
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stakeholders including owners/shareholders?7 Figure 1.1 provides an overview of 
CR’s spread during the past thirty years. The bars represent the number of OECD 
countries that ‘have CR’ in a given year.8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 1.1: CR’s Spread During the Past Thirty Years 
Figure 1.2 shows a typology of two countries with extreme values on CR: the UK, 
‘extensive’ and ‘early,’ and Germany, ‘limited’ and ‘late.’ 
 
 Early Late 
Extensive Britain  
Limited  Germany 
 
Figure 1.2: Corporate Responsibility ‘Leaders’  
and ‘Laggards’ in Contemporary Europe 
Figure 1.3 gives us a sense of the gap between these two countries, with time on the x-
axis and the number of firms subscribing to CR9 on the y-axis. When it comes to 
                                                 
7 Whatever the differences in their domestic institutions, OECD countries have much in common: they 
are highly developed, affluent, and tightly linked with each other through trade and finance.  
8 A detailed description of these units of analysis follows on pp. 41-46.  
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timing, the UK comes in almost two decades before Germany. When it comes to 
quantity, the UK has a twenty-fold lead:    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3: CR in the UK and Germany 
 
What explains these differences? Why is Corporate Responsibility institutionalized at 
different times in different countries, and why do some countries have more CR than 
others? In short, what are we to make of this amorphous and essentially contested 
phenomenon?10 In what follows, I outline a political-economic approach for 
explaining CR’s variation and significance. Before proceeding to the argument, we 
need to establish what we mean by Corporate Responsibility.            
                                                                                                                                            
9 These are firms joining non-profit business-led coalitions for advancing CR. A detailed description of 
these units of analysis follows on pp. 41-46. 
10 I want to suggest that understanding CR’s political-economic context will help us to make sense of it 
more generally. While philosophical literature on contextualism is relevant here, my claim does not rest 
on any strong anti-foundational views.     
  
 
5
  
  
II. Defining Corporate Responsibility 
Although CR’s multidimensionality and amorphousness constitutes a challenge for 
empirical research,11 it is possible to define the concept with reference to its socially 
accepted meanings. Following widely accepted usage, I define Corporate 
Responsibility as firms’ voluntary engagement for social and/or environmental ends 
above legally mandated minimum standards.12  
 Three elements of this definition deserve emphasis. First, CR encompasses a 
wide array of ‘responsible’ practices ranging from a businesses ‘core’ responsibilities 
(survival, the production of goods and services, obeying the law) to initiatives which 
impact upon core activities (codes of conduct, reputation-, risk-, and supply-chain 
management) and those which lie beyond a firm’s narrow economic functions 
(philanthropy, charity). Second, the engagement is voluntary. Third, it is business-led.    
 The contemporary understanding of Corporate Responsibility, with its 
voluntarist emphasis, originated in the United States (Carroll, 1999). CR is  
 
the notion that corporations have an obligation to constituent groups in society 
other than stockholders and beyond that prescribed by law and voluntary 
contract. Two facets of the definition are critical. First, the obligation must be 
voluntarily adopted; behavior influenced by coercive laws or union contract is 
not voluntary. Second, the obligation is a broad one, extending beyond the 
traditional duty to shareholders to other societal groups such as customers, 
employees, suppliers, and neighboring communities (Carroll, 1999: 284) 
 
                                                 
11 The claim that social practices and institutions are socially constructed is now widely accepted 
(Berger and Luckman, 1966). It is less common to speak of different degrees of the social construction 
of social phenomena. If one does, Corporate Responsibility lies at one extreme: this elusive concept is 
situated on the social kinds end of the natural kinds / social kinds spectrum. (Whereas natural kinds 
have real, non-epistemic essences, social kinds do not). 
12 The World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) states that “corporate social 
responsibility is the continuing commitment by business to behave ethically and contribute to economic 
development while improving the quality of life of the workforce and their families as well as of the 
local community and society at large” (WBCSD, 1999: 3). The European Commission has defined CSR 
as “a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business 
operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis” (CEC, 2001: 6).    
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Archie Carroll stresses that CR is “a condition in which the corporation is at least in 
some measure a free agent. To the extent that any of the forgoing social objectives are 
imposed on the corporation by law, the corporation exercises no responsibility when it 
implements them” (Carroll, 1999: 276).  
 Corporate Responsibility emphasizes that corporations should be accountable 
to a broader network of stakeholders than just owners/shareholders, and should take 
responsibility for social and environmental outcomes, while stressing – and this is 
crucial – that they should be flexible to pursue these ends as they see fit. Corporate 
Responsibility gives profit-oriented companies a discretionary role in the allocation 
and distribution of social goods.  
 Instead of being voluntary and left to the discretion of companies, standards 
can be enforced by hard law.13 People can act out of a sense of duty, rather than 
because of the benefits they anticipate from their actions. Forms of corporatism or 
collaborative governance provide firms with less leeway for voluntary engagement 
while dispersing power more equally among stakeholders, for example empowering 
trades unions or works councils, thus reducing the ability of the owner(s) and of 
management to take credit for the activities in question. Historically, there have been 
alternatives to business self-regulation: the collective and legally binding institutions 
of the post-war compromise are one example.14  
 A brief remark on terminology is in order. I use ‘Corporate Responsibility’ as 
an umbrella term to refer to the discourse and practice of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR), Corporate Citizenship, Corporate Social Performance, and 
                                                 
13 For Max Weber, hard law increases the probability that something will get done: “an order will be 
called … law if it is externally guaranteed by the probability that physical or psychological coercion 
will be applied by a staff of people in order to bring about compliance or avenge violation” (Swedberg, 
2005: 140).  
14 Bartley (2007) and Matten and Moon (2008) are among the few authors who acknowledge this.  
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related terms.15 These concepts have different emphases, but they share an emphasis 
on voluntary engagement above and beyond legally mandated minimum standards.16 
 
III. My Argument in Brief 
 
I argue that Corporate Responsibility is integral to the process of economic 
liberalization and to market liberalism itself. Market liberalism is best known for its 
political proponents Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan and their agendas of 
liberalization, privatization, deregulation, and market society. Against John Gerard 
Ruggie who views CR as the “re-embedding of global liberalism,”17 I argue that the 
rise and institutionalization of modern-day Corporate Responsibility is associated with 
the very same processes of liberalization and marketization which have spread across 
the world since the 1970s, and which involve  
 
 a major recasting of the system of democratic capitalism as we know it …. The 
 current transformation of modern capitalism is making it more market-driven 
 and market-accommodating as it releases ever more economic transactions 
 from public control and turns them over to private contracts (Streeck and 
 Thelen, 2005: 5; 4)  
Since the 1980s, “the spread of marketization has meant, in reality, deep 
transformations with economic, social and political dimensions. Market-oriented 
macro-economic policies – privatization, deregulation and liberalization – have spread 
rapidly” (Djelic, 2006: 71), along with New Public Management,18 soft law,19 and 
Corporate Responsibility.  
                                                 
15 Therefore, Corporate Responsibility does not have a different meaning than Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR). Both business and responsibility are inherently social endeavors, hence the word 
social can be considered redundant.     
16 A distinction is commonly made between CSR and Corporate Citizenship: CSR refers to engagement 
within a firm’s core business processes and operations (CSR), whereas Corporate Citizenship (CC) 
refers to a firm’s relations with its broader social and societal environment. As an umbrella term, CR 
includes both CSR and CC. 
17 Ruggie (2003, 2004, 2007) 
18 Saint-Martin (2000) 
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 The emergence of Corporate Responsibility during the past thirty years is 
connected with the erosion and dismantling of the post-war social order20 and its 
replacement with market-liberal forms of economic organization. The post-war order 
was a period of rapid economic growth, full employment, and declining levels of 
inequality.21 Standards of living and life-chances for the vast majority of the 
population improved dramatically. Trade-union power, market-correcting regulation, 
extensive welfare-state provisions and corporate governance regulations strengthened 
workers’ voice at the expense of owners’ and managers’ discretion.   
 Drawing on Karl Polanyi, Ruggie coined the term “embedded liberalism” to 
refer to a “grand social bargain whereby society agreed to liberalize markets … but 
also to share the social adjustment costs that open markets inevitably produce” 
(Ruggie, 2008: 3). In Ruggie’s original formulation, “embedded liberalism” refers to 
the multilateral post-war economic order “predicated upon domestic intervention,” an 
“intersubjective framework of meaning” that was a “fusion of power and legitimate 
social purpose” (1983: 209; 196; 201).22 Ruggie describes the “grand domestic 
bargain” underpinning the embedded liberal compromise as follows: “societies were 
asked to embrace the change and dislocation attending liberalization, but the state 
promised to cushion these effects by means of its newly acquired domestic economic 
and social policy roles” (Ruggie, 1998: 89).   
 Since the 1970s, unemployment and inequality have risen, growth has slowed, 
and the institutional and ideological underpinnings of the embedded-liberalism 
                                                                                                                                            
19 Vaughn Lowe describes soft law as “norms that are not themselves legally binding but form part of 
the broader normative context within which expectations of what is reasonable or proper State behavior 
are formed” (Lowe, 2007: 95-96). See also Chinkin (1989)’s seminal article.  
20 known variously as the ‘Golden Age,’ the ‘post-war compromise,’ the ‘post-war consensus’ and 
‘embedded liberalism.’   
21 Glyn (2006); Marglin and Schor (1992)  
22 Kurtulus Gemici (2008) argues convincingly that embeddedness should be understood as a 
methodological principle – i.e. ‘in what ways is the economy embedded in these various contexts?’ – 
but not as a theoretical proposition according to which economies can be embedded or disembedded. 
Despite this problem, the term has acquired widespread use, which is the reason why I adopt it.      
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compromise and “Golden Age”23 have come under attack. This has occurred through 
liberalization, which Martin Höpner et. al. define as “the politically implemented and 
politically legitimized delegation of allocation and distribution decisions to markets” 
(Höpner, Petring et. al. 2009: 3). Most, if not all countries have experienced “a counter 
double movement … away from embedded liberal ideas” (Blyth, 2002: 5):  
 
in the past 30 years the established system of industrial democracy and 
stakeholder representation has been disrupted throughout the industrialized 
world. The roles of unions and of government regulation, central to the post-
war order, have everywhere been weakened or have come under attack 
(Heckscher et. al, 2003: 3)  
The employment system of embedded liberalism, with its stability and job security, 
has “collapsed” and “been shattered,” resulting in “tremendous insecurity” for 
employees (Osterman, 1999: 180, 167, 181). According to Wolfgang Streeck, 
capitalists were no longer content being “stall-fed” by social democratic governments, 
and they set out to free themselves from the institutional shackles that had been 
imposed on them in the preceding decades:  
 
 Capitalist firms and those who own and run them can only for so long be 
 treated as patient cogs in a collectively serviceable machine. Then, their true 
 nature must come to the fore again, revealing them to be the live predators that 
 they are, for which politically imposed social obligations are nothing but bars 
 of a cage bound to become too small for them and for their insatiable desire for 
 the hunt …. Capitalists are the modern, nontraditionalist economic actors par 
 excellance: they never rest in their perennial rush to new frontiers. This is why 
 they are fundamentally unruly: a permanent source of disorder from the 
 perspective of social institutions, relentlessly whacking away at social rules, 
 continuously forcing rulers to rewrite them, and undoing them again by 
 creatively exploiting the inevitable gap between general rules and their local 
 enactment (Streeck, 2009: 234-235, 241)    
How does Corporate Responsibility relate to these changes? John Ruggie nicely 
illustrates the hopes vested in CR. Ruggie suggests that CR can help “re-embed global 
liberalism” (Ruggie, 2002, 2003, 2005). “Good practices will help to drive out bad 
                                                 
23 Marglin and Schor (1990) 
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ones through the power of dialogue, transparency, advocacy and competition” 
(Ruggie, 2002: 32). In Ruggie’s view, CR socializes, civilizes, and politicizes the 
economy.24 The story I tell in this thesis is rather different.  
Rather than subduing or taming markets, the rise of CR is associated with the 
“unleashing of capitalism” and with a “decisive recovery in capitalism’s strength and 
stability” during recent decades (Glyn, 2006: 23).25 Changes include the disciplining 
of labor unions, the decentralization of wage bargaining, declining statutory tax rates 
and levels of regulation, varying levels of welfare state retrenchment, and growing 
levels of poverty and inequality.26 The rise of CR is part of the same process as 
business’s shedding of institutionalized social obligations. CR is endogenous to the 
decline of the post-war compromise and the rise of liberal market varieties of 
capitalism in affluent countries during the past thirty years. This thesis draws attention 
to a neglected facet of CR: its anti-political role in sustaining and normalizing market 
liberalism.27 
 Since this thesis aims to explain change – the rise of Corporate Responsibility 
across the OECD along with the decline of institutional diversity during the recent 
decades – a historical-political approach to institutions that pays attention not only to 
their formal existence or persistence, but also to their political content, seems more 
fruitful than a focus on static institutional equilibria. Processes of layering, drift, 
                                                 
24 In this view, the economy is not just about profits; it’s about sustainability, social cohesion, and 
variety of other social goals. No doubt the attractiveness of this vision accounts for CR’s persistent 
allure among businesspeople, employees, and the public at large. 
25 Capitalism’s dynamism and instability is powerful evinced by recurrent crises, including the current 
financial debacle. Yet the system is arguably without any serious alternative, hence cognitively stable or 
legitimate.   
26 Androniki Apostolakou and Gregory Jackson concur with this view. They argue “that CSR practices 
may be emerging as a substitute for formal institutions rather than as a mirror of strong stakeholder 
involvement” (2009: 2). 
27 As Andrew Barry (2002: 270) points out, “Politics can often be profoundly anti-political in its effects: 
suppressing potential spaces of contestation; placing limits on the possibilities for debate and 
confrontation. Indeed, one might say that one of the core functions of politics has been, and should be, 
to place limits on the political.” In this view, CR depoliticizes, normalizes and rationalizes market-
liberal forms of social and economic organization, even as it politicizes business practice.  
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conversion and exhaustion can take place while leaving the form and façades of 
institutions intact.28 A focus only on formal institutions leads us to lose sight of:  
 
the retreat in contemporary capitalism of institutions imposing and enforcing 
public obligations on economic actors, in favour of voluntary, privatised 
institutions of the Williamsonian kind …. capitalist inventiveness is capable of 
using institutions for economizing, for example on transaction costs, that had 
originally been intended to serve some very different purposes, including not 
least market-breaking ones (Streeck, 2009: 170, 257)   
 My findings suggest that Corporate Responsibility substitutes for, rather than  
complements, institutionalized forms of social solidarity: powerful trade unions, 
market-constraining regulation,29 and expansive welfare states in Europe and beyond. 
CR has risen along with the tide of market liberalism that has swept across OECD 
countries, indeed the world, in recent decades. CR has affinities for liberal varieties of 
capitalism and co-evolves with liberalization, privatization and deregulation: with the 
transformation of labor market regulation, industrial relations institutions, 
redistributive taxation, and social welfare programs. Contrary to the popular 
perception that CR has been at loggerheads with these developments, CR has in fact 
been integral to them, as part of the “economic spirit” of market liberalism, a term I 
elaborate below. It is commonplace to explain CR with reference to civil society 
activism and norm entrepreneurship.30 In my view, the rise of CR across the OECD 
since the 1970s cannot be explained without reference to the transformations of 
capitalism during this period.  
 Corporate Responsibility is not generally a high salience issue for politicians 
and political parties. Like liberalization itself, CR has been a bi-partisan project, 
                                                 
28 Streeck and Thelen (2005) 
29 I am not suggesting that CR is at odds with regulation per se. It is necessary to distinguish between 
“market-making” or market conforming regulation on one hand, and “market distorting” or market 
correcting regulation on the other (Streeck, 2009: 156). CR is inversely related to the latter, not the 
former.  
30 Flohr, Rieth, Schwindenhammer and Wolf (2010); Soule (2009)  
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supported by parties on the Left and on the Right.31 Yet CR is deeply political. CR has 
been integral or endogenous to the politics of releasing and freeing markets from 
social regulation. The rise of responsible business coincides with deep structural 
changes within the political economies of individual OECD countries. Scholars have 
been too quick to equate Corporate Responsibility with globalization and with trans-
national anti-globalization activism.32 David Vogel expresses this received wisdom 
when he states that “civil regulations employ private, non-state, or market-based 
regulatory frameworks to govern multinational firms and global supply chains” 
(Vogel, 2009: 153); and that CR is “a direct response to a perception that globalization 
has inappropriately distributed benefits globally; and that companies benefiting from 
globalization are the main vehicles of it, and therefore they should be the main targets 
to ameliorate its negative impacts” (Vogel, 2006: 40). CR is in part a response to civil-
society anti-globalization activism, but this is by no means the whole story.  
 What emerges quite clearly from the chapters below is that CR is less about 
globalization than about capitalism at both national and trans-national levels. Contrary 
to the expectations of strong globalization and world society perspectives, political-
economic contests at the national level are highly consequential for the political 
economy of CR.33 As markets are unleashed, social protections erode. Margaret 
Thatcher’s policies of liberalization, privatization and deregulation are emblematic of 
this turn to the market which has left no society untouched. Today, most people forget 
                                                 
31  In the view of the Right, CR is ‘Corporate.’ In the view of the Left, CR is ‘Responsibility.’ See 
Cioffi and Höpner (2006) for an account of center-left parties’ support for, and right-wing parties’ 
opposition to, pro-shareholder reforms in Germany. For an account of the limitations of this argument 
in Switzerland, Sweden, and the Netherlands, see Schnyder (forthcoming).   
32 In his widely acclaimed book, David Vogel states that “Because its focus is on the contemporary 
revival of CSR, it emphasizes developments since the early 1990s” (Vogel, 2005: 15).  Yet his book 
also covers organizations, such as “Business in the Community, a prominent British NGO” (Vogel, 
2005: 42), that pioneered a CSR agenda since the beginning of the 1980s. Chapter 2 pursues this 
historical revisionist argument at length.    
33 My claim that there are important dimensions of trans-national variation, and that states and domestic 
politics are consequential for the political economy of CR does not imply that trans-national processes 
are unimportant or inconsequential.     
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that Thatcher herself was an outspoken proponent of CR: the “Iron Lady” and leading 
members of the British business community saw radical free-market policies and CR 
as tightly linked,34 as indeed they are.35 This example suggests that CR is associated 
not only with the ‘left’ but also with the ‘right’ hand of business and society. Since 
Hobbes, it has become customary to think of politics using the metaphor of the ‘body 
politic.’ Bodies normally have two hands and arms – and so does CR.   
 This thesis provides abundant evidence of a correlation between Corporate 
Responsibility and market-liberalism. Identifying the causal linkages is tricky. 
Corporate Responsibility is slippery, amorphous and multidimensional, as it assumes 
different forms in different contexts and at different times.36 Although this thesis stops 
short of articulating and testing causal claims,37 I suggest that at the macro-level, there 
are elective affinities38 between Corporate Responsibility on one hand, and economic 
liberalization as well as market-liberal institutions on the other. In some cases – such 
as in the UK under Margaret Thatcher – the rise of CR and market liberalism are high-
salience affairs. In other cases, firms’ CR engagement finds its diabolical twin in the 
low-salience, “quiet politics”39 lobbying of industry and trade associations to secure 
institutional reforms for their members.  
Corporate Responsibility is linked to the disintegration of the post-war 
settlement, the decline of institutionalized solidarity, and economic liberalization in 
                                                 
34 This makes it all the more astonishing that CR is branded as a left-wing ideology. See Green (2002) 
for an excellent discussion of Thatcher’s conservative ideology.  
35 Both CR and market liberalism share an emphasis on business freedom and discretion. This 
differentiates them from the constraints of the post-war order that they replace. 
36 Thus, I agree with Suzanne Shannahan and Sanjeev Khagram that “diverse set of practices captured 
by the moniker CSR eschews easy, singular explanations” (Shanahan and Khagram 2006: 204). 
37 It is not alone in this respect. To the knowledge of this author, no existing social-scientific studies of 
CR do this.  
38 This term, which has its origins in eighteenth-century chemistry and was popularised by Goethe, is 
often used by Max Weber. Richard Swedberg defines the term as: “two sets of social facts or 
mentalities [which] relate to one another or gravitate to each other—even though no direct and simple 
causality between the two can be established” (Swedberg, 2005: 83)  
39 “Quiet Politics and Business Power” is the title of a forthcoming book by Pepper Culpepper 
(Culpepper, 2010). 
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multiple ways: it is used by governments and business to inoculate firms against 
burdensome regulation40 and justify a light regulatory touch; to facilitate business-
friendly reforms of political-economic institutions; to satisfy firms’ needs that are not 
satisfied by the market and to compensate for market failures and deficiencies in 
public provision; and to constitute businesspeople as responsible moral agents. CR 
addresses problems (for businesses and society) which bear no discernable 
relationship to liberalization, and which predate it. CR also arises to address problems 
which stem from liberalization itself. It is in this specific sense that CR is endogenous 
to liberalization, that CR and liberalization are complementary. We can formulate this 
point in the form of a hypothesis:  
 
H1. Liberalization and Corporate Responsibility co-evolve. As liberalization proceeds 
apace, CR will take root and grow.   
Corporate Responsibility’s temporal variation is linked to its function of legitimating 
economic liberalization and market liberalism. CR is an important element in the 
transition from social democracy and embedded liberalism to market liberalism. CR 
helps to furnish businesspeople with pragmatic and moral legitimacy in market liberal 
orders, and especially during processes of economic liberalization. Thus, it provides 
business with authority in these roles.41  
Solidaristic political-economic institutions decrease the likelihood of CR 
adoption, whereas market-liberal institutions and policies of economic liberalization 
increase it. Analytically, institutions provide a good barometer for the rise of CR in 
different countries – the prevalence of liberal-market as opposed to non-liberal 
                                                 
40 My claim is not that CR is associated with an absolute decline in the quantity of regulation in social 
or other affairs, for there has been no such decline: as Stephen K. Vogel has shown, freer markets are 
associated with more, not less, rules (Vogel, 1998). Rather, my claim relates to the social content of this 
regulation: market-conforming and enabling legislation is different from market-correcting legislation, 
institutionalized social solidarity or collective action that leads to redistribution.       
41 For Thomas J. Biersteker and Rodney Bruce Hall, “to have authority, actors must be perceived as 
legitimate” (Biersteker and Hall, 2002: 204). 
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political-economic institutions is a useful measure of the state of market-liberalism in 
any given jurisdiction, and a predictor of CR’s emergence and prevalence. Rather than 
solid and invariant, national political-economic institutions have been in a state of flux 
during recent decades, bending and buckling under the tidal waves and torrential 
currents of global capitalism. The “major recasting of the system of democratic 
capitalism” referred to above is the product of agents who, driven by material and 
ideal interests and powerful systemic dynamics, have subverted the institutions of the 
post-war compromise and Social Market forms of economic organization. As they 
have done so, they have embraced Corporate Responsibility. In a twist on a growing 
literature that seeks to expose the ideational underpinnings of institutions and of 
political-economic change, my approach emphasizes the salience of political-
economic institutions for explaining ideational change. No single conceptual 
perspective suffices to elucidate this relationship. Instead, an “analytic eclectic” 
approach is necessary which draws upon a variety of different frameworks.42 In the 
pages below, I show how drawing simultaneously from different conceptual 
frameworks better elucidates the political economy of CR than any single one alone.  
 Both employers and state officials have an interest in compensating for the 
hardships that result from liberalization and the weakening and dismantling of 
institutionalized social solidarity. Corporate Responsibility functions as a ‘filler,’ 
rising as the post-war compromise decays and social market institutions erode.   
At the macro-level, CR will be more limited in densely-regulated environments than in 
free market contexts; and as the former come to increasingly approximate the latter, 
CR will increase. If the gap between private and external costs is greater in Liberal 
Market Economies than in Social Market Economies, then so is the demand and need 
for CR. In the words of Geoffrey Heal, there is a  
                                                 
42 Sil and Katzenstein (2010) 
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resource-allocation role for CSR programs in cases of market failure through 
private-social cost differentials, and also in cases where distributional 
disagreements are likely to be strong …. [Where] private and social costs are 
roughly in line and distributional debates are unusual: here corporate social 
responsibility has little role to play (Heal, 2004: 1)  
CR does not make sense to employers that are already doing much of this stuff on an 
involuntary basis. Yet CR does not automatically arise to compensate for the 
institutional deficits of liberalized and liberalizing economies.43 CR substitutes for 
institutionalized social solidarity (a term I will elaborate below) in most cases, but not 
in all. Liberalization and CR co-evolve in most cases, but not in all. 44 Elective 
affinities are not ironclad causal laws.45 Furthermore, to the extent that CR does fill 
the gaps created by liberalization, it does so partially and imperfectly. 
 In my argument, Corporate Responsibility functions to legitimate market-
liberalism and economic liberalization, both by compensating for some of the fallout 
of the latter and by appeasing the ethical sensibilities of those associated with 
capital.46 More generally, CR has the function of shoring up the legitimacy of 
capitalism.47 At the micro-level, business people’s engagement in CR cannot be 
understood in purely instrumental, Machiavellian, manipulative or cynical terms.48 To 
conceptualize CR in purely rational-instrumental terms is to miss what accounts for 
CR’s luster in the first place. Businesspeople want to believe in their own goodness 
                                                 
43 The coherence posited by structural-functionalist explanations is very rare in actually existing 
institutional systems. The reason is simple: although actors pursue their myriad (material and ideal) 
interests, there is no ingénieur système, “no master designer” (Streeck 2009: 106). 
44 New Zealand is a case in which thoroughgoing, indeed radical liberalization preceded, rather than 
accompanied, the rise of Corporate Responsibility.  
45 Analysts who invoke this concept must take care to explain exceptions to dominant patterns and not 
abuse the flexibility that comes with it. 
46 I am grateful to Richard W. Miller for pointing out that my argument can be construed in functional 
terms.  
47 Thus, my argument can be construed as a “functional explanation,” according to Richard W. Miller: 
“These explanations of a social phenomenon appeal to its tendency to benefit a larger system in a 
certain way, without claiming that those benefits operate as people’s reasons for creating or maintaining 
the phenomenon” (Miller, 1987: 119).  
48 Waddock (2008) contains a detailed portrayal of leading figures in the Corporate Responsibility 
movement, one that is impossible to square with cynical interpretations.  
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and virtuousness,49 and CR facilitates this. Like the market-liberal order of which it is 
a part, CR is voluntary. This differentiates it from the mandated, coercive, binding 
nature of the order it replaces. While my findings push back against some of the more 
strident claims made on behalf of ideational and constructivist political economy, I do 
not propose to put narrowly rational-strategic action in its place. No doubt corporate 
officials are often disingenuous, well-trained in the art and strategy of corporate PR. 
But many of them are sincere. Moral legitimacy and sincere commitment is an 
important, if not indispensable underpinning of CR; sincere commitment helps 
originate and sustain commitment to CR activities. People say CR moves them 
because it’s the right thing to do, and because being driven only by the “legitimate 
greed”50 that is the cornerstone of the capitalist order is ‘meaningless’ and ‘soulless.’  
 How do two of the major theoretical approaches in the social sciences, 
rationalism and culturalism, relate to the rise of CR and the decline of institutionalized 
social solidarity and institutional diversity in contemporary capitalism? Neither 
thoroughbred rationalist nor clear-cut constructivist or norms-based theoretical 
frameworks are up to the task. What is distinctive about CR, and this writer’s 
treatment of it, is its hybridity, its innovative synthesis of instrumental reason and 
value rationality. Those who view CR as a mere Machiavellian fig-leaf are wrong. It is 
not narrow instrumental rationality alone, but material and “ideal interests” that 
motivate and constitute Corporate Responsibility. In this sense, CR is similar to the 
“economic ethics” Max Weber wrote about a century ago.51 Just as in Weber’s eyes, 
                                                 
49 Ludger Heidbrink (2003) argues that “the success of the responsibility principle stands in a direct 
relationship to the growing complexity of the modern world.” The more difficult responsibility becomes 
to locate in modern knowledge and communication societies, the more intensively the responsibility 
principle is propagated (Heidbrink, 2003: 10, 263). 
50 Streeck, 2011: 143.  
51 As Richard Swedberg has pointed out to me, the infamous Protestant Ethic and the economic ethic of 
CR are similar in the following two ways: first, both are ethics, sets of values or principles that motivate 
their carriers; second, neither is backed up or enforced by the coercive power of the state.  
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the Protestant Ethic provided a foundational impetus to the rise of modern-day 
capitalism, Corporate Responsibility can be viewed as an economic ethic of market 
liberalism. CR seems close to what Weber described as the “theodicy of good 
fortune,” the need of the privileged to legitimate their own situation. Humans have an 
enormous capacity to believe that they are doing good. In all Varieties of Capitalism, 
those associated with capital want to see their own conduct in this light.52 These 
motivations provide a central impetus for CR.  
  
IV. The Legitimation Functions of Corporate Responsibility 
 
What role does Corporate Responsibility play in market-liberalism, and in transitions 
to market liberalism? I argue that CR performs crucial legitimation functions in 
market society and in transitions towards it. CR contributes to the substantive, 
procedural and constructivist legitimacy of business.53 CR legitimates liberal market 
institutions as well as the political process of moving from social-market to liberal-
market institutions. CR underpins not only individual firms, but national capitalist 
systems and global capitalism as a whole. But how does it do so? This chapter outlines 
how. Legitimacy is hard to pin down and measure empirically,54 but this will not 
                                                 
52 I am grateful to Richard W. Miller for this insight.  
53 CR contributes to what Michael Hechter and his contributors call substantive, procedural, and 
constructivist legitimacy. CR contributes to substantive legitimacy through the provision of public 
goods including education, training, and public infrastructure of various kinds. CR contributes towards 
procedural legitimacy though an increase in the transparency, inclusiveness, and accountability of 
corporate decision-making to external stakeholders. Finally, CR contributes towards contructivist 
legitimacy when firms “judiciously employ ideologies, symbolic scripts, and techniques of mass 
persuasion … highlight[ing] the very real possibility that … subjects may be hoodwinked into attaining 
“false consciousness”  (Hechter, 2009: 287-288).  
54 As Michael Hechter remarks, “the measurement of legitimacy poses a formidable challenge. On this 
account, most empirically oriented social scientists try to refrain from discussing it” (Hechter, 2009: 
280).  
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dissuade us from invoking it.55 Figure 1.4 provides an overview of my discussion of 
the historical emergence of CR in the pages below.  
Exogenous shocks and endogenous change erode solidaristic institutions. State 
and corporate officials initiate Corporate Responsibility to pave the way and to 
compensate for these changes. The legitimacy provided by CR can be differentiated 
into pragmatic and moral legitimacy.  
 
Exogenous Shocks and Endogenous Change 
 
 
Institutional Retrenchment, Displacement, Layering,  
              Drift, Conversion, and Exhaustion 
                [Erosion of Institutionalized Social Solidarity] 
 
Corporate Responsibility 
 
 
                 Pragmatic Legitimacy   Moral Legitimacy 
                          (Logic of Consequences)   (Logic of Appropriateness) 
 
Figure 1.4: Institutional Change and the Legitimacy of Business: 
The Functions of Corporate Responsibility  
 
In Economy and Society, Max Weber referred to legitimacy as “the generally 
observable need of any power … to justify itself” (Weber, 1978: 953). Weber noted: 
“Not every case of domination makes use of economic means.” The members of the 
administrative staff who are “normally required” for rule  
 
over a considerable number of persons …. may be bound to obedience to their 
superior (or superiors) by custom, affectual ties, by a purely material complex 
of interests, or by ideal (wertrationale) motives. The quality of these motives 
largely determines the type of domination. Purely material interests and 
calculations of advantages as the basis of solidarity between the chief and his 
                                                 
55 As Victor Nee and Richard Swedberg point out, “The difficulty of identifying, detecting, and 
measuring fundamental features of the physical world is widely acknowledged in the natural sciences. 
In the social sciences, we are still at an early stage of recognizing that mechanisms difficult to identify 
and observe may have a huge causal significance in explaining transformative changes” (Nee and 
Swedberg, 2007: 11).  
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administrative staff result, in this as in other connections, in a relatively 
unstable situation (Weber, 1978: 212-213) 
Weber’s statement that a “belief in legitimacy” can furnish greater stability than 
“purely material interests and calculations” is as applicable today as it was when he 
was writing (Weber, 1978: 213). As James D. Brummer notes, institutional legitimacy 
can be understood as “a social consensus that supports the institution, gives it legal 
sanction, and perhaps even gives it special privileges” (Brummer, 1991: 74). 
Managers are aware of their need for legitimacy, and management journals contain 
scores of articles on legitimation strategies.56 If Corporate Responsibility furnishes 
business with a greater degree of legitimacy, CR is a desideratum from business’s 
point of view. The more legitimate business and the market are, “the more [they] tend 
to be taken for granted – and this gives th[ese] institutions legitimacy and makes 
[them] stronger” (Swedberg, 2005: 6). Following Mark C. Suchman (1995), I 
distinguish between pragmatic and moral legitimation, and describe how Corporate 
Responsibility fulfills each of these roles.57  
 Suchman defines legitimacy as “a generalized perception or assumption that 
the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions” (Suchman, 1995: 574). 
For Suchman, pragmatic legitimacy “rests on the self-interested calculations of an 
                                                 
56 Yongvanich and Guthrie (2007) 
57 The third element of Suchman’s threefold categorization is cognitive legitimacy. Since it does not do 
much work in this thesis I do not discuss it in detail. Cognitive legitimacy tends to reinforce belief in 
the necessity of an institution, leading it to be taken-for-granted or accepted as an inherent part of the 
order of things. By valorizing the corporation, CR promotes the cognitive legitimacy of the corporation 
and of a market-driven social order. It is well-established that CR promotes the cognitive legitimacy of 
corporations, the market, and capitalism. (Manokha, 2006). L.E. Preston remarks that “The great bulk 
of corporate philanthropic activities has no connection whatsoever with profit seeking behavior or any 
other conventional business management goal. It does, however, have a great deal to do with the 
preservation of the social system within which the corporation operates” (Preston, 1986: 215). H.J. 
Glasbeek argues that Corporate Responsibility is “The Latest in Maginot Lines to Save Capitalism” 
(Glasbeek, 1987). Cognitive legitimacy seems close to Gramscian work on political economy and CR 
(Sklair, 2001). Without denying the importance of the cognitive legitimation function of CR, I do not 
foreground it in this thesis, because I have little reason to believe that cognitive legitimacy varies 
significantly across different regime types.  
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organization’s most immediate audiences.” Thus, it “boils down to a sort of exchange 
legitimacy” – a bargained exchange of material interests and calculations between two 
or more rational agents (Suchman, 1995: 578). Much of what is classified under the 
“business case” for Corporate Responsibility falls into this category.58  
In the UK beginning in the 1970s, CR fostered entrepreneurship and job-
creation in areas hit hard by rationalizations and restructuring. When firms have to lay 
off workers, CR can help to insulate the firms in question from public backlash. CR 
can also be used as a bargaining chip in employers’ demands for market-liberal 
institutional reforms. The notion of pragmatic legitimacy suggests that as 
institutionalized solidarity weakens, as embedded liberalism and the post-war 
compromise fray and collapse, there is progressively more to compensate for, and CR 
emerges as a ‘filler.’  
I wish to emphasize that ‘filler’ should not be understood in the literal sense of 
providing full compensation for the social disruptions caused by liberalization or 
filling in the cracks59 left by the lack of a comprehensive welfare state. Firms use CR 
to provide workers with better employment prospects and life-chances than would 
have been the case in the absence of these initiatives, while the companies in question 
save face, preserving their standing and reputation in the face of challenges from 
affected constituents. The oil company Shell uses CR to legitimate itself in the 
communities in which it was drilling. The supermarket chain Tesco uses CR to gain 
planning consent for new supermarkets. In the German city of Herford, the electricity 
giant E.ON obtains local authorities’ planning consent for new high-voltage electricity 
                                                 
58 CR is used in the following areas: employee training; personnel recruitment and community relations 
management through corporate volunteering; to pay off those who could stand in the way of a 
business’s projects, for example infrastructure; to pre-empt a public backlash that could lead to new 
burdensome regulations or threaten a business’s ‘license to operate’; to comply with the requirements of 
the rating agencies of institutional investors; or as a means to legitimate or facilitate institutional 
reforms. 
59 Or gaping holes, as it may be. 
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infrastructure in return for sponsorship of a new modern art museum. These actions 
can narrow the gap opened up by the unrolling of market-liberalism, but they are far 
from closing it.    
Moral legitimacy is no less important. In contrast to pragmatic legitimacy’s focus on 
self-interested calculation, moral legitimacy is grounded on a logic of appropriateness. 
While moral legitimacy’s altruistic grounding “does not necessarily render moral 
legitimacy ‘interest free,’” Suchman maintains that “at its core, moral legitimacy 
reflects a prosocial logic that differs fundamentally from narrow self-interest” 
(Suchman, 1995: 579). There can be no doubt of the towering importance of moral 
legitimacy in the Corporate Responsibility movement. Many, perhaps most people 
engaged in CR – inside of firms, intermediary CR organizations / associations, and of 
course civil society activists – are engaged not for instrumental reasons, but because 
they believe in the rightness of their cause.60 In few cases is Corporate Responsibility 
merely a rationalist-strategic means to the attainment of other ends.  
This thesis contains abundant evidence that businesspeople really believe in 
CR. CR, in turn, helps businesspeople believe in themselves, in their own worthiness 
and deservedness. But what about workers, NGOs, and civil society activists? It seems 
possible that CR’s motivating force is weaker for workers than it is for those higher up 
the corporate hierarchy. To be sure: workers are sometimes beneficiaries of CR; but 
they are rarely its drivers and initiators. Workers may favour CR if the alternative is 
                                                 
60 This seems to be more generally true: of scholars studying CR, and of journals associated with the 
Corporate Responsibility movement. The leading contribution in a recent issue of the Journal of 
Corporate Citizenship, for instance, is titled “A Journal That Makes a Difference.” In an interview, the 
Journal’s founder Malcolm McIntosh describes his motivations for the journal: “It’s most definitely 
about seeing the planet as one space. It’s about connecting economic, social and environmental issues 
and impact and performance around the idea that we share one planetary space connected back to the 
human world of people, making the world a peaceful and socially just place for everybody. That’s 
absolutely fundamental” [Cooperider and Fry (2009): 3]. 
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market liberalism tout court, i.e. market liberalism without CR. Something, after all, is 
better than nothing.61 But this is not a savoury choice set.  
A deeper look suggests that the relationship between CR and political-
economic structures is more complicated than the above. As Nancy Fraser points out, 
a straightforward Polanyian perspective, one which views the political-economic 
contests of the past decades as a tug-of-war between market liberalism on one hand, 
and institutionalized social solidarity on the other, is deficient. The political economy 
of advanced capitalism is not simply a struggle between markets and social protection, 
as Polanyians (and political economists more generally) are inclined to believe. There 
is a distinct third category – emancipation – which cross-cuts the opposition between 
markets and social protection. Emancipation has been at the core of capitalism’s “New 
Spirit,”62 which has muddied the waters by incorporating some of the radical critiques 
launched at it since the 1960s. “[B]ecause the new spirit of capitalism incorporated 
much of the artistic critique that flourished at the end of the 1960s, the accusations 
formerly leveled at capitalism out of a desire for liberation, autonomy and authenticity 
no longer seemed to be soundly based” (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2006: 419). CR is 
part of this incorporation.   
Instead of a contest between markets and institutionalized social solidarity, 
Fraser suggests that we conceptualize the relationship between markets, social 
protection, and emancipation as a “trilemma.” In an ideal world, we could 
simultaneously have the dynamism and innovation that characterize competitive 
markets, high levels of institutionalized social protection, and an emancipated society 
                                                 
61 We are reminded here of Thucydides: The strong do what they will, and the weak suffer what they 
must. Civil society activists’ investment and complicity in the market-liberal order, on the other hand 
demands more systematic analysis. There is considerable evidence that civil society activists target 
corporations directly because it is easier than targeting governments; and because it invests activists and 
civil society organizations with a role they did not have in the post-war order.    
62 Boltanski and Chiapello (2006[1999]).  
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characterized by the absence of systematic oppression and domination. On the basis of 
the historical record, Fraser suggests that at best two of these three can be realized at 
any one time, and none of these categories is an unqualified good. Social protection, 
marketization, and emancipation each have their own ambivalences. Social protection, 
for example,  
 
is often ambivalent, affording relief from the disintegrative effects of 
deregulation, while simultaneously entrenching oppression …. Deregulation of 
markets does indeed have the negative effects that Polanyi stressed, but it can 
also beget positive effects to the extent that the protections it disintegrates are 
oppressive (Fraser, 2009)  
 
Viewing the economic transformations of the past thirty years, we have witnessed a 
  one-two punch in which marketization and emancipation effectively ganged up 
 on social protection …. The relative shift from embedded liberalism to 
 neoliberalism  arose from the convergence of two distinct historical streams, 
 each with its distinctive project and its distinctive critique of postwar social 
 democracy. The first stream was indeed neoliberalism, a political project that 
 aimed to disencumber markets from regulatory regimes (both national and 
 international) of Embedded Liberalism. The second stream was an array of 
 postwar new social movements, which attacked the various oppressive aspects 
 of social protection in the postwar welfare state. Thus, while free-marketeers 
 excoriated welfare states as paternalist, bureaucratic, inefficient, and 
 oppressive, movements for emancipation critiqued their gender-hierarchical 
 androcentrism, their monocultural majority communitarianism, and their neo-
 imperialist misframing of social protection. The result was a one-two punch in 
 which marketization and emancipation effectively ganged up on social 
 protection. In this three-sided conflict, the ambivalence of emancipation was 
 largely resolved in favor of marketization. Intentionally or otherwise, it 
 became allied with the latter against social protection (Fraser, 2009)   
Fraser’s re-formulation of Polanyi has important implications for the political 
economy of CR. It suggests that CR can legitimate market liberalism in not one but 
two ways. CR can entail the provision of social protection at the firm-level to 
compensate for substitute for declining levels of institutionalized provision. CR can 
also entail an alliance with emancipation and against social protection. In sum, we 
have three possibilities:    
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1.      Emancipation--------CR----------------- Market              Social Protection 
2.        Emancipation                   Market-------------CR------Social Protection 
3.      Social Protection------------------Emancipation          CR-------Market 
 Source: own conceptualization on the basis of Nancy Fraser’s Messenger Lectures given at   
 Cornell University in November 2009 (Fraser, 2009) 
 
Figure 1.5: The Three Worlds of Corporate Responsibility 
 
In the first scenario, Corporate Responsibility allies itself with Market Forces to 
dismantle the post-war order, replacing institutions of social protection with 
institutions that are more normatively appropriate – for example, in the area of gender 
equality and racial and ethnic diversity – yet less socially protective. In the second 
scenario, CR satisfies some of the needs for social protection in the wake of 
liberalization, much in the tradition of 19th century paternalistic industrialists and 
philanthropists, who paid only selective attention to emancipatory social movements 
and changing social values. Scenario 3 is the utopia of socialists, CR cynics and 
radical NGOs. It involves the alliance of social protection and emancipatory 
movements against markets and Corporate Responsibility, in effect socialism. As we 
will see in the empirical chapters below, the contested political economy of CR is 
situated firmly within scenarios 1 and 2. Before proceeding to the dependent variable, 
we will discuss sociological approaches and their relevance to this thesis.  
Sociological neo-institutionalism and the world society approach of John 
Meyer and his colleagues herald promise for this subject matter, for they foreground 
“normative preferences and the power of legitimacy” (Krücken and Drori, 2009: 10). 
World polity theory emphasizes the influence of institutionalized norms and “of the 
broader sociocultural environment as an explanatory variable for organization” 
(Krücken and Drori, 2009: 12). Sociological neoinstitutionalism views norms and 
social practices as diffusing across time and space through processes of “mimetic 
isomorphism” (Meyer, 2009: 50). Where economists and political scientists stress 
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actors’ agency, intentionality and the functional payoffs of strategic interaction, world 
society theorists see structure, legitimacy, and ideologies of functional payoffs. 
Sociological or organizational institutionalism emphasizes the non-rational – 
symbolic, ritualized and ceremonial – aspects of Corporate Responsibility’s spread 
across space and time. According to neo-institutional theory, if firms or governments 
find themselves in a climate of uncertainty, they will tend to adopt practices just 
because they are considered legitimate in other parts of the organizational field.63  
John W. Meyer stresses the “extreme dependence of modern actors on wider 
legitimating models that sustain their actorhood” (Meyer, 2000: 238). These views 
will resonate with anyone who has witnessed the spread of responsibilization rhetoric  
and sustainability reports to ever more company offices across the OECD.  
CR seems a ‘most-likely’ issue area for processes of homogenization and 
emulation: inter-subjective processes relating to reputation and legitimacy are highly 
salient, and CR is relatively inexpensive.64 However, while sociological 
neoinstitutionalists must be commended for their critique of crude and overly simple 
rationalism, and while they are right to stress that norms matter, they underestimate 
the power of interests.65 They ignore disparities in power and the relentless dynamism, 
unruliness and aggressiveness of capitalism as a historical social order. While neo-
institutionalism and the world society tradition are of limited help for analyzing 
capitalism and identifying the determinants of CR’s variance across time and space, 
                                                 
63 Meyer and Rowan (1977). As Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell argue, “structural change in 
organizations seems less and less driven by competition or the need for efficiency. Instead … forms of 
organizational change occur as the result of processes that make organizations more similar without 
necessarily making them more efficient” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 147). 
64 CR, taken seriously, is not costless, and may entail significant investments that only pay off in the 
long term, if at all. Yet an abundance of evidence in this thesis and elsewhere suggests that much of 
what counts as CR falls under discretionary spending. No firm to date has been ruined on account of its 
CR expenditures. CR is not a big ticket item.  
65 As Richard Swedberg points out, the new sociological institutionalism argues “that firms are not run 
in a rational manner; firms just want to appear rational since rationality is an important value in 
contemporary Western culture” (Swedberg, 2004: 12). 
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they are nonetheless invaluable for identifying the cultural traditions of liberalism 
which move and legitimate actors propagating CR and market liberalism.66 
At the core of the corporate avowals of citizenly conduct is a distinctly liberal 
worldview. Responsibility presupposes freedom. If an individual is not free in some 
important sense, that person cannot be held legally responsible or morally culpable for 
her actions. That much is straightforward. Transferring this insight from individual 
citizens to the social institution of the modern firm is anything but – yet many 
businesspeople and citizens do just this. This, and the fact that Britain and the United 
States have played leading roles in CR advocacy, suggests that high liberalism with its 
cultural scripts and political-economic reforms and interest-driven politics are 
associated with each other. The cultural traditions and scripts of liberalism are used to 
legitimate political-economic reforms and material interests of market liberalism. 
These traditions and scripts are wielded as weapons to legitimate employer-friendly 
reforms.67  
Instead of Milton Friedman’s insistence that the business of business is 
business, employers endorse liberalization and responsibility by chanting: ‘Free us up 
so we can do some Corporate Responsibility!’ The constraints of the post-war 
compromise have been loosened in some cases, removed entirely in others. Many of 
these constraints protected employees, and their removal has ruined many lives, 
resulting in increased disparities in income and life-chances. But the removal of these 
constraints has also opened up space for human agency. Some what firms are doing 
                                                 
66 As John Meyer puts it, “the cultural traditions of liberalism provide a rich source of legitimating story 
lines.” Personal communication, August 4, 2010. 
67 I am grateful to John Meyer for discussing this point with me. Meyer and the world society tradition 
underscore the importance of cultural traditions and legitimating scripts. Samuel E. Finer observes that 
“rulers cannot maintain their authority unless they are legitimated, and . . . they are legitimated by belief 
systems …. The belief systems are stronger than the ruling authorities because it is by their virtue that 
rulers rule” (Finer, 1997: 28-29). 
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today with CR was done by governments in the previous era. But other aspects of CR 
are new, and they may not have gotten done in the other world.68   
CR may appear to be at odds with the ascendant philosophy of market-
liberalism, endorsing as it does expansive extra-legal commitments of corporations; 
but where employers felt initial unease with this idea, they soon discovered the 
suppleness and usefulness of voluntary business-led CR. In practice, orthodox market-
liberals and Corporate Responsibility advocates are separated by less than one might 
think.69 As Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello remark, “the spirit of capitalism 
incorporates schemas other than those inherited from economic theory. These 
schemas, while they permit the defense of the principle of accumulation in abstraction 
from all historical specificity, lack mobilizing power” (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2006 
[1999]: 20). Corporate Responsibility provides market-liberalism with mobilizing 
power. CR endows institutions and actors with legitimacy – not only the instrumental 
legitimacy required for system maintenance, but moral legitimacy as well. But what it 
is that is being displaced by market liberalism and CR?  
 
V. Institutionalized Social Solidarity 
 
The underlying idea of institutionalized social solidarity (ISS) is simple: 
formal and informal institutions constrain markets in the service of collective social 
goals. The umbrella term of ISS includes: redistributive and regulatory institutions 
such as the welfare state and market-correcting government regulation (especially of 
labour markets), trades unions, and other “constraining social obligations” (Streeck, 
2009: 168). ISS also includes organized capitalism, a form of business organization 
                                                 
68 I owe this formulation to Michael Schwartz, discussant at the American Sociological Association 
regular session on Corporate Capitalism in San Francisco, August 9, 2009. 
69 Indeed, the late Milton Friedman had no problems with CR provided it furthers, rather than impinges 
on, owners’ and shareholders’ interests – which it does in the now-dominant incarnation of CR. See 
footnote 2 above.  
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which relies on the “authoritative enforcement of social obligations on market 
participants” (Streeck, 2009: 151), thus “transcend[ing] maximization strategies and 
adjust[ing] them to collective interests beyond maximization” (Höpner, 2007: 3). 
These diverse institutions share a solidaristic normative core and endow citizens with 
social citizenship rights.70  
 ISS was a cornerstone of the post-war social contract in liberal democracies,71 
and scholars use a variety of different terms to refer to this idea. For Ruggie, it is 
“embedded liberalism.” Robert Goodin, Bruce Headey, Ruud Muffels and Henk-Jan 
Dirven refer to these interdependent institutions as “welfare regimes.”72 This broad 
conceptualization of the explanans is indispensable if we are to undertake genuine 
“contextualized comparisons” of different institutions, which have an equivalent 
meaning (and possibly function) in different contexts.73  
It is not necessary to specify a priori precisely which institutions of the post-
war compromise need to be challenged to prompt the rise of CR.74 Thus, the 
proposition is falsified if the retrenchment of ISS is not associated with the rise of CR. 
The fraying of this compromise need not lead to the outright dismantling of 
solidaristic institutions. Nor do I presuppose a ‘race to the bottom’ or downward 
convergence of different countries on a common absolute level of inequality, poverty, 
                                                 
70 Robert Goodin, Bruce Headey, Ruud Muffels and Henk-Jan Dirven conceptualize these 
interdependent institutions as “welfare regimes.” Welfare regimes refer “to that larger constellation of 
socio-economic institutions, policies and programmes all oriented toward promoting people’s welfare 
quite generally.” Welfare regimes “bunch together particular values with different programmes and 
policies. Welfare regimes include the transfer-oriented welfare-state sector, the tax sector, and the 
productive sector of the economy” (1999: 5; 4; 5). 
71 It is not clear whether countries of Eastern Europe included in this study, such as Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, belong in this categorization.    
72 Welfare regimes “include the transfer-oriented welfare-state sector, the tax sector, and the productive 
sector of the economy” (Goodin et. al., 1999: 4; 5). Welfare regimes refer “to that larger constellation of 
socio-economic institutions, policies and programmes all oriented toward promoting people’s welfare 
quite generally” (Goodin et. al., 1999: 5). 
73 Locke and Thelen (1995). A broad conceptualization helps guard against a common tendency in the 
institutionalist literature to conflate the physical existence or persistence of an institution with its actual 
content. 
74  Although empirical evidence suggests that welfare state and labour market reforms are pivotal 
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or welfare state retrenchment. Change relevant to the domestic status quo ante is more 
salient than convergence on some absolute level:75 it is actors’ perceptions of their 
interests in the context of these changes, rather than the changes themselves, that lead 
them to embrace and practice CR.  
The transformations of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s saw not only the 
weakening, retrenchment and dismantling of ISS, of the institutions underpinning the 
post-war order, but also a fundamental change in their quality. Capitalism has been 
“unleashed” (Glyn, 2006), and the institutions underpinning the post-war order have 
been weakened and dismantled. Institutionalized social solidarity took a hard hit. 
Trade unions lost members, state-owned enterprises were privatized, markets were 
deregulated and liberalized. Unemployment rose, as did income inequality. Where the 
institutions of the post-war order persisted, observers often interpreted this persistence 
as a sign of continuity – without recognizing the fundamental change in the 
institutions’ function and quality. Not only institutions changed, the dominant 
ideology did as well. Bourdieu sums up market liberalism as “A programme for 
destroying collective structures which may impede the pure market logic” (Bourdieu, 
1998: 2). Along with the rise of market liberalism, “[t]he language of class faded out 
of politics” (Offer, 2006: 297). Scholars disagree on whether the transition from 
embedded to market liberalism is a result of an exogenous shock (from globalization 
or international competition) or of endogenous institutional change: of displacement, 
layering, drift, conversion and exhaustion, in short, of self-undermining institutions.76 
                                                 
75 Societal norms are not autonomous from social institutions, and one can plausibly claim that a 
restructuring of social institutions will over the medium- to long run lead to an adjustment of citizen’s 
preferences, for example to being more accepting of inequality or poverty. But such adjustments take 
time, and during difficult times of economic turbulence CR can fulfill an important role by appealing to 
norms of altruism and fairness.  
76 Mahoney and Thelen (2010); Streeck and Thelen (2005); Streeck (2009) 
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I am agnostic on this matter. Whether exogenous or endogenous, the transition is 
linked to the rise of CR.77 Thus we have hypothesis H2: 
 
H2. Institutionalized social solidarity will be inversely related to CR: the higher the 
level of institutionalized social solidarity, the later the onset, and the lower the 
quantity of CR. The lower the level of institutionalized social solidarity, the earlier the 
onset of CR, and the greater its quantity.  
Wolfgang Streeck (2009)’s typology of political-economic institutions is useful for 
comparing the post-war order with the market-liberal order which has replaced it. 
Streeck contrasts the Durkheimian institutions of classical sociology, which exemplify 
ISS and the post-war order, to the rational choice institutions, Coasian firms, and 
transaction-cost economics, in short Williamsonian order of market liberalism:                             
 
Durkheimian Williamsonian 
Authoritative organization Voluntary coordination 
Creation of obligations Reduction of transaction costs 
Public order Private ordering 
Government Governance 
Obligational Voluntaristic 
Exogenously imposed Endogenously contracted 
Third party enforcement Self-enforcement 
(Streeck, 2009: 155)  
Figure 1.6: Durkheimian and Williamsonian Orders 
The basic logic linking CR to a Williamsonian order78 is simple. The fact that in a 
Williamsonian market liberal framework, many social and economic needs are not 
satisfied by binding institutional frameworks increases the demand and necessity for 
other actors, including the private sector, to contribute towards their provision (which 
is not the same as saying that they will therefore be satisfied). The needs of the 
economy and society can be satisfied by a binding institutional framework, 
                                                 
77 To clarify, my claim is not that the transition to market liberalism is the only cause of Corporate 
Responsibility.  
78 As Bruno Amable remarked at the author meets critics session of Wolfgang Streeck’s “Re-Forming 
Capitalism” at the annual meeting of the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics in Paris on 
July 16, it is unclear to what extent Williamsonian institutions are institutions or norms of conduct, 
rather than simply behavior.   
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authoritative organization, public order, and the creation of obligations – or through a 
less-binding framework based on the voluntary coordination and self-enforcement of 
the private sector and civil society. In the former case, these functions are built into a 
system’s structure; in the latter, they are built into the system’s units through CR. The 
fact that in a market liberal framework, there is a gap which leaves many social and 
economic needs unsatisfied by binding institutional frameworks increases the demand 
and necessity for other actors, including the private sector, to contribute towards their 
provision. This linkage is not functionalist in the Parsonian sense: employers and state 
officials will tend to perceive an increased need to legitimate themselves in the 
Williamsonian market-liberal framework, but they will not automatically or invariably 
embrace CR when faced with these challenges.79  
 Before discussing how my approach relates to the Varieties of Capitalism, I 
wish to show some of its advantages by comparing it to one of the most widely cited 
contributions to the literature on CR, Dirk Matten and Jeremy Moon’s work on 
“implicit and explicit CSR” (Matten and Moon, 2008). Matten and Moon ask “how 
and why corporate responsibility (CSR) differs among countries and how and why it 
changes” (Matten and Moon, 2008: 404). Matten and Moon argue that “differences in 
CSR among different countries are due to a variety of long-standing, historically 
entrenched institutions” (Matten and Moon, 2008: 406, 411). While “explicit CSR 
relies on corporate discretion, rather than reflecting either governmental authority or 
broader formal or informal institutions,” for Matten and Moon, “the distinctive 
elements of the European CSR are embedded in the European NBSs [National 
Business Systems], such as industrial relations, labor law, and corporate governance” 
                                                 
79 While functional approaches have considerable purchase on the political economy of Corporate 
Responsibility at the macro-level, a careful analysis of the New Zealand case reveals their limitations. 
The most abrupt and radical liberalization of the whole OECD, with many social dislocations, did not 
result in the institutionalization of CR until years after the fact. I discuss this case in detail in chapter 6, 
the conclusion. 
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(Matten and Moon, 2008: 409). Matten and Moon remind us that binding regulations 
can be functionally equivalent to voluntarist “explicit CSR,” and one or the other may 
predominate, depending on the context. This is a valuable insight, and Matten and 
Moon deserve credit for making the case for “implicit CSR” to a business- and 
management audience.80 Nonetheless, their framework is problematic: it does not 
make the trade-offs between CR and institutionalized social solidarity clear enough.   
The following statement is revealing of Matten and Moon’s use of the terms 
“CSR” and “implicit CSR”: “[o]ur NBS approach reveals alternative institutional 
frameworks to regulate the social consequences of business and to enable 
corporations to share in coordinated social responsibility” (Matten and Moon, 2008: 
420; my emphasis). The problem with the term “implicit CSR” is that this analytical 
projection backwards includes involuntary as well as voluntary business involvement 
in the provision of social or collective goods under the label of CR. This thesis 
provides evidence that businesspeople do not typically view their interests in this way. 
They tend to be less than patriotic when it comes to being forced, through the 
compulsions of hard law, to contribute to collective goods. If the differentia specifica 
of CR is its voluntariness, it is not clear what is gained from applying this label to 
social institutions which have been imposed on businesspeople against their will. 
Applying the label of “implicit CSR” to institutionalized social solidarity creates the 
impression that business supported the creation or maintenance of these institutions. 
The chapters below suggest that “implicit” and “explicit” CR are not two different 
species of the same genus; they are altogether different beasts. Thus, Matten and 
Moon’s “explicit CSR” is associated with a market-liberal agenda that is in effect a 
negation of “implicit CSR.” These trade-offs need to be made much clearer. In the 
                                                 
80 Matten and Moon’s (2008) article appeared in Academy of Management Review.  
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next section, I discuss how my approach builds on, and relates to, Varieties of 
Capitalism.  
VI. Corporate Responsibility and Varieties of Capitalism 
 
Despite its limitations for explaining dynamic change, Varieties of 
Capitalism’s typologies are relevant for the political economy of CR: I argue that 
Corporate Responsibility has affinities for Liberal Market, and against Social Market 
forms of economic organization. Not only did CR originate in the US; CR’s emphasis 
on corporate discretion suggests that CR has a better ‘fit’ with deregulated LMEs than 
with more highly institutionalized Social- or Coordinated Market Economies. I begin 
with Hall and Soskice’s seminal contribution and bring in other literature and concepts 
as I proceed.  
The insight that “the capitalistic orientation of profit-making can take a number 
of ‘qualitatively different forms’” is not new – this quotation stems from Max Weber 
(Weber, 1978: 164). Yet in recent years, one book and theoretical approach – Peter 
Hall and David Soskice’s Varieties of Capitalism (2001) (henceforth VoC) – has 
achieved a prominent if not pre-eminent status in the sub-field of comparative political 
economy. Although Hall and Soskice (2001) have been criticized on a number of 
grounds,81 VoC is a progressive research program that has resulted in a number of 
important works during the past decade.82 I share these authors’ preoccupation with 
different national institutional configurations of capitalism,83 and with institutional 
                                                 
81 Among them Amable (2003), Bohle and Greskovits (2009), Campbell and Pedersen (2006), Crouch 
(2005), Howell (2004), Kinderman (2005), and Streeck (2009)   
82 Including those mentioned in the above footnote and Pontusson (2005) and Becker (2009).   
83 Many scholars point out that in addition to national-level variation, there are also sectoral and 
regional varieties of capitalism (see Crouch, Schröder and Voelzkow 2009). And there are undoubtedly 
also regional and sectoral varieties of Corporate Responsibility. But one cannot do everything at once 
so my primary focus in this thesis is on national-level variation.  
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complementarities. My approach differs from VoC with regard to institutional 
complementarities and institutional equilibrium and change.  
 Hall and Soskice (2001) categorize affluent countries into two groups: those in 
which the predominant form of strategic coordination among firms is the market – 
Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) – and those in which non-market coordination 
plays a crucial role – Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs). Institutional 
complementarities are a central element of each economy’s comparative institutional 
advantage: “nations with a particular type of coordination in one sphere of the 
economy should tend to develop complementary practices in other spheres of the 
economy” (Hall and Soskice, 2001: 18). Useful as it is, this concept must be modified 
if it is to be fruitful for the political economy of CR.  
 First of all, Hall and Soskice conceive of complementarities as institutional 
similarity (Campbell and Petersen, 2007: 326). An economy is based either on market- 
or on non-market coordination in different spheres and social sub-systems. This 
conceptualization is problematic. To be sure, some complementarities are based on 
institutional similarities, but others are a matter of institutional supplementarity or 
difference (Crouch, 2005).  Although Hall and Soskice concede that “even in liberal 
market economies, firms enter into some relationships that are not fully mediated by 
market forces” (Hall and Soskice, 2001: 8-9), their theoretical framework is ill-
equipped to deal with the logic of institutional difference. The evidence in this thesis 
suggests that CR functions according to the logic of institutional difference, thus 
weakening Hall and Soskice’s claims of comparative institutional advantage based on 
a complementarity logic of similarity. CR arises in LMEs precisely because it is not 
market-based coordination; and it arises in Social Markets as they become more, not 
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less, market-liberal. This is the sense of complementarity noted by Colin Crouch.84 
The underlying dynamic is similar to the use of bankruptcy law to “dampen the shock 
of neoliberalism” and “save neoliberalism from itself.”85   
 The entities that are complementary to each other must coincide in time and 
space. If Corporate Responsibility is complementary to institutionalized social 
solidarity or the institutions of Coordinated/Social Market economies, it would arise 
earlier in these countries than in Liberal Market economies. If Corporate 
Responsibility is complementary to market liberalism, then it arises earlier in LMEs 
than CMEs in order to compensate for the former’s market failures and legitimacy 
deficits. This leads us to our third hypothesis:   
 
H3.  Liberal Market Varieties of Capitalism develop Corporate Responsibility earlier 
than Coordinated/Social-Market Varieties of Capitalism 
Complementarity can also manifest itself in terms of quantity. If the quantity of x is 
variable and x is complementary to y but not to z, x will be more plentiful in 
conjunction with y than it will in conjunction with z. Thus follows our fourth 
hypothesis:  
 
H4. Liberal Market Varieties of Capitalism have more Corporate Responsibility than  
Coordinated/Social-Market Varieties of Capitalism 
These hypotheses must not be treated as heuristics not dogmas. As critics point out, 
Hall and Soskice overstate the tightness of complementarity linkages.86 
Complementarities are contested and “loosely coupled” (Höpner, 2006: 402). 
                                                 
84 As Crouch remarks, “components of a whole mutually compensate for each other’s deficiencies in 
constituting the whole” (Crouch, 2005: 50). As Crouch remarks, Hall and Soskice’s world is one of 
pedigree dogs: ‘purebred’ LMEs versus ‘purebred’ CMEs. CR functions according to the logic of 
mongrels: the erosion of institutionalized social solidarity is accompanied by firms’ voluntary 
engagement in the form of CR. 
85 “The incentive to use bankruptcy law to intervene in the economy increases as other policy tools are 
set aside …. changes in bankruptcy law help to dampen the shock of neoliberalism. Rather than simply 
contradicting or undercutting neoliberalism, the new bankruptcy regime helps to save neoliberalism 
from itself” (Carruthers, Babb and Halliday, 2001: 119) 
86 Becker (2009); Campbell and Pedersen (2006) 
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Complementarities reside in “how people use them” (Deeg, 2007: 626) – they are not 
functionally determined by institutions alone. “One cannot read groups’ interests or 
preferences strictly off structure … they are constructed through social interaction” 
(Jackson and Deeg, 2008: 701). Rather than the straightjackets or determinants 
suggested by Hall and Soskice (2001), the institutional configurations of LME- and 
CMEness provide actors with a set of dispositions and tendencies, ones which actors 
can (and do) manipulate creatively.87 Agency, and actors’ interpretation of their 
interests matters; structure is only partially determinate.88 Richard Deeg and Gregory 
Jackson’s formulation of “strategic constructivism” and “discourse coalitions” aptly 
acknowledges the importance of institutional configurations and symbolic 
articulations.89   
 Business discretion and voluntary engagement is perceived to be less 
burdensome, and more suited to corporations’ needs, than legally mandated 
obligations. Employers have an intellectual affinity for CR because they prefer doing 
things voluntarily rather than being forced to do them. Intellectual arguments have 
played a role in this concept’s victory (it is said that flexible-, soft- and network-based 
solutions are more dynamic and innovative than the stultifying coercive power of hard 
law), but corporate power has as well: as Thomas Berger and Peter Luckmann put it, 
“he who has the bigger stick has the better chance of imposing his definitions of 
                                                 
87 Alexander Börsch (2007); Uwe Becker (2007); Andrea Hermann (2008)  
88 Colin Hay and Ben Rosamond emphasize that “it is the ideas that actors hold about the context in 
which they find themselves rather than the context itself which informs the way in which actors 
behave” (Hay and Rosamond, 2002: 148). Unfortunately, like some other constructivists, Hay and 
Rosamond seem to neglect the interrelationship between context and ideas. 
89 “Discourse coalitions and strategic constructivism are, in our view, quite promising as it reinvigorates 
the CC literature with a neo-Weberian approach that integrates the material and ideational. Specifically, 
these perspectives incorporate an explicit, non-deterministic political dimension into various theories of 
capitalist variety. Such a political model starts with a theory of preference formation in which 
preferences grow out of the distinct institutional configurations of different capitalisms, and yet they 
cannot be reduced to these configurations because interests must be symbolically articulated and 
anchored in particular sets of values. A discursive approach could then be incorporated into an analysis 
of the historical co-evolution between preferences and their translation into outcomes (rules, policies, 
etc.) or institutional change” (Jackson and Deeg, 2008: 701-702) 
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reality” (Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 109). Since the late-1970s and especially 
following the collapse of Communism, business has had a progressively bigger stick. 
This suggests the need to move beyond VoC’s excessively narrow firm-centrism to 
include a broader array of institutional variables: the extent to which national-level 
institutions decommodify labor,90 and the organization of the national business 
community.  
Gøsta Esping-Anderson (1990) famously distinguishes between liberal, 
conservative, and social-democratic worlds of welfare capitalism based on the degree 
to which they decrease worker’s direct reliance on the labor market for income.  
Daniel K. Finn (2006) extends this idea using the metaphor of “fences.” “Fences” 
constitute markets and define what activities may take place within them. The 
transition from the post-war compromise to market-liberalism shifted these 
boundaries, expanding the sphere of markets and reducing – though not altogether 
eliminating – de-commodified spaces and institutionalized social solidarity. While the 
fences have shifted, cross-national differences remain. Thus, in Social Market 
Economies,91 the fences restricting direct market relationships tend to be more 
expansive than in Liberal Market Economies. Corporate Responsibility arises in part 
in response to the weakness of ISS vis-à-vis market relations.   
If de-commodification has a stultifying effect on CR, the same can be argued 
for the degree of business organization.92 The posited relationship between these two 
dimensions, regulatory/welfare-state compensation and business organization, is 
                                                 
90  Esping-Anderson (1990) 
91 Jonas Pontusson distinguishes between „Liberal Market Economies“ such as the United Kingdom and 
the United States and „Social Market Economies“ such as Germany and Sweden. As articulated by 
Pontusson, SMEs „are distinguished by densely organized business communities ... strong unions and 
highly institutionalized collective bargaining systems .... [and] extensive public provision of social 
welfare and employment protection (2005: 17).   
92 Streeck (2009) suggests that the extent of business organization, rather than coordination (Hall and 
Soskice), best gets at the Durkheimian institutions that motivate our interest in comparative capitalism.  
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summarized in figure 1.6. In this stylized account, the upper left quadrant does not 
have an acute need for CR, since the bulk of externalities and social compensation are 
taken care of by the welfare state and the institutions of organized capitalism. By 
contrast, in environments with a residual welfare state and disorganized capitalism 
(the darkly shaded box in the lower right quadrant), Corporate Responsibility fulfils 
some of these tasks. The lightly shaded quadrants are ambiguous, in between these 
pure predictions. 
     
  Expansive Welfare 
State  
Residual Welfare 
State  
 Organized 
Capitalism 
Limited Potential to 
acquire pragmatic 
and moral legitimacy 
through CR 
 Ambiguous: 
Some CR 
 Disorganized 
Capitalism 
Ambiguous: Full Potential to 
acquire moral and 
pragmatic legitimacy 
through CR 
Some CR 
Figure 1.7 Welfare States, Organized Capitalism & CR 
CR arises to satisfy material and symbolic needs that are not, or are no longer satisfied 
by existing institutional arrangements. There is more to compensate for in 
disorganized LMEs than in organized Social or Coordinated Market Economies with 
more extensive collective welfare provision. Conversely, the solidaristic institutions of 
CMEs tend to depress the perceived need for voluntary corporate activity.93 It is to the 
dependent variable(s) that we now turn. 
 
VII. The Operationalization of the Dependent Variable: 
Corporate Responsibility Associations 
                                                 
93 As Neill J. Mitchell recognized twenty years ago in his work on corporate social policy: “Corporate 
social responsibility … is underdeveloped in most European corporations, because in Europe the state is 
traditionally viewed as the source of social policy” (Mitchell, 1989: 145) See also David T. Beito 
(2000) 
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Operationalizing Corporate Responsibility across time and space presents a challenge. 
Business-school literature provides little guidance, as it consists principally of case 
studies of specific companies and of cross-sectional work based on firm-level surveys. 
The analytical primacy of firms and of firm-level data in the study of CR is easy to 
understand: without corporations there can be no Corporate Responsibility. However, 
important as it is, firm-level data has several major limitations.94 The overwhelming 
majority of firm-level work is not concerned with trans-national variation or with 
political-economic institutions. Instead, it is focused on the question of whether it pays 
to be virtuous.95 Another problem with firm-level data is that it exists for very recent 
years only, which precludes a genuinely historical account of the rise of CR.96 Given 
these limitations, is there a measure that can elucidate the institutionalization and 
growth of Corporate Responsibility at the national level; the collective action of firms 
for CR; the role of the state and of public policy, the lobbying, institutional and 
regulatory preferences of national and international business communities in the area 
of CR, and the stance of trade unions and other social actors towards Corporate 
Responsibility?  
 An examination of business-led Corporate Responsibility coalitions and 
associations (henceforth: CRAs) can generate these insights and more;97 they are my 
                                                 
94 I discuss these in detail in chapter 7.  
95 Vogel (2005) surveys this literature. His conclusion is that sometimes is does, often it doesn’t. CR is 
a niche-strategy.  
96 When it comes to amorphous and rapidly changing subject matter such as Corporate Responsibility, 
trade-offs are inevitable. Most current work stresses the dynamism of the concept and practice, and so it 
should: Corporate Responsibility is a moving target. But in so doing, it underestimates the historical 
continuity between what firms are doing today and what they did decades ago. A focus on the 
establishment and growth of CR associations compensates for the presentist bias in the current 
literature. While CR is dynamic and changing, an examination of CRAs shows that there has been a 
tendency to overestimate the novelty, and underestimate the continuity of rhetoric and practice during 
recent decades. 
97 A problem with qualitative data from individual firms is that precisely because their individual 
reputations are on the line, firms are typically very circumspect about what they are willing to disclose.   
Whereas firm-level representatives are heavily guarded and provide highly scripted responses, several 
associations have provided me with full unrestricted access to their internal correspondence, financial 
and governing documents. And whereas several association representatives have told me that their own 
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proxy for CR at the national level. In this thesis, CRAs are business-led non-profit 
organizations98 with a voluntary corporate membership, annual membership dues, and 
a mandate to advance the cause of Corporate Responsibility. With few exceptions, 
membership is open to any firm that cares to join.99 CRAs work together with their 
membership to advance the cause of CR on a voluntary and mutually beneficial basis. 
Virtually every OECD country has a CRA; some countries have more than one.100 
There are also some at the supranational level. Though scholars to date have paid scant 
attention to these organizations,101 I argue that they are indeed a proxy – by no means 
the only indicator, but a plausible and defensible indicator – for the state of CR in a 
given country at a certain time.102  
 CRAs highlight a level of political action above the level of individual firms, 
similar to what Michael Useem has referred to over twenty years ago as “the logic of 
classwide benefits” (Useem, 1984: 5). As an indicator, CRAs highlight the novelty of 
                                                                                                                                            
members provide them with inaccurate or misleading information concerning their CR activities and 
performance, intermediary organizations are less prone to do so, even if, like most of us, they may not 
always succeed in sober self-reflection. 
98 It is important to emphasize that CRAs are not genuinely multi-stakeholder organizations, 
organizations that give groups other than business a formal stake in the running of the organization 
(Freeman). Instead, in the words of Luc Fransen, they may “flirt with multi-stakeholderness” (Fransen, 
2009: 71). Colin Crouch regards “the concept of ‘stakeholder’” as “suspect, unless it refers to the 
possessors of legally or substantively  guaranteed rights within a corporation, rights that can neither be 
reduced to market transactions nor removed at will by a firm (e.g. rights to codetermination enjoyed by 
employees and embedded in either legislation or guaranteed by collective agreements). If a right derives 
directly from a market contract (as with customers), the concept of stakeholder is redundant, as one 
needs nothing beyond the market contract to describe the relationship” (Crouch, 2006: 1535).   
99 The International Business Leaders’ Forum does not admit weapons or tobacco manufacturers into its 
membership 
100 France has two (ORSE and IMS Entreprendre pour la Cité), as does Spain (Club de Excelencia en 
Sostenibilidad and Forética), Italy (Impronta Etica and Sodalitas), and Germany (Econsense and UPJ). 
The UK has Business in the Community and Scottish Business in the Commmunity. A smaller number 
of CRAs seek to advance the cause with an explicitly international or global mandate. My primary 
focus in this thesis is on CRAs with an explicitly national, rather than international or global mandate. 
101 to my knowledge, this is the first systematic study of CRAs. 
102 This indicator is obviously inadequate to account for local, regional, and supranational 
developments. Its usefulness is obviously premised on the assumption that states remain important loci 
for determining the institutional environment of business. As Colin Crouch (forthcoming, quoted in 
Amaeshi 2008) observes: “Local specialisms that depart from the logic of a national system … suggest 
that the nation state is not necessarily the most important level for determining the institutional 
environment of business.”  
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CR during the past thirty years. Whereas “corporate welfare” in individual firms dates 
back many decades, in fact to the dawn of industrial capitalism,103 firms’ collective 
action to promote Corporate Responsibility through Corporate Responsibility 
Associations coincides with the rise of market-liberalism and attacks on ISS. CRAs 
also provide insights into a variety of other interesting phenomena including 
business’s lobbying activities,104 and reveal some of the limitations of club theory for 
the analysis of CR.105 Their programmatic orientation and coloration are highly 
diverse.106 Their membership includes the largest publicly traded firms in the world – 
with localized and culturally and geographically specific criteria of legitimacy. CR 
associations are by definition collectivities of firms.107  CRAs are intermediaries and 
brokers between business, civil society, the state and the broader public; they serve 
their members’ interests as well as those of wider society.108  In short, CRAs are 
catalysts, facilitators and motors of responsible business practice.  
                                                 
103 See for example Jacoby (1998) for an account of the history of corporate welfare in the United 
States.  
104 Associations’ mandate is typically to lobby their own members to be good corporate citizens, but in 
conjunction with trade associations and industry lobby groups, they are often also involved in lobbying 
the state when it threatens to mandate responsibility. By looking at associations’ lobbying stance on 
issues of mandated regulation, we can contribute to understanding this important, but neglected, aspect 
of the “market for virtue.” As David Vogel remarks, “the definition of corporate social responsibility 
needs to be redefined to include responsibilities of businesses to strengthen civil society and the 
requirement that all firms act responsibly (Vogel, 2005: 172). 
105 Matthew Potoski and Aseem Prakash’s (2010) volume deals with “collective action through 
voluntary programs,” voluntary “in the sense that it is not coerced by the state via regulation or statute 
… [it] is not mandated by legal or regulatory requirements” (Potoski and Prakash, 2009: 19). Potoski 
and Prakash distinguish between lenient and stringent club standards and weak and strong swords.  
These categories are of little use for the analysis of CRAs. There is virtually no variation regarding the 
stringency of club standards for the thirty CRAs studied in this thesis. These CRAs are open to any firm 
that wants to join. Yet there is a huge variation in the cross-national membership levels of these CRAs. 
Club theory cannot explain this variation. Moreover, CRAs include both leaders and CR laggards, 
companies that produce high and low amounts of social externalities.  
106  Encompassing community involvement, social compensation, ecological sustainability, in short, all 
aspects of CR. 
107 Thus, a thriving and vibrant CRA will benefit the reputation of business in general. The UK CRA is 
not called “bank X in the community,” “manufacturer Y in the community,” or “professional services 
firm Z in the community.” It is called “Business in the community.” 
108 William J. Baumol argues that “for business firms [the provision of public goods] is often a matter 
which can only be dealt with collectively, by volunteer groupings of firms rather than by the individual 
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Reputational concerns are one of the primary drivers of firms’ engagement in 
CR. Reputation can be defined as “an intangible asset that helps companies attract 
resources, develop a sustainable competitive advantage, and drive long-term 
profitability” (Tucker, 2008: 2).109 The stake that firms have in their reputations and 
brands helps justify expenditures in CR and in CR-related endeavors such as CRA 
membership, which is seen as a means to fortify and/or improve firm’s reputation and 
brand. In this way, the brand/reputation factor helps resolve collective action problems 
that could otherwise plague CRAs.110  
CRAs provide a platform for the exchange of ‘best practice’ through peer-
pressure, in addition to functioning as ‘think tanks’ and consultancies for the CR 
activities of their members. To varying degrees, they challenge their members to attain 
ever-higher levels of ‘responsibility,’ social engagement, and minimization of negative 
and maximization of positive externalities. They organize award schemes for the most 
responsible companies. The staffs of these associations are typically composed of 
institutional entrepreneurs who see it as their duty to make the world a better place. 
 The fact that association members support the associational infrastructure for 
Corporate Responsibility in general, including the CR activities of their competitors, 
strengthens the case for viewing associational membership as one element (among 
many) of responsible corporate conduct – of the hitherto understudied ‘social case’ for 
Corporate Responsibility.111 While it is difficult to determine the effect that CRAs 
                                                                                                                                            
enterprises. For it is only such groupings of firms that can provide resources sufficient to make the 
difference” (1970: 19).   
109 See also (among others) Fombrun and Shanley (1990). Fombrun defines reputational capital as “the 
excess market value of its shares – the amount of which the company’s market value exceeds the 
liquidation value of its assets” (Fombrun, 1996: 92). 
110 The collective action challenges of the political economy of CR are twofold. First, there are costs, 
which may take time to amortize, or pay off. Second, the reputational benefits of CR are (to some 
extent) non-excludable. David Vogel remarks that CR often falls within the limits of “discretionary 
spending” (Vogel, 2005: 165). If Vogel is correct, the collective action problems that affect CR are not 
serious. Without data it is impossible to know for sure.  
111 A shortcoming of the current CR literature is its neglect of the ‘social case.’ The vast majority of 
extant studies of CR ask: ‘what are the benefits of CR for companies? Are companies which engage in 
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have on the conduct of their member companies, it can be quite substantial. The fact 
that in the end, member companies take credit for their achievements does not imply 
that CRAs were unimportant for bringing these about. The overwhelming majority of 
companies that score highly in the CR league tables are members of CRAs, and 
associations’ membership generally comprises the “inner circle” of national and 
international business elites.112 CRAs are barometers for the state of CR in the country 
in which they are located. The existence of such an association, and the fact that firms 
are willing to join it, is evidence that the idea of CR has ‘come of age’ in a given 
country.113 An early establishment date and a large CRA membership are signs that a 
country is a CR leader; a late establishment date and low membership levels are signs 
of a CR laggard.  
 
VIII: Alternative Explanation: CR as Complement to Institutionalized Solidarity 
 
This explanation states that institutionalized social solidarity and Corporate 
Responsibility are complements rather than substitutes. ISS enhances CR 
performance. This view is not only popular among Corporate Responsibility advocates 
and activists, it also has a number of prominent scholarly proponents. Although 
advocates of this view are plentiful,114 only Maria Gjølberg spells out the underlying 
                                                                                                                                            
CR more profitable than their counterparts which do not?’ Though undoubtedly important from the 
perspective of employers and business schools, in adopting the point of view of business, these 
questions neglect the impact of CR on societies – the ‘social case.’ 
112 Useem (1984) 
113 See chapter 5 for a detailed discussion. Like firms’ membership in CR initiatives such as the Global 
Compact, membership in CRAs is no guarantee of corporate virtuousness. However, entailing as it does 
an explicit commitment to CR and a higher level of external scrutiny of their own activities, for 
example through the prodding of association staff, CRA membership is a plausible indicator of the state 
of CR in a given country. While adjustments must be made for the objectives of an association and for 
the size of its member companies, ceteris paribus, firms that are members of CRAs are more 
responsible than those that are not; and the greater the number of firms in a given CRA, the further the 
state of CR in a given jurisdiction. 
114 Midttun, Gautesen, and Gjølberg (2006), Gjølberg (2009a), Gjølberg (2009b), Ruggie (2007, 2004, 
2003) 
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logic. In my attempt to render this claim plausible, I draw on these authors. 
Nonetheless, the views are largely my own.  
 Alte Midttun, Kristin Gautesen and Maria Gjølberg’s findings “support the 
idea of a symmetric relationship between the ‘old,’ politically driven embeddedness 
and the ‘new,’ industry-driven embeddedness” of CR (Midttun, Gautesen and 
Gjølberg, 2006: 369). Maria Gjølberg argues that firms located in Coordinated Market 
Economies have a comparative advantage in CSR (Gjølberg 2009). Unlike the theory 
which views CR as a substitute for institutionalized solidarity and a complement to 
liberalization, the underlying assumption here is a positive-sum world, a variable if not 
expanding “market for virtue” in which Corporate Responsibility is a ‘mirror’ or 
reflection of the prevailing institutional framework (Apostolaku and Jackson, 2009). 
CR, in other words, is endogenous or integral to the solidaristic institutional 
frameworks of these countries and a complement to expansive welfare states, dense 
regulation, redistributive taxation and powerful labor unions – at least insofar as 
business is able to adopt and prosper under such environments.115 As figure 1.7 
shows, institutionalized forms of solidarity can be seen as primarily normative i.e. 
ideational, or material, or both:  
                                                 
115 The fact that highly regulated and solidaristic economies in Europe are towards the top of the 
international competitiveness league tables is sometimes mentioned as support for this argument. 
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                                                  S  O  L  I  D  A  R  I  S  T  I  C 
                               NORMS             INSTITUTIONS 
     
      
            
                                                 CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 
 
Figure 1.7: Institutionalized Social Solidarity and CR as Complements 
In the rationalist version, firms endorse and practice CR as part of their instrumental 
and maximizing strategies. In the sociological or constructivist version, institutions 
shape the very interests and preferences of businesspeople, firms and associations, 
leading them to take a more enlightened, positive-sum or expansive view of their 
interests, or possibly even accept a lower rate of return in their desire to further CR.116 
A sociological perspective that views ISS and CR as complements might foreground 
the social relations and actors promoting Corporate Responsibility. If citizens and 
businesspeople embrace and practice the norms of CR as well as those of ISS, or if, 
for example, their social status becomes dependent on their corporate civic 
engagement, this could lead to a complementary relationship between CR and ISS. For 
Gjølberg, the welfare state and corporatism provide CMEs with a comparative 
institutional advantage in Corporate Responsibility (Gjølberg 2009: 9); the very social 
norms which underpin and sustain the welfare state and corporatism lead to higher CR 
performance. 
 The theory which states that CR is complementary to institutionalized 
solidarity admits to several additional variations. For example, the encompassment of 
social institutions may be positively correlated with CR. More encompassing 
institutions “provide ‘built-in’ conditions that facilitate internalizing production and 
consumption externalities,” according to Lyle Scruggs (Scruggs, 2003: 152). This 
                                                 
116 For an argument that welfare attitudes are governed by ‘feedback loops’ which stabilize and 
reinforce the logic of the system, see Christian Larsen (2006) 
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model seems particularly appropriate for economies in northern Europe where firms 
are embedded in dense networks of social institutions. If this means that firms in 
countries with encompassing institutions are already engaging in responsible business 
practice (to a greater or lesser extent), shouldn’t these actors embrace CR? Moreover, 
these firms may be inclined to push for binding regulations for all to prevent their less-
regulated competitors from undercutting their own high-road strategies.    
As we will see, the empirical findings of this thesis contradict the CR-as-
complement to institutionalized solidarity view. Countries that are invested in 
solidaristic structures take longer to adopt CR than their market-liberal counterparts 
and when they adopt CR, they do so in a less extensive way than their counterparts in 
liberal market contexts. Further, there does not seem to be much support for hard law, 
even among firms which one would think would have an interest in it.     
 
IX. Plan of the Thesis 
 
 This thesis tells the story of Corporate Responsibility’s rise in individual 
European countries, at the EU-level, and across Europe and the OECD. It is the fist 
systematic empirical account of this subject matter. Thus, the tasks it undertakes are 
not just analytical, but descriptive as well. Though this kind of work is undervalued in 
contemporary social science, it is necessary, indeed indispensable, for scientific 
progress. We begin with two detailed historical country case-studies on the UK and 
Germany. These chapters constitute the groundwork of the thesis. From this 
foundation, we proceed to more remote domains: to the EU-level, and to variation 
across Europe and the OECD.  
Chapter 2 tells the story of the genesis and evolution of CR in the UK, tracing 
its rise from the 1970s to the present. The UK is an important case for both Corporate 
Responsibility and political economy. On one hand, the UK is said to be a global 
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leader in CR; viewed through the dimensions of timing and quantity, the UK is both 
‘early’ and ‘extensive.’ On the other hand, the UK is a leading exemplar of market-
liberal varieties of capitalism. In an attempt to determine whether these two states of 
affairs have anything to do with one another, this chapter draws on a wealth of original 
data, including interviews with key figures and hitherto unseen archival materials. 
These sources show that CR and market-liberalism co-evolve. They support the claim 
that the rise of market-liberalism and the rise of CR are linked not only temporally, but 
causally, in institutions, interests, and actors’ subjective understandings.  
Chapter 3 recounts the rise of CR in Germany. Compared with the UK, 
Germany is a contrasting, possibly even a ‘least likely’ case. Whereas the UK is seen 
as a CR leader, Germany is a ‘CR laggard,’ ‘late’ and ‘limited’ in terms of timing and 
quantity. Whereas the UK is an exemplar of market-liberalism, Germany is an 
exemplar of coordinated, organized or non-liberal capitalism. Drawing on extensive 
fieldwork, this chapter sets out to determine what relationship, if any, obtains between 
these two states of affairs. I argue that there is a systematic relationship. The late and 
limited rise of CR in Germany is explained by the long-time persistence and 
comparatively recent erosion of structures of institutionalized solidarity and 
‘organized capitalism.’ As Germany’s economy has liberalized, CR has taken root.  
 Chapter 4 surveys the rise and political contestation of CR at the EU-level.  EU 
institutions have far-reaching effects on EU member states, hence the importance of 
EU CR policy. What circumstances and agency prompted European institutions to 
adopt CR, and how has the political coloration of EU CR policy changed over time? 
Based on extensive field research in Brussels, I narrate the co-evolution of market-
liberalization and CR promotion by the European Commission. This chapter also 
draws attention to considerable amount of political contestation over CR, not only by 
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EU interest groups, but within the Commission itself. The co-evolution of CR and 
market liberalism does not imply an actor-less apolitical functionalism.  
Chapter 5 tests the generalizability of the proposed framework across Europe 
and twenty-five OECD countries, using Corporate Responsibility Associations, or 
CRAs, as proxies for the state of CR in a given country in a given time. Do Liberal 
Market Economies get CR earlier and in greater quantity than Coordinated- or 
Organized Market Economies? What about the relationship between regulatory 
density and CR? What about coding issues? This chapter includes an explication and 
defence of the measures used, and it discusses the relationship between the findings 
and existing literature.  
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis. Rather than summarizing the empirical 
chapters, it provides a broad outlook on the reach – and the limitations – of the linkage 
between CR and market liberalism. I draw out the implications of my argument for the 
current economic crisis; reflect on the case of New Zealand, which saw radical 
retrenchment of ISS amidst skepticism towards CR; and outline priorities for future 
research: why do Anglo-American multinationals have the highest centrality in 
Europe’s trans-national CR networks? While this finding dovetails with my argument 
about CR and market liberalism, further work is needed to clarify their political 
significance. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
The Transformation of British Capitalism  
And the Rise of Corporate Responsibility: 
 1977-2007 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The British case is central to this thesis for two reasons. It has high values on 
the outcome of interest, Corporate Responsibility, and on the explanation which I 
argue brought it about, the systematic deconstruction of the post-war order. I will 
begin with the latter. For almost a century, one of the forces holding British society 
together was a “collective or class consciousness,” “a consciousness of sin among men 
of intellect and men of property,” in the words of Beatrice Webb. According to Mont-
Pelerin Society member Ralph Horowitz, post-war Britain had a “Christian Socialist 
morality of the wickedness of profits and the sanctity of fair shares”; it was engaged in 
“a Social Welfare Crusade.” (Horowitz, 1970: 3). By the 1970s, this view was being 
challenged, and the order that sustained it was breaking down. In economic terms, 
Britain was “the sickest of the sick men in Europe” (Rhodes, 2000: 34).  
In 1976, Keith Joseph observed that Britain was “over-governed, over-spent, 
over-taxed and over-manned.” If poor macroeconomic performance, a visit by the IMF 
in 1976, and the ‘Winter of Discontent’ in 1979 were symptoms of a seriously ailing 
patient, it was Margaret Thatcher who administered the medicine, “driving a stake into 
the heart of British trade unionism” (Reitan, 1997: 165) and creating “‘an army of 
capitalists,’ capable of winning the economic battle in Britain” (Hetzner, 1999: 3). 
While not all stones were overturned by “the first anti-socialist to come to power in 
social democratic Europe” (Jenkins, 1987: 340), this period saw a profound 
transformation of Britain’s political-economic institutions, social order and ideological 
self-understanding. Ex-Thatcherite and former Chair of the Institute of Directors Sir 
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John Hoskyns reminds us that “the UK had been in a state of virtual economic civil 
war from 1964 to 1984” (Hoskyns, personal communication, January 5, 2009). If that 
is the case, there cannot be a shadow of doubt as to who won and who lost.  
 It is said that during the 1970s, British shopkeepers wanted their children to go 
into the public service. In the ensuing decades, that world, the institutions, and the 
ideology that had sustained it were replaced by ‘Enterprise Culture.’ John Banham, 
Director of the Confederation of British Enterprise in the 1980s, referred to this new 
attitude with the following words: “there’s a new generation out there. They’re 
hungry, and they like winning” (Riddell, 1991: 80). Britain has come to exemplify a 
market-driven economy and society in the popular and scholarly imagination. Finance 
has grown to comprise approximately one-third of UK GDP, and the aggregate market 
capitalization of publicly traded companies and the equity issued by newly listed 
companies are almost three and four times the global average.117 Deregulation of the 
financial and housing markets, liberalization, large-scale privatizations, cuts in 
marginal income tax rates in favor of consumption taxes, and reduced rights for 
organized labor have resulted in a dramatic increase in income inequality.118 The 
essential features of the ensuing British model of capitalism are summarized by Peter 
Hall as: “highly fluid labor markets [and] readily available labor at low cost” (Hall, 
2002: 42-43). Indeed, Tony Blair proudly remarked that the UK has “the most lightly 
regulated labor market of any leading economy in the world.”  In some sense, the 
reforms paid off: the sluggish macroeconomic performance of the 1970s gave way to 
dynamic growth and low levels of unemployment that were the envy of many in 
continental Europe by the 1990s. To summarize the first point: Britain’s socio-
                                                 
117 Cheffins (2008) 
118 Between 1980 and 2000, post-tax income inequality in the UK, though still lower in absolute terms 
than in the USA, increased by a larger margin than in the USA, France, Germany, Denmark, or Sweden 
(Glyn, 2006: 169). According to Shaw (2007: 43), “Britain witnessed the most rapid growth of 
inequality of any industrialized country” apart from New Zealand.      
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economic order has undergone a profound transformation during the past three 
decades.     
“The Thatcher project deliberately set out to emulate the American model, and 
has been pursued with similar ardour by New Labor,” notes economic historian Avner 
Offer (Offer, 2006: 365). During this same time period, Britain has emerged as a 
Corporate Responsibility leader. Although the contemporary era of Corporate 
Responsibility is thought to have originated in the United States,119 Britain was the 
first OECD country (in 1981/1982) to found a national Corporate Responsibility 
Association – Business in the Community. Since then, CR has evolved with such 
dynamism in the UK that according to David Vogel, Britain has replaced the United 
States in occupying the “[global] geographical center of gravity” of CR: 
 
Today more conferences on this subject are held in London than any other city, 
 and the London-based Financial Times and Economist cover CSR more 
 extensively than the New York-based Wall Street Journal, Fortune, or 
 Business Week. Since the mid-1990s, many of the most important publications 
 on CSR, including influential critiques, have come from British-based 
 organizations and individuals. The Journal of Corporate Citizenship and 
 AccountAbility Forum are published in Britain, and UK-based Greenleaf and 
 Earthscan are the major publishers of books on the subject. While ethical 
 investment funds and advisors are much more likely to be American, largely 
 because of the larger size of U.S. capital markets, ethical consumerism is much 
 more widespread in the United Kingdom (Vogel, 2005: 7-8)  
 
Since 2007, BITC has over eight-hundred member companies that pledge to 
‘continuously improve their impact on society,’ and the organization’s budget exceeds 
20 million £. This is an entirely different order of magnitude than any other CRA in 
the OECD. When it comes to multinationals with staff in the UK, the latter’s 
Corporate Responsibility activities are typically more extensive than in the 
                                                 
119 Bowen (1953). Alastair Pilkington, the first Chairman of Business in the Community, remarked in 
1984 that “almost 20 years more experience has put the USA generally well ahead of the UK in terms 
of corporate social responsibility” (1984: 14).  
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multinational’s country of origin. So when it comes to corporate volunteering, 
Deutsche Bank’s City of London operations win out over the much larger Frankfurt 
headquarters. Mike Kelly, head of Corporate Responsibility at the management, 
auditing and financial consultancy KPMG, confirms that when it comes to CR, “the 
UK is global leader by volume” (Kelly, interview, 2007). The Bank of England has 
extensive Corporate Responsibility activities. Germany’s Bundesbank has none. 
Britain’s post-1970s business elites not only like ‘winning,’ as in Banham’s quote 
above; they also like to engage themselves for the common good. In sum, the U.K. has 
‘extreme values’ on the dependent variable and explanation that are of interest in this 
thesis. In this chapter, I argue that the erosion and dismantling of Britain’s 
institutionalized social solidarity and the rise of Corporate Responsibility in the UK 
are intimately linked.     
This chapter focuses on the co-evolution of market liberalism and CR in the 
UK during the past thirty years. As I have suggested in chapter 1, it seems 
straightforward that CR gains prominence when public becomes private, for example 
when public utilities and social services are privatized. In the words of Ronen Shamir, 
“contemporary tendencies to economize public domains and methods of government 
also dialectically produce tendencies to moralize markets in general and business 
enterprises in particular” (Shamir, 2008: 1).  But this does not tell us how firms come 
to assume these new roles. This chapter sheds light on these processes, drawing on 
interviews, a large number of hitherto unexamined primary documents and archival 
sources, and secondary literature. I focus on the major British CR associations: 
Business in the Community, Scottish Business in the Community, the London 
Enterprise Agency and the International Business Leaders Forum.120 Remarkable as 
                                                 
120 I am particularly indebted to Business in the Community and Scottish Business in the Community 
for giving me with access to their voluminous internal archives, a treasure trove of information on 
Corporate Responsibility in the UK and beyond. In addition, this chapter has benefited from documents 
  
 
54
  
these CRAs are, I wish to stress that they are only part of the landscape of CR 
organizations in the UK.121  
As noted above, my argument in this chapter is that the rise of Corporate 
Responsibility in the UK must be understood in relation to the structural 
transformation of British capitalism during the past thirty years. The British case 
exemplifies the co-evolution of CR and decline of the postwar order in liberal 
democracies. Surprisingly, few if any existing accounts view Corporate  
Responsibility as an integral part of this transformation. Instead, scholars commonly 
suggest that CR and “neoliberal economic ideology” were at odds with each other. 
According to Crowther and Rayan-Bacchus, for example, the “concern with social 
responsibility faded out at the end of the 1970s with the rise of the New Right politics 
of Thatcher and Reagan and the consequent legitimation of selfish behaviour and 
greed in the acquisition of wealth” (Crowther and Rayman-Bacchus, 2004: 245). 
According to Michael R. MacLeod:  
 
there was little indication within the business world itself that CSR was 
 something to be seriously considered or operationalized, especially in the 
 business-friendly environment nurtured in the core Reagan-Thatcher years of 
 the 1980s. Promoting a more expansive business accountability to society ran 
 headlong into consolidating a neoliberal economic ideology emphasizing 
 deregulation and more unfettered opportunities for corporations (MacLeod, 
 2007: 233) 
                                                                                                                                            
from the National Archives in Kew (near London, UK), the Modern Records Centre at the University of 
Warwick, as well as countless interviews and meetings with Corporate Responsibility leaders in the 
UK. My special thanks goes to David Grayson, who was joint Managing-Director of BITC for several 
years and is now Professor at Cranfield School of Management, for his repeated guidance and meetings 
with me. And to Anthony Pelling, for indispensable and irreplaceable documents, for initiating 
interviews with key players, and excellent insights into BITC’s founding phases. 
121 which now includes the London Benchmarking Group, AccountAbility, Centre for Tomorrow’s 
Community, and scores of private sector and boutique consultancies including Corporate Citizenship 
and Sustainability. David Sadler and Stuart Lloyd “estimate that there are over one hundred 
consultancies in the UK engaged in some form or another of CSR activity” (Sadler and Lloyd, 2009: 
615).   
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Maria Gjølberg argues that countries’ CR performance can be explained with 
reference to “globalist” and “institutionalist” hypotheses. The UK’s high CR 
performance is attributable to the “globalist hypothesis,” in which “CSR emerges as a 
functional response to anti-globalization and anti-corporate sentiments” (Gjølberg, 
2009: 608).122 Gjølberg may be right that the UK’s CR performance is facilitated by 
the UK’s high proportion of highly internationalized or global companies.  
 But if my argument in this chapter is correct, Crowther, Rayman-Bacchus, 
Gjølberg and MacLeod have the story the wrong way around. It is not the case that the 
market liberalism of the 1980s prevented CR from being seriously considered or 
operationalized. Instead, CR sprouted and grew in precisely this environment. This 
chapter shows that the rise of CR in the UK is associated with the opposite of 
Gjølberg’s “institutionalist hypothesis.” Rather than “stronger institutions for the 
social embedding of the economy … result[ing] in stronger CSR performance” 
(Gjølberg, 2009: 609), the rise of CR in the UK is linked to the dismantling of these 
institutions.  
Figure 2.1 provides a graphical representation of the number of firms in the 
membership of UK CRA Business in the Community from 1982 until 2007123: 
                                                 
122 Since anti-globalization sentiments are directed against global companies, “the proportion of ‘CSR 
companies’ in a country is predicted to coincide with the proportion of global companies in the 
country’s economy” (Gjølberg, 2009: 609). 
123 This data was compiled by the author on the basis of annual financial reports from Companies 
House. BITC has two levels of membership: national and regional. Total and Total (continued) are the 
sum of national and regional membership. This data is unavailable for the decade from the early 1990s 
until the early 2000s.    
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Figure 2.1: BITC’s Membership 
What was BITC’s mandate during this period? The organization’s mission as stated in 
1983 was “to encourage industry and commerce to become more involved on a local 
basis in the economic, training, social and environmental needs of the communities in 
which they operate” (BITC, 1983: 2). In 1984, one of BITC’s “two main objectives” 
was “the promotion of corporate social responsibility” (BITC, 1984: 2).124 In 1994, 
the mission was “to make community involvement a natural part of successful 
business practice and to increase the quality and extent of business activity in the 
community” (BITC, 1994: 2). These mandates do not differ substantially from BIT
current mission, which is: “to inspire, to engage, and support and challenge compa
to continually improve the impact they have on society.” Despite the absence of 
national membership data for the 1990s, the data show that by the end of the 1980s, 
C’s 
nies 
                                                 
124 The other main goal is “to provide an umbrella role for the Enterprise Agency movement” (BITC, 
1983: 2). 
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more than four-hundred corporations had joined BITC and committed themsel
the aforementioned objectives; by 2007, the total exceeded eight-hundred.
ves to 
tion, 
                                                
125 The 
claim that Corporate Responsibility did not take hold in the midst of the privatiza
liberalization, and deregulation of the 1980s is untenable.   
This chapter illustrates the role played by Corporate Responsibility in general, 
and CRAs in particular, in furnishing business with legitimacy during the rise of 
market-liberalism.  I will suggest that the story of Corporate Responsibility in the UK 
has more general implications for scholars of political economy. This chapter 
addresses the following dimensions of CR in the UK: 
 
1. Temporality and novelty. The rise of Corporate Responsibility in the UK 
dates back to the economic transformations of the 1970s and 1980s, when 
these ideas were ‘imported’ from the US – and not to transnational civil society 
activism since the 1990s.  
  
2. Varieties of Capitalism and Complementarities. Corporate Responsibility is 
complementary to the expansion and intensification of market relations and to 
the erosion of institutionalized solidarity in the UK during the past thirty years. 
Corporate Responsibility should be understood as part and parcel of the 
transformation to market liberalism. CR has accompanied this shift, 
compensating for the market’s deficiencies and deficits in the areas of 
legitimacy, business and social needs. Bringing CR in to the analysis 
challenges Varieties of Capitalism’s conceptualization of comparative 
institutional advantage as well as its assertion that complementarity should be 
understood as institutional similarity.   
  
3. Politics. Despite the association of Corporate Responsibility in the UK with 
one of Margaret Thatcher’s rallying cries – ‘Enterprise Culture’ – CR cannot  
be understood as a narrow political project of the New Right. CR arose before 
Thatcher’s rise to power; it has been supported by Labour and Conservative 
governments alike; and the UK’s CRAs have maintained a strictly non-partisan 
stance. However, with regard to lobbying and institutional reforms, these 
 
125 This growth, it is worth emphasizing, was not entirely organic, as BITC swallowed other 
organizations, including the Special Programs Unit, the Action Resource Centre and Action: Employees 
in the Community during the 1980s and 1990s. As a consequence, Peter Davies, Managing Director and 
subsequently deputy CEO of BITC, wonders whether BITC is “part of the problem rather than the 
solution.” Following its mergers, BITC has become a “monster” which must be “fed” (Davis, interview, 
2007). Be that as it may, in few other countries are observers concerned that the national CRA has 
become too large. 
  
 
58
  
organizations have towed the line of industry lobby groups and employers 
associations such as the Confederation of British Industry and the Institute of 
Directors. Segments of the British business elite have used CR in their 
attempts to pre-empt burdensome government regulation – indeed, they have at 
times been aided in this quest by government itself. They have also sought to 
use CR take over activities previously undertaken by government, and to 
promote an Enterprise Culture which in its ‘liberationist’ incarnations views 
business as the hegemonic social pivot.      
 
4. The UK has played a pivotal role diffusing CR into Eastern Europe and 
across the world. CR has spread in tandem with market-liberal forms of 
economic governance.  
  
This chapter re-constructs the founding and initial phases of CR in the UK. While 
structural forces powered CR’s dramatic rise, this effect was compounded by a 
number of idiosyncratic and context-specific factors including: the UK’s business 
culture,126 the UK’s unitary and highly centralized state and business community,127 
and the involvement of Prince Charles. I begin by summarizing a few of the relevant 
changes in the British economy since 1977. I then proceed to discuss the implications 
for the Varieties of Capitalism theory. This is followed by an examination of 
Enterprise Agencies, Michael Pocock’s 1977 Ashridge Lecture, the 1980 Anglo-
American Sunningdale Conference on Corporate Community Involvement. I then 
proceed to the central focus of this chapter, the UK CRAs Business in the Community 
and Scottish Business in the Community. Because I see the period since the early 
1990s as a continuation of the course embarked on in the 1970s and 1980s, it receives 
more superficial treatment. 
Before proceeding to the appearance of Corporate Responsibility on Britain’s historical stage, 
it is it is essential to place it in its historical context. This chapter begins in 1977 because Michael 
                                                 
126 Grayson (2007). Tony Pelling, BITC’s first Chief Executive, also remarks that “The British are 
obsequious. There is much more reverence for government here in the UK than in the US” (Pelling, 
interview, 2010). 
127 Compared, for example, with the decentralized and Federal states such as Germany and the United 
States. 
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Pocock’s 1977 Ashridge Lecture, which laid out the  UK Corporate Responsibility agenda, was 
delivered that year.128 Furthermore, “it was not until the late 1970s that interest in corporate social 
involvement and responsibility became a phenomenon of general interest” (Marinetto, 1999: 1). Just a 
decade later, an article in The Economist magazine described the newly-found (or regained) confidence 
and assertiveness in Britain’s elite: 
 
The revival of self-confidence under Britain’s rulers, and particularly its 
businessmen, has been the greatest single achievement of the Thatcher years. 
That self-confidence is no longer a tender flower in need of careful cosseting. 
It has grown as the powers of trade unions have declined, as state industries 
have been privatized or forced to shape up. Now, after Tuesday’s budget, no 
businessman in Britain will be able to claim that he is handicapped by higher 
taxes than his foreign competitors pay.  
 
For almost 40 welfare-state years Britain’s leaders have said that the 
government will do it. Education, urban redevelopment, theatres and museums, 
new or better hospitals – all were seen as the job of the state, paid for by those 
extortionate taxes. The sense of civic pride and civic duty that is so common 
among American and Japanese businessmen barely existed in the Britain of 
1945-1985. Noblesse oblige had gone; richesse oblige was buried by high 
taxes.  
 
It is starting to come back, and the unspoken message from Mr Lawson’s 
budget is that it had better get a move on. Yes, the highly paid have a keener 
incentive to earn more; but they are also keeping more, and should be thinking 
of using some of that freedom that their extra money gives them to support 
charities, finance a small business, sponsor or employ bright kids, buy 
computers for a school. British businessmen have often claimed that the state 
uses its 45% of GDP inefficiently and ineffectively. Such adverbs were 
presumably chosen to mean ‘relative to how well the private sector would use 
it.’ Now businessmen have a chance to prove that point. If they fail, they will 
open the way to an unThatcherite government, and should expect little 
sympathy from it. There is no excuse any more.  
 
“From TINA to TINE,” The Economist, March 19 1988  
 
                                                 
128 Hardly less important, the White Paper Policy for the Inner Cities also appeared in 1977 under the 
Secretary of State for the Environment Peter Shore in the Labour government of PM Callaghan. Rather 
than viewing inner city deprivation as “a residual problem of the welfare state,” the White Paper viewed 
the inner city problem as one that derived from a lack of entrepreneurialism. See Nicholas Deakin and 
John Edwards (1993: 3).  
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The decades since the late-1970s have seen a far-reaching metamorphosis of 
British capitalism with an unleashing of market forces on all fronts. Britain’s system 
of industrial relations has been transformed with a dramatic weakening of trade 
unions. Welfare benefits have been cut back, resulting in a “break with universal 
social rights trajectory” (King, 1989: 51). State-owned enterprises have been 
privatized; income and corporate tax rates have been reduced; markets have been 
deregulated; and the service sector has grown as industrial employment as shrunk. 
This section surveys these changes and their relevance to CR, proceeding from 
industrial relations to privatization and the welfare state.  
As E.H. Green notes, “Thatcherism saw its task as being to challenge and 
ultimately dismantle the institutions, practices, and assumptions which underpinned 
what had come to be known by the mid-1970s as ‘the post-war consensus’” (Green, 
2002: 216). Thatcher’s deconstruction of Britain’s system of industrial relations is 
among her most well-known legacies. Chris Howell characterizes the post 1979 
Conservative challenge of the industrial relations regime as “a critique of the entire 
postwar political economy of Britain” (Howell, 2005: 135). The decline of organized 
labor was precipitous: “the eighteen years of Conservative government industrial 
relations reform saw the most sustained assault on trade unionism among advanced 
capitalist countries in the postwar period” (Howell, 2005: 133). The numbers are 
striking:  
 
In 1979 13.3 million people belonged to trade unions, the highest level ever 
reached in Britain, for a union density of 55.4 percent; approximately 85 
percent of the working population were covered by collective pay-setting 
mechanisms.... By the end of 2001, after eighteen years of consecutive 
Conservative rule, and more than four of a ‘new’ Labour government, union 
membership had declined 40 percent to 7.6 million, and density had fallen 
below 30 percent of the workforce (Howell, 2005: 131) 
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Howell queries whether the high degree of collective bargaining regulation which 
predominated during the late 1970s “can be described as characteristic of a liberal 
market economy” (2007: 255). Rather than inherent characteristics of the British 
political economy, he suggests that “the end of industrial relations” and their 
replacement by managerial unilaterialism should be understood politically (Howell, 
2005: 159). Employment in the manufacturing sector fell from 7.2 million in 1977 to 
5.4 million by the end of 1984 (Gibb and Durowse, 1987: 3); manufacturing’s 
employment share dropped by 44% between 1979 and 1996, to 15.8% of the total 
workforce from 28.9%; the employment share of the service sector increased by 25%, 
to two-thirds of total employment. The share of total employment in small firms 
employing fewer than fifty people rose from 33.6% to 42.3%; the share of 
employment in firms employing over five-hundred people shrunk from 42.8% to 
34.2%; women’s share of total employment increased from 39.9 to 46.3%; part-time 
employment rose from 18.5% to 24.8%; self-employment increased substantially 
(Howell, 2005: 138). 
 How has the weakening of trade unions fostered the expansion of CR? Though 
trades unions have seen it as their mandate to hold employers accountable for the 
welfare of their employees, unions are not generally supportive of initiatives in which 
employers and management have a decisive unilateral voice, as is the case in CR. 
Unions tend to favor union-, employee-led or legally mandated forms of corporate 
accountability. Thus, by weakening labor, one potential hindrance to CR has been 
removed. By 1981, the Trades Union Congress was anxious to be involved in the 
emerging attempts to coordinate CR in the UK.       
When it comes to the privatization of state-owned enterprises, the UK has been 
hailed as a “trailblazer” and “paragon” (Glyn, 2006: 37). In her memoirs, Margaret 
Thatcher writes that:  
  
 
62
  
 
Privatization … was fundamental to improving Britain’s economic 
performance. But for me it was also far more than that: it was one of the 
central means of reversing the corrosive and corrupting effects of socialism … 
Just as nationalization was at the heart of the collectivist programme by which 
Labour Governments sought to remodel British society, so privatization is at 
the centre of any programmme of reclaiming territory for freedom (Thatcher, 
1993: 676) 
 
Privatization reduced the share of government-owned enterprises from 12% to 2% 
from 1979 to 2006 (Glyn, 2006: 38). Privatization emerged as Thatcher’s “great 
success” (Prasad, 2006: 102) because of its constitutive effects. By transferring 
600,000 employees from the public to the private sector by 1987,129 privatization 
shifted voters’ identities and interests towards a ‘property-owning democracy’ – it 
“changed the actors’ understanding of the project on which they were embarked” 
(Prasad, 2006: 103). The sale of social housing to tenants created a new ownership 
class. Privatization was one element in the “transformation of the British public into 
non-unionized, home owning workers increasingly drawn to the Conservative policies 
of lower taxes, incentives for home ownership, and punishment of the unions” (Prasad, 
2006: 160).        
As state-owned firms were privatized, the number of companies practicing 
Corporate Responsibility increased. While publicly owned state utilities are (at least in 
theory) democratically accountable, private corporations are accountable to the 
market. The market is an effective mechanism for the satisfaction of consumer 
demand; but it lacks the democratic accountability of the political process. The 
institutionalization and public endorsement of Corporate Responsibility can help to 
compensate for the ‘legitimacy deficit’ arising from privatization. If the newly 
privatized firm seeks to lay off workers, as many do, this would be an additional 
powerful motivator to take up CR, as a means to mitigate the negative side-effects and 
                                                 
129 Jenkins (1987: 369) 
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legitimate the firm. Large-scale privatizations swelled the ranks of CRAs and 
organizations such as Business in the Community (discussed in detail below): newly-
privatized companies almost invariably became members. The following table – 
derived from Peter Riddell (1989: 87, 88) – shows a list of the “main privatization 
sales” undertaken during the 1980s. The companies that became members of BITC are 
shaded in grey. Those that did not are white. 
 
Name of Firm Date of Privatization 
British Aerospace 1981 (and 1985 for remaining shares) 
Cable and Wireless 1981, 1983 and 1985 
Amersham 1982 
Britoil [taken over by British Petroleum] 1982 and 1985 
Associated British Ports 1983 and 1985 
Enterprise Oil 1984 
Jaguar 1984 
British Telecom 1984 
British Gas 1986 
British Airways 1987 
Rolls Royce 1987 
British Airports Authority 1987 
British Steel 1988 
Figure 2.2: Privatization and Business in the Community Membership 
As we can clearly see, the majority of newly privatized firms joined BITC.130 What 
about the welfare state?     
As elsewhere in the OECD, U.K. government welfare expenditures grew 
rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s. Government expenditures on social security, personal 
social services, health, education and housing rose from 16 percent of GNP in 1951 to 
24 percent in 1971 and 29 percent in 1975, one-half of total public expenditure 
(Finlayson, 1994: 352). The UK’s economic troubles during the 1970s provided fertile 
                                                 
130 David Halley, Head of International Partnerships and Business in the Community, notes that the 
BITC CR Index, an index developed to monitor firms’ CR performance, “can be a useful tool to address 
issues of workplace, marketplace, community and environmental impact in the planning of privatization 
in order to signpost potential challenges and mistakes” (Halley, 2008: 378). 
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ground for a critique of the welfare state by the New Right. In their eyes, “not only 
could the state not deliver all the services expected or required of it, but equally it 
should not do so” (Finlayson, 1994: 355). In the words of Norman Johnson, the “neo-
liberal version of the minimum state implies a dramatic reduction in the welfare role 
of the state and a transfer of functions and responsibilities to other institutions” 
(Johnson, 1987: 88).        
Following Paul Pierson,131 it has become customary to stress welfare state 
resistance in the face of politicians’ attempts at retrenchment. However, Starke (2008) 
points out that Pierson understates the actual extent of retrenchment. Korpi and Palme 
(2003) show that between 1979 and 1995, “net wage replacement rates of work 
accident, sickness and unemployment compensation were reduced to a level not 
reached since the 1930s.” Work accident compensation was cut from over 70 percent 
to 20 percent, and sickness and unemployment benefits were cut from over 60 percent 
in 1979 to just 20 and 24 percent respectively by 1995 (Starke, 2008: 176). It seems 
reasonable to posit that reductions in state welfare provision that lead to an increase in 
social deprivation and disparities increase the pressure on companies for social 
compensation in the form of CR. In the next section, I discuss the implications of UK 
Corporate Responsibility for Varieties of Capitalism.  
 
II. Implications of CR in the UK for Varieties of Capitalism 
I begin this section by describing Varieties of Capitalism’s account of 
coordination and institutional complementarities. I then show how bringing Corporate 
Responsibility into the analysis challenges Varieties of Capitalism’s account of British 
political economy since the late 1970s.   
                                                 
131 Pierson (1994, 1996) 
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Hall and Soskice (2001) distinguish between Liberal Market Economies 
(LMEs) and Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs). Along with the United States, 
Britain is characterized as an archetypical LME. The core of VofC’s notion of 
comparative institutional advantage is that ‘pure’ uncoordinated Liberal Market 
Economies and ‘pure’ Coordinated Market Economies will outperform in-between 
types (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Hall and Gingerich, 2004). But what is coordination? 
For Soskice, “Coordination among business, outside of competitive market 
interactions, can take many forms within an economy. One way of measuring strategic 
coordination is to look at noncompetitive links between companies” that address a 
variety of collective action problems (Soskice, 1999: 104). For Hall and Soskice,  
 
non-market modes of coordination generally entail more extensive relational or 
incomplete contracting, network monitoring based on the exchange of private 
information inside networks, and more reliance on collaborative, as opposed to 
competitive, relationships to build the competencies of the firm (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001: 8)  
 
For Hall and Soskice, LMEs are characterized by relatively pure market coordination. 
Thus, to quote Stewart Wood, “in an LME, where relations between firms are 
mediated by markets, the state will be more effective if it restores and ‘sharpens’ 
market mechanisms” (2001: 274). King and Wood share this view: the UK and the US 
were predisposed towards neo-liberalism by “the inability of business to solve basic 
problems of collective action” and by the absence of coordination (King and Wood, 
1999: 375).      
 For Hall and Soskice, the differences between CMEs and LMEs are reinforced 
by the presence of “institutional complementarities.” A complementarity exists when 
“the presence (or efficiency) of one [institution] increases the returns (or efficiency of) 
the other” (Hall and Soskice, 2001: 17).  As Howell (2007: 259) recognizes, VoC 
views institutions as tightly linked and interdependent such that a change in one area 
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will trigger change across the economy as a whole, if the structures of inertia are able 
to win out over the dynamics of institutional self re-enforcement.     
Howell takes the Varieties of Capitalism account of British political economy 
to task for providing “a post hoc justification of the neo-liberal experiment after 1979” 
(Howell, 2007: 250). “Far from approximating a liberal market economy prior to 
1979, the British labor market “was subject to a high degree of collective regulation” 
(Howell, 2007: 258). Only concerted state action and high levels of political conflict 
transformed Britain into an LME. Howell’s challenge of Varieties of Capitalism’s 
portrayal of historical continuity and its neglect of political conflict is forceful and on 
the mark.   
Bringing Corporate Responsibility in to the analysis challenges Varieties of 
Capitalism in another respect, in the area of institutional complementarities.  Although 
Hall and Soskice concede that “even in liberal market economies, firms enter into 
some relationships that are not fully mediated by market forces” (2001: 8-9), their 
theoretical framework seems ill-equipped to deal with the simultaneous sharpening of 
market mechanisms and increase of coordination in LMEs because it sees 
complementarities as a matter of institutional similarity (Crouch, 2005; Campbell and 
Petersen, 2007: 326). In contrast to Varieties of Capitalism’s account of 
complementarities as institutional similarity, Corporate Responsibility in the U.K. is 
complementary to the post-1980s institutional framework precisely because it is 
different from it: CR compensates for the latter’s functional and legitimation deficits. 
This is similar to the sense of complementarity noted by Colin Crouch: “components 
of a whole mutually compensate for each other’s deficiencies in constituting the 
whole” (Crouch, 2005: 50).  
As Thatcher restructured the British welfare state and successively dismantled 
the high degree of collective bargaining regulation, new forms of collective action and 
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employer coordination came into being to deal with the problems of unemployment, 
inner city unrest, business development and skills shortages. Business in the 
Community provides an excellent example. In this organization, firms that are 
competitors in the marketplace come together to collaboratively address problems that 
affect their businesses and the community at large.  At the time of its founding,  
Business in the Community’s mandate was to “engage industry and commerce to 
become more involved on a voluntary basis with the economic, training, social and 
environmental needs of the communities in which they operate” (BIC, 1983). In 1984, 
these activities included “small business clubs; links with enterprise and training; links 
with venture capital funds; establishing property registers; managed workshops etc” 
(BIC, 1984: 2). In 1987, 240 or 79% of all Enterprise Agencies across the UK 
provided training services to small businesses and to aspiring businesspeople (Colman, 
1989: 304). The economic geographers Jamie Gough and Aram Eisenchitz draw 
attention to this compensatory function:   
 
since the mid-1970s, while neoliberalism has triumphed in national 
government, Local Economic Initiatives have expanded rapidly, using an 
approach neoliberals deride as ‘tired and discredited’ interventionism and 
consensus .... The great majority of local initiatives are politically Centrist, 
using mild forms of intervention pragmatically directed at perceived market 
malfunctions. They address demands both from business (for example, training 
to overcome skill shortages) and from labor and disadvantaged groups (training 
for equal opportunities) (Gough and Eisenchitz,1996: 179, 178)   
Especially interesting for our purposes is Gough and Eisenschitz’s suggestion that 
Centrist Local Economic Initiatives, which include CR programs such as Business in 
the Community, “create new nonmarket forms of coordination” in liberal market 
economies (Gough and Eisenschitz, 1996: 180).  Jeremy Moon describes CR in the 
UK as entailing business “not only operating in its market mode but also in a network 
mode with government and non government organizations in which the inter-
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dependencies of actors depend neither on authority nor on market relations” (Moon, 
2004: 1).   
But if CR and liberalization are connected, what are the elective affinities 
between the rise of CR and the liberalization of the British economy? While 
successive British governments, including Margaret Thatcher’s, have played a role in 
fostering CR since the late 1970s, CR in the UK cannot be properly understood as a 
political project of narrow ideological provenance. Instead, CR represents a response 
to business and societal needs during the structural transition away from the postwar 
compromise and welfare-embedded liberalism. CR serves to mitigate the negative 
material side effects of industrial restructuring, and endow the new market-driven 
order with legitimacy. This process of co-evolution (Boyer 2005)132 is described in the 
remainder of this chapter. 
 
III. Defining the Agenda: C.C. Pocock’s 1977 Ashridge Lecture 
 
When people recount the recent history of Corporate Responsibility in the UK, 
Micheal Pocock’s 1977 Ashridge Lecture is sometimes mentioned as the starting point 
(i.e. Grayson 2007). Pocock’s talk proposed a UK CR agenda for the 1980s and well 
into the 1990s. Pocock had spent thirty years in the Royal Dutch/Shell Group and in 
1977 he was the Managing Director and also the Chair of the London Business 
School. Given the seminal nature of his talk, it is surprising that the secondary 
literature contains no references to its actual content. This is an unfortunate omission, 
as Pocock’s lecture provides invaluable insights into meaning of CR: in to the 
conditions that necessitate it; and into the institutional reforms that need to accompany 
                                                 
132 As Robert Boyer remarks, “all institutional forms result from social compromises ….. At the level of 
the economy, there is no automatic mechanism that would ensure their compatibility. Instead, 
institutional forms continuously adjust and thus co-evolve. Co-evolution is the process of trial and error 
through which a series of institutional forms that are initially disconnected and formally independent 
(since they result from institutionalized compromises among diverse agents in different fields) adjust to 
one another until a viable institutional configuration emerges” (Boyer, 2005: 367). 
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it. Pocock prescribes some of the key ‘reforms’ of the British economy since the late 
1970s, which other countries have undergone at varying times and to varying degrees 
since then. The foil I am arguing against is the widespread claim that CR involves “re-
embedding” the corporation in society.133     
The title of Pocock’s talk is “More Jobs: a small cure for a big problem.” 
Pocock’s central message is that “even with renewed economic growth, enough new 
jobs are unlikely to come from the traditional sources, but there is a hope – to put it 
more strongly – that the encouragement of small business could help significantly” 
(Pocock, 1977: 3).134  By contrast, a continuation of the status quo will have dire 
consequences: “unless this intractable problem of structural unemployment is 
corrected, we are likely to witness the permanent alienation of whole blocs of people – 
defined by lack of skill, by location or by age group – who will lose the dignity, and 
the discipline, of working to pay their own way” (Pocock, 1977: 3). Pocock identifies 
a slew of causes for this unsatisfactory state of affairs. One of the most important 
relates to competitiveness and rationalization pressures: “Most industrialists you talk 
to here will admit that their aim is to do better, to make more and newer things, but to 
do it with fewer people – maybe partly different people, certainly better educated and 
trained, better paid too, but above all fewer people” (Pocock, 1977: 4). The reason he 
gives is not, as one would think, the direct financial cost “which still compares 
favourably with other countries, but what might be called the behavioral cost” 
(Pocock, 1977: 4). In Pocock’s view, “large concentrations of manpower” are afflicted 
by problems such as “immobility and inflexibility, over-manning, contrived overtime 
and low productivity.” These are exacerbated by “a whole raft of well-meaning social 
                                                 
133  Ruggie (2003, 2005, 2008) 
134 According to Brian Wright, Pocock’s interest in how small firms work was actually prompted by his 
daughter purchasing a garage (Wright, interview, 2007).  
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legislation, in which the theme of job protection is uppermost, while the ideal of job 
opportunity is virtually ignored” (Pocock, 1977: 5).  
Pocock diagnoses an unfavorable – too low – birth rate of small businesses in 
the U.K. at the time of writing. “[T]he burden of taxation, availability of finance, and 
the coils of red tape” are to blame (1977: 7). Unions are taken to task for their 
contribution to this predicament:  
 
In fact, over-manning indicates industrial suicide, and it would be great to hear 
a trade union leader—a real leader, I mean—saying so. Is it fair to put this 
onus on trade unionists alone? I think so, because the root cause of over-
manning, even in otherwise efficient plants, lies in a highly conservative union 
structure, with the jealousies, internecine competition and sheer resistance to 
change that this implies. We will never have a really efficient and well-paid 
manufacturing population until this self-inflicted damage is corrected, and 
there is little that management can do about that particular problem  
 
If we want labour mobility, jobs in depressed areas, the rebirth of urban 
centres, then we must encourage the small business and accept the 
imperfections and inequalities which may come with it. It may be unfair, but it 
is less unfair than nothing. Of course I am not arguing for no checks, but for 
fewer, for exemptions according to size, and for a willingness to sacrifice some 
sacred cows (Pocock, 1977: 5; 8)  
 
What “sacred cows” should be sacrificed on grounds of expediency? Pocock states 
that “fair wages clauses and Schedule 11 of the Employment Protection Act are the 
enemy of entrepreneurial growth and competitive efficiency” (Pocock, 1977: 9).135 It 
is not difficult to characterize the general thrust of Pocock’s lecture: a decisive break 
with the post-war political-economic order is necessary. In subsequent publications 
before his unexpected death in 1979, Pocock stresses the need to move away from risk 
adversity and the ‘entitlement state’ towards a more dynamic form of capitalism: 
 
                                                 
135 The 1975 Employment Protection Act had provided new individual and collective rights for workers. 
Schedule 11 “permitted the extension of collective bargaining into new areas, such as private services” 
(Howell, 2005: 116). 
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If the first political challenge confronting us in the years just ahead is the 
problem of economic imbalances, the second is the trend toward risk aversion. 
The demand of what US Ambassador [To the United Kingdom] Kingman 
Brewster calls the ‘entitlement’ state are twofold: first, for ‘public goods’ 
(education, housing, sports fields); and, second, for protection – protection 
against unemployment, against old age, sickness, noise, smells, even against 
unwanted competition. And governments everywhere have encouraged the 
notion that they have it in their power to offer voters not only a shower of 
public goods but a risk-free society as well (Pocock, 1979a: 24-25) 
 
Failure to adjust means extinction, so we must have the guts to say a blunt ‘no’ 
to political pressures and we must break – or rather, untie – union strangleholds 
(Pocock, 1979b: 195) 
 
Pocock did not believe that unleashing market forces alone would suffice to address 
the crisis at hand. As he emphasized, business had to play its part: “industry cannot 
just opt out of society’s problems, particularly those that press on the local community 
where it operates” (1977: 5). The Corporate Responsibility initiatives Pocock lists – 
training programs, businesses cooperating with local schools and making unused 
facilities available to budding entrepreneurs – became a central focus of the London 
Enterprise Agency, Business in the Community and Scottish Business in the 
Community in the years and decades to come.  
Before moving on, I wish to underline the boldness with which Pocock urges a 
break with the past, both in instituting Corporate Responsibility and in breaking with 
(or simply breaking) the postwar system of industrial relations. For the purpose of 
comparison, just one year earlier in 1976, Lord Robens of Woldingham had remarked 
in the inaugural Ashridge Lecture:  
 
Management needs to be much more tolerant and helpful to Trade Unions and 
to the Trade Unions Organizations ... What we need is not a political coalition. 
We really need for five years a Council of State, composed of all parties and of 
none, and of the Trade Union and business world. Such a government could 
identify very clearly what was required to put the country back on its feet. 
They would require to forego their political theories and concentrate on a 
single aim (Woldingham, 1976: 14, 15)   
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Jonathan Boswell and James Peters term Robens’ view “revisionism.” Revisionism 
refers to a cooperative relationship and to the positive-sum balancing of the interests 
of labor, capital, and the state with an unmistakable resemblance to corporatism. 
Revisionism remained a powerful and popular view among businessmen in the mid 
1970s. Pocock’s view seems much closer to “liberationism,” which sees business in a 
hegemonic role as the “social pivot” (Boswell and Peters, 1997: 16), with labor and 
the state clearly subordinate. Liberationism was still contentious in the British 
business community in 1977. Howell concurs that at the time of Pocock’s lecture, 
British business had yet to make a decisive break with Donovan:  
 
The speed at which employer attitudes towards trade unions and collective 
regulation turned to hostility is remarkable. Until at least the 1970s, the bulk of 
employers seemed committed to making Donovan work—working with trade 
unions to the problems posed by economic restructuring. The same could not 
be said by the end of the 1980s (Howell, 2005: 140; my emphasis) 
 
Admittedly, Prime Minister Callaghan’s abandonment of Keynesianism and 
full employment and his quip at the Labour party conference that “The option [of 
spending yourself out of a recession] no longer exists” lay between these two talks 
(Kavanagh, 1992: 185); but Pocock’s Ashridge Lecture was given before the ‘Winter 
of Discontent’ of 1979, which “emerges as the moment in which Thatcherism 
achieved state power” (Hay, 1996: 274), galvanizing support for the liberationist 
camp. It is ironic that in Pocock’s conception, the rise of CR – a business ideology that 
advocates for enlightened self-interest and corporate community involvement – is 
premised on breaking with the post-war settlement and weakening some of the central 
pillars of institutionalized social solidarity. The following section discusses how 
Corporate Responsibility endows the new market-liberal regime with pragmatic 
legitimacy. 
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IV. Enterprise Agencies: Vehicles for the Promotion of CR and Pragmatic 
Legitimacy in the 1970s and 1980s 
 
In this section, I discuss the Local Enterprise Agency (LEA) movement, which 
originated in the 1970s and grew rapidly during the 1980s. LEAs endow business with 
legitimacy by providing material and symbolic compensation to those who become 
unemployed as a result of plant closings, rationalization, and tight macroeconomic 
policy. The Enterprise Agency movement differs from individual companies’ attempts 
to acquire pragmatic legitimacy through Corporate Responsibility initiatives. Adam 
Rendall, formerly with Shell and (with Anthony Pelling) one of the two founding staff 
of Business in the Community, provides a good example. Rendall recalls how “a lot of 
the things we [Shell] needed to do (drilling etc.) didn’t make us popular. What 
happened is we throw money at good causes.” Thus, CR “allowed [drilling] projects to 
go ahead with less aggravation than they otherwise would have faced” (Rendall, 
interview, 2007). LEAs developed to address problems that confront collectivities of 
firms, segments of British business pertaining in areas of high unemployment or where 
major firms were laying off workers.  
The British LEA movement began around 1974/75 (Community Initiatives 
Research Trust, 1985: 2), as a response to the rationalization, industrial restructuring 
and rising unemployment confronting the UK at this time. The situation was especially 
grim in Britain’s inner cities, and in areas dependent on manufacturing and on the 
dying industries of coal, steel, and shipbuilding. LEAs trace their origins not to 
Thatcher’s Conservatives but the Callaghan Labour government, and to these 
challenges. “By the late 1970s,” note Barnekov, Boyle and Rich, “urban policy was 
already oriented towards a more expansive role for the private sector and, in important 
respects, was compatible with the Conservative Government’s ideological 
commitment to privatization” (Barnekov, Boyle and Rich: 1989: 143). Until the 
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beginning of the 1990s, the practice of Corporate Responsibility in the UK was tightly 
bound to LEAs.      
Supported by private and public-sector monies, LEAs supported 
entrepreneurship in economically depressed areas, thus furthering business’s 
pragmatic legitimacy. For LEAs, Corporate Responsibility was the promotion of 
entrepreneurship. Supporting budding entrepreneurs seems sensible given that labor 
market participation is the primary ticket to social citizenship in liberal democracies. 
But for those who associate CR with businesses transcending business interests or 
even with anti-capitalist agendas, this may be surprising. Job creation agencies 
represented “a means of weakening potential worker opposition to closures,” 
according to Colin Mason (Mason, 1987). In the case of the British Steel 
Corporation’s job creation and re-training agency,  
 
As a symbol of British Steel’s good intentions towards its threatened 
workforce and by raising hopes of alternative employment opportunities, it [the 
job creation agency] can be interpreted as a means by which BSC hoped to 
implement its redundancy programs without serious labour resistance (Mason, 
1987: 305)  
 
Mason emphasizes the positive symbolism of job creation initiatives: 
 
in the short term the symbolic value of corporate job creation initiatives and 
rapid growth achieved by some new companies which such initiatives have 
assisted – no matter how rare and atypical such ‘success stories’ are – can be of 
great importance in increasing hope, morale and confidence, all commodities 
that are scarce in communities suffering from the erosion of their employment 
base (Mason, 1987: 305)   
 
While stressing that evidence  
 
on the tangible impact of such initiatives in terms of employment creation 
indicates that they provide a very partial solution to the problems resulting 
from large scale redundancy and are unable to do more than achieve a very 
limited reversal of economic decline in areas affected by corporate 
disinvestments (Mason, 1987: 308) 
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The symbolic politics touched on in these quotations deserves emphasis, as it receives 
little acknowledgement in the contemporary CR literature. Jeremy Richardson writes: 
by engaging in local economic initiatives, “Business can at least avoid the criticism 
that it is ‘uncaring’ and they certainly contribute to a feeling that at least ‘something is 
being done’ especially at a local level” (Richardson, 1983: 19). “By publicizing our 
activities, we can bring home to the community as a whole the fact that companies do 
care, and that the private enterprise system is not (as it is sometimes caricatured) a 
cold, selfish and self-centred system” remarks Sir Mark Weinberg (Weinberg, 1990: 
8). Support for institutions such as Local Enterprise Agencies can show evidence of 
the “human face” of the corporation in communities afflicted by plant closures, 
according to Allan Gibb and Henry Durowse (Gibb and Durowese, 1987: 5). James 
Cooke, who directed the Special Programmes Unit of the Confederation of British 
Industry (discussed below), recalls: “at the public level of politics there was a 
considerable animus against Mrs Thatcher from the socialists and from the trade 
unions.” However, this animus did not provide much weight to opposition to 
Corporate Community involvement and CR, since “when you get down to the local 
community, everybody cared about their community” (Cooke, interview, 2007).136  
 The symbolic dimension should not lead us to neglect the practical impact of 
Enterprise Agencies in the context of high unemployment. Pocock’s proposals to 
facilitate entrepreneurship would allow large firms to rationalize and invest in more 
capital-intensive plant – laying off many of their workers in the process. The need to 
rationalize was intensified by the economic downturn that followed Thatcher’s 
monetarist turn in 1980/1981 and by the subsequent privatizations of state-owned 
                                                 
136 Indeed, preoccupations with the public reputation of business were widespread in the business press 
at the time. In one Financial Times interview, for example, one interviewee stated that he thought “if we 
want to retain a mixed economy then it is essential that the private sector is seen to be doing something 
on its own during a recession … It would be disastrous … if the myth that business didn’t care which 
grew up in the 1930s was allowed to be revived” (Dickson, 1983: 11).  
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enterprises and international competitiveness pressures. There thus emerged a 
mutually beneficial relationship between rationalization, Corporate Responsibility, and 
the new enterprise agencies.   
As Brian Wright, founder and longtime Director of the London Enterprise 
Agency (set up in 1979), put it: “there could be wholesale change in large companies 
because small companies could help people start again …. Shell saw it as a job 
creation scheme that would enable the private sector to invest in more capital-
intensive plant (much the same thinking as Pilkingtons in St Helens, who had invented 
a new way of making glass that needed far fewer workers” (Wright, personal 
communication, June 19, 2008). None of this implies that the number of jobs created 
by Local Enterprise Agencies were adequate to compensate for the dramatic re-
structuring of the UK economy. As Stephen O’Brien, Business in the Community’s 
Chief Executive from 1983, put it in 1985: “Real jobs are being created cheaply, but 
so far in insufficient numbers to dent the devastation caused by the economic 
revolution through which we have been living” (O’Brien, 1985: 3). According to 
Business in the Community documentation, enterprise agencies helped to create 
56,000 jobs in 1984, or 16.5 percent of all new jobs created (BITC, 1985: 4).137  
My account would be incomplete without at least a brief mention of St. 
Helen’s Trust, which was the first contemporary example of CR in the UK, opening 
four months before the establishment of the London Enterprise Agency (Fazey, 1987: 
79).138 The circumstances that led to the creation of the Community of St. Helen’s 
Trust are well-known: new glassmaking technology led to substantial productivity 
gains and redundancies.  
                                                 
137 David Goss views small business policy as politically motivated, pointing to the lack of evidence 
that “small business policy has produced real ‘additionality’ (events that would not have taken place 
without the policy intervention), except in the negative sense of removing legislative protection from 
workers” (Goss, 1991: 148). 
138 In fact, Bristol was first, but it was not as effective, as Anthony A Pelling has pointed out to me.  
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The Pilkington glass factory in St Helens offers a particularly striking example 
of how rationalization created a need for CR. The float glass processes were 
“reckoned to be over 10 times more productive” than the preceding production 
techniques, “a boon to glass manufacturers, but not to their employment” (Salmans, 
1980: 67). The reduction of employment in St Helen’s was accompanied by increasing 
investment and employment overseas (Salmans, 1980: 69). Peter Horan, a Merseyside 
official of the General & Municipal Workers Union, lamented: “now that the company 
has the new technology, it no longer needs the people of St Helens.” According to the 
same trade unionist, the jobs created to replace those eliminated by large industrial 
employers such as Pilkingtons “are not the same types of jobs, with the same wage 
level” as those being eliminated (Salmans, 1980: 70; 72).   
Foregoing the new technology and retaining extant employment levels would 
endanger the long-term survival of the company. Given the competitive pressures and 
macroeconomic conditions at the time, this was simply not an option. The Trust’s 
expressed aim was to support the creation of entrepreneurship and new small 
businesses to take the place of the jobs that were being lost. The motivations for this 
policy are unclear. The fact that the Pilkington Brothers Glass company was the 
largest employer in St. Helen’s limited collective action problems and the company’s 
ability to externalize costs onto others, and these structural conditions may well have 
facilitated the Trust’s success. But the company’s managers, Bill Humphrey and 
Alasdair Pilkington, gave other-regarding rather than instrumentally rational or 
calculative justifications for their actions, so this question is hard to answer. In any 
case, the St. Helen’s Trust became so formative that “it was held up as an example of 
the ‘acceptable face of capitalism’ with Government ministers urging other large 
corporations to follow the Pilkington lead,” according to Ian Hamilton Fazey (Fazey, 
1987: 74).  
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  In its initial phases, Corporate Responsibility in the United Kingdom was 
closely connected with the agenda of urban regeneration spearheaded by the 
Pilkingtons and the London Enterprise Agency. As David Sieff of Marks and Spencer, 
one of the UK’s largest food retailers,  put it, “The inner cities, in which we have 
stores and many staff, present a bewildering range of challenges with problems of 
decay, unemployment and social unrest” (Sieff, 1980: 32). These dire circumstances 
propelled high-status businesspeople and state officials into action. They also opened 
state coffers. Substantial pubic monies flowed to promote the cause of CR. Indeed, 
there was widespread agreement across party lines regarding palliatives for the 
structural ailments of the British economy at the time. According to Robin Boyle, the 
involvement of business in urban regeneration through public-private partnerships, 
which has a close relation to the first phase of the development of CR in Britain, 
already began under Callaghan’s Labour government in 1976:  
 
the enthusiasm for privatism emerged before the election of the Thatcher 
government in 1979 …. The desire to integrate the private sector into the 
development and implementation of policy aimed at urban renewal was not the 
invention of the 1979 Thatcher government, but can be traced to the review of 
inner city policy announced by Callaghan in September 1976 …. [O]n coming 
to office in May 1979, the Conservative government inherited urban 
programmes, compatible with their ideological and electoral commitment to 
helping industry and improving the urban environment (Boyle, 1983: 12, 13; 
14)      
The importance of CR for legitimating business in the difficult economic environment 
of the 1970s and 1980s cannot be underestimated. Brian Wright, Director of the 
London Enterprise Agency, had the impression that “companies believed that they 
should come up with solutions to society problems both because they were in danger 
of being taxed to allow the government to do so and because they (the companies) 
were able to do it better” (Wright, personal communication, June 30, 2008). Laying 
off employees without regard to the impact on employees and local communities 
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could lead to pressures for government regulation. Wright recalls that “Shell together 
with BP and the banks also saw it [their involvement in Corporate Responsibility and 
in CR associations such as the London Enterprise Agency] as a way of trying to avoid 
a windfall tax on their profits” (Wright, personal communication, June 19, 2008). The 
fact that this thinking was taking place under Callaghan’s Labour government could 
support the view that CR was an attempt to secure business interests against state 
encroachment. The fact that Corporate Responsibility has grown and flourished under 
Conservative and New Labour governments since Thatcher  – governments that were 
ideologically committed to eliminating burdensome regulation on business – 
underlines the limitations of these ‘business versus politics’ interpretations. In the 
following section, I discuss the Sunningdale Conference on Corporate Community 
Involvement. Sunningdale laid the groundwork for Corporate Responsibility in the UK 
during the past three decades.  
V. The Sunningdale Anglo-American Conference 
on Corporate Community Involvement 
 
Even prior to the Sunningdale Anglo-American Conference on Corporate Community 
Involvement, CR in the UK was an Anglo-American affair. On May 10, 1979, 
American Ambassador to the UK Kingman Brewster wrote a letter to Anthony 
Pelling, Assistant Secretary in the Department of the Environment, concerning the 
London Enterprise Agency which had been established that year. Brewster writes: 
  
 it occurred to me that all of us might benefit from an opportunity to hear about 
 it [LENTA] from those directly involved and to see whether there might be 
 some ways in  which some of us might wish to lend our support to a program 
 with significant potential for constructive community relations in this capital 
 [London]. At the suggestion of some of your colleagues and the Department of 
 the Environment, I am hosting a small get-together for this purpose over coffee 
 at my residence … The Department of Environment has informed me that the 
 New Secretary of State, Michael Heseltine, is very interested in this project 
 and hopes to be present for our meeting. I very much hope that you will also be 
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 free at that time and will be able to join me and a small group of 
 representatives from American companies here in London to discuss this 
 interesting initiative (Brewster, letter to Anthony Pelling, May 10 1979) 
 
Anthony A Pelling worked for the Inner City Directorate of the Department of the 
Environment and was in charge of the preparations which led to the founding of 
Business in the Community in 1981. Subsequently, Pelling was Founding Director of 
BIC. He remarks that plans for a CR conference at Sunningdale and for a CRA were 
already well underway under Callaghan’s Labour government. He had visited several 
cities in the US in 1978 and was impressed by the public private partnerships in 
Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, and Baltimore. The London Enterprise Agency was founded 
in April 1979, during the general election in which Margaret Thatcher became Prime 
Minister. Labour Ministers Peter Shore and Harold Lever were both at LENTA’s 
opening press conference, convened at Shell, as was a Tory spokesman for the Greater 
London Council. Thus, LENTA was technically a cross party initiative (Pelling, 
personal communication, May 16 2008). Shore, who was one of Callaghan’s 
Ministers, played a particularly important role in arranging the exchange of 
experiences between US and UK firms from the late 1970s onward. Indeed, the 
importance of American ideas in the initial stages of UK CR is hard to 
overestimate.139  
 If social movements are driving forces of CR, as many scholars maintain,140 
one wonders whether the urban unrest of this period caused Sunningdale or led
founding of BITC. It did not, as Tony Pelling, the first Chief Executive of the 
organization notes: “BIC/BITC was up and running before the major inner city riots
 to the 
 in 
                                                 
139 Anthony A Pelling, BIC’s first Chief Executive, tells that Leslie Slote, former press secretary to 
Mayor Robert F. Wagner and Gov. Nelson A. Rockefeller, got him into the US embassy, arranged tours 
of US cities to learn from American experiences and “forewarned Ministers that we would have inner 
city riots which we poo-pooed,” as Pelling recalls (Pelling, personal communication, August 30, 2010). 
Other examples include a “vice-president from Citibank, New York, [who] had been loaned to Brixton 
to work on housing problems” in 1981/1982 (BIC Chairman’s Annual Report 1982-1983) 
140 See Soule (2009) for references to this literature. 
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the early 80s and was not a reaction to [these] events as is often asserted” (Pelling, 
letter to Stephen Howard, August 3rd 2010). Furthermore, the Sunningdale conference
was already underway when riots shook Bristol and St Pauls riots. In March 1981, a 
month before the riots in Toxteth and Brixton, the decision was made by ten firms to
set up Business in the Community.
 
 
141 BITC was not established in response to civil 
society
g) 
 
etary 
n 
ies 
literatu
ed 
                                                
 activism or social unrest.   
The Sunningdale conference was convened by Tom King (now: Lord Kin
and Anthony Pelling, both from the Ministry of the Environment, on 9-10 April 
1980.142 This conference had already been in the planning stages under the preceding
Labour government. According to Pelling, the “main internal catalyst” was “a short 
letter from PM Callaghan to Peter Shore the Department of the Environment Secr
of State calling for measures to support the growth of small firms in inner cities” 
(Pelling, personal communication, 2007; see also Marinetto, 1998: 59). Indeed, it is 
worth stressing that the dawn of the contemporary era of Corporate Responsibility in 
Britain was orchestrated by government (Moon, 2005). However, it was not a partisa
political project: it was supported and facilitated by Labor and Conservative part
alike (Grayson, 2007). Remarkably given its importance, no existing secondary 
re contains any references to the papers or proceedings of this conference.143  
Held at the Civil Service Staff College in Sunningdale Park, south of London, 
the Anglo-American conference on Corporate Community Involvement was attend
by British members of government, industry and commerce together with people 
experienced in similar problems in America (Heseltine (1990 [1987]: 165). Of the 
twenty-seven conference delegates, seventeen corporate and government officials 
 
.141 I am grateful to Anthony A Pelling for providing me with this information.  
142 Interestingly, the US Ambassador to the UK, who C.C. Pocock refers to in the aforementioned 
section, was the co-sponsor of this conference.  
143 I am grateful to Anthony Pelling for entrusting to me his personal (and only) copy of the conference 
proceedings. 
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were based in the U.K. and ten were from the U.S. The conference’s Anglo-America
composition is no coincidence. As Michael Marinetto notes, during its early
CR in the UK “drew much of its inspiration from the policies of American 
corporations” (Marinetto, 1999: 8). Michael Heseltine, who was Secretary of State for 
the Environment, claimed that “the idea [for Business in the Community] originated in
the United States” (Heseltine, 1983: 21). It does not seem like an exaggeration to say 
that the model of CR implemented in the UK was ‘imported’ from the US, which
Weber eighty years earlie
n 
 phases, 
 
 Max 
r had termed “the land of associations par excellance” 
(Swedb
lic’s questioning of 
the legi
e, 
 in 
porate activity is de-
f 
, 1980: 42). In view of the 
impend
acy could take place over the next decade” (Langton, 1980: 46)    
erg, 2005: 295).  
The social legitimacy of business was prominent, perhaps the most prominent 
theme of the conference. In his paper “Dinosaurs did not survive,” James F Langton, 
Senior Vice President of the Bank of America, described the pub
timacy of business as “pervasive”:   
 
This questioning has eroded the sense of corporate legitimacy. Legitimacy – 
the public perception that an institution is serving societal need – is the charter 
to operate in a democratic society. Without such validation by society, 
corporations will be strangled by legislation and regulation, or, in the extrem
will be nationalized. Over the past decade, the industrialized countries have 
seen far too much of both kinds of infringements …. The unfortunate fact, 
borne out by poll after poll, is that the public holds the business community in 
low esteem. Acceptance of business conduct and function in public opinion 
polls is roughly analogous to the electoral approval public officials receive
the political process. Without such social validation, cor
legitimized, and in a political democracy, real questions arise concerning 
survival of the corporate form (Langton, 1980: 39, 42) 
Langton concludes his paper: “Business is beginning to recognize the problem o
legitimacy, but still gropes for its solution” (Langton
ing election of Ronald Reagan as President,  
 
For the first time in memory, American corporations have the opportunity to 
ride a ground swell of public sentiment against waste and inefficiency in 
overnment. If corporations do this wisely … a major reaffirmation of business g
legitim
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Noting high unemployment levels, the delegate from the London Enterprise Agency 
reported “There is a real and justifiable fear that where whole communities have lost 
any real prospect of employment – particularly in inner city areas – there will be 
widespread alienation adding to what is already an increasingly hostile climate for 
business” (LEA, 1980: 15). Not only pressures of pragmatic legitimation vis-à-vis the 
public, the new government’s objective of reducing state activities prompted an 
increased interest in CR, noted Sara Morrison, a director of the General Electric 
Company Ltd. in the UK. Interestingly, not an actual reduction of state activities in 
society but rather the anticipation of such a reduction engendered this increased 
interest:  
se to the 
ention to reduce the State’s activities in society 
(Morrison, 1980: 16) 
On the other hand, a tight macroeconomic environment does not help:  
e the mind 
of the corporate executive on short-term profitability (Morrison, 1980: 16)  
 
Although relatively few companies in Britain pursue corporate responsibility 
policies those consultants who are active in the field detect a growing interest. 
Much of this has been seen in the last year and in part reflects a respon
new Government’s int
 
 
It might be argued that the reduction of the State’s activities in society and 
Government measures to combat inflation, including public expenditure cuts, result in 
an increased need for involvement in community affairs by large firms. But there is, of 
course, a dilemma, since difficult financial circumstances tend to concentrat
 
Apart from addressing the external pressures at hand, conference participants 
pointed to deficiencies in the institutional and regulatory status quo. Why was the 
U.K. behind the United States in Corporate Responsibility? Sara Morrison asked, 
referring to the prevailing level of corporate engagement, “Valuable though such aid 
and assistance is to voluntary organizations, it adds up to very little overall and hardly 
represents any selective, systematic or even very conscious involvement by employers 
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and their firms in the welfare of the community. What prevents more being done?” 
(Morrison, 1980: 84).  For Morrison, the expensive welfare state is to blame for the 
non-co
rising 
 they might have a 
ommitment to the welfare not only of their employees but also to the 
ns for 
n 
that 
the primary vehicle of Corporate 
esponsibility well into the 1990s, took shape.  
 
s) in 
 motivations 
VI. Promoting Moral Legitimacy: Business and the Community and Scottish 
Business in the Community 
                                                
mmitment of business and citizens to community affairs: 
 
Whatever the merits of Britain’s welfare state and its services, and its taxes, it 
tends to encourage the firm impression among many that the well-being of 
fellow citizens is essentially someone else’s business. Hence it is not surp
that industry and commerce do not readily accept that
c
community in which they exist (Morrison, 1980: 85) 
 
Other papers recount the experiences and best practices of American corporatio
their British counterparts. Among the delegates who attended the Sunningdale 
conference was Sir Alastair Pilkington, who became the first Chairman of Business i
the Community after the Shell rep backed out.144 The Pilkington Brothers Glass Ltd 
company in the town of St. Helen’s was important in another respect, for it is here 
the notion and practice of the enterprise agency, 
R
 
The remainder of this chapter examines various facets of the evolution of Business in
the Community (BITC), one of the leading business-led CR associations (CRA
the world. The next section provides some insight into the moral
underlying businesspeople’s engagement for the cause of CR.   
 
 
Business in the Community was set up on June 1, 1981 and fully registered as a 
company limited by guarantee on 2 March 1982. Given the organization’s current 
status as one of the foremost CRAs, its humble beginnings are remarkable. BITC was 
 
144 I am grateful to Anthony A Pelling for this information.  
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set up with three desks and three chairs, and was originally slated to self-destruct after 
five years if it proved unsuccessful in achieving its goals. The problem was, it was too
successful. They wanted to carry on – and they did. Initially, BITC had no paid staff. 
It was composed entirely of secondees – staff on the payroll of the government or th
private sector who were ‘lent out’ pro bono to the organization. According to To
Pelling, BIC’s first Director, these people hanged together; there was a kind of 
community (Pelling, interview, 2010). As the BIT
 
e 
ny 
C’s first annual report points out, the 
 
y, 
 had 
s to 
ge in the economy (BIC Chairman’s 
n of 
 
r 
 it is no 
 
 
organization seeks to persuade Chief Executives  
 
 of the contribution that business sector support could make to the alleviation of
 problems that might well threaten the existence of the mixed market econom
 and the prospects for individual firms. The Group [composed of BIC’s 
 governing council in March 1982] believed that direct gains were to be
 from closer involvement of firms with other employers and local authoritie
 stimulate local employment generation and to meet some of the social 
 problems arising from structural chan
 Annual Report 1982-1983)   
In what follows below, I present some of the key figures in the early phases of BITC.  
These people were outspoken supporters of Margaret Thatcher’s politics, just as they 
were motivated by humanitarian and religious ideals and an expansive conceptio
their self-interest that contradicts Milton Friedman’s view that “the business of 
business is business.” These leaders were motivated by a very discernable sense of
moral legitimacy, the view that CR is worth doing not because of its pragmatic o
instrumental benefits for business, but because it is the right thing to do. If this 
evidence is any guide, the cynical interpretation of CR according to which
more than a fig-leaf or public-relations attempt to distract attention from 
businesspeople’s real (and base) motivations and activities, is not applicable to many 
of the key leading figures in the UK’s CRAs. As we will see, these figures tended to 
be political moderates, “wets” not radicals, within Thatcher’s political ambit. They can
be understood as the “institutional entrepreneurs” who provided an important impetus
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for the development of CR. Before discussing these Thatcherites, I wish to underline 
the importance of Thatcher herself. In a letterto Sir Alastair Pilkington dated August 3, 
 
Lord Sieff. I am very pleased to be able to add my good wishes for its success 
y 
nt 
ociated with you and your venture. I hope that this 
association will continue and that, through it, practical projects will be 
 
ve 
le and 
e deployed, in co-operation with central and 
local government, to develop some of the under utilized sites which blight so 
 
e know more about the form it will be taking and 
other particular ways in which you feel we could help you. 
Margaret Thatcher (Thatcher, 1981)  
 
a 
1981, the Prime Minister expressed her support for BITC:  
 
 Tom King has told me about the formation of Business in the Community with
 its aim of encouraging industry and commerce to play a more active role in 
 local communities.  I have also heard about its success from others, including 
 
 to those you have already received from my colleagues.  
 
 I am convinced that there is scope for a much wider involvement of industr
 and commerce with local communities, and I am pleased that Governme
 Departments are ass
 
 developed.  
 
 The recent troubles in some of our inner city areas well illustrate the need for
 action by all concerned. I hope, therefore, that you will be able to encourage 
 more firms to take a keen interest in meeting the needs of those who li
 there. This is particularly important  in the fields of training young peop
 encouraging small firms which can provide longer-term employment 
 possibilities. I am sure that it would help a great deal if the commercial 
 expertise of companies could b
 
 many of our inner city areas.  
 
 I understand your Council will be formally established in the autumn. Perhaps
 at that  stage you will let m
 whether there are 
  
 Yours sincerely,  
 
 
Until his break with Thatcher in the late-1980s, Michael Heseltine was in the inner 
circle of her Ministers. A political moderate, Heseltine’s career spanned posts as MP,
Minister, Secretary of State, and Deputy Prime Minister from the 1970s through the 
1990s. Heseltine was confronted with a severe recession in 1980 and 1981, which led 
to rapidly rising levels of unemployment and a series of violent uprisings in England’s 
cities: first in Bristol in 1980, then in the Brixton area of London and the Toxteth are
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of Liverpool in 1981. As Clive Unsworth remarks, “[t]he vision of violence of such 
ferocity and on such a scale being unleashed upon the British mainland administered a 
profoun
s in the 
hich had arisen so dangerously in the US” 
(Heselt
sted in the communities where they lived, 
and in general did not choose to desert their homes to attach themselves to the life of 
the Court (Heseltine 1990 [1987]: 151)  
c 
 
ely 
 
g unemployment and increasing crime and vandalism” 
(Heselt
d 
r the group. Heseltine describes how interest quickly spread in the 
busines
d shock to the political system” (Unsworth, 1982: 75).  
At the time of the riots, Heseltine was Secretary of State for the Environment 
in Margaret Thatcher’s Cabinet. Heseltine remarked that he “saw many parallel
developing UK situation with that w
ine 1981). He believed that  
 
England escaped revolution in the eighteenth century in part because, although 
there were some absentee landlords the privileged members of society were not 
divorced from their humbler fellows. They enjoyed very different standards of living, 
but they were closely involved and intere
 
According to Heseltine, “British capitalists can show a well-developed sense of publi
duty” (quoted in Deakin and Edwards, 1993: 29). So Heseltine sought to re-connect 
what had become separated. In practice, this meant a focus on the inner city problem,
which he described as “about concentrations of relatively poor people, inadequat
educated and trained, living in badly maintained housing and areas of declining
economic activity, risin
ine, 1983: 3).    
During and after the Toxteth riots, Heseltine invited thirty leading corporate 
executives to travel to Merseyside (where riots had recently taken place) by bus, an
see for themselves the squalor in which some of their compatriots lived. The new 
BITC put togethe
s sector:  
 
The breakthrough came when David Edmonds [Michael Heseltine’s personal 
secretary] received a telephone call from the secretary to the chairman of a 
financial institution who had not been invited. ‘I understand that some of my 
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chairman’s colleagues have been asked to tour Liverpool with the Secretary of
State,’ an anxious voice said
 
. ‘My chairman was wondering if there had been 
some mistake and whether a letter for him had not gone astray.’ The bus was 
tor 
the 
rms and 
 Tory principles involved.” 
Fazey d
lesse 
nd 
ike that unless those who have made a success and 
have the resources are prepared to take a positive look at the opportunities? 
is 
g 
full’ (Heseltine, 2000: 224) 
 
This may be an early example of peer pressure or contagion behavior in the area of 
CR. Heseltine did not ask these executives for money – after all, “the private sec
had been emasculated by years of penal taxation” (Heseltine, interview, 2006). 
Instead, he asked for one talented executive from each firm to be seconded (lent out, 
free of charge) to the Department of the Environment for one year. The result was the 
Financial Institutions Group, which sought to infuse government with entrepreneurial 
initiative and the spirit of efficiency. As Nicholas Deakin and John Edwards note, “
imagery was powerful: enterprise to the rescue where a plodding and divided local 
government had allowed such dreadful things to happen” (Deakin and Edwards, 1993: 
29). In Heseltine’s eyes, this was “a revolution” in the relationship between fi
government authorities, an early form of today’s private-public partnerships 
(Heseltine, interview, 2006). There were also “radical, high
escribes these as follows, paraphrasing Heseltine:  
 
Here was an opportunity to develop a Twentieth Century version of nob
oblige. Those who have the powers and responsibilities have an obligation to 
act on a wider scale than that of their own corporate entity. That is the 
approach that I adopted when I took that busload of institutional leaders rou
Merseyside and said, ‘If you’re not prepared to do it, who is?’ What hope is 
there for a community l
(Fazey, 1987: 81-82)   
 
Though references to “noblesse oblige”—“from those who have much, much 
expected” have since vanished from Corporate Responsibility rhetoric, these 
quotations provide support for Bryn Jones’ argument “that there are underlyin
similarities between contemporary CSR and previous, more explicit cases of 
  
 
89
  
patronage” (Jones, 2007: 168). Though the riots made this agenda more difficult to 
ignore than would otherwise have been the case, I agree with Ian Hamilton Fazey that 
ent 
It 
ity of St 
 writes that businesses should see CR not 
as char
 
ees 
atter 
e value of such an 
activity it is wholly appropriate that they take a systematic and businesslike 
y’s CRspeak and its 
stress o
good for the 
company, and good for the individuals. You really are on the side of the angels 
in this in my view. Everybody benefits (Fazey, 1987: 86).  
                                                
they were not responsible for its initiation or for its final shape.145   
  A common refrain in the contemporary literature on CR is that the curr
‘strategic,’ ‘business case’ focus differentiates it from previous philanthropic 
initiatives. A look at the early phases of BITC shows that this focus is not so new. “
is to enlightened self-interest that the [Community of St Helens] Trust appeals for 
support. Social conscience is a bonus,” reads a 1981 report by the Commun
Helens trust (quoted in Morison, 1987: 71). In his 1984 recollection of the 
Sunningdale conference, Alasdair Pilkington
ity, but as enlightened self-interest:  
 
there was clear agreement that the business sector had a major role to play in
the renewal of local communities. More fundamentally, this was not just a 
charitable gesture; it was in the direct interests of business, their employ
and investors …. Whilst some of these initiatives result from charitable 
motivations, the rationale for community involvement lies clearly in 
enlightened self interest …. Community involvement policy is not just a m
of public relations – it should be a part of the main stream thinking of 
corporate life … It should be a regular feature in company reports, and in 
systematic internal reviews …. Once employers recognize th
approach to ‘manage’ it (Pilkington, 1984: 15, 16, 20, 21)   
Pilkington’s statements are virtually indistinguishable from toda
n ‘win-win’ partnerships among different stakeholders: 
 
This thing is not just charity – and I don’t mean to demote the concept of 
charity – it is good for the community, good for the nation, 
 
145 Fazey remarks how: “…Despite the fact that riots were basically responsible for getting people out 
of their London offices to join the ‘moneybus’ tour of Merseyside, they were not the factor that 
precipitated Heseltine’s view on partnership between capitalism and the public sector. Rather, they were 
a calamity that he turned into a vehicle to push an idea that was already well and truly launched (Fazey, 
1987: 83).  
  
 
90
  
It is remarkable that in the maelstrom of industrial and social conflict in the 1980s, 
BITC did not become the object of political contention. Pilkington let there be no 
doubt that keeping BITC away from partisan politics was one of his foremost 
objectives:  
 
It has also become separated from politics. We have had all the parties, all the 
trade unions, come solidly behind Business in the Community. I made it a 
condition when I took it on that there should be no question of this becoming a 
political football. And the politicians who have had anything to do with it have 
been absolutely meticulous about not turning it into a political issue (Fazey, 
1987: 89) 
  
Barnekov, Boyle and Rich similarly note that “one of the virtues of nearly all the 
enterprise agencies is that they function independently of Government, banks, local 
authorities, and unions, as well as being non-political” (1989: 106). To “those who 
resisted it and said it was only small compared with the size of the problem,” 
Pilkington made the pragmatic argument that “it was better to do something rather 
than nothing” (Fazey, 1987: 89). The same spirit of pragmatism and business interests 
informs CR: 
 
It is of course true that every business is part of a larger community, and in the 
long or short run every business will be affected by social conditions in that 
larger community. We are influenced by the world outside the factory gates or 
office doors, even by the world which may be a few miles away. In this sense 
trying to influence social conditions for the better makes plain commercial 
sense. It is also very much the case that those organizations which demonstrate 
in practical terms that they care about the larger community are likely to be in 
good standing with their workers, their customers, their shareholders, and with 
central government ….. Putting the matter crudely but directly, it seems very 
likely indeed that a very large number of companies would themselves gain 
from doing more as a consequence of higher public esteem and a better 
motivated work-force.  
 
The excerpt is from Lord Carr of Hadley, who became Chairman of Business in the 
Community after Pilkington in the mid-1980s (Carr, 1986). It is striking how little 
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these excerpts differ from today’s CRspeak. If either one of these excerpts were to 
appear in print today, unaltered, hardly anyone would blink an eye.  
 The continuities also encompass the limitations of Corporate Responsibility. 
CR’s self-proclaimed potential is not unlimited. There are limitations to the voluntary 
engagement of the corporate sector, actors with whom corporations cannot dance. In 
his important study The Pathfinder, Ian Hamilton Fazey remarks that “‘Democratic’ 
controls narrow the constraints and inhibit responsiveness” (Fazey, 1987: 122). How 
do they do so?  
 
Leadership by the private sector is another crucial lesson in pulling together 
community efforts of this sort. However well-meaning and idealistic, most similar 
efforts by local authorities rarely attain the same momentum and drive. 
‘Accountability’ acts as a brake. Debates by groups of dedicated people are no 
substitute for action. If the debates lead to resolutions that cannot be realistically 
applied in the marketplace, their effect may be worse than inaction. This is not to say 
that the manager in charge be entrusted with unbridled power. It is rather that the 
controls over him or her are concerned with a different kind of accountability. If the 
manager fails to deliver, or does so in an unacceptable manner, he or she is sacked …. 
The question is about freedom of action within certain constraints (Fazey, 1987: 121; 
120)  
  
During the 1970s and 1980s, local council authorities occupied a similar role as 
radical civil society organizations over two decades later. I will now proceed to 
discuss some of the key figures in the evolution of Business in the Community, and in 
Corporate Responsibility more generally in the UK. These figures are sincere, 
outspoken advocates of engagement for the less-advantaged. They are also advocates 
of a market-liberal reform agenda.  
BITC’s first chair was Sir Alasdair Pilkington, from 1981 to 1984. Pilkington’s 
glass company was subject to economic pressures which necessitated large-scale 
redundancies – yet Pilkington felt a sense of responsibility towards his employees 
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which went beyond his legal obligations. The result was the pathfinder enterprise 
agency in St. Helen’s. In the words of Michael Heseltine (1990 [1987]): 165): 
 
like so many companies facing technological change and the need to improve 
efficiency, Pilkington had to reduce its workforce drastically. In a town where 
it was the dominant employer, the directors resolved to combine their 
determination to keep the company at the forefront of the world market with an 
equal determination to temper the social consequences for the local people 
 
During its first decade of existence, BITC’s focus was on inner-city regeneration, 
including the creation of jobs in ‘ghetto areas’ and areas of high unemployment. The 
organization took on “responsibility for setting up the network of enterprise agencies 
which we saw could play a vital part in urban regeneration” (Heseltine, 1990 [1987]), 
166). BITC also helped to regenerate rural areas. So great was the interest in CR 
during the 1980s that government officials were eager to enlist BITC’s help in 
alleviating social problems. A letter written by Dr P J Whitehead of the Development 
Commission, a UK Government Body, and addressed to P Roberts of BITC, clarifies 
the interest of public policy in CR. Whitehead draws attention to  
 
 unemployment and rural deprivation blackspots which would be suitable for 
 BIC to target  …. In addition to the valuable work which BIC undertakes 
 through LEAs I believe that many of the projects mentioned above would 
 benefit considerably in their own right from  closer involvement of BIC and its 
 members (Whitehead, 1987) 
  
Several prominent businesspeople joined Pilkington on this quest, united by an 
involvement in wartime sacrifice.146  
 Sir Hector (now: Lord) Laing, who chaired the family-owned company United 
Biscuits from 1972 to 1990, Scottish Business Community during the 1980s and 
Business in the Community from 1987 to 1991, was a central figure in the formative 
                                                 
146 Ian Hamilton Fazey writes that Bill Humphrey, the founding director of the St. Helen’s Community 
trust, Bill Humphrey, that “the war was the single most formative experience” of his life (Fazey, 1987: 
15). This is also true of Hector Laing, discussed below. 
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phases of BITC and ScotBIC (now known as SBC). Laing was very much a 
businessman. But as Director of United Biscuits, a family-owned confectionary 
company, he did not shy away from harsh criticism of his fellow businesspeople, and 
of financiers and speculators in the City who failed to live up to his moral ideals. 
Laing and others like him are evidence against the Machiavellian interpretation 
according to which CR is but a cynical or strategic attempt to legitimate base interests.   
In his biography of Hector Laing, Peter Pugh characterizes this Scotsman as “a 
Christian with a deep and unquestioning faith” (Pugh, 16). Indeed, in correspondence 
with business leaders whom he hoped to enlist in Business in the Community, Laing 
referred to CR as his ‘crusade.’ Laing was also a “friend and loyal supporter” of 
Margaret Thatcher (Pugh: 1991: 139). Laing shared with Thatcher a faith in the utility 
of the market for solving social problems. As he put it in a newsletter in 1982, 
“Instead of looking to central government to solve the problems of economic decline, 
inner city decay and environmental blight, I believe that more could be achieved more 
quickly and probably at less cost if companies and their people tackled these problems 
in a local context” (quoted in Morison, 1987: 74). Laing’s conception of businesses’ 
responsibilities and self-interest is broad and encompassing. Laing’s criticisms of 
finance, the City, and prevailing views of corporate governance are not what one 
would ordinarily expect from a close supporter of Margaret Thatcher. In his essay 
“The Balance of Responsibilities,” Laing articulates a far-reaching critique of the City, 
speculation, and short-termism. He writes that “it is wrong to define ‘performance’ as 
short-term gains for shareholders” (Laing, 1990: 61) “Sadly, the national interest 
seems to be of little account where there is a profit to be taken” (Laing, 1990: 63). In 
another paper on the ‘morality on the distribution of wealth, Laing writes: 
 
while profits are of course an essential operating requirement of a business 
they are not its sole purpose – the ultimate responsibility of business is to serve 
the needs of society and I believe the decision-makers in a business have a 
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wider moral responsibility in the distribution and application of the wealth they 
create. Business cannot isolate itself from the community of which it forms a 
constituent part … Christ gave us two great commandments: to love God and 
to love our neighbour. ‘Neighbour’ as illustrated by the story of the Samaritan 
is not a term of limited liability. It is not to be used as the measure according to 
which whole categories of people are to be selected or rejected as fit objects for 
our sympathies. Our neighbor is anyone whose need constitutes a claim on 
those of us who have resources to help alleviate that need (Laing, 1985: 8).   
 
He continues:  
The main justification for free enterprise is that it provides the best climate for 
innovation and risk-taking and I believe that it is the most efficient means of 
generating real wealth for a community and of lifting the standard of living of the vast 
majority of people. I support this Government’s policies – they have given business 
back its freedom, along with the discipline of failure if it is unprofitable. But freedom 
demands responsibility and if we want to continue to enjoy our freedom, we must 
demonstrate that a buoyant economy and business success go hand in hand with a 
caring society; that as our profits increase so too does our contribution to improving 
the condition of disadvantaged areas and people (Laing, 1990: 18) 
 
Laing described how “my peers thought all you had to do is make money and give it to 
shareholders. Improving the standard of living in the areas in which you drew your 
employees was anathema” (Laing, interview, July 6th 2006).  
 During the past decade, finance has been a major driver of Corporate 
Responsibility. From this perspective, it is interesting that in the late 1980s, “the 
Chairman [Hector Laing] was particularly concerned about the extent of the 
involvement of participation by the financial community. He felt that this sector 
required greater exhortation to become involved. There was general agreement on this 
point.” Laing also admonished financial institutions and the City of London for their 
short-termism and insufficient patriotism. Regarding the attempt to justify CR on cost-
benefit terms, i.e. the benefits [to the firm] of corporate social involvement exceed the 
costs, Laing states that “it’s a mistake to try” (interview, July 6th 2006). Laing, it 
seems, was driven more by moral motivations and ideal interests than by the self-
interested calculations of pragmatic legitimacy. The welfare of employees, 
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communities and the country have independent status and are not reducible to mere 
means to the attainment of businesses’ ends. When queried whether his firms’ CR 
activities were benefitting shareholders, Laing instated that the better the community 
is going, the more likely the shareholders are to do well (Laing, interview, 2006). 
Referring to Milton Friedman’s famous claim that “the notion of social responsibility 
was ‘a fundamentally subversive doctrine,’ and that ‘few things could so thoroughly 
undermine the very foundations of our free society as the acceptance by company 
officials of a social responsibility other than to make as much profit for their 
shareholders as possible,’” Laing says “I cannot agree” (Laing, 1985: 7).  
After being involved with the founding of the London Enterprise Agency, John 
Moorhouse moved to Scotland where he became CEO of Scottish Business in the 
Community (SCotBIC, later SBC), a position in which he served from 1990 until 
1998. Like Laing, Moorhouse displays strong ethical convictions: “money without 
heart is meaningless” (Moorhouse, interview, 2007). Corporate Responsibility is not 
understood in pragmatic or ethical functionalist terms as whatever is beneficial for the 
firm with unspecified benefits to outside stakeholders. The Minutes of the Executive 
Council of Scottish Business in the Community provide an example of Moorehouse’s 
thinking: “John Moorhouse commented that first and foremost companies must be 
seen to support their local community and until companies pursued this approach they 
would not be asked to become members of SBC” (SBC, 1992). The following 
provides another example of the importance of moral legitimacy for Moorhouse:  
 
Tesco had been involved in the initial planning of the London Enterprise 
Agency. They saw it as an opportunity to build up relationships to get planning 
consent for more supermarkets. Tesco wanted measurable benefits and 
outcomes for Tesco in return for what they put in (Moorhouse, interview, 
2007)        
 
To this Moorehouse said:  
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That’s not what it’s about! I’m not here to deliver benefits to Tesco in return 
for what they put in. I’m here to persuade Tesco that they should be doing 
something around every school that they’ve got! (Moorhouse, interview, 2007) 
 
There was no compromise, and Tesco did not become a member of LENTA. 
Moorhouse describes situations in which firms were eager to become members of 
SBC. From SUN Microsystems, he heard that: “We’re opening a factory next week [in 
Scotland]. Can we say we’re members of SBC?” To this Moorhouse replied: “we’d 
love to have you as a member but until you’re practicing some CSR we can’t invite 
you as a member.” The deal was “you gave your money to the local community first 
and to us second, we weren’t in competition for the same money,” Moorhouse recalls 
(Moorhouse, interview, 2007).    
Allen Sheppard, on the other hand, is more pragmatic. Sheppard was CEO of 
Grand Metropolitan (now known as Diageo) from 1975-1996 and Chair of BITC from 
1994-1996. For Sheppard, the connection between Business in the Community and 
market-liberalism is obvious. He states that BITC “actually started because regulation 
was becoming less marked.” He recalls that “we were great supporters of Margaret 
Thatcher,” recognizing that “we had to dramatically reduce employment in our own 
companies, reduce the inefficiencies” – but at the same time address very high 
unemployment levels, particularly of young people (Sheppard, interview, 2006). 
Addressing these challenges, according to Sheppard, required a shift from an ideology 
of ‘they-ism,’ which hadn’t worked in the preceding twenty years or so, to ‘we-ism’ 
by way of the promotion of job training and other programs described below. 
Sheppard has no problem conceding that “In case I’ve implied it was a well thought-
out philosophy a lot of it was in the time we had available and it wasn’t a huge 
amount. We just kind of got on with doing it and we sat down and rationalized it 
afterwards.” Emphasizing the business-driven nature of CR and BITC, Sheppard 
warns against regulation in the area of CR: “One of the dangers [is] people being 
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obligated rather than business itself using it appropriately…. There’s a difference 
between their [government’s] involvement in [supporting] social responsibility and 
where regulation starts” (Sheppard, interview, 2006).    
This outlook, emphasizing voluntary engagement in a context relatively free of 
regulation and constraints for companies, is a constant for the major figures in the 
development of BITC whom I interviewed. Rather than eliminating the force of moral 
or non-instrumental motivations, it seems its precondition. Stephen O’Brien “had been 
ordained as a priest in the Church of England in 1971, but had subsequently left the 
church for the voluntary sector” and retired after a successful career in finance to 
become CEO of BITC from 1983 to 1992 (Trippier, 1999: 155).  O’Brien describes 
his motivations for starting BITC as follows: “I got into it because I wanted to change 
the world and it didn’t seem like government or churches were being very helpful. We 
only later began to work out what’s the commercial case” (O’Brien, interview, 2006).  
David Sieff directed Marks and Spencer’s CR activities during the 1980s. Sieff 
critically remarks that the quality of CR has changed over his more than 30-year 
involvement with the ‘movement.’ Whereas twenty years ago the shareholders never 
really challenged CR initiatives and “quite a lot of companies had the philosophy to 
give to the community without expecting anything in return,” “I think it has moved, 
today it has changed …..We’re a much more materialistic society ….  If I give 
something [today] I expect something back. If I spend 600,000 £, [the question would 
be] how much PR would I get from it?” (Sieff, interview, July 2006). Stephen 
O’Brien, former CEO of BITC, concurs: “quite a lot of companies had the philosophy 
to give to the community without expecting anything back in return” (interview, 
2007).  
An internal May 1997 “Chairman’s Committee Paper” reflects the increasingly 
intense competitive environment and shareholder-value orientation: “An increasing 
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number of members are seeking direct and defined benefit to their company in return 
for their membership contribution.”  From its original status as a “purposive” 
organization, as BITC has grown and risen to prominence, it has become increasingly 
“utilitarian” in Peter B. Clark and James Q. Wilson’s  differentiation between 
utilitarian, solidary and purposive organizations (Clark and Wilson, 1961). Sieff 
recalls that at the time that BITC was founded, people were saying: “You’re a bunch 
of idealists. It’s a pipedream.” Though critical of these utilitarian tendencies, Sieff 
concludes that in light of the successes of BITC during the past twenty-five years “the 
idealists won. The riots helped” (Sieff, interview, July 2006). 
The evidence above suggests that many of Business in the Community’s key 
founding figures were motivated to by the desire to address their moral sensibilities 
and pressing social needs as well as the imperatives of business. This, I surmise, was a 
powerful motivation not only for the leaders of businesses and CR associations such as 
BITC, but for employees as well. The late Chris Bullock, who had been involved for 
Shell with CR since the early 1980s, remarked that the “Friedman line is soulless” and 
has consequently “become devalued over time.” “We aren’t machines,” he insists. 
Bullock mentions his son, who spends most of his time “pushing money around” for 
Goldman Sachs. Though this activity pays handsomely, this activity is “is not that 
meaningful for his life,” whereas community projects are (Bullock, interview 2007).   
After 1983, with the return of Anthony Pelling to his Department and the 
appointment of Stephen O’Brien as Chief Executive followed soon by Sir Alastair 
Pilkington relinquishing the post of Chairman, BITC offered the role of Patron and 
later President to HRH Prince of Charles.147 The active involvement of Prince Charles 
brought a social cachet to being a member of the BITC board. The Prince personally 
                                                 
147 According to Tony Pelling, this post had been offered to Prince Charles at the outset. However, there 
had been concern that this might lead people to join the organization for the wrong reason: to hobnob 
with Prince Charles.  
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led a series of “Seeing is Believing” tours of depressed areas and participation in these 
was as strongly sought as had been invitations to Michael Heseltine’s business leaders 
tour of Liverpool in 1981. The pull of the future monarch gave extra momentum to the 
growth of BITC’s membership and his leadership and presence continues to bolster 
support for CR among UK firms.  
Returning to the macro-level: at the same time as the British economy was 
progressively ‘freed’ from its fetters under Margaret Thatcher, Corporate 
Responsibility acquired a ‘social’ coloration. In ideal-typical terms, in a market-liberal 
regime, firms legitimate themselves by emphasizing that they are socially responsible. 
As we will see in the next chapter, this contrasts with the rise of CR in Germany. In 
that more constrained institutional framework, firms emphasize their ‘freedom.’ CR is 
thus a concept with different faces, which fulfills different meanings in different 
contexts.  
 
VII. Corporate Responsibility and the Question of Regulation 
So far, I have used precious little space to address the relationship between Corporate 
Responsibility – private self-regulation – and public regulation. David Vogel makes a 
compelling case that CR “should be about more than going ‘beyond compliance’; it 
must also include efforts to raise compliance standards” (Vogel, 2005: 171). Yet 
Vogel provides no empirical evidence of business’s willingness – or lack of 
willingness – to raise the bar for all. BITC’s stance in this area is invariant and easily 
summarized:  BITC is opposed to more stringent binding regulation. Anthony Pelling 
recalls that there had been fear/speculation during the mid-1980s that BITC had been 
set up to bypass the Confederation of British Industry as an organization representing 
business to the corridors of power. An article had suggested that BIC was an attempt 
to undermine the CBI from the left. However, these fears/speculations were without 
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basis in fact.148 There is little evidence that British businesses favor legislating more 
stringent standards for all. The exchange between Sir Geoffrey Chandler and Tony 
Cleaver, Chief Executive of IBM (UK), following the latter’s lecture on “The Social 
Responsibilities of Business” (Cleaver, 1987) is particularly instructive.  
Sir Geoffrey Chandler:  
 
IBM is a very large part of its own industry and can in some ways influence a 
pattern of behaviour. But in most industries if one thinks one is good oneself, 
one will be concerned about the bad behaviour of competitors. I wonder if IBM 
share that concern, because their reputation is obviously tempered by the way 
other people behave. Would you welcome legislation which led others to 
match your approach to social responsibilities? Clearly IBM, like any other 
company in this country, suffers from episodes such as the Guiness affair. 
 
 A.B. Cleaver: 
 
I think it would be very unusual for anybody in IBM to say that they would 
welcome more legislation. In general terms we would prefer to see self-
regulation of one form or another. But as you observe, some recent events 
suggest that it is not always very effective. We clearly are a very large part of 
our industry, but I do not think that we do what we do because of our size and 
relative position within the industry. I really think we do it because we believe 
in the long term it is in our interests to operate that way. A rule book that 
somebody else had set up and you did not necessarily believe in would not 
have quite the same effect as going it because it is accepted throughout the 
organization as the right thing to do and part of company culture …. By being 
successful in genuine commercial terms, other people may come to believe that 
it is the right thing to do. I would rather achieve it by example than by 
legislation (Cleaver, 1987: 756) 
 
Cleaver’s response typifies businesspeople’s stance on this issue, not only within the 
UK but across Europe and the OECD more generally.  
A 20 May 1994 Strategic Impact review of BITC written by the management 
consultants McKinsey is also instructive. The review categorizes members according 
to their corporate will and skill on CR. In the report, approximately 57% of the 
                                                 
148 Anthony A Pelling, personal communication, 7 July 2008 
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members sampled belong in the low skill and low will section, while 20% exhibit high 
skill and high will. Those with high will and low skill as well as high skill and low 
will make up just under twenty and five percent of the membership, respectively 
(McKinsey, 1994: 32). McKinsey sees BITC’s mandate as helping to move as many 
members as possible into the high will and high skill category, and to stay far enough 
‘ahead of the pack’ that even the most sophisticated members in that category continue 
to see value in their BITC membership.     
On the issue of regulation, the McKinsey report differentiates between 
Business Impact goals and strategies, community impact goals and strategies, and 
government impact goals and strategies. According to McKinsey, Business impact 
goals and strategies are “on mission” for BITC, as they “play to the strengths of BITC 
and business.” The example cited is to “secure members commitment to measurement 
and continuous improvement of their own performance in area x [for example increase 
members’ purchases from black owned suppliers ten-fold in three years]” (McKinsey, 
1994: 12). Community impact goals include the social objective pursued such as 
“reduce unemployment amongst black 16-21 year olds by 50% in three years.” Like 
the business impact goals, social objectives are “on mission” for BITC, but 
challenging, since “it is harder to demonstrate [a] causal link between BITC / business 
effort and impact.” Finally, there are government impact goals and strategies, for 
example, “secur[ing] introduction of U.S.-style positive discrimination laws.” The 
McKinsey report is clear: these strategies and goals are “off mission,” and they “do 
not play to BITC / business strengths” (McKinsey, 1994: 12-13). 
 That is not the only section in which the report discusses companies’ lobbying 
impacts on public policy. In a later section, the report states that BITC “should focus 
on mobilising corporate organizations”: 
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GET MEMBERS INTO ACTION     CEOs LOBBY GOVT   
RATIONALE        RATIONALE 
Membership satisfaction demands demonstrable   Impact driven by changes in  
if modest impacts       Government may be large 
CEOs can’t do it on their own     Government biggest lever on   
Employee demand for corporate involvement   community 
Employees need to be engaged and be helped to    CEOs sufficient 
learn how to do it       CEOs value this form of  
        activity 
CCI is an excellent vehicle for people development 
 
CCI mission requires heavy emphasis on mobilising   There are many other players: 
corporate organisations      CBI, Trade Associations,  
BITC is market leader      London First 
Changes uncertain, 
unsustainable and unlikely to 
satisfy membership 
 
Despite recognizing that “Government [has the] biggest lever on community” and “the 
impact driven by changes in Government may be large,” the McKinsey report 
recommends against BITC lobbying government on CR related issues. It points out 
that there are other, powerful players in this field, not only business lobbying 
associations such as the Confederation of British Industry and Trade Associations, but 
CEOs of large firms as well. BITC’s stance is typical of the CRAs studied in this 
thesis. CRAs are neither able nor willing to lobby to raise regulatory standards.  
In addition to a programmatic element, organizational interests matter. As the 
McKinsey report stresses, “Employees need to be engaged and be helped to learn how 
to do it ….  CCI mission requires heavy emphasis on mobilising corporate 
organisations ….  BITC is market leader.” A voluntaristic framework accords a role to 
NGOs like BITC which they did not have under the post-war settlement, and which 
they might not have if the public provision of social goods was more extensive or 
regulatory standards were more stringent. This corroborates with other anecdotal 
evidence suggesting that NGOs and civil society organizations are organizationally 
invested, and actively complicit in the market-liberal order.149  
                                                 
149 See Soule (2009: 8-9). 
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 Another instance when BITC has spoken out against regulation was the 
Consultation on the European Union Green Paper ‘Promoting a European Framework 
for Corporate Social Responsibility.’ In unpublished BITC documentation preceding 
the Green Paper, BITC’s push “to promote best practice, avoiding formal regulation,” 
is apparent. “The CBI would go in heavily on the anti-legislation point and BITC 
wanted to endorse this but also put forward positive suggestions.” One participant, 
Sandy Leitch, stressed that “the [BITC’s] paper contained examples of leadership 
commitment but emphasis needed to be even stronger to offset possible legislation.” 
While pre-empting EU legislation was at the forefront of participants’ concerns, the 
question also arose of BITC’s role should the EU take the legislative route: “Sir Peter 
[Davis] asked Peter Davies to respond on how BITC could cope and what role it 
would take if legislation were imposed” (BITC archives, CC4/2001/37 “Any Other 
Business,” Business in the Community, London). In a summary statement on the 
Green Paper, then-BITC chairman Peter Davis stated: 
 
Business in the Community has worked closely with the CBI in the response to 
the consultation, as both organizations have the same core membership 
companies. We welcome the issuing of the Green Paper from the European 
Union as recognition of the mainstream relevance of Corporate Social 
Responsibility. However member companies of Business in the Community 
and the CBI are wary of the potential intervention of government through 
legislation on corporate social responsibility – by definition CSR practices are 
beyond compliance to legislation. Members would be against any suggestion 
of increased legislation, particularly at the European level that tries to draw 
together all the various strands that contribute to the definition of corporate 
social responsibility and imposes an EU-wide model (Davies, 2001: 3).  
 
In this instance, one of the world’s foremost CRAs spoke out against “harmonization” 
at the European level. Evidently, there continue to be exceptions to the “notable shift” 
towards “harmonization strategies” noted by Virginia Haufler: strategies which would 
“support international regulation ... in order to reduce the costs of operating under 
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multiple regulatory regimes and level the competitive playing field,” strengthening 
“international institutions as sites of governance” (Haufler, 2003: 231). In the U.K and 
elsewhere, this thesis finds little evidence that CRAs are pursuing harmonization 
strategies. 
Quite the contrary: CR is used to justify a deregulatory agenda. In his speech to 
the Business in the Community 2006 annual conference, Conservative Party Chairman 
and now Prime Minister David Cameron describes the Conservatives’ approach to 
Corporate Responsibility as “deregulation in exchange for more responsibility” 
(Cameron, 2006: 3). This view was later re-formulated by the Conservative Party 
working group in the report entitled “A light but effective touch” (2008). The report is 
based on the notion of Corporate Responsibility Deals. The Secretary of State 
convenes working groups with businesses and societal stakeholders. As a quid pro quo 
for their engagement and self-regulation, businesses are rewarded with “a lighter 
regulatory touch where appropriate” (2008: 11).  
While speaking out against regulation, BITC has articulated an ambitious 
social agenda, setting goals which the organization and its member companies were 
unable to realize. The cynical interpretation according to which CR is pragmatic 
bargaining, public relations and tokenism cannot account for this discrepancy between 
objectives and outcomes. Sir Hector Laing celebrated Margaret Thatcher’s policies, 
while chiding sections of the business community for their lack of responsibility. In a 
speech to the PerCent Club, Laing praised the Prime Minister:  
 
Your [Margaret Thatcher’s] Government has taken a step back from 
involvement in every aspect of our economic and social lives, which has 
encouraged the business sector to take a step forward and to invest in the 
communities from which we draw our employees and to which we sell our 
goods and services. Without this change of climate, the Per Cent club would 
never have gotten off the ground (Laing, 1988: 2)  
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The UK PerCent Club was founded by Sir Hector Laing in 1986 to encourage 
companies to devote one percent of their before profit revenues to community 
investment; in more recent years, the Club has sought to inspire and challenge 
companies to maximize their positive impact on society. Hector Laing had gotten the 
idea from a visit to Minnesota, where firms devote up to five percent of their pre-tax 
profits to philanthropic causes. Though a number of companies ended up joining the 
Per Cent Club – 52 in 1986, nearly two-hundred by 1988 – these numbers remained 
far below Laing’s ambitions. In 1988, Laing’s objective was 500 members giving at 
least one percent of pre-tax profits within two years. This goal was never realized. 
Notes from the 08 July 1997 Board Meeting show that nearly a decade later, BITC 
intended that “the criteria for membership be increased to 1%, and that members move 
towards this target by 2001” (BITC 1997). In 1998, an unpublished “chairman’s 
committee“ draft “Measurement against the Strategic Objectives” enunciated similar 
objectives: “Increasing both the rigor and the membership of the percent club as a 
measure of company resources, in cash, time and time, allocated to community 
investment moving to a 1% standard, with 75% of the BITC membership achieving 
the standard” (BITC 1998). These objectives were not attained: according to David 
Campbell, Geoff Moore and Matthias Metzger, the generosity ratio of the PerCent 
Club members rose from approximately 0.49% to 0.64% of pre-tax profits between 
1997 and 2000 (Campbell, Moore and Metzger 2002: 39; my calculations).150      
During the 1980s, the political and social context for the conduct of business 
had undergone a fundamental change. In this new environment, defensive action to 
prevent government and trades union incursions into business freedoms receded into 
the background. In the “Corporate Social Responsibility Discussion Document: 
                                                 
150 The PerCent Club has since been disbanded, in a move from philanthropic or redistributive CR to an 
increasingly ‘strategic’ orientation emphasizing the ‘business case’ for CR. 
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Business Investment in the Community,” the Confederation of British Industry gives 
four reasons why businesses should become involved in CR:  
 
i) as caring citizens; the wish to put something back into the environment; 
much is already being done, the image of British business as exploiters and 
profit makers is not a true picture   
 
ii) Thriving British industry makes a contribution of some 28 billion a year to 
Government funds; value for money in public expenditure us a priority 
 
iii) Inner city riots, wasted resources, high crime rates, unfit workforce, and 
uncompetitive education system all contribute to business costs and are 
reflected in lower international confidence in the UK economy 
 
iv) If business does not take on the problems of the community, in tackling 
pollution for example, such issues may become law; industry would prefer to 
be allowed to get on with running its own business (CBI, 1987) 
 
This document reflects on the Watkinson Report on “The Responsibilities of the 
British Public Company” in 1977:  
 
That report was written at a time when the CBI was concerned at the 
encroaching public sector. Now the pendulum is swinging the other way and 
the question is how companies should respond to the increasing demands 
which society is putting on it. Part of the response has to be to convince society 
of businesses’ role in terms of wealth creation. The second aspect is to advise 
companies on how best to respond to these demands in the most constructive 
way at local, regional and national level (CBI, 1987: 3). 
According to these documents, eight years after Margaret Thatcher’s rise to power, 
British society was placing increasing demands on business. These societal norms 
must be seen in the context of Thatcher’s institutional reforms and her dismantling of 
institutionalized social solidarity. In response to the demands made on business as a 
consequence of its increased freedoms, the CBI proposes two strategies: convincing 
society of the legitimacy of normal business activities, i.e. adjusting society’s 
expectations in business; and helping business to satisfy these expectations “in the 
most constructive way” (CBI, 1987). As I have suggested above, CR helps to fulfill 
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both of these functions, closing and diminishing though by no means eliminating the 
resulting legitimation deficit. The relationship between Corporate Responsibility and 
Enterprise Culture receives in-depth treatment in the following section.  
 
VIII. Corporate Responsibility and Enterprise Culture 
 
I came into office with one deliberate intent: to change Britain from a 
dependent to a self-reliant society – from a give-it-to-me to a do-it-yourself 
nation. A get-up-and-go, instead of a sit-back-and wait-for-it Britain. This 
means creating a new culture – an enterprise culture – which accords a new 
status to the entrepreneur and offers him the rewards to match; which breeds a 
new generation of men and women who create jobs for others instead of 
waiting for others to create jobs for them (Thatcher, 1984: 11).   
As I have sought to show, Corporate Responsibility, and the support of 
organizations such as Business in the Community, was one attempt to deal with the 
problems of unemployment, rationalization and industrial restructuring that hit the UK 
hard during the 1970s and 1980s. But CR was not only a material practice; it was (and 
is) a discourse as well, one that did not merely reflect material and social practices, but 
aimed to alter actors’ self-understandings. The discourse of Corporate Responsibility 
rose along with those stressing entrepreneurship and Enterprise Culture. The historical 
backdrop of the 1970s is critical. According to Roger Burrows and Dick Hobbs, 
“before 1979 the term entrepreneur was one of abuse” in some sectors of society 
(Burrows and Hobbs, 1991: 1). In the words of Ian Hamilton Fazey, during the mid-
1970s the attitude “was one that saw jobs as being provided by someone, some body, 
some institution, some central or local government body or agency, or some sort of 
charity” (Fazey, 1987: 23). 
Enterprise culture was an attempt to reverse this tide in favor of business, to redefine 
norms of appropriateness, to provide a “radical break” and “complete political 
redefinition of the desired form of state and society” in line with the Thatcherites’ 
goals (Kus, 2006: 507). Enterprise culture is the rhetorical inflection given to CR by 
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Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative governments: “the programme of enterprise reform 
lies at the very heart of the government’s moral crusade” (Heelas and Morris, 1990: 
1); but since CR is Corporate Responsibility, Enterprise Culture is always at least a 
latent or implicit part of the concept/practice of CR. It can be seen as part and parcel 
of the Tories’ attempt to replace the norms of the postwar compromise with an 
enterprise culture and a “property-owning democracy.” In the words of Nicolas Keat, 
Enterprise Culture “emerged as a central motif in the political thought and practice of 
the Conservative government in Britain” (Keat, 1990: 1).   
The current literature sees CR as an exogenous response to the threat of 
government regulation. Thus, it almost completely ignores Corporate Responsibility’s 
active, indeed integral role in re-shaping of Britain’s post-war order. For Jeremy 
Moon, “one reason that UK CSR can be regarded as increasingly explicit is the 
emergence of its new institutional context” (Moon, 2005: 60). Moon points to the 
crisis in societal governance in the 1970s, which the Thatcher government resolved by 
“narrowing its responsibility for the direct delivery of social goods” (Moon, 2005: 54). 
Moon rightly stresses that governments were not passive bystanders in the rise of CR 
in the UK: they actively promoted and facilitated CR in a variety of ways (Moon, 
2005, 2004). However, the precise relationship between the rise of CR on one hand, 
and the socio-economic transformations of the 1970s and 1980s remains unclear, as in 
the following passage: “British CSR has now acquired wider global application as the 
trend toward the downsizing of government’s role in social regulation has become 
more widespread” (Moon, 2005: 55). Is CR endogenous or exogenous to these 
changes? 
Moon suggests that CR is exogenous, a reaction to these changes rather than 
part and parcel of them. He notes that CR was motivated “to protect the social license 
of business to trade.” He quotes the following excerpt from the report Company 
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Responses to Unemployment, published by the Confederation of British Industry in 
1981:  
 
companies fear that if they make no attempt to find solutions to community 
problems, the government may increasingly take on the responsibility itself. 
Thus might prove costly to employers both in terms of new obligations and 
greater intervention in the labour market. Many companies prefer to be one 
step ahead of government legislation or intervention, to anticipate social 
pressures themselves and hence be able to develop their own policies in 
response to them (CBI, 1981: 7, quoted in Moon, 2005: 55)  
Moon rightly emphasizes that many companies engage in CR hoping to pre-empt 
government regulation. But beyond this basic point, the excerpt is misleading, in two 
respects. First: it does not seem like UK governments from Thatcher to New Labour 
needed to be convinced of the merits of deregulation or of business-led CR. This was 
Margaret Thatcher’s agenda, and these priorities did not change under New Labour. In 
the wake of the European Commission’s 2003 Green Paper, for example, the UK’s 
Department of Trade and Industry lobbied the Commission to “ensure that reporting 
on social and environmental issues remains voluntary” (Joseph, 2003: 62-63). Second, 
the above paragraph is a selective excerpt from the Company Responses to 
Unemployment report. Here is the excerpt preceding the one quoted by Moon:  
 
Not only do companies recognize their responsibilities to the community and 
see action as being in their own self interest, they understand that it is often business 
and not government which is in the best position to act …. Companies recognize that 
the entrepreneurial spirit on which private enterprise has developed, combined with 
the management expertise possessed by most successful companies, puts business in 
unique position to ‘get things done.’ The ability to analyse problems and develop 
solutions makes business more effective than a government department (CBI, 1981: 
6).   
 
In contrast to the paragraph quoted by Moon, this excerpt suggests that CR is not 
simply a reaction or response to the threat of government regulation. Instead, CR can 
be thought of as an active and integral part of business-led re-structuring of social 
relations away from institutionalized social solidarity and towards market-liberal 
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norms of civic voluntarism. While some scholars have come to see the rightward shift 
of the Conservative party during the 1970s and 1980s as “The Free Economy and the 
Strong State,”151 E.H. Green argues that Thatcher’s goal was to re-invigorate and de-
politicize civil society. “Thatcherism can be viewed as perhaps the ultimate expression 
of Conservative belief in agencies of civil society as the fulcrum of social life” (Green, 
2002: 278). This suggests a very different interpretation of Corporate Responsibility, 
and of government’s role in fostering it, than is suggested above by Moon, one which 
makes the impassioned advocacy of a Hector Laing for this cause much more 
comprehensible. I will return to the question of whether businesses can properly be 
thought of as yet another element of civil society. Whatever its intellectual cogency, 
we can see from the following example that this view was politically expedient.    
 The Institute of Directors was the most radical free-market wing of British 
business during the 1980s. Walter Goldsmith was director general of the Institute of 
Directors from 1979-1984 and “the most outspoken liberationist of early 
Thatcherism,” as Jonathan Boswell and James Peters note in their important study 
(Boswell and Peters, 1997: 155). Goldsmith is typical of liberationists in seeing a 
harmony of interests between business and society: “There is not a separate business 
interest that needs to be restored to … prosperity at the expense of employees and 
customers. The interests of business are not competitive ... but complementary and 
even identical with them” (Boswell and Peters, 1997: 157). In fact, CR was one 
element in Margaret Thatcher’s drive to replace the postwar compromise with 
‘enterprise culture.’ CR was thus compatible with the political priorities of 
Conservative governments. As John Corner and Sylvia Harvey put it: 
 
In the New Right vision of enterprise culture, enterprise is the enemy of 
regulation, red tape and bureaucracy, of stagnation, welfarism, and elitism. … 
The enterprising spirit is believed to be at odds with the collectivist 
                                                 
151 Gamble (1994) 
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philosophy; it is competitive, flexible, innovative, bold, confident and risk-
taking. It is a pre-condition, its advocates argue, for the creation of wealth, and 
its manifestations are to be found in the qualitative growth of small businesses, 
and in the wider share-ownership of privatisation and ‘popular capitalism’ 
(Corner and Harvey, 1991: 60).   
 
Carr and Beaver (2002) point to a striking paradox at the heart of the creation of an 
enterprise culture in the UK: it was spearheaded by government. Thus, rolling back the 
state and redressing the balance between state and society were, to a considerable 
extent, the result of government action. Patricia Carr (Carr, 2000: 8) links the creation 
of an enterprise culture to the following structural changes: 
 
dismantling the welfare state 
reducing the power of trade unions 
deregulation 
marketization 
privatization 
cuts in taxation 
reducing the role of the state and enlarging that of the individual 
reducing the public sector borrowing requirement 
introducing firm monetary and fiscal discipline thus bringing inflation under 
control 
promoting self-employment  
 
Although the rise of Corporate Responsibility was closely linked with these 
developments, it was not at their cutting edge. If we follow Jonathan Boswell and 
James Peters (Boswell and Peters, 1996) in dividing the post-war British business elite 
into “revisionist” and “liberationist” groups or ideal-types, the mid-1970s saw a 
groundswell of support for “liberationist opinion.” Only well into the 1980s did this 
radical Thatcherite, neo-liberal view of society become dominant among business 
associations – and the Confederation of British Industry lagged behind the Institute of 
Directors in the adoption of this ideology (Boswell and Peters, 1996). BITC’s close 
ties with the CBI in its early years can be seen as a sign that CR was initially aligned 
with the old order, not the new one that Thatcher and her disciples were creating. At 
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the beginning of the 1980s, the CBI was criticized for its conservatism. An excellent 
example of this was Director Sir General Terrence Becket’s vow in 1980 to conduct a 
“bare knuckles” fight to get the Thatcher government to lower interest and exchange 
rates. The CBI, and British manufacturing’s reservations with selective aspects of 
Tory policy do not imply that the CBI was more supportive of the Labour party than 
the Tories. But they are a stark contrast to the Institute of Directors, to which BITC 
was only weekly linked during the early 1980s.  
Relations between the IOD and BITC improved towards the mid-late 1980s. In 
his speech at the Institute of Directors’ 1988 annual convention, IOD Chairman  Sir 
John Hoskyns stated that “the Institute of Directors has been at the heart of Britain’s 
economic revolution since 1979” (Hoskyns, 1988). While such laudatory self-
descriptions must be treated with caution, a number of sources corroborate this claim. 
The IOD was a radical and outspoken supporter of the Thatcher government’s 
remaking of Britain’s post-war order (Grant, 1987: 127-128). Over time, “the 
unthinkable,” the IOD’s radical policy prescriptions, “gradually bec[ame] the 
conventional wisdom” (Hoskyns, 1988). Indeed, the IOD is “widely regarded as a 
major influence in shaping the Tory employment legislation” (Lewis and Wildes, 
1984: 75). Lewis and Wiles write: “[t]he CBI was fatally flawed as an historical 
creature of corporatism …. [T]he CBI has ceased to be the voice representing capital 
to government and its leaders have sometimes been publicly rebuked for their lack of 
commitment to the new market ideology” (Lewis and Wiles, 1984: 71). While the split 
between the CBI and IOD was especially apparent in the early 1980s, it subsequently 
diminished. And even when the CBI remained “cautious,” it “welcomed most of the 
[Thatcher] government’s industrial relations policies” as Colin Crouch observes 
(Crouch, 1990: 342).     
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In his 1988 Convention speech “A New Agenda for Business,” Hoskyns linked 
Corporate Responsibility to the IOD’s radical agenda for institutional reform. Hoskyns 
stressed the IOD’s push for privatization and a “low-tax economy,” and against 
collective bargaining, which he described as “obsolescent” and “out of date”: 
employees should be treated as “individuals not as collective factors of production.” 
But along with these priorities, Hoskyns stresses the necessity for business to 
“improve the quality of business leadership” to “help solve public problems.” The 
latter sounds much like Corporate Responsibility. In fact, Hoskyns referrs specifically 
to the Institute of Business Ethics and to BITC in his speech.  He mentions that 
BITC’s CEO Stephen O’Brien “warmly endorsed” the IOD’s ‘New Agenda,’ as did 
BITC’s President the Prince of Wales (Hoskyns, 1988).   
 Unlike the Institute of Directors, Business in the Community did not lead the 
charge against labor unions, the Trades Union Confederation, or other elements of the 
post-war settlement. BITC’s was an inclusive enterprise from the very start. At the 1st 
meeting of the Working Group on Community Involvement which led to the 
formation of BITC, “The Chairman [Sir Alastair Pilkington] considered it important 
that the trade unions should also be involved as their support was essential. The 
Secretary Anthony Pelling reported that he had written to the TUC and hoped to 
arrange a meeting in early November to discuss the possibilities” ((CI(80)). As a 
result, the Trades Union Congress became a founder member of Business in the 
Community’s Governing Council. Even during the coal miners in 1984-1985, BITC 
remained committed to non-partisanship. The organization’s governing council was 
composed of members of the TUC as well as business and state representatives. 
According to a brochure entitled Trade Unions and the Community: Working for Jobs, 
“Business in the Community is a business-led partnership of business enterprises, 
central and local government, chambers of commerce, the trade union Movement and 
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voluntary, professional and educational organizations” (1986: 1). However, being 
business-led, BITC was either unable or unwilling to take a stand on institutional 
reform that differed from the IOD, the CBI, and other business associations. On these 
fundamental questions of the institutional rules of the game, BITC swam with the tide. 
A cynic might state that BITC did not need to take a stance on these issues because 
powerful business interests already had. Another perspective would emphasize BITC’s 
inability rather than its unwillingness to affect these macro-level processes.   
To clarify, Business in the Community was manifestly not the leading edge of 
the transition towards market-liberalism in the U.K. Nor were the leading market-
liberal think-tanks, the engines of the transition to market-liberalism – the Institute of 
Economic Affairs, the Centre for Policy Studies, the Adam Smith Institute and the 
Social Affairs Unit – outspoken proponents of Corporate Responsibility. The 
relationship was more complex and subtle than that.     
Two decades later, the position of major British business interest associations 
on CR is unchanged. Businesses should engage in Corporate Responsibility activities 
as they see fit. The regulatory framework should provide them with as much discretion 
and as little compulsion as possible. In the words of Bryan Cress of the Confederation 
of British Industries, who lobbies to ensure that there is no regulatory framework on 
Corporate Responsibility, “CSR should remain a set of voluntary initiatives.” In the 
context of CR, “[one should] not use the word should or must.” In addition, “business 
is not a surrogate of government” (Cress, interview, 2006). Though large 
multinationals are more proactive than small and medium-sized companies, Cress 
stresses that there is no variation among the CBI’s membership on the question of a 
regulatory framework. All 2,000 direct and 20,000 indirect CBI members agree that 
CR has to be voluntary (Cress, interview, 2006).         
  
 
115
  
It therefore seems that Corporate Responsibility has not been at odds with the 
transformation of the British political economy since the late-1970s. On fundamental 
questions of the institutional and regulatory framework, business and industry lobby 
and business-led CR organizations have been on the same page. This is not surprising 
when one considers that virtually all members of BITC are simultaneously members in 
powerful industry lobby organizations such as the CBI and IOD. Apart from the 
alignment of their underlying interests, it is clear that despite the impressive dynamism 
of CR in the UK, the voices from Centre Point (CBI) and Pall Mall (IOD) carry more 
punch than those from Shepherdess Walk (BITC), where emphases differ. The 
relations between these organizations can be seen as a “good cop, bad cop” division of 
labour: the CBI and IOD lead the charge to promote a business-friendly environment 
and defend business against burdensome regulations, while BITC and other 
organizations work together with companies on a voluntary basis to maximize positive 
and minimize negative impacts.  
This division of labour is facilitated by the prevailing definition of CR that sees 
it as ‘activities that go beyond compliance.’ Thus, as one official of the UK’s 
Department of Trade and Industry stressed to me, “corporate taxation is not a CSR 
issue” (DTI, interview, 2007). Whether it may become one remains to be seen; but the 
theoretical point stands. If CR consists of whatever goes beyond regulation, “you can’t 
have the conversation about what should be regulated,” as Deborah Doane of the 
CORA Coalition for Corporate Accountability stresses (Doane, interview, 2006). This 
is not to deny differences of emphasis between business associations with a broad- 
based membership and CRAs composed of CR leaders and agenda-setters. The latter 
may, for example, stress the difference between legality and morality. Thus for Peter 
Brew of the International Business Leaders Forum: “just because something is not 
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illegal it doesn’t mean it is right. We take a very different line from the CBI” (Brew, 
interview, 2007). 
For British trade unions, Corporate Responsibility is an ambivalent 
phenomenon. “CSR is not a substitute for legally required minimum standards which 
all companies should comply with” remarks Janet Williamson of the Trades Union 
Congress. “One of the dangers of CSR is in the sphere of what’s voluntary. [CSR] 
tends to promote a pick-and-choose agenda.” Williamson points out that virulently 
anti-union companies such as Unipart and Asda are members of Business in the 
Community. According to David Grayson, John Neill, CEO of Asda, was “scarred by 
the trade union militancy and extremism in the UK auto industry in the late 
1970s/early 80s which largely destroyed the UK auto industry (Grayson, personal 
communication, January 6, 2010). According to Williamson, the white collar union 
Amicus has tried to use CSR to argue against the off-shoring of thousands of jobs 
from the UK. “I wouldn’t say it’s succeeded,” she remarks (Williamson, interview, 
2006). However, it would not seem reasonable for union activists to blame BITC for 
some of their members’ antipathy towards unions. By its very nature, CR precludes 
such sanctioning power.  
Though BITC has often sought to ‘inspire rather than bludgeon,’ BITC 
occasionally criticizes those who fail to adhere to its ideals of responsible business 
practice. In 2004, Philip Green launched a takeover bid of Marks and Spencer, a BITC 
member familiar from the discussion above and considered to be part of the inner 
circle of responsible business in Britain. In a Financial Times interview, BITC CEO 
Julia Cleverdon stated that “These aren’t the values by which Philip Green runs the 
business … I think these values will go if he takes it over and takes it private” 
(Financial Times, July 7, 2004). Threatened with a lawsuit, Cleverdon was forced to 
retract these remarks and offer an apology stating that she had no grounds to doubt 
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Green’s ethical credentials. This example suggests that, though BITC is not without 
levers with which to influence companies’ actions, there are very real limits to the 
reach and influence of this ‘soft’ power. Indeed, it may be CR’s inability to shape 
these conditions that most starkly differentiates it from the institutions of the post-war 
settlement.     
 
IX The Role of State Support and Public Subsidies 
 
One of the surprising empirical findings about Corporate Responsibility in the 
U.K. is the importance of state involvement in this area. The resources for CR are not 
necessarily corporate; many of them are public. Since the late 1970s, British 
governments have supported CR through direct transfers and subsidies, and indirectly, 
though tax credits and reforms to incentives for charitable giving, and through direct 
political support.    
  The precise amount of government support for CR associations in the UK is 
hard to quantify, but it is clear that it has been substantial (Moon, 2004). First, under 
the leadership of Ministers Michael Heseltine and Sir David Trippier, Conservative 
governments spearheaded the creation of several hundred Local Enterprise Agencies 
(LEAs) across the U.K. in the early 1980s. Michael Heseltine wanted there to be at 
least 300 LEAs, more than the private sector was able or willing to sustain. So 
government took the lead. LEAs were devised to facilitate the creation of small 
businesses through entrepreneurship, particularly in depressed areas affected by 
industrial restructuring. Although government support seems to have been less 
extensive for BITC than for the LEAs, if is not clear how much there would have been 
for BITC to oversee during the 1980s, had government not spearheaded the creation of 
the LEAs. According to Michael Heseltine, “Without Government intervention there 
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is not the slightest doubt that things would have gone much more slowly” (quoted in 
Fazey, 1987: 82).  
 With regard to the Local Enterprise Agencies – the main delivery vehicles for 
CR beginning in the 1970s – the extent of direct state involvement is striking: “The 
most significant EAs are heavily dependent on public sector sponsorship …. [T]he 
more substantive EAs involve significant public investment either directly through 
core funding or indirectly through supporting projects” (Moore, 1988: 27, 28). Though 
“based on market assumptions and objectives,” these initiatives “represent 
intervention in the market and rely extensively on public support” (Moore, 1988: 27). 
Funding which matched private sector funds with government support, such as the 
LEA Grant Scheme and LEA Projects Scheme, was critical to the rapid expansion of 
Local Enterprise Agencies.152  Indirect support, for example through provisions in the 
tax code, was also important. Tom King persuaded John McGregor, then Chief 
Secretary (ie responsible for the public correspondence) at the Treasury,  
 
to make an important concession in the 1982 Budget. Section 48 of the 1982 
Finance Act enabled companies to claim 100 per cent tax relief on 
contributions to Enterprise Agencies, whether these were in cash or in kind. 
When it came to secondment, it was a very good deal, since secondment was 
‘help in kind’ just as much as passing on a used computer for an agency to use 
for financial modeling. It really did mean training and management 
development on the cheap (Fazey, 1987: 87) 
Then, in the 1986 Budget, Nigel Lawson passed a Charities Package costing £70 
million:  
partly on merit and partly to give it an added political dimension …. This had 
one principle running through it, which I frequently enunciated, and which informed 
my other concessions in this field in other Budgets: namely, that the best way to make 
such concessions is to assist, not the charities themselves, but the act of charitable 
giving.  (Lawson, 1993: 380)    
  
                                                 
152 I am grateful to David Grayson for this point.  
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David Trippier was elected as Minister of Parliament for Rossendale in 1979. 
Trippier became the Minister in Margaret Thatcher’s administration in 1983, 
responsible for Small Firms. He describes the conditions in his constituency in the 
early 1980s:  
 
I was in terrible trouble in my constituency. Unemployment had rocketed. It 
was the worst example of the rise of unemployment in the UK. It went from 4.3 per 
cent to 19.1 per cent in just a few months and that was because 50 percent of the 
working population were employed in textiles and footwear. A textile mill was closing 
at the rate of one every other week and a footwear factory at the rate of one a month 
(quoted in Fazey, 1987: 78) 
With Thatcher’s support, Trippier became a major political advocate of Enterprise 
Agencies, disseminating them across the UK. This resulted in the creation of a large 
number of LEAs, more in fact than CR insiders such as Brian Wright thought would 
be reasonable and sustainable (Wright personal communication, July 2008).    
Returning to literature on CR in the 1970s and 1980s is not only worthwhile 
out of historical interest; ironically, the secondary literature during these decades was 
more conscious of political questions – such as accountability and the distinction 
between public and private interests – than today’s literature on CR, which oftentimes 
assumes or imputes a harmony between them.   
David Smallbone (1991) poses the question of the accountability of Local 
Enterprise Agencies. David Smallbone cites sources according to which in 1988, 35% 
of LEA funding was from central government and another 24 percent from local 
public authorities (Smallbone, 1991: 91). Though ironic given the Thatcher 
government’s stated desire to reduce state activities in the economy, according to 
Smallbone, “There is political capital to be gained from an alliance of a Conservative 
government and business emphasizing the minimal role of the state” (Smallbone, 
1991: 91). From the point of view of the conservative government, “the lack of local 
accountability is not an issue,” since the central government had an interest in a lack 
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of accountability to local authorities that were often in the hands of radical Labour 
supporters. Though supportive of the combination of resources from public and 
private sectors, Smallbone faults LEAs on democratic grounds:   
 
The central issue … is the lack of accountability ….. Local enterprise agencies 
 may be seen as partnerships in the sense that they operate with some 
 combination of public and private sector resources, but if partnership implies a 
 sharing of control and decision making then it is difficult to justify such a 
 description (Smallbone, 1991: 97)   
  There are also consistent references to public sector involvement in BITC 
publications.  In 1984, the Special Programmes Unit of the Confederation of British 
Industry – a division of the Confederation of British Industry which had been funded 
exclusively from government funds to promote business involvement in the MSC – 
was merged into BITC. Michael Heseltine noted in 1987 that  
 
[o]nly government can take the lead ....There can be no way of turning back 
urban decline that is not led by the taxpayer. The elimination of social stress and the 
eradication of urban dereliction are not the natural hunting grounds of the profit-
seeking entrepreneur left to his own devices (Heseltine, 1990 [1987]: 156)  
Heseltine’s point was not only that government must take a lead in addressing 
problems of social deprivation. While business often “takes the lead,” it is government 
that turns this “first spark” into a “flame of enthusiasm”:  
 
Business often takes the lead; and when it does government, with incentive, 
encouragement and help, can turn a first spark into a flame of enthusiasm. It 
happened with the movement known as ‘Business in the Community,’ and the 
growth of enterprise agencies – a conspicuous example of caring capitalism 
(Heseltine, 1987: 164).  
In a similar vein, Julia Cleverdon, BITC’s CEO from 1992 to 2008, states: “in the 
absence of government support, BITC’s activities in Northern Ireland would not have 
opened as fast, nor could BITC have obtained anywhere near the caliber of the 
Director” [Cleverdon, interview 2007]. Does partisan (party) politics have a role to 
play with regard to CR in general or BITC specifically? It seems not. The Callaghan, 
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Thatcher, Major, Blair, and Brown governments have stepped up to the plate in 
support of CR, BITC and initiatives that were indispensable for the creation of these 
and related initiatives. No clear line can be drawn between Thatcher and Blair. 
Perhaps this is because “Thatcher moved the centre of political gravity firmly to the 
right,” with Blair situated in that new center (Kavagnah, 1997: 230). 
As we can see in the two charts below, BITC has grown remarkably since its 
founding nearly thirty years ago. Figure 2.3 shows that New Labour has funded BITC 
generously; public sector funds accounted for approximately £9.6 million or 40% of 
BITC’s £24 million budget in 2005 before declining to approximately £6 million of a 
£20 million annual budget in 2007. Figure 2.4 provides an overview of BITC’s 
organizational growth. Eleven regional offices and a total of over 350 staff – this is 
larger than any other Corporate Responsibility association in the OECD.153  
 
                                                 
153 Not apparent in these charts is the fact that the growth of BITC’s membership, staff, and budget is in 
part a result of it’s having merged – or taken over – other organizations in the same area, namely the 
CBI Special Programmes Unit (discussed above), in 1984, as well as the Action Resource Centre 
(which was reincarnated as the BITC campaign vehicle Action: Employees in the Community).  
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Figure 2.3: BITC’s Finances 
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Figure 2.4: BITC’s Growth in Staff  
As we have seen, Conservative governments in the 1980s and 1990s supported 
Corporate Responsibility and Business in the Community in a variety of ways. New 
Labour, which came to power in 1997, did so no less vigorously. New Labour’s 
support for CR has included funding from numerous government departments. But 
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rather than a result of coordinated government action, “BITC is good at tapping into 
government and putting proposals for projects” (DTI, interview, 2007).  
In March 2000, Prime Minister Blair created the first Minister, Margaret 
Hodge, with explicit responsibilities for CR in a national government in the OECD. 
Housed in the Department of Trade and Industry, the role of the Minister of CSR is to 
coordinate the government’s overall CR strategy as well as the activities of many 
different Departments in this area. As Lozano, Albareda and Ysa et. al. (2008) point 
out, New Labour’s CR strategy has been “basically one of voluntary compliance, 
although its proactive attitude has taken the issue somewhat further than this merely 
voluntary idea.” According to Lozano, Albareda and Ysa et. al, thirteen government 
departments are involved addressing a wide variety of different issues through CR  
(Lozano, Albareda and Ysa et. al., 2008: 103; 105).154 Social compensation is a clearly 
an important element of the UK Government’s CR strategy, as is emphasized by 
Margaret Hodge, CSR minister in 2006: “I believe CSR brings together two themes – 
improving business performance and helping to combat social injustice” (Hodge, 
2006: 112). On a voluntary basis – it is striking how little separates the New Labour 
and Conservative party agendas. As the then Conservative Candidate, now MP Robert 
Halfon put it to me: “I’m a passionate believer in Corporate Responsibility. But no 
company should be obligated. It should not be used for attacks on capitalism!” 
(Halfon, interview, 2007). I do not know whether New Labour MPs would disagree.     
                                                 
154 These include, among others: “employment policy, gender equality policy in the workforce, cultural 
diversity policy in the workplace and equal opportunities, health and safety at work, environmental 
management policy, sustainable tourism, sustainable transport and mobility, corporate transparency and 
reporting, socially responsible investment and pension funds, employee education and training, social 
policy and the fight against social exclusion, regeneration of socially and economically less-favored or 
deprived areas, human rights and labor rights, social inclusion and community investment, socially 
responsible corporate behavior in developing countries, and the fight against corruption and bribery” 
(Lozano, Albareda and Ysa et. al., 2008: 105). 
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Why did New Labour come to embrace CR in such a wholehearted way, much 
more so than other centre-left parties across Europe? The answer likely relates in part 
to New Labour’s ideological shift during the 1990s. Ruth Levitas avers that  “Far from 
being a centre-left project, New Labour could more accurately be characterized as 
centre-right, combining a neo-liberal commitment to the market with notions of 
‘community’ replacing the role of the state in Thatcherism” (Levitas, 2005: ii). 
Levitas’s interpretation appears consistent with my interview with Labour MP Stephen 
Timms, Minister for CSR from 2004 to 2005 and 2006 to 2007. Timms notes that in 
contrast to countries in which the Corporate Responsibility portfolio is held by the 
labour or international development portfolios, it is in the business department in the 
UK where the voluntary, non-regulatory approach has borne fruit: The  
 
enthusiasm with which it has been pursued by business is its strength. A 
regulatory glove would stifle that innovation….I think my view would be that 
if you compare what’s been achieved in the UK compared with other European 
countries on this agenda than we’re in a pretty good position. I would argue 
that the progress has been made on the basis of the approach without regulation 
(Timms, interview, 2007)    
Firms are not the only ones to legitimate themselves with CR; government officials do 
so as well. As one Department of Trade and Industry official put it to me, “there is lots 
of political mileage in doing CSR … Being associated with this area which is 
fashionable [makes it] an automatic political buy-in” (DTI, interview, 2007). Claims 
that Corporate Responsibility “is an attempt by businessmen to constrain the scope of 
government economic regulation” (Barnekov, Rich and Boyle, 1989: 22) seem odd in 
light of evidence that government is supporting a business-led organization that itself 
lobbies government against regulation. Government aids business in its attempts to 
diffuse the pressures that could lead to pressures for government regulation. In 
addition, government “routinely invite[s] business views on aspects of Government 
policy,” which may decrease the need for unsolicited business lobbying, remarks 
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Department of Trade and Industry official Jane Leavens (Leavens, personal 
correspondence, 31 May 2007). While Corporate Responsibility prompts businesses to 
increase their contribution to underprovided public goods, the fact that for New 
Labour, such support includes little in the way of more stringent or binding regulation 
supports claims that “New Labour communitarianism … effectively excludes the 
sphere of economic activity from … ethical regulation” (Shaw, 2006: 178) and that 
New Labour has gone “beyond the rapprochement and co-operation with business 
interests which is essential to all social democratic parties to becoming simply a 
business party” (1999: 80). Like Margaret Thatcher six years before him, Tony Blair – 
then Leader of the opposition – addressed the Per Cent Club at its annual meeting in 
November 1994, praised the latter’s activities and explicated how they fit in with New 
Labour’s social and economic vision. 
 
X Tensions Between Pragmatic and Moral Legitimacy 
In chapter one I suggest that pragmatic and moral legitimacy are Corporate 
Responsibility’s motors and justification during the transition to market-liberalism. 
This does not imply a peaceful and happy co-existence between pragmatic and moral 
legitimation. Why should companies try to minimize their negative externalities and 
engage themselves in community issues and social problems beyond their core 
business activities? Because of a cost-benefit calculus or because it’s the right thing to 
do? Few questions are more enduring and central for the staffs of firms and CRAs 
engaged in Corporate Responsibility than this one.   
In 1991, BITC was in the process of charting its future course. These 
preparations culminated in a seminal document by David Grayson, Directions for the 
Nineties. Three early, unpublished documents from BITC’s internal archives present 
differing views on the nature of BITC membership. I have organized them into a 
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continuum, beginning with the most ‘moral’ or ‘purposive’ and proceeding to the 
increasingly ‘pragmatic’ or ‘business case’ oriented. In the first internal, “private and 
confidential” discussion paper titled “Membership Strategy” for the “Strategy Board” 
dated 6.9.91, the (unidentified) author writes: 
 
Membership is not ‘for sale.’ The litmus test for whether a company is eligible 
to be a member should be our mission.... to increase the Quality and Extent of 
business activity in the Community’ Thus a consultant who finds useful the 
contacts made at our events is not eligible; a company who likes the PR but has 
no involvement in our work does not qualify; the fundraiser who has his own 
agenda is ineligible. Clearly there are secondary benefits from membership. 
HRH [the Prince of Wales], personal networking, media profile etc are all part 
of the ‘club benefits’ but should not be seen as primary motives (unpublished 
internal memo, BITC archives [BITC, 1991])        
 
The next draft is significantly more pragmatic and utilitarian, and stresses that 
regulation would be counterproductive:  
 
-Social problems will constrain long-term business growth 
-Business can help to overcome many of these problems 
-It is in business’s interest to do so 
-Therefore, it is in the interests of business and society generally for such 
business involvement in the community to be maximised. 
-Business involvement will be maximised when it meets business as well as 
community needs 
-External pressures on individual firms differ 
-Successful corporate community involvement, starts with the priorities of 
individual firms rather than imposing top-down instruction for all firms.  
(unpublished internal memo, BITC archives [BITC, 1991]) 
The third draft endorses the very ‘networking opportunities’ that were decried in the 
first draft, and describes BITC as an organization which is useful both as a PR tool and 
because of the improved image which it can offer its members. The resulting emphasis 
is an almost sinister emphasis on being seen to be good, rather than actually being 
good: 
Economies of Scale. More macro ‘changing the world’ can be achieved by 
joining with others 
BITC has a pool of skills and expertise, which members can access 
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BITC is a centre of good practice and the leading authority on corporate 
community involvement 
BITC offers lots of networking opportunities 
Through BITC, companies can contribute to national policy development 
CCI is our core business. We never lack enthusiasm and can offer lots to others 
when they need a pick-up 
BITC is politically neutral 
We can offer companies and individuals profile and status. We are a useful PR 
tool.  
We are private sector led, not voluntary sector led. Therefore a company’s 
business needs is our starting point.  
Being seen in the community can help the bottom line. Being seen as a good 
corporate citizen. (BITC, 1991)  
As I have described elsewhere in this chapter, tension between moral legitimacy, the 
moral/ethical justifications for involvement in CR, and the ethically functionalist and 
instrumental pragmatic justifications, is alive and well in the political economy of 
Corporate Responsibility. The following section discusses the UK’s pivotal role in 
disseminating CR practices internationally.  
 
XI The UK’s Role in Diffusing Corporate Responsibility Internationally 
CR has co-evolved with market-liberalism not only within the UK, but in the 
international arena as well: the UK has played a pivotal role in diffusing and 
disseminating Corporate Responsibility across Eastern Europe and indeed the world. 
As above, CR has spread in tandem with market-liberal forms of governance. This 
section focuses primarily on the International Business Leaders Forum, an offshoot of 
BITC founded in the early 1990s and the foremost CRA for promoting CR in Eastern 
Europe and in the developing world.  
The earliest mention of the role of the UK in the international dissemination of 
CR can be found in the Business in the Community Press Release (1987) titled “UK to 
Follow Reagan Initiative.” In a meeting chaired by Mr John Raisman, former 
chairman of Shell UK, and attended by Mr. Hartley Booth, policy advisor to the Prime 
Minister, the Hon. David Sieff, director Marks & Spencer, Mrs. Anne Simor of the 
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America/European Community association and Mr. Michael Brophy, director, 
Charities Aid Foundation suggests that “the UK is more like the US than unlike, and 
could build a bridge between the US and Europe for private sector community 
initiatives.” An internal document two years later explicitly acknowledges the 
pioneering role that the US and UK perceived for themselves in the area of in CR:  
“Business leadership and corporate community involvement have largely evolved in 
the USA and the UK. Under the leadership of our President, BIC should seek to 
develop and export these concepts” (BITC, 1989: 3).155 This view is confirmed by 
Peter Brew, who says that “I don’t think that there was any doubt that the whole 
Corporate Responsibility agenda was very much driven from the UK initially. There 
was still a very clear distinction in France and Germany between the responsibilities of 
business and the responsibilities of government. So it took longer to convince these 
companies that it was part of their core business agenda” (Brew, interview, 2007).     
  The UK’s role in the international promotion of Corporate Responsibility 
gained intensity and dynamism at the beginning of the 1990s. In his speech “New 
Directions for the New Decade,” the Secretary General of the Confederation of British 
Industry John Banham (1991: 3) stressed: “a major opportunity exists, in the European 
context, to introduce our philosophy not just to our partners within the European 
Community but to Eastern Europe as well. At present, voluntarism is not a concept 
widely recognized on the other side of the Channel.” As it turns out, Business in the 
Community founded another organization, initially known as Business in the 
                                                 
155 A close examination of Business in the Community documents reveals that for them during the 
1980s, the United States was an example to learn from and emulate. For example, the theme of 
Business in the Community Magazine No. 3 from Winter 1986-1987, is: “Bearing the American 
example in mind.” Ron Mayes, who was editor of the Business in the Community magazine at that 
time, wrote on May 15, 1986 that: “our quarterly Business in the Community … breaks new ground in 
that it is the first journal in this field to be published outside the USA.”   
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Community International,156 which has become the leading business-led organization 
for disseminating CR into Eastern Europe and into the developing world. As Larry 
Ray notes surveying the situation in Eastern Europe post-1990, “it can hardly escape 
anyone’s attention that one strong contender in this reform process is the programme 
of radical marketization of social relations, which can appear similar to the enterprise 
culture in the UK” (Ray, 1991: 114). CR spread across Eastern Europe and into the 
developing world in tandem with market-liberal forms of governance, blatantly 
contradicting predictions in the early 1990s that the German model of industrial 
relations and social partnership would gain a foothold there.157    
Following preparations in the late 1980s, the International Business Leaders 
Forum158 was officially established as an independent company and registered charity 
on 1 January 1991. A conference held in Charleston, South Carolina, led to the 
founding of the IBLF; it was attended by approximately 120 business leaders, 60 were 
Americans and 30 British. Thus, approximately three quarters of the organization’s 
founders were Anglo-American (Sheppard, interview, 2006).  The initial international 
sponsors of IBIC were two American and six British companies.159 As David Halley 
made clear to me, the “parting of the ways [of IBLF and BITC] was more about a 
clash of egos than programmatic differences. The IBLF can be seen as an international 
extension of BITC” (Halley, interview, 2006). While containing a grain of truth, this 
portrayal may underestimate functional reasons for separating international and 
domestic activities. As David Grayson points out, there was concern on BITC’s board 
that international work might threaten the organization’s work in the UK: “We need 
                                                 
156 later renamed the Prince of Wales International Business Leaders Forum and finally the International 
Business Leaders Forum 
157 Hodges and Woolcock (1993). I am grateful to Peter Katzenstein for this point.  
158 initially called International Business in the Community, Business in the Community International 
and Prince of Wales International Business Leaders Forum. 
159 American Express International, Atlantic Richfield Company, BP p.l.c., Cable & Wireless p.l.c., 
Grand Metropolitan p.l.c., Johnson Matthey p.l.c., SmithKline Beecham p.l.c., The Wharf Holdings Ltd. 
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Cleverdon and O’Brien and Grayson in Rotherham and Swindon – not spending all 
their time in Eastern Europe” (Grayson, 2007: 38).    
An early publication describes the “key issues” on IBIC’s 1991 agenda as 
“support for the resurgent enterprise culture in Eastern and Central Europe, sustainable 
development and the environment, and community involvement in the developing and 
newly industrializing worlds.” This agenda, the report remarks, is falling on 
particularly receptive ears “in those countries implementing economic liberalisation 
such as Brazil and India, and those having undergone radical change such as in 
Eastern and Central Europe” (IBIC, 1991: 2).  
The meeting that took place in Czechoslovakia in May 1991 “focused on the 
contribution of international business to recreating an enterprise culture and restoring 
the environment.” This agenda of enterprise promotion, as an internal paper on the 
formation of BITC International reveals, “is intended to retain the ‘power to make 
reasoned responses to proposed legislation” (BITC internal archives, B4/90/2). The 
main activity of the IBLF in Eastern Europe during the early 1990s was the founding 
of national Business Leaders’ Forums in a number of different countries: 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary (in 1992); and Bulgaria (in 1994), among others. These 
business-led CR associations have served to promote the cause of Corporate 
Responsibility within their respective countries, much like BITC, in cooperation with 
their indigenous and international (predominantly Anglo-American) corporate 
membership. Unlike many other CRAs across Europe and the world, these 
organizations have retained a close connection to the head offices of the IBLF at St. 
Regent’s Park, London.    
 Though Milford Bateman (2000) does not touch directly on CR and of 
institutions such as the IBLF, he describes how the Local Enterprise Agencies (LEAs), 
the central focus of CR in the 1970s and 1980s, were “the practical inspiration for the 
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majority of Business Support Groups in Central and Eastern Europe” post-1990 (2000: 
280). For Bateman, LEAs, along with Business Support Centres, played a key role 
facilitating the transition of Central and Eastern European Economies to market 
liberalism. As he remarks, “transition policy in Central and Eastern Europe was a 
textbook variant of the dominant radical free market discourse, neo-liberalism,” with 
its prominent proponents Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. The international 
donors who spearheaded the creation of the Business Support Centres were “were 
keen to set up just such [CR] advocacy bodies to promote the US-Wall Street version 
of finance-based capitalism” (Bateman, personal communication, December 03, 
2008).   
There are similarities between the economic conditions in the UK during the 
early 1980s and those in Eastern Europe a decade later. The institutions and programs 
used to promote CR were similar, as were the conditions that prompted their use. In 
both cases, Enterprise Agencies served to compensate for the collapse of 
manufacturing and rising levels of unemployment: “the overriding mission of 
Hungarian and UK agencies is fundamentally the same,” as Gibb and Haas (Gibb and 
Haas, 1996) note. There are also important differences. As we have seen from the 
1980 Sunningdale Conference, British businessmen and policymakers looked to the 
US for lessons and guidance. The agency movement in the UK was nevertheless a 
“bottom up phenomenon.” By contrast, in Hungary and elsewhere in Eastern Europe, 
“agency development was a top-down construct” driven by external donors (Gibb and 
Haas, 1996: 205).160  
                                                 
160 Allan Gibb and Zoltan Haas write that Local Enterprise Agencies in the UK were driven by “private 
sector resource” whereas in Hungary, agency development was “driven by public (particularly foreign) 
funding” (1996: 205). As I have argued above, this claim is questionable: Enterprise Agencies in the 
UK during the 1980s received substantial public funding.  
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Before concluding this section, it is worth noting that in addition to the IBLF, 
BITC has itself played an increasingly prominent international role during recent 
years. BITC had an international department in the early 1990s, but couldn’t get it 
going because of a lack of member company interest. My argument implies that CR 
and market-liberalism had not yet become politically salient enough in countries 
outside of the UK where BITC members had other operations.161 During the past 
decade, this has changed. Despite its apparent overlap with parts of the IBLF’s 
mandate, BITC has developed a global network of firms and CR organizations of 
which it is the coordinator. In the words of David Halley, initiator and head of 
international partnerships and of BITC’s Global Partner Network:   
 
‘We have a model which we think will work and we can export it’ … Halley 
acknowledges that some Europeans may see the planned spread of BITC's 
message as ‘an Anglo-Saxon plot’ and stresses that the organisation has never 
opened offices in European cities. ‘We want home-grown organisations, local 
camouflage,’ he says (Financial Times, June 10, 2004) 
Just as Thatcher is a source of inspiration for advocates of market liberalism across the 
world, BITC and the IBLF have been important promoters and facilitators of 
Corporate Responsibility in Eastern Europe and beyond.    
 
XII. Scottish Business in the Community as Additional Variation 
Readers may wonder whether the story of CR and BITC in the UK, told in the 
pages above, is a tale sui generis. What confidence do we have that the link between 
CR and market liberalism via pragmatic and moral legitimacy is not simply the result 
of a perfect storm, a coincidence of contingent and nationally idiosyncratic factors? 
Chapter five compares Liberal with Social/Coordinated Market Economies as a group 
and address the generalizability of my findings. But we needn’t leave the United 
                                                 
161 Except of course in Eastern Europe, but these countries were under the IBLF, not BITC’s purview.  
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Kingdom to find additional sources of variation: Scottish Business in the Community, 
BITC’s Scottish sister CRA was incorporated on 11 October 1982.  
Scottish Business in the Community provides additional variation on the 
dependent variable. SBC shares with its BITC cousin many contextual factors, such as 
Whitehall’s macroeconomic and fiscal policies,162 and substantial public support for 
the organization’s activities.163 Scotland differs from the rest of the UK in other 
respects.164 This section provides a cursory description of SBC and the challenges it 
has faced during its more than twenty-five years of existence. This is useful as a frame 
of reference for BITC. The story of SBC shows that the deconstruction of 
institutionalized social solidarity does not necessarily, automatically or functionally 
imply the extraordinary successes of BITC. In this section I show that SBC has faced 
many formidable challenges that BITC did not face. SBC has done as well as it has – 
and not worse – because of the structural and contextual factors it shares with its larger 
sister organization. After a thumbnail presentation of SBC, I discuss the challenges it 
has faced.  
Two of SBC’s major figures, Hector Laing and John Moorhouse, will be 
familiar from the aforementioned discussion, and I will not recount the development 
of SBC in detail. Needless to say, these two figures were not the only ones who used 
the lever of moral legitimacy to champion the cause of responsible business in 
Scotland. As Mark Laing, who runs Simmers of Edinburgh (a biscuit factory) puts it: 
“it is right that a business should do what it can to contribute to the well-being of 
society” (Laing, interview, 2007). Like BITC, SBC championed business support for 
Local Enterprise Agencies as a way of business helping to regenerate communities 
                                                 
162 At least until devolution established the Scottish Parliament in 1998.  
163 SBC benefited from government secondees as well as from direct funding from the Sxottish 
Development Agency. 
164 For example, the rate of collective bargaining coverage has been consistently higher in Scotland than 
in England throughout the past thirty years. 
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depressed by corporate closures during the 1980s; beginning in the early-mid 1990s, 
SBC gave up responsibility for LEAs and promoted a wider agenda of corporate 
community involvement, with a particular focus on depressed urban housing estates.   
Like BITC, SBC grew rapidly during the 1980s. The number of Scottish local 
enterprise trusts increased to more than forty by 1988. During the 38th Executive 
Council of Scottish Business in the Community, an amendment was proposed to the 
Articles of the organization to increase the maximum size of the Governing Council 
from 100 to 200 – at that time, each member of the organization had a seat on 
ScotBIC’s Governing Council. SBC was at the forefront of the Scottish Enterprise 
Trust movement until these responsibilities were transferred to Scottish Enterprise, a 
government authority, in 1993-1994. The transition to a new focus and organizational 
model did not prove easy. Figures 2.5 and 2.6 provide an overview of SBC’s evolution 
over twenty-five years. 
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Figure 2.5: SBC’s Membership 
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The Growth of Scottish Business in the Community, 
1982-2007
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Figure 2.6: SBC’s Ups and Downs 
Unlike BITC’s aggregates, which point steadily upwards, SBC ran into trouble during 
the 1990s, as declining membership levels and finances attest. What were SBC’s 
challenges? Though SBC’s “principal activity” was to “encourage and assist 
companies to adopt a philosophy of corporate social responsibility”165, “working in 
the [housing] estates,” areas with endemic high unemployment, “it was really hard to 
keep people’s enthusiasm up because we didn’t give people any easy successes that 
they could tell their mates about” (Moorhouse, interview, 2007). By 1997, Prince 
Charles, patron of SBC, the Chairman of  SBC Sir Tom Farmer and the Board of 
Directors commissioned a strategic review of the organization which, according to it
author, “was struggling to survive” (Pignatelli, personal communication, February 5 
2008). In the mid-late 1990s, virtually all indicators – membership, income, 
expenditure, and number of employees – pointed downward, and some members of 
the organization, including Moorhouse, thought that perhaps the time had come for 
s 
                                                 
165 SBC (1995). Unpublished document, Scottish Business in the Community archive, Edinburgh. 
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SBC to close up shop. Membership had dropped to 45 firms, roughly half its 2007 
level. Janet Hamblin of Baker Tilly, who is also a Board Member of SBC, describ
this period as “a dodgey time” (interview, 2007). Pignatelli’s unpublished 1998 
strategic review stressed that “mechanisms should be put in place as a matter of 
urgency to address the problems of declining membership” (Pignatelli, 1998: 2). 
While the report does not clearly lay out the causes of SBC’s tribulations, it does no
that “over recent years difficulties have arisen as SBC’s membership has declined
as it has become increasingly difficult to secure business support for activities” 
ed 
te 
 and 
ion is 
 
f SBC in 
ier for 
lt sell for 
RAs from in Social Market Economies 
ve at the time of their greatest successes.166  
  
                                                
(Pignatelli, 1998: 3).    
 Whether SBC’s problems were endogenous or exogenous to the organizat
beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice to say, the problems were serious; two in 
particular proved thorny. First, the centralization of the UK business world on London,
combined with the fact that many Scottish business executives would regularly spend 
time in London, led many firms to question the necessity of being a member o
addition to the much larger (and better-resourced) BITC parent organization. 
Consequently, attempts were made to merge SBC with BITC. Secondly, SBC’s 
concentration on tackling tough social issues such as public housing estates proved a 
hard sell for some member companies. Since 1998, devolution has made it eas
SBC to tap public finding resources such as Scottish Parliament and Scottish 
Enterprise, leading again to upward slopes. The point remains, however, that despite 
overlapping mandates with BITC and a programmatic focus that was a difficu
member companies, SBC still had more member companies at the time of its 
existential crisis in the later 1990s than many C
ha
 
166 A detailed presentation and comparison of membership figures can be found in chapter 5.  
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XIII Political-Economic Structure and the Self-Sustaining Dynamism of UK CR  
  
Before concluding, I wish to address once more the relationship between 
structural and institutional conditions on one hand, and Corporate Responsibility on 
the other. It is well-known that CR has acquired considerable dynamism across the 
UK and in London, and many of my interviewees across Europe refer with amazement 
to developments across the English Channel. Thus, in multinational corporations with 
substantial UK operations, the UK operations almost invariably sported more dynamic 
or significant CR activities than elsewhere in Europe. This chapter is focused on the 
1970s and 1980s because Britain’s political-economic institutions changed most these 
years, and these developments are important for explaining UK CR’s present-day 
dynamism. This does not mean that CR has stopped evolving or that CR’s dynamism 
is attributable solely to its role of legitimating liberalization or compensating for 
declining ISS. Figure 2.7 shows the growth of corporate volunteering at the auditing-
accounting firm KPMG’s UK operations between 2002 and 2007: 
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Figure 2.7: Corporate Responsibility’s Dynamism 
The remarkable rise of corporate volunteering at KPMG during these five years is not 
a direct consequence of liberalization or the dismantling of Britain’s post-war order 
during this period. Nor does the rise of corporate volunteering by a factor of more than 
two imply that social problems have risen by exactly that factor. The relationship 
between political-economic framework conditions and CR is more subtle and less 
mechanical than that. CR has in many areas acquired its own (self-sustaining) dynamic 
and dynamism. But this should not lead us to forget the crucial role of structural and 
institutional conditions to give the initial impetus as facilitators and enablers.  
 
XIV Conclusions and Outlook 
  
In this chapter, I have shown how the rise of Corporate Responsibility in the UK 
between 1977 to 2007 was connected with the structural erosion and the dismantling 
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of the post-war compromise and institutionalized solidarity. These policies were a 
response to de-industrialization and rapidly growing unemployment levels; vertical 
disintegration, the dismembering of corporate conglomerates, the increased use of sub-
contracting; the growing importance of the service sector, entrepreneurship and small 
businesses; the declining importance of collective bargaining and the diminished 
power of unions; and varying degrees of privatization, liberalization, deregulation, and 
rising inequality. The borrowing of ideas from the United States, though “piecemeal,” 
was continuous (Bader, interview, 2007). Towards the end of this chapter we have 
seen how the UK has itself become a cause, an exporter of Corporate Responsibility 
across Eastern Europe and indeed the world. How should we interpret the rise of CR 
in the UK – as a response to the structurally inevitable diminution of institutionalized 
solidarity, or as an element in its willful and contingent dismantling? Is Corporate 
Responsibility itself responsible? 
Those who stress the morally ambivalence of these developments include 
Desmond S. King: “the movement towards the voluntary sector through state 
divestment constitutes an initiative aimed at emulating the American tradition and 
breaking with the universal social rights trajectory” (King, 1989: 51). Simon Deakin 
and Richard Hobbs (2007) find that despite the UK’s status as Corporate 
Responsibility leader, the latter’s impact on domestic working conditions is small. 
More cynically, Peter Kellner remarks: “Active citizens are those who contribute to 
the success of the free market economy by picking up the pieces that the free market 
drops: helping charities, clearing litter, helping inner city reconstruction” (quoted in 
Ray, 1991: 129). And for Mike Geddes, “Partnership is the banner under which 
society is invited to join in the neo-liberal project, as ‘stakeholders’ in its outcomes. 
The concern must be, however, that this is not, when the chips are down, primarily a 
model in which business makes a substantive commitment to a more just society, but 
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one in which society is a stakeholder in ‘UK plc’” (Geddes, 2001: 194). Those who 
take this view see Corporate Responsibility as hollow or craven. 
 By contrast, those who emphasize innovation, structure and systemic dynamics 
are less likely to reach these conclusions. For all of its virtues, CR in the UK is not just 
a substitute for the dismantling of institutionalized social solidarity. Some of the 
things currently done in the name of CR did not get done in that other world, the world 
of the post-war compromise.167 Julia Cleverdon, who succeeded Stephen O’Brien as 
Chief Executive of Business in the Community, recounts how she was asked the 
following question: “Can you explain to me: BITC is concerned with improving its 
effects on society but trust has fallen so fast since you’ve been set up.” Cleverdon 
quips that “it might have fallen even faster if it hadn’t been for us” (Cleverdon, 
inteview, 2007). Indeed, the public’s loss in confidence in business may have much to 
do with the changes in the structure of the economy. While the systematic 
dismembering of social democracy in the UK was especially stark, abrupt, and 
dramatic, the UK is hardly a unique, isolated case. As I show in the chapters below, 
virtually all affluent countries have been undergoing these changes to varying degrees. 
Thus, the degree to which it can be construed merely as a project of Thatcherism or 
the New Right is open to question. Furthermore, the continuity from the Labour 
Government of James Callaghan to Thatcher’s Conservatives should caution us from 
interpreting the rise of Corporate Responsibility as a narrowly orchestrated partisan 
political project. Nor were the policies of institutional reform and restructuring 
specific to the UK: the economies of most if not all OECD countries have been 
undergoing similar structural transformations. None of this diminishes the tension 
between the aspirations of a Hector Laing, or a John Moorehouse, for “inclusive 
capitalism” (Davies, 2002: 650), and the structural changes in the economy, which one 
                                                 
167 I am grateful for Michael Schwartz for making this point to me.  
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commentator describes as a “‘Reverse Robin Hood program,’ which transferred 
‘income from the poor, especially the poorest, to the rich, and especially the richest’” 
(Pollard 1992: 379, quoted in Rhodes 1999: 41). It is striking that it is possible to 
profess sincere and committed advocacy for CR on the one hand, and a Hayekian or 
Friedmanite view of society’s political-economic institutions on the other. This 
appears to be true of Margaret Thatcher herself, as well as a number of leading figures 
in UK CR.168 What unites CR and market-liberalism and separates both from the 
institutions of ISS is an emphasis on freedom and the absence of constraints on 
business activity.  
  With regard to the economy proper, as Daniel Cohen remarks, “[o]n all sides, 
contemporary capitalism is thoroughly dismembering the industrial firm” (Cohen, 
2008: 33). Regarding small business growth, “What does seem beyond dispute is that 
small business growth since the early 1980s reflects a genuine and fundamental socio-
economic shift not only in Britain but also elsewhere in the industrialized world” 
(Gray, 1998: 7). According to Peter Sedgwick: “It is often assumed that the ‘enterprise 
culture’ is a product of Mrs Thatcher’s government …. However, as is often the case, 
the government was simply exploiting deep-rooted economic and social changes that 
were already in existence. The changes would have happened anyway, and have many 
years left to run” (Sedgwick, 1992: 8). Alan Harding writes that the trend toward 
public-private partnerships in urban governance, a central element of UK CR during 
                                                 
168 Auerbach remarks that “Mrs Thatcher is a self-confessed ‘great admirer’ of Hayek, and Mr Nigel 
Lawson, the key architect of the economic policies of the 1980s, has endorsed the association with 
Hayek’s name. He has also set out the key components of the economic policy which the government 
claimed to be pursuing from 1979, in impeccably New Right, and particularly Friedmanite, terms 
(Auerbach, 1990: 228). David Grayson is one of the masterminds of UK CR, and was formerly joint 
managing director of BITC. Grayson describes that “I personally come from a political tradition that is 
strongly pro-market, and I believe that responsible business is a crucial force for human progress and 
happiness” (Grayson, 2002: 15)   
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the 1980s, is neither “limited to the UK [n]or [to] a particular brand of ideological 
Conservatism” (Harding, 1998: 77).  
The erosion of social citizenship rights has been an integral part of this 
transformation. Again, we may ask: to what extent is this story peculiar to the UK? 
There has been variation in the timing and extent of the erosion of social citizenship 
rights in different countries: the UK has proceeded farther and faster along this path 
than many other countries. But the common trends in this direction are unmistakable. 
For Bryan S. Turner, “[t]he Marshallian framework [of social citizenship] has been 
eroded because economic changes, technological innovation and globalization have 
transformed the nature of work, war and the social relations of production” (Turner, 
2001: 203). Richard Marriott, who was chairman of the executive council of BITC and 
who had an overview of IBM’s international CR activities at the time, remarked that 
“in 1985-1988 no one was as advanced as the UK. No one had as much need as the 
UK” (Marriot, interview, 2007).    
In sum, it is hard to know how to assess the activities of those like those like 
Prince Charles, president of Business in the Community, who strive for “Enlightened 
Capitalism” and for “mak[ing] everyone in Britain a ‘stakeholder’: People will be 
much more positive and responsive if they have a stake in the system” (Speech for 
HRH the Prince of Wales, BITC archives, 25.07.91: 1, 7). However, it is hard to 
escape the conclusion that, while the trajectory of Corporate Responsibility has been 
particularly impressive in the UK – indeed, few other countries have been able to 
match the UK’s activities in this area – they were no match for the transformation of 
British capitalism during this same period. If they are partners, market-liberalism and 
Corporate Responsibility are two very unequal partners. We will return to the question 
of the relationship between agency and structure/systemic dynamics in the chapters 
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below. How CR fares in an institutional context very different from the British one is 
at issue in the next chapter.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
The Rise of Corporate Responsibility and the Decline  
of Organized Capitalism in Germany: 1995-2008 
I. Introduction 
If the U.K. is a ‘most likely’ case for Corporate Responsibility given its turn towards 
market-liberalism, Germany appears as a contrasting, perhaps even a ‘least-likely’ 
case. Germany is viewed as a paragon of institutional continuity and stability and as an 
exemplar, a poster-child for Coordinated or non-liberal capitalism.169 Thus, a careful 
study of developments in Germany may yield lessons for other countries. If CR’s rise 
relates to the rising wave of liberalization during recent decades, and if Germany is 
coordinated, organized and otherwise non-liberal, then Germany should not be a 
propitious environment for Corporate Responsibility.  
Kathleen Thelen remarks that “in the end, not institutional rigidity, but 
resiliency and flexibility, is what accounts for the continued stability of negotiated 
adjustment in Germany” (Thelen, 1991). In Small States in World Markets, Peter 
Katzenstein observes that Germany’s political economy “provides perhaps the closest 
approximation to the political practices characteristic of small states. West Germany’s 
corporatism, Katzenstein emphasizes, derives substantially from “openness, 
dependence, and a sense of vulnerability” (Katzenstein, 1985: 204). 
“[E]xperimentation and change within a stable institutional framework” captures the 
central dynamic of German industry and politics,” he argues (Katzenstein, 1989: 308).    
Germany’s trajectory during the 1980s contrasts starkly with developments 
across the English Channel. Unlike the U.K. under Margaret Thatcher, West Germany 
was not subject to far-reaching economic reforms or attacks on organized labor. Thus,  
 
the policies of the Kohl government seem to differ much less from those of the 
previous social-democratic-liberal coalition than is suggested by the neo-
                                                 
169 Hall and Soskice (2001); Streeck and Yamamura (2003); Thelen (2004) 
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liberal rhetoric. German neo-liberalism, when compared with the neo-liberal 
governments in the United States and in Great Britain, can be characterized as 
quite moderate (van der Wurff, 1993: 193) 
Katheen Thelen finds that “[a]lthough West Germany took a marked rightward shift in 
the 1980s, neoliberalism has had a very different meaning there. Among other things, 
organized labor’s institutional anchoring helped shield unions from the full impact of 
political isolation and declining market strength” (Thelen, 1991: 12). And Peter A. 
Johnson recalls: “in the election of 1983, the coalition campaigned by mimicking 
some of the traditional monetarist and supply-side rhetoric of Reagan and Thatcher; 
but once in office, it left the German economy and social structure essentially as it 
found them” (Johnson, 1998: 104).  
The institutions of the German economy have deep historical roots. In the 
Weimar Republic, Rudolf Hilferding remarked that as a consequence of the 
organization of the German economy, “the firm, the management of the individual 
company, has ceased to be a private matter” (Hilferding, 1927: 168, quoted in Streeck 
and Höpner, 2003: 17). In his classic Capitalism vs. Capitalism, Michel Albert uses 
Germany as an exemplar of the egalitarian ‘Rhine model’ of capitalism, characterized 
by a diminished role for the market and superior social outcomes compared with the 
“neo-American model” (Albert, 1993). As Streeck points out: “Germany has long 
been considered a ‘model’ for countries unwilling to subject themselves to the rule of 
the market in the same way and to the same extent as Anglo-American economies” 
(Streeck, 2009: 21).     
As recently as the millennium, the continuity of German’s ‘non-liberal,’ 
‘organized’ or ‘coordinated’ market institutions seemed so assured that Peter Hall and 
David Soskice (2001) used Germany as an ideal-type exemplar of a ‘Coordinated 
Market Economy,’ one that these authors expected would diverge from, and not 
converge with, Anglophone Liberal-Market norms of economic governance. Recall 
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that for Hall and Soskice, “institutional complementarities generate disincentives to 
radical change” (Hall and Soskice, 2001: 64). As is often the case when scholars think 
they have figured out the world: it changes. While there is no consensus on how to 
interpret the changes in the German political economy during the past decade, 
proponents of the Hall/Soskice view are increasingly on the defensive. In this chapter, 
I challenge the claim that German employers have structurally conservative employer 
preferences, and assert that CR has co-evolved with the progressive liberalization and 
declining organization of German capitalism.   
Far-reaching changes in corporate governance, industrial relations and wage 
bargaining, and the German welfare state have put analytic models stressing 
divergence and continuity under siege. While scholars continue to disagree on whether 
the changes that have taken amount to ‘convergence’ or ‘hybridization,’ there is 
increasing recognition that a great deal has changed in the German political economy 
during the past two decades. Wolfgang Streeck’s new monograph Re-Forming 
Capitalism (Streeck, 2009) is the most notable contribution of this vein of scholarship 
to date. Streeck’s critique of Varieties of Capitalism’s portrayal of the German 
political economy is hard-hitting. Streeck argues that VoC’s backwards projection of 
static institutional equilibria onto Germany’s post-war institutions misses a lot of what 
has been happening in the German political economy. The decay and transformation 
of Germany’s post-war institutions cannot be understood with reference to 
institutional equilibria, and has everything to do with the unleashing of capitalism 
from its institutional fetters.  
Just as Germany’s move towards market-liberalism has been more recent than 
across the English Channel, Germany has acquired a reputation as a ‘laggard’ in 
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Corporate Responsibility.170 The following statement by André Habisch and Martina 
Wegner exemplifies this view: 
 
For international firms with their headquarters in Germany we have a curious 
phenomenon: In the business ethics discussion of the 1990s, it was criticized 
that the standards in a company’s home jurisdiction were higher than in the 
foreign subsidiaries. In a reversal of this line of argument one can see today 
that many German firms are more responsible abroad (especially in the Anglo-
Saxon areas) than in their original national social environment (Habisch and 
Wegner, 2004: 9-10)  
Elsewhere, Habisch and Wegner remark that “[m]any European neighbours perceive 
Germany as a ‘white spot’ in the European CSR landscape” (Habisch and Wegner, 
2005: 111). A few examples illustrate what they are referring to. The German software 
giant SAP’s month of service elicits a participation rate of 40% of employees in the 
United States. At the company’s headquarters in Heidenheim, a participation rate of 
1.6% is considered a “great success” (Raabe, interview, 2007). A comparison between 
the UK and German offices of the professional services consulting firm KPMG is 
equally revealing. In 2008 at KPMG in Germany, a single part-time position was 
allotted to CR. In London, twelve full-time staffs are devoted to this cause. The UK-
based CR associations BITC and the IBLF had a smattering of German companies in 
their membership during the 1980s and 1990s – long before CRAs were set up in 
Germany. Thus,  
 
on the whole, the Corporate Citizenship discussion about the new role of firms 
in society is evolving relatively late and remarkably sluggishly, even though – 
or maybe because – companies in Germany can look back on a decades-long 
tradition of engagement in the tradition of the national welfare state 
(Backhaus-Maul, Biedermann, Nährlich and Polterauer, 2008: 33)  
This view receives support from a comparative firm-level survey on CR in Germany 
and the US. The survey shows that far many more German than American firms are 
                                                 
170 Chapter 5 provides a detailed overview of how German CR associations compare with their 
counterparts across Europe and the OECD. 
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sceptical of CR.171 Political authorities too recognize Germany’s laggard status in CR 
matters. In a declassified memo written by Dr. Linckelmann of the Federal Ministry 
for Women, Seniors, Family, and Youth (Linckelmann, 2000), the author concludes 
that  
 
the strengthening of civic engagement is not only the business of society and of 
the state, it can and should also be a thing of the economy as the British 
example, which has been copied by the Netherlands, France and Denmark, 
shows. In Germany the topic [of CR] is neither grounded in the public 
consciousness nor in management’s (Linckelmann, 2000: 10)   
The claim that Germany is a laggard in Corporate Responsibility may be puzzling at 
first sight. The German economy is known to combine competitiveness with high 
levels of equality and social cohesion.172 This serves as a reminder that CR refers not 
to aggregate social outcomes, nor to business’s contribution to public goods, nor to 
business’s social or environmental performance, but only to businesses’ voluntary 
engagement for social and environmental ends above the statutory minimum.    
This chapter tells the story of Corporate Responsibility in Germany during 
recent decades. As in chapter 2, my focus is on the interrelationship between political-
economic institutions and the rise of CR. The empirical states of affairs to be 
explained are threefold: 
 
1. Temporality and novelty, or Germany’s status as a CR ‘laggard.’ What 
explains CR’s rise, and German managers’ and entrepreneurs’ reduced/delayed 
propensity to draw on CR for pragmatic and moral legitimation compared with 
their British and American counterparts? I trace the rise of CR in Germany to 
the progressive disorganization and liberalization of German capitalism since 
the 1990s.   
 
2. Varieties of Capitalism and Complementarities. CR is complementary to the 
intensification of market relations and to the erosion of institutionalized social 
solidarity in Germany during the past fifteen years. CR has accompanied this 
shift, compensating for the market’s deficiencies and deficits in the areas of 
                                                 
171 See CCCD 2007.  
172 Although Germany has high rates of wage compression, its conservative, Bismarkian welfare state 
performs poorly when it comes to gender equality and women’s labor market participation.   
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legitimacy, and business and social needs. Bringing CR in to the analysis 
challenges Varieties of Capitalism’s assertion that complementarity should be 
understood as institutional similarity.  
 
3. Politics. CR in Germany is associated with a market-liberal if not libertarian 
agenda. Although pressures to compensate for the fallout of liberalization are 
less of a stick in Germany than in the UK, CR’s voluntariness is a powerful 
carrot for German business. CR has not been a party-political issue, except 
perhaps on the far-left.    
I argue that the delayed onset of CR in Germany, and German firms’ ambivalence 
towards it, must be understood with reference to Germany’s institutional framework, 
corporate governance and regulatory standards, which until recently left German firms 
with less ‘need’ (on the demand side) and less ‘space’ (on the supply side) to engage 
themselves in CR compared with their Anglo counterparts. These institutions were 
functionally equivalent, if not superior to the voluntaristic arrangements in LMEs. 
They satisfied business’s needs for efficiency, competitiveness, pragmatic and moral 
legitimation; and society’s needs for social integration, redistribution, and cohesion. 
But this is crucial: from the point of view of business, these institutions also had 
downsides: they constrain business’s and circumscribe capital’s class power. Although 
German businesses had difficulty recognizing this at first, CR is a ticket to (greater) 
freedom, one that German business has cashed in on as it has “broken out of its 
postwar social shell” (Streeck, 2009: 25).  
I argue that liberalization and the changing institutional structure of the 
German economy are indispensable for explaining the rise of CR. There has been a 
growing need for business to legitimate itself in this changed context, and German 
businesses have done so in part through CR. I immediately concede that political-
economic institutions are not the only plausible explanation for Germany’s status as 
CR laggard. Cultural attitudes also play a role. Corporate Responsibility is not 
culturally neutral. It is recognizably Anglo-American and utilitarian if not Calvinist in 
its orientation and adage to “do good and benefit at the same time.” It would not be 
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surprising if these practices were less enthusiastically received in the land of Hegel 
and Kant, where managers and entrepreneurs are willing to defer to the state, or do 
good without publicizing or claiming credit for their good deeds.173 However, cultural 
explanations have their limitations. Unless they invoke capitalism and political-
economic institutions, cultural explanations have difficulty accounting for why 
Germany’s Wirtschaftskultur [economic culture] has become increasingly open, 
liberal, and accepting of CR during recent years. Political-economic institutions are 
indispensable for explaining the delayed onset of CR in Germany, just as its recent 
rapid rise has much to do with capitalism’s “re-emergence” (Streeck, 2009).   
While there is a voluminous literature on the practice of Corporate 
Responsibility in Germany, very few studies place CR in the context of the changing 
German political economy. Stefanie Hiß (Hiß, 2009; 2006) is an exception. Hiß draws 
on Matten and Moon (2008) and on the new sociological institutionalism to theorize 
the change from the “implicit” CR of the post-war compromise to the voluntaristic 
“explicit” CR of today. She theorizes this change as a “fight for myths” (Hiß, 2009; 
2006). There is much to commend in Hiß’s focus on symbolic articulations.  But there 
are also problems with her theorization that a more explicit political-economic focus 
can help to address. For example, Hiß notes that the German institutional environment 
“has eroded” and the myths sustaining it have been “de-legitimated” (Hiß, 2009: 434). 
But she does not identify the origins of these developments, their evolution over time 
and the ambivalence that has arisen during the transition from “implicit” to “explicit” 
CR. This ambivalence can be understood only by taking actors’ interests in the context 
of political-economic institutions into account.     
                                                 
173 Indeed, it appears that the very terminology of CSR may lead to misunderstandings due to the 
different meaning of sozial in German compared with the English social. 
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  German businesspeople hold ‘opposing affective orientations’ toward 
Corporate Responsibility. These orientations are based on the perceived opportunities 
and risks of CR in the eyes of German businesses. On one hand, CR can enhance the 
legitimacy of business in the eyes of lawmakers and the public, which in turn can 
facilitate business-friendly political-economic reforms. On the other hand, CR can be 
wielded by those pursuing an anti-business agenda. CR as voluntary action 
presupposes also the ability to go above and beyond existing regulatory standards. 
Existing regulations can make it difficult to implement CR programs devised for 
LMEs, as Hans Daniel of the German chemical association VCI recognizes: “we have 
a high regulatory density; as a result, the classic program [the CR program 
‘Responsible Care,’ originated in Canada in the mid-1980s] can’t be realized as it can 
elsewhere. We saw that we could only go beyond the legally mandated standards to a 
limited extent” (Daniel, interview 2006). Petra Schack of the VCI provides the 
following views on the use of Responsible Care at the EU level: 
 
As you know, Responsible Care came about during the mid-1980s in North 
America and came to Europe at the end of the 1980s. This is the background to 
our joining the initiative in 1991. The VCI’s Responsible Care program is 
based on the VCI’s environmental guidelines from 1986. The goal of these 
environmental guidelines was to pre-empt legal overregulation 
[Überregulierung]. Against this background we organized a European seminar 
on self-regulation to advertise for this instrument on the European level. 
During recent years, we had to conclude that the Director-General responsible 
for Environmental policy prefers legal regulation to voluntary initiatives 
(Schack, personal correspondence, 11 November 2005)  
Functional equivalence is one reason for German businesses’ ambivalent 
stance on CR. Organized capitalism is another. In terms of social outcomes, 
Germany’s high regulatory density, works councils and co-determination are 
functionally equivalent if not superior to the voluntary arrangements in Liberal Market 
Economies such as the United States or the United Kingdom. But these institutions 
tend to ‘crowd out’ CR. Another factor relates to the organization of the business 
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community itself. Organized capitalism results in the internalisation of societal 
expectations into German businesses’ operations at the expense of profitability.174 The 
erosion of organization of business and labour during recent years, and the shift from a 
“corporatist” to a “transparency” model of corporate governance175 has redoubled 
incentives for firms to engage in CR.   
What role does Corporate Responsibility play in the ongoing transformations 
of Social Market Economies such as Germany? This is a tricky juncture for German 
business: on the plus side, the institutions of the ‘German model’ have contributed to 
high social stability and strong economic performance. But despite the societal 
benefits generated by these institutions, and contrary to newer rationalist accounts that 
emphasize the benefits of the welfare state and co-determination for business,176 many 
German businesspeople perceive these institutions as burdensome and constraining. 
Co-determination, labour-market regulation, trade unions and the welfare state are 
viewed as an attack on owners’ and management’s prerogatives and freedom of 
manoeuvre, rather than as means to a functional coordinated institutional equilibrium. 
Corporate Responsibility, with its appeal to liberalism and business self-regulation, 
appeals to these sentiments.  
German companies’ ambivalence towards CR is attributable in part to their 
dilemma at this juncture. What can business do with CR in such an environment? One 
option is to re-define CR to encompass businesses’ active support of ISS or what 
Matten and Moon call “implicit CSR.” This would create a complementarity between 
ISS and CR. These institutions, after all, have arguably helped German employers 
through their “beneficial constraints” (Streeck 1997). Another option is to try to loosen 
                                                 
174 The high levels of encompassment of Germany’s corporatist institutions have traditionally led 
German business to internalize social externalities to a greater extent than their counterparts in Liberal 
Market Economies. See Scruggs (2003) 
175 Gourevitch and Shinn (2005) 
176 Hall and Soskice (2001); Mares (2003); Iversen and Soskice (2009) 
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the strictures of these institutions to expand businesses’ room of manoeuvre, and space 
for voluntary engagement. German politicians, managers and entrepreneurs have opted 
for the latter, filling the wine of CR into libertarian flasks. Responsibility? Yes, but in 
exchange for (greater) freedom!177 To make a long story short: CR has co-evolved 
with market-liberalism.  
The organization of this chapter is as follows. The following section provides 
some historical context and provides some clues why Germany became a CR laggard. 
The third and fourth sections discuss some key changes of the Rhine model of 
capitalism as well as the New Social Market Initiative, an employer-funded market-
liberal reform initiative. These sections are essential to refute the claim that German 
employers are content with the institutional status quo. The fifth section links 
liberalization with the growth of CR, while the sixth section discusses German CR-
activities at the association- and firm-level. The seventh section concludes the chapter.  
 
II. ‘Father State’ and Institutionalized Social Solidarity: 
The Historical Context of Corporate Responsibility in Germany 
There are at least two reasons why Germany has been considered a ‘laggard’ in 
CR matters: a comparatively long period of strong macroeconomic performance and 
an associated low incidence of social problems; and a crowding out of voluntary 
engagement through the functionally equivalent institutions of ‘Rhine capitalism.’ 
Social tensions and urban decay were (and are) serious problems in the U.S. and the 
U.K. during the 1970s and 1980s, and an impetus for CR there. Britain’s de-
industrialization and social and racial unrest that culminated in riots at the beginning 
of the 1980s contrasted with conditions in Germany, as Neal R. Peirce and Jerry 
Hagstrom write in the conclusion to the tri-nation study Advanced Industrialization 
                                                 
177 To clarify: German employers’ first-order preference is for freedom, and their second-order 
preference is for CR. They want to be free and then they want to be responsible. Freedom, in other 
words, is not merely a means to CR.     
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and the Inner Cities: “West Germany’s inner-city problems are substantially less 
severe than those in Britain or the United States. Indeed, the overall health of West 
German cities stands in dazzling contrast to the American and British conditions” 
(Peirce and Hagstrom, 1981: 142).  
Some evidence suggests that the institutionalization of German entrepreneurs’ 
and businesspeople’s responsibilities provided them with a better reputation and 
higher legitimacy than their British counterparts. The topic of the legitimacy of the 
entrepreneur was discussed at a conference of the Mont-Pelerin Society in Munich in 
1970. Referring to the results of a representative survey of the West German 
population, Gustav Schmölders states: 
 
only four percent of the respondents gave negative or explicitly anti-
entrepreneurial comments with harken back to the old class-conflict 
terminology like ‘capitalist’ or ‘exploiter’ (lets others work for him etc…. in 
general the following can be said: the picture that the West German population 
makes of the entrepreneur is highly differentiated and – insofar as we have 
time-series data – has improved markedly over the past years (Schmölders, 
1970: 2; 13-14)178 
While anecdotal, this evidence suggests that whatever their costs, the 
institutions of Rhine capitalism also had advantages.179 There has been less need for 
CR in Germany than in the U.K. or U.S.180 But was this always the case?  The recent 
flourish of CR discourse in Germany should not lead us to believe that CR is a new 
idea between the Rhine and Oder: “the idea that business bears social responsibilities 
                                                 
178 Schmölders’ qualifies this otherwise positive outlook by noting that 55% of respondents were of the 
opinion that entrepreneurs have to compelled by laws to fulfil the wishes of their employees, and they 
are only friendly towards their employees because these are in short supply and they need them urgently 
(52%); and they live from the work of others (55%), indeed at the expense of others (57%) and have too 
little social orientation (58%). (Liberaal Archiv, 1970: 8-9). 
179 Which is not to claim that these institutions, rather than “D-mark nationalism” or any number of 
other causes, were the cause of business’s legitimacy in this particular instance.  
180 The paper the “Image of Entrepreneur in Great Britain” by Ralph Horowitz has a very different tone. 
Horowitz sees the Britain of his time as ”engaged in a Social Welfare Crusade,” and as having “a 
Christian Socialist morality of the wickedness of profits and the sanctity of fair shares … with Labour 
in control as a permanent power-centre in Parliament or in Transport House” (1970: 3). Admittedly, it is 
unclear to what extent Schmölders and Horowitz’s papers are based on comparable questionnaires.    
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is a long-standing feature of German culture,” note Ariane Antal, Maria Oppen and 
Andre Sobczak (Antal, Oppen and Sobczak, 2009: 288). The Fuggers, Krupps and 
Thyssens are only some well-known examples.181 During the post-war period, the 
German welfare state expanded rapidly, depressing the perception – and reality – of 
acute social need which had previously led businesspeople to take voluntary action in 
social affairs.  
The Notgemeinschaft Lennep provides a good example of social need as a 
driver for CR. The Notgeimeinschaft or emergency initiative Lennep was founded in 
the fall of 1947 near the city of Wuppertal in the west of Germany. In response to the 
question “What is the Notgemeinschaft for?” its initiator and director, Mr Hardt said:  
 
Departing from the hardships of the German people and the impending dangers 
for life and health in the coming winter, there is a need for a comprehensive 
relief program. In this capacity, the call for help goes out to large factories and 
companies, which thankfully initiated this endeavour in the first place (Hardt, 
1947) 
Hardt appeals to the humanistic and Christian motives of his audience in his appeal for 
food, clothing, heating materials, and places to live for needy persons. In addition to 
donating and distributing large quantities of goods, the Notgemeinschaft provided 
payments to individuals on the basis of their social need. In effect, the emergency 
initiative Lennep was a private voluntary social safety net. But its activities did not 
continue indefinitely. Twenty years later, protagonists noted: “with the improving 
economic conditions, the utilization of the Notgemeinschaft has declined more and 
more” (Hardt, 1969). Rising levels of material affluence and an expanding welfare 
state meant that the social needs which had been addressed by the Notgemeinschaft 
were satisfied by other means. 
                                                 
181 According to Julia Streets and Thomas Weihe (2006), CR was promoted with special vigour under 
National Socialism to legitimate capitalists against challenges to their legitimacy by Communists.  
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Jumping to the contemporary period, the following example illustrates the 
importance of statist attitudes among citizens. Julia Adou of Ford Motor Company in 
Cologne describes how the American corporate headquarters’ initial attempts to 
centrally organize and implement Corporate Citizenship and Volunteering in Germany 
“failed utterly”: “it shocked the people [at Ford in Cologne].” At Ford, each employee 
is permitted to take two paid days off each year for community service projects. The 
up-take varies substantially in different countries: “the English colleagues need less 
[external] motivation than us. They do it by themselves…. And the Americans are 
very patriotic about their engagement … for Americans it’s part of their self-
understanding” (Adou, interview, 2006). At Ford Germany, “the internal legitimation 
[of CR practices vis-à-vis the company’s employees] is much more difficult than the 
external [legitimation to society and outside stakeholders].” “The will to engage is 
greater with British managers.”  Environmental issues enjoy a high priority in 
Germany, but “[getting employees engaged in] the social aspect of CSR takes more 
convincing.” According to Adou, Ford is more engaged in CR in the US and UK than 
in Germany. The explanation for Germany’s underdeveloped CR is not hard to find: 
“in Germany there is father state [Vater Staat]” (Adou, interview, 2006). Oswald 
Menninger, Director of the welfare organization Paritätischer Wohlfahrtsverband, 
corroborates this view: “During the 1960s and 1970s, the focus was exclusively on 
professional social work because the state financed everything. Voluntary engagement 
[in this area] has gone down because there was no need – until things started to move 
again during the 1990s,” remarks Oswald Menninger of the Paritätischer 
Wohlfahrtsverband (Menninger, interview, 2007).   
These entrenched statist attitudes suggest that despite the fiscal crisis of the 
German welfare state, moving towards a higher level of voluntary engagement, CR or 
otherwise, may not be straightforward. Statist attitudes and expectations of entitlement 
  
 
157
  
are slow to change, conditioned as they are by Germany’s post-war welfare regime. As 
Eckhard Priller and Jana Sommerfeld remark,  
 
[w]ith the social welfare laws initiated during the 1950s, the Federal Republic 
implemented not only a relatively comprehensive safety net for the greatest 
life-risks, but also changed the priority and modified the reasons for charitable 
giving. Social problems and dire situations were put under state responsibility 
and were seen as solvable by the state (Priller and Sommerfeld, 2004: 7) 
The burdening of firms by taxation, social insurance contributions and other 
levies reduces their ability and willingness to contribute voluntarily. In the automobile 
manufacturing town of Wolfsburg, the Volkswagen Corporation contributed towards 
the costs of building and maintaining a theatre which was completed in the early 
1970s. Not just out of altruism, but to promote good relations with its employees and 
the local populace: “the objective was also to make the city [an] attractive [place to 
live] for the workers it needed.” Faced with tight budgets, the local city authorities 
decided to increase the rate of corporate taxation in 1975. VW warned that the 
company would review its contributions if faced with a tax increase. When the city 
increased taxes, VW reduced its subsidies for the theatre’s operations – but it did not 
eliminate its support altogether. As one board member put it, “I am of the view that 
even in the current situation, we should not extricate ourselves from all of our 
obligations towards the city and its infrastructure. In that case, we would one day have 
to restore this loss of face with great effort (Volkswagen Archive, file 373/181/2, 
Board Meeting 24.06.1975).   
The following statements provide some idea of the anti-business public opinion 
climate of the 1960s and 1970s, and of businesses’ struggle to legitimate itself in that 
anti-business environment. Alwyn Münchmeyer writes: “The entrepreneur differs 
from the profiteer in that he puts on hold his by all means legitimate profit seeking 
when macroeconomic and socio-political damage is created” (Münchmeyer,  1964: 
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78). A decade later – this was the time that saw the passing of some of the most 
employee-friendly corporate governance legislation in the entire OECD – the 
Christian Democratic politician Kurt H. Biedenkopf implores businesses to take an 
enlightened view of their interests: 
 
Businesspeople [should] revisit their existing conception of business and ask 
themselves which attacks against their activity may be partially justified. One 
of the tasks which businesspeople will have to solve in this context is taking 
greater account of the social costs, which, when ignored in economic processes 
have been a wellspring of critique of entrepreneurs’ activities (Biedenkopf, 
1973: 156)  
German business responded to these pressures with non-financial social and 
environmental reports. Meinolf Dierkes, one of the leading figures for non-financial 
reporting during the 1970s, entitled an article “Waiting for Legislation” (Dierkes, 
1975). Dierkes expectecd that companies’ voluntary practices would become legally 
mandated. An advertisement by the chemicals manufacturer Henkel in 1974 reads: 
“Companies that only think about profits will have a lot to lose.” Meanwhile, German 
trade unions went from strength to strength. A 1974 publication by the German 
employers’ federation is titled Auf dem Weg in den Gewerkschaftsstaat? (On the Way 
to the Trade-Union State?). It reads: “no question: unions and employers federations 
are important elements of social organization and power distribution. But there is also 
no question that this system threatens to collapse when one side becomes 
overwhelmingly powerful” (1974: 11). Employers fearful of unions’ overwhelming 
power – how the tables have turned in thirty years!  
The co-determination laws of 1976 politicised the Boards of large German 
corporations, symbolically if not actually expropriating capital. Management of large 
companies now became certainly not less responsible, but less corporate; and owners’ 
and manager’s ability to take unilateral credit for their activities was compromised. 
Such arrangements may provide competitive advantages compared with more classic 
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liberal forms of economic organization, but they also constrain employers’ freedom of 
manoeuvre in general, as well as leaving less space for the managers or owners of 
firms to promote their reputations through CR. Retrenching or dismantling these 
institutions may not make sense from the standpoint of economic efficiency, but as 
Streeck reminds us, efficiency is only one of several motives – next to unruliness and 
subversiveness – that marks the behaviour of capitalists vis-à-vis societal institutions.  
Compared to the UK, where CR rose from the ashes of industrial restructuring 
during the 1970s and 1980s, CR was late to arrive in Germany because of the 
legitimacy and social cohesion that were provided by the its political-economic 
institutions. The very strength of these legally and collectively binding institutions 
proved to be a liability once voluntary CR engagement came to be expected of firms 
everywhere, irrespective of their institutional environment. As recently as the turn of 
the millennium, some large publicly listed German companies reported “confusion, a 
lack of clarity” with regard to their handling of CR. Marita Hilgenstock of the energy 
giant RWE remarks that the situation “is different than in Anglo-Saxon countries 
where there is pressure from deficits in social provision” (Hingenstock, interview 
2006). By 1990, firms across the English Channel had been championing CR 
collectively for almost a decade. But as Karl Heinrich Wilke’s 1990 discussion of the 
“US prototype” shows, German business was still ambivalent about CR at this time:  
 
The new business ethics create an ideal frame for the picture of the 
entrepreneur in public opinion. Since it supplements the evident usefulness [of 
the entrepreneur in the provision of goods and services] with a second 
characteristic which promises great popularity: an increase of voluntarily 
assumed social responsibility. As compellingly successful as such initiatives 
may appear: to date, there is no convincing empirical or scientific proof of their 
effectiveness. On the other hand, it is indisputable that there are deficits in this 
area (Wilke, 1990: 489) 
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The first book on CR in Germany was published in 1995.182 Only about 30% of the 
initial print run of 1000 were sold.183 Achim Westebbe, one of the book’s co-authors, 
says that CR only really arrived in Germany five years later.  
 
Antal, Oppen and Sobczak emphasize the functional equivalency of the German 
institutions to the voluntary CR arrangements in other countries: 
 
The social responsibilities of business was not subject to explicit discussion for 
many years because the relations between business and its employees and 
business and society were covered by legal requirements, societal norms, and 
tripartite conflict procedures.... for a long time there was little need nor space 
for other forms of social regulation ... such as the ones based on voluntary 
commitments by owners or on stakeholder pressure that characterize the CSR 
concept in Anglo-Saxon cultures. Numerous aspects of the CSR discourse that 
are considered discretionary in the United States or the UK are mandated by 
law in Germany, and many fall under the auspices of co-determination (Antal, 
Oppen and Sobczak, 2009: 286, 289)   
This message is echoed by a sizable literature. For example, in their contribution to the 
2003 study “Corporate Responsibility and Working Conditions,” Wieland, Büchner, 
Eberbach and Winckler write that “at first sight, there does not appear to be any 
important CSR practice that was not already enabled by the German model of co-
determination” (2003: 44). Scholars who argue for continuity and path-dependency 
rather than change – such as Frank Heuberger, Maria Oppen and Sabine Reimer 
(2004) – argue that many German firms are looking for their own route for social 
engagement, one that takes account of the path-dependent nature of the German 
welfare state as well as the corporatist nature of the social sector.  
The issue of culture is a weighty one. Germany’s economic culture differs 
from that of the Anglo-American countries where CR originated. According to Bettina 
Palazzo, its characteristics include  
                                                 
182 Westebbe and Logan (1995) 
183 Westebbe, personal communication, November 15, 2010 
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a basically antagonistic relationship of business and morality, the stricter 
separation of public and private spheres, the relational understanding of norms 
and values, the more pessimistic assessment of the human potential for moral 
improvement, and the idealistic intellectual style (Palazzo, 2002: 210)  
In line with Palazzo’s characterization, some German managers and entrepreneurs 
insist that ‘doing good and not talking about it’ is their self-understanding. Stefanie 
Wismeth is in charge of CR in Germany at KPMG, a leading professional services 
firm with extensive CR activities across the OECD. Wismeth says: 
 
Germans don’t talk with pride about this [“it makes me proud that my 
company is offering this, is doing this”], it just sounds kitschy in German ears. 
There are always those who say if I engage myself then KPMG should have 
nothing to do with it (Wismeth, interview, 2008) 
This culture can help to explain the delayed onset, reduced quantity and ambivalent 
attitude towards CR in Germany. But CR is taking hold in Germany.  The rise of 
Corporate Responsibility in Germany is proof that economic culture is dynamic and 
changing rather than static; and the concurrence of cultural change with recent 
institutional change suggests that the dynamism of the former may have something to 
do with changes in the latter. As Reinhard Lang of the CR Association UPJ put it, “the 
fact that we [the CRA UPJ] exist – even in Germany – shows something” (Lang, 
interview, 2006; my emphasis).  
Dieter Schöffmann is one of the pioneers of Corporate Volunteering in 
Germany. In 2001 Schöffmann was awarded the main prize of the transatlantic idea 
competition Usable, “American ideas in Germany,” funded by the Hamburg-based 
Körber Foundation. Schöffmann’s project examines Corporate Volunteering in the US 
and its applicability to Germany. He openly concedes that he picked up his ideas 
during travels in the United States: they are an example of “constructive theft” 
(Schöffmann, interview, 2006). Indeed, it worth noting the importance of Anglo-
American ideas for the development of CR in Germany. The first German-language 
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book on contemporary CR, Corporate Citizenship. Unternehmen im gesellschaftlichen 
Dialog is a German translation of an English original written by David Logan 
(Westebbe and Logan, 1995). Just as British corporate and state officials have 
borrowed ideas from Americans, German state officials from North-Rhine Westphalia, 
Rheinland-Pfalz and Hessen have travelled to the US and UK to learn about CR.    
Like Schöffmann, these officials might want to adopt some of the instruments 
and practices of CR without embracing the whole gamut of LME institutions in which 
they developed and from which they derive. As Schöffmann puts it, 
 
it is rightly pointed out that the American economic culture differs from ours 
and that taking over the former is not always desirable. Experience so far 
shows however that not the context and circumstances, but certainly the 
instruments of firm-level engagement can be taken over (Schöffmann, 2001b: 
18)  
What prevents state officials and firms in Coordinated- or Social-Market economies 
from doing this: using the tools of CR, for example corporate volunteering, while 
leaving the remainder of their own political-economic institutions intact? As plausible 
as this seems in theory, it doesn’t work out this way in practice. A significant number 
of businesspeople propagate CR while demanding economic liberalization as a quid-
pro-quo. This linkage speaks to the elective affinities of CR and liberalization. Below, 
I survey some of the changes that the German political-economy has undergone during 
recent decades before introducing these people and their views.  
 
III. The Transformation of German Capitalism, 1995-2007 
 
Germany’s move towards market-liberalism differs from the UK’s in several respects. 
Margaret Thatcher’s impact on the British economy and society is not only far-
reaching, it is also “high salience.” The transformation of German capitalism, by 
contrast, is more subtle, proceeding insidiously within existing institutions, leaving 
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many of them formally intact.184 Since the mid-1990s, signs of institutional change are 
accumulating; but many of these occur through layering, displacement, drift, and 
conversion,185 rather than by dispensing with non-liberal institutions altogether. 
Market liberalism in Germany has had some unexpected / counterintuitive political 
proponents: the Social Democrats (SPD) and the German labour movement took the 
initiative to dissolve ‘Germany Inc.,’ the network of cross-shareholdings among banks 
and large firms that was a cornerstone of Germany’s organized capitalism.  
Scholars increasingly recognize that a notable transformation of German 
capitalism has taken place during the past decade.186 A non-exhaustive list of changes 
includes: the large-scale privatisation of state enterprises beginning in the 1990s, 
substantial changes in labour market regulation through the ‘Hartz’ reforms; the 
disintegration of ‘Germany Inc,’ of the structures of organized capitalism and 
interlocking board directorates; the drying up of bank loans and the rise of 
shareholder-value orientation in corporate governance; and the weakening of the 
corporatist institutions of sectoral collective bargaining, including the conversion of 
institutions such as co-determination for managerialist uses.   
It is not clear to what degree these changes are a result of exogenous shocks or 
of self-undermining institutions.187 Nor is it clear whether the transformation of the 
German model can be traced to the 1990s or whether the seeds of destruction were 
sown earlier.188 Regardless, this transformation has gained speed during the 1990s, 
when the German model entered a “severe performance crisis” (Streeck and 
                                                 
184 Kinderman (2005); Streeck (2009)  
185 Streeck and Thelen (2005) 
186  Höpner (2003); Höpner, (2007); Jürgens, Krzywdzinski and Teipen (2006); Kinderman, (2005); 
Paster (2009);  Streeck and Thelen, (2005); Streeck, (2009). 
187 The most forceful proponent of the latter is Wolfgang Streeck in his Re-Forming Capitalism: 
Institutional Change in the German Political Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.  
188 According to Wolfgang Streeck, “Pressures for change emanating especially from employers had 
started long before the 1990s” (Streeck, 2009: 112)   
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Yamamura, 2003: 12). Jürgen Beyer and Martin Höpner argue that “the German 
variant of capitalism changed towards greater market orientation because of 
simultaneous and reciprocally reinforcing, complementary developments” (Beyer and 
Höpner, 2003: 180).  These changes are especially important in the arena of industrial 
relations. 
A growing number of firms are members of employers associations without 
being bound to collectively binding wage agreements (Ohne Tarifbindung or OT). By 
selling services to firms without negotiating collective agreements for them, 
employers associations can expand their membership base, or at least appeal to 
companies that would otherwise cancel their memberships, while increasing pressure 
on trade unions (since high wage settlements will exacerbate companies’ exodus into 
OT membership). The services provided by employers’ associations to their OT 
members are selective goods, not the collective goods of a collective wage agreement 
(Haipeter, 2010: 209). In 2004, the ratio was 5000 firms bound by wage agreements 
and roughly 2000 OT members (Schnabel 2005). In late 2008, the ratio was 4000 
firms bound by wage agreements to 2300 OT members (Gesamtmetall, 2008). In just 
four years, the percentage of Gesamtmetall’s OT members, those not party to 
collectively binding agreements jumped from 28.5% in (2004) to 36.5% (in 2008). 
Thus, the rise of OT-membership is contributing to the erosion of the German system 
of industrial relations (Haipeter, 2010: 217). In addition, since the Pforzheim 
agreement of 2003, the collectively binding (non-OT) agreements have become less 
binding (for employees) as wages and working hours can be adjusted downwards if 
economic circumstances necessitate. The trade union research institute WSI found that 
in 1999, 22 percent of firms made use of opening clauses in sectoral collective 
agreements. By 2004, this had increased to 75 percent (Streeck, 2009: 41).   
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 On the side of organized labour, there has been a gradual and continuous 
decline in the coverage of industry-wide collective bargaining, from 72% to 53% of 
workplaces and 57% to 37% of employees between 1995 and 2006 (Streeck, 2009: 
39). Union membership has declined from 31% in 1992 to less than 20% in 2003 
(Streeck, 2009: 47). According to Streeck, “the German wage structure remained 
largely unchanged until the early or mid-1990s,” after which inequality increased 
markedly, especially below the median (Streeck, 2009: 41). Income inequality 
increased markedly between 2000 and 2007, and with it, the risk of falling into 
poverty.189   
Levels of product market, administrative and economic regulation have fallen 
substantially during recent years (Conway, Janod and Nicoletti, 2005). Martin Höpner 
distinguishes organization from coordination from and suggests that while German 
firms may remain co-ordinated, their organization, a “function [which] transcends 
maximization strategies and adjusts them to collective interests beyond maximization” 
has been compromised (Höpner, 2007: 3). In the words of Georg Menz:   
 
While the institutions of economic governance in Germany continue to diverge 
from the liberal Anglo-Saxon model, the policy output produced by these 
institutions varies dramatically from earlier decades. While traditional 
Rhineland institutions may survive, they serve fundamentally new goals. While 
no neoliberal ‘revolution’ has occurred as in Britain and New Zealand, actual 
policy output has assumed a distinctly neo-liberal direction (2007: 17)  
Similarly, Anke Hassel stresses:  
 
what seems to become increasingly clear is that the link between distributive 
outcomes and coordinating institutions is not a direct one. In other words, 
while coordinating institutions help the German manufacturing sector to 
remain competitive, they do little to preserve the previously egalitarian nature 
of the German model (Hassel, 2007: 276)  
                                                 
189 Goebel and Krause (2007). 
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The fact that some German institutions look different than the market liberal ideal type 
does not mean that they continue to deliver different outcomes:   
 
deregulation is spreading from the periphery to the middle of the labour 
market, and the unions have little power to change this. The German labor 
market is undergoing a process which has taken place in the 1980s on the labor 
markets of Britain and the United States and which has contributed to the 
insecurity of employees there: a trend to flexible and insecure employment 
relations. In the Anglo-Saxon countries this was achieved through an active 
political contestation of trade unions. In German capitalism it occurs subtly 
within existing institutions (Hassel, 2006: 207) 
These findings – the weakening, hollowing out, mutation and transformation of 
Germany’s political economic institutions – are hard to reconcile with Hall and 
Soskice’s frozen pictures of equilibrium and institutional order.  
Streeck pinpoints the problems with the Varieties of Capitalism view: “the 
domestic institutions of the postwar political economy were not just useful 
Williamsonian instruments for the competitive pursuit of shared economic interest, but 
also sources of social constraints that firms would not have subjected themselves to 
voluntarily” (Streeck, 2009: 190).  Streeck challenges a vitally important assumption 
underlying the Varieties of Capitalism literature: that German employers support the 
distinctive non-liberal political-economic institutions of German capitalism because 
they support their comparative institutional advantage. Contrary to VoC 
pronouncements that these institutions were supported by employers, Streeck argues 
that “the model had if at all been imposed on rather than created by capital” (Streeck, 
2009: 112). “[T]emptations to defect from national risk pools have never been alien to 
capitalist firms, including German ones,” and the circumstances from the 1990s 
onward offered welcome opportunities (Streeck, 2009: 197)  
The same processes of liberalization which are hollowing out the traditional 
institutions of the German model are re-enforcing the adoption of CR. Germany’s 
institutions of ISS were imposed on rather than created by capital. Corporate 
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Responsibility, by contrast, is by definition corporate-led. The fact that the latter could 
itself facilitate defection from the former added to its appeal. At the same time, the 
internationalisation and financialization of the German economy has brought more and 
more managers from other countries into Germany.190  
Not everyone agrees with the diagnoses of Höpner, Streeck and others that 
Germany is converging with Anglo-American liberal market economies. Alexander 
Börsch finds that:  
 
piecemeal institutional change is possible without jeopardizing the whole 
institutional configuration at the firm level … Institutional change in German 
corporate governance has been happening, but it has been limited to certain 
aspects that have left the fundamental structures of corporate governance intact 
(Börsch, 2007: 164; 177)  
Even so, Börsch notes that “the changes observed … are far-reaching enough to post a 
problem for the varieties of capitalism approach” (Börsch, 2007: 175). The 
aforementioned changes do not imply that the German political economy has become 
an LME through and through. But it has become more liberal and voluntaristic. 
Moreover, these changes are not restricted to the economy and its institutions proper; 
they also apply to the sphere of normative orientations about the economy. The 
following section discusses the New Social Market Initiative, a Public-Relations 
initiative founded by German employers to expand their room of manoeuvre.191 It 
serves to underline the attractiveness of liberal and voluntaristic ideals for German 
employers, and will serve as a comparison to statements by German CRA officials in 
the remainder of this chapter. Both the NSMI and the CRA initiatives described below 
in this chapter are characterized by a liberal and voluntarist, in other words a market-
                                                 
190 Simon, Kucher & Partners report that the proportion of foreign executives has nearly doubled from 
13.3% in 2000 to 24.7% 2007 (Simon, Kucher and Partners, press release, 31 July 2007). 
191 This section derives in part from Kinderman (2005). 
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liberal orientation, which sets them apart from stylized accounts of the institutions, 
though not necessarily of the ideational origins, of post-war Rhine capitalism.192    
 
IV. The New Social Market Initiative 
 
According to Hans Tietmeyer, former president of the Bundesbank and representative 
of the New Social Market Initiative,  
 
We can’t simply adopt the American mentality, the American model, we need 
to find out own way. Bismarkian social security system, co-determination, 
wage-bargaining system … that can’t be given up from today to tomorrow but 
it must be loosened, lightened, [geleichtert, erleichtert] and reformed. Elements 
have to be built in everywhere. I think we can say that in Germany today, all 
important topics are on the table. For a long time, they were under the table. 
They were swept under the table (Tietmeyer, interview, 2006)     
The New Social Market Initiative was founded after a public opinion survey in the 
summer of 1999 showed evidence of substantial mistrust of business and the market 
on the part of the general German population. Two-thirds of citizens surveyed in 
Germany viewed the prospect of upcoming economic reforms with attitude ranging 
from “skepticism” to “fear” and supported a generous welfare-state (Gesellschaft im 
Zwiespalt, 2000: 16), and forty-two percent favored a third way between capitalism 
and socialism (Speth, 2004b: 7). The NSMI was founded in order to help bring about a 
Klimawechsel – a change in the public opinion climate – to facilitate the 
implementation of the reforms employers desire and advocate.   
The campaign is titled the “neue soziale Marktwirtschaft” – the ‘New Social 
Market Economy’ – although according to its managing director, its goal is to restore 
the ‘old’ social market economy (Rath, interview, 2002).193 The social market model 
is the founding myth of the Federal Republic of Germany, as Haselbach remarks:  
                                                 
192 Ptak (2009) 
193 Which ‘old’ social market economy? The one that existed before it was ‘hijacked’ by special interest 
groups and distorted by excessive welfare-state interventionism. When exactly this occurred is not 
clear. Already in 1958, when German social policy was in its infancy, the Ordoliberal theorist Wilhelm 
Röpke thought that West German economic policy had taken a turn towards excessive interventionism. 
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[t]he social market economy’ constitutes in part West Germany’s self-
consciousness; it forms the specific ‘identity’ of the West German 
people. In other words, the ‘economic miracle’ and the ‘social market 
economy’ constitute the founding myth of West Germany (1997: 158)  
The prominence and currency of ‘social market economy’ discourse in Germany is 
astounding; it would be no exaggeration to say that it is hegemonic as far as economic 
and social policy is concerned. One recent commentator declared the ‘social market 
economy’ to be in all honesty “[u]p to now, the most successful conception of 
economic policy in the history of [hu]mankind” (Haselbach, 1997: 160). More even – 
as Haselbach emphasizes, “[t]he tale of the ‘social market economy’...is referred to 
almost every day, somewhere in a German newspaper or political statement; it has 
become part of the national memory” (1997: 161). The genius of the ‘social market 
economy’ lies in its versatility: it is both ‘social’ (fair/just) and a ‘[capitalist] market.’ 
By emphasizing different aspects of this totality, Left and Right can endorse the 
‘social market economy’ from within their own normative vocabularies. – much like 
an ‘overlapping consensus’ (Rawls, 1993). How does the NSMI seek to alter the 
balance between ‘market’ and ‘social’ in the ‘social market economy’?    
 The NSMI is non-partisan: it has ambassadors from each of the major political 
parties, in addition to celebrities and public icons, academics, businesspeople and 
workers. These figures appear on brochures, billboards, television and newspaper ads, 
online advertisements, television documentaries and opinion pieces, public events, 
press releases, publications, and at conferences, and are supported by a budget of 100 
million Euros over ten years. The campaign focuses on ‘multipliers,’ persons who are 
in a position to affect public opinion and who can further disseminate the message. 
Articles appear almost daily in all major German newspapers and newsmagazines 
                                                                                                                                            
He declared that the state should place itself as a ‘guardian of the market’ above societal interest groups 
(Haselbach, 1991: 172). 
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(Speth, 2004).194 The campaign centers on the disjuncture between the 
historically evolved social market economy and its ideational origins. In addition to 
the political recognition of core sections of the labor movement and their integration 
into mechanisms of corporate governance, the post-war German political economy 
evolved an extensive welfare state with a dense network of regulations, extensive 
corporate-governance powers for labor, and generous income-replacement levels. This 
is the historically evolved social market economy. The ideational origins are more 
complicated.195 As Gerhard Schwarz points out: “For him [Ludwig Erhard] the social 
market economy [...] was a sales formula, that should make clear that the market 
economy is itself social [that is, egalitarian or just]” (Plehwe and Walpen: 224).196 
 Two points illustrate how the NSMI aims to engage with and transform 
prevailing societal norms of social justice. Firstly, it argues that a social market is a 
free one, not one burdened by regulation and welfare-state interventionism. As 
Tietmeyer puts it, “the ‘market economy’ and ‘the social’ are erroneously seen by 
many as separate or opposed.” The campaign aims to “free up Erhard’s original 
system from the shackles placed on it down the years” (Tietmeyer, 2001: 29). 
Secondly, the NSMI advocates replacing distribution of resources with equality of 
opportunity: “Today it is no longer appropriate to promise Wohlstand [material 
                                                 
194 The message presented tends to be remarkably uniform across different new social market 
contributors. See for instance Hans Tietmeyer, “Ein Blick zu unseren Nachbarn,” Handelsblatt 12/13. 
April 2002, and Roland Berger, “Von anderen Ländern lernen,” Handelsblatt 19/20 April 2002. It is 
striking that these two articles by different authors, appearing in the same newspaper within a week of 
each other, are almost identical. 
195 Although one should emphasize that the traditions of Ordoliberalismus and Anglo-American free 
market liberalism are dissimilar in many respects. 
196 I will leave open the extent to which the redistribution of wealth was integral to the ideational 
concept of the social market economy, or an element necessitated by cold-war regime competition. 
Alfred Müller-Armack, one of the ‘founders’ of the soziale Markwirtschaft in Germany, describes the 
class compromise as “reconciling the principle of market freedom with that of social equalization.” See 
his  “Soziale Marktwirtschaft,” Handwörterbuch der Sozialwissenschaften, Vol. 9, Stuttgart, p. 390. 
Other members of the Ordoliberal school, such as Alfred Müller-Armack and Alexander Rüstow, 
emphasized the need for state intervention and social policies. Alfred Müller-Armack believed that the 
“point of the social market economy is to connect the principle of free market relations with that of 
social compensation” [Röller and Wey, 2001: 11).  
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affluence] to everyone. The point is that everyone get a chance” (Tietmeyer, 2001: 
22).  
 The NSMI emphasizes the need for flexiblization and deregulation in general, 
and of labor markets in particular; and the creation of jobs as both the overriding goal 
of social policy and indeed, the principal requirement of social justice. “Badly paid 
jobs are better than none at all. [...] A guiding principal of the new social market 
economy is the motto: Just is whatever creates employment.” (Rodenstock, 2001: 54-
55). This motto has come to dominate German public debate. As these examples and 
Tietmeyer’s quote above (“the new social market economy is equivalent to the 
American principle”) indicate, the NSMI advocates a move towards the liberal market 
model. “Unions say that the [NSM] initiative is dangerous,” remarks a director of the 
NSMI (Rath, interview, 2003). Norbert Reuter states that “a change of the German 
economic order according to the plans of the NSMI can not be seen as a further 
development of the social market economy, but would mean a fundamental break with 
‘Rhenish capitalism’” (Reuter, 2002: 687).  
The NSMI has supported economic regime change in myriad ways.  If it is 
true, as one commentator has suggested, that “2003 [and 2004] will go into the records 
as a year of political climate change,” then to a substantial part because of the 
activities of the NSMI (Metzger, 2003). As Rudolph Speth concludes his study, “one 
can reasonably assume that the activities of the NSMI have contributed massively 
towards changing the orientations of the population and bring into discussion topics 
such as retrenchment of the welfare state, [lengthening] working times, increased self-
reliance, and a reduction of state intervention and expenditure during the past few 
years” (Speth, 2004: 41). Regarding employer preferences, it is interesting to note that 
the member associations Gesamtmetall have criticized the initiative for being too slow 
– far from wanting to conserve existing structures, they were impatient with the 
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progress in the direction of liberalization and market reforms in 2003 (Rath, interview, 
2003).  
In 2007, the Initiative published an initiative titled Deutschland zum 
Selbermachen – do-it yourself Germany. The book presents and celebrates twenty-two 
examples of civic-mindedness across Germany. The examples show citizens pulling 
together to sustain or expand public infrastructure threatened by closure due to a 
shortage of state funding including libraries, parks, swimming pools, museums, 
pedestrian bridges and street lighting. On the back of the book is a quote by Peter 
Hahne. Hahne, who works for one of the major national public television stations, is 
“complaining doesn’t help, pull up your sleeves! Because good examples are better 
than regulations!” This publication underlines the liberal visions which underlie and 
justify much CR. Much like Nancy Fraser’s point about the alliance of emancipatory 
movements with the market, grass-roots and civil society are presented as integral to 
the new, market-liberal order.  
In 2009, Gesamtmetall renewed the New Social Market Initiative’s mandate 
for another five years. Nico Fickinger of Gesamtmetall justifies this decision:  
 
In recent years Germany has indeed evolved – in the area of politics (keyword 
Agenda 2010) as well as the social partners (in the metal and electrical industry 
especially through the agreement of Pforzheim), have set important switches. 
Nonetheless the tasks of the NSMI remain unchanged, and are perhaps more 
urgent than before 
Fickinger mentions the challenge of financing pensions and health care, pressures 
which had gone down because of higher tax receipts during of late, before stressing:   
 
Perhaps even more urgent is the general acceptance of our society towards the 
economic order. The reaction to the current economic crisis leads to fears of a 
return of the belief in the state [Staatsgläubigkeit] – the belief in the necessity 
and the success of state-led and dirigist economic policy is growing. Here and 
especially here, the INSM has the task of explaining the origins of current 
problems, of explaining which regulatory framework the state is responsible 
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for – and where its limits lie. It is also important to warn of a turn to the 
[political] left, which would destroy the gains made during recent dates  
After all, the view that ‘politics creates jobs’ is still a frighteningly widespread 
view. Our society engages intensively in questions of how wealth is and should 
be distributed, but not at all with questions of how it comes about and is 
created in the first place  
The diverse stimulus packages and ‚safety umbrellas’ that result from real 
needs but also from electioneering and demands for intervention in the 
economy lead to more regulation, less self-reliance and less self-responsibility. 
At the end of the day we have the danger that we have more state regulation 
and less freedom.... 
(Fickinger, personal communication, March 31, 2009)       
The New Social Market Initiative has in fact taken up the cause of Corporate 
Responsibility. In 2005, debates over the social/societal responsibilities of business 
were heated following the Deutsche Bank’s announcement that it would lay off nearly 
two-thousand employees despite profits of €2.5 billion. According to a survey 
conducted by forsa, a public opinion sampling company, on February 8 and 9 2005, 88 
percent of the German public disapproved of this decision. The NSMI then 
commissioned and publicized another survey highlighting the contribution of 
corporate citizens to the common good (Entzweiler, 2005), and issued press releases 
publicizing German firms’ contributions to the community – reportedly ten billion 
Euros each year.    
 
V. Liberalization, Disorganization and Corporate Responsibility 
 
This section argues that there is a coincidence between the political-economic 
changes and the rise of Corporate Responsibility in Germany. They can be seen as 
complementary and mutually reinforcing. The less and less the traditional institutions 
of the German model can ‘deliver the goods,’ both materially and symbolically, for 
capital and for ‘the rest of us,’ the greater the space and necessity for CR to fill this 
functional and ‘legitimation deficit.’ At the same time, as long as these institutions 
persist, CR takes on a libertarian meaning: from the point of view of business 
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representatives and organizations, CR in Germany fulfils not only ‘defensive’ roles, 
serving legitimate business and pre-empt new, burdensome legislation, but ‘offensive’ 
ones as well, serving to facilitate reforms which promote a more business-friendly 
environment.197   
In the 1990s, the German political economy was destabilized by several 
exogenous ‘shocks’: reunification, the severe post-reunification recession, and harsh 
competitive winds from the East. It is unclear to what degree these shocks are 
responsible for undermining the German model – but they undoubtedly increased the 
pressure on these institutions. Whether the resulting changes amount to convergence 
or mere hybridization, Germany’s movement towards LMEness since the 1990s has 
increased the appeal of CR – which should not lead us to neglect the fact that 
Corporate Responsibility was initially perceived as a threat by business and politicians 
alike, according to Peter Wilke and Axel Hauser-Ditz:  
 
in Germany … the issue of CSR has been taken up with hesitation by 
politicians. After the employers- and industry associations had made it clear in 
their response to the EU Commission’s Greenbook that in light of the high 
level of social and environmental regulation in Germany, they saw no room for 
upward harmonization, there was an informal consensus with the German 
federal government to not pursue any CSR initiatives that would be legally 
binding (Wilke and Hauser-Ditz, 2004: 24)  
Given their continued overlap and functional equivalence in a number of areas, the 
balance between the old institutions and CR is oftentimes unresolved. It would be a 
distortion to claim that there has been no support among the business community for 
the institutional and regulatory status quo. Viewed somewhat differently, a number of 
                                                 
197 Jürgen Beyer and Martin Höpner write that “in the past, managers of large companies often 
emphasized their responsibility for their employees, their region and society as a whole. Even if this 
was lip service in some cases, in others there are indications that companies did act with a degree of 
social or national responsibility. For good or bad, shareholder value-oriented companies no longer have 
any need or legitimacy to do this…” (Beyer and Höpner, 2003: 195). I do not disagree with these 
authors in terms of substance, but they miss the irony that formally institutionalized Corporate 
Responsibility has arrived in Germany along with shareholder value.   
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German business representatives can’t understand the fuss about Anglo-American 
companies’ voluntary activities in areas which for them have long been areas of 
common business practice. Jochen Rudoph at the specialist chemicals manufacturer 
Evonik Degussa remarks: 
 
The American manages without problems to put the topic of workplace safety 
under ‘social responsibility.’ We would never come up with the idea of using 
the term ‚social responsibility’.... It cannot be that only voluntary engagement 
counts, because then the same outcome is evaluated differently depending on 
whether I am in the USA or in Germany. Then all of the countries that have a 
high level of regulation are at a disadvantage because I can’t add much ‘on top’ 
(Rudolph, interview 2007) 
 Some CR activities, Ursula Mathar of Bayer AG noted, are “personnel costs in one 
system and voluntary [CR] engagement in the other” (Mathar, interview 2007). Renate 
Hornung-Draus of the employers’ association BDA sees German companies as bad at 
CR “as a formalized concept and as communication. But that has nothing to do with 
substance!” (Hornung-Draus, interview, 2008).    
Despite the existence of statist and regulatory patriotism in some parts of 
business community as well as within the population as a whole,198 I argue that CR in 
Germany has assumed a libertarian meaning during the past decade. An elective 
affinity has evolved between CR and the agenda of economic liberalization. As in the 
UK, CR and national-level institutional frameworks are complementary in Germany in 
Colin Crouch’s sense of the term (Crouch, 2005: 359). This process of co-evolution 
(Boyer 2005)199 is described below.  
                                                 
198 Renate Koehler of the Allensbacher Institut für Demoskopie, a large public opinion research 
institute, summarizes the German public’s preference for an expansive welfare state as expressed in her 
institutes surveys: „for the majority, a state that intervenes massively in the economy and at the same 
time insures citizens against risks is preferable to the liberal state which intervenes as little as possible – 
in terms of humaneness, justice and surprisingly also in terms of the expected level of affluence“ (2002: 
78).  
199 As Robert Boyer remarks, “all institutional forms result from social compromises ….. At the level of 
the economy, there is no automatic mechanism that would ensure their compatibility. Instead, 
institutional forms continuously adjust and thus co-evolve. Co-evolution is the process of trial and error 
through which a series of institutional forms that are initially disconnected and formally independent 
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During the severe post-reunification economic crisis of the mid-1990s,  
Rupert Graf Strachwitz made the linkage between corporate community involvement 
and a reduction in corporate taxation: 
 
In many cases such an analysis is deemed unnecessary on the grounds that the 
firm is paying taxes, and not too little, and beyond that also gives charitable 
donations and therefore more than fulfils its obligation. But this overlooks that 
the paying of taxes has no future-oriented component and because of the 
anonymization inherent in the system can hardly or not at all contribute 
towards positioning a firm in its societal context. In addition, no firm should 
miss the opportunity to try to radically reverse the long-term trend of 
increasing taxes. Because after all taxes reduce profits (Rupert Graf Strachwitz, 
1995: 10-11)     
This does not imply that social actors in Germany, including business, 
immediately recognized the potential of CR to facilitate political-economic reforms. 
The 1997 report of the Kommission für Zukunftsfragen of Bavaria and Saxonia is one 
of Germany’s more prominent market-liberal manifestoes of the later 1990s. The 
report prescribes far-reaching economic reforms including, but not limited to, the 
deregulation of labour markets, the retrenchment of the state and increased civic 
engagement. But the report does not mention Corporate Responsibility. Meinhard 
Miegel, who headed this commission, looks back and reflects:  
 
The topic of Corporate Responsibility came up again and again in the 
work of the Commission, but for whatever reason, the commission did not 
focus on it. So it ended up on the periphery of the inquiry. In retrospect I wish 
that this topic had received greater treatment. But this did not happen. I suspect 
that the topic had not yet matured in the heads of the commission members 
(Miegel, personal communication, 2008) 
Gerhard Schröder’s Agenda 2010 makes no explicit references to Corporate 
Responsibility – though integrating CR into the Agenda 2010 would have made a 
great deal of sense, according to CR management consultant Arved Lüth (Lüth, 
personal communication, July 8, 2008). Despite this lack of an explicit reference, CR 
                                                                                                                                            
(since they result from institutionalized compromises among diverse agents in different fields) adjust to 
one another until a viable institutional configuration emerges” (2005: 367). 
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has became increasingly popular among Germany’s political class during the Schröder 
governments.  
In 2001, Hans-Martin Bury, Minister of State in the Bundeskanzler’s office 
under Gerhard Schröder, explicitly connected the agenda of welfare-state reforms to 
granting increased freedoms to citizens and businesses to take up some of the slack 
(Bury, 2001). Michael Bürsch, a SPD member of parliament and a chairman of the 
Bundestag’s Enquette Commission into civil-society engagement, espouses a view 
similar to that of New Labour in the UK: binding, command-and-control regulations 
are futile, and will only prompt attempts by firms and citizens to evade them or 
comply at the minimum required level. Greater market freedom will lead to a new 
social contract and new forms of solidarity between the state, business, and citizens 
(Bürsch, interview, 2008).   
Corporate Responsibility is political. But political differences between the 
main German political parties, FDP, SPD and CDU/CSU and Greens, are hard to 
make out. UPJ, one of Germany’s two main CRAs, has received support from CDU as 
well as PD/Green governments. In 2003, Gerhard Schröder’s SPD/Green coalition 
stressed the importance of “transparency, [minority] investor protection, and 
Corporate Responsibility,” underlining the attractiveness of CR for New Labour-
inspired policy and politics (BMJ press release, 2003). Die Linke, the left-wing party 
which resulted from merging of the post-communist PDS and the WASG, seems to be 
alone in insisting on the implementation of hard law in the place of CR.200 State 
politics provide evidence of the non-existence of major policy differences among 
political parties. Two German states, North-Rhine Westphalia and Hessen, have 
promoted CR in a variety of ways, including by organizing competitions and prizes for 
                                                 
200 In November 2006, Die Linke questioned the CDU/SPD government about its CR policies. The 
government’s response in July 2007 underlined its commitment to a voluntary, non hard-law approach 
and against CR. 
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the most socially engaged enterprises. The CR policies that were initiated by the NRW 
SPD government in 2004 were continued by Jürgen Rüttgers’ CDU government 
without any (noticeable) changes.  
Following SPD politician Franz Müntefering’s polemical characterization of 
private equity firms as ‘locusts,’ the Initiative Neue Soziale Marktwirtschaft or New 
Social Market Initiative commissioned a survey on firms’ CR  engagement to counter 
the negative public opinion swell against business. Other business associations, such 
as the Federal chambers of commerce, publish studies showing how businesses can 
improve their public image by engaging in CR (DIHK, 2008).   
When we think of CR, we often think of businesses legitimating themselves 
vis-à-vis society and (potential) regulators. But it is important to keep in mind that this 
is not the only game in town. Corporate Responsibility also helps to legitimate politics 
vis-à-vis business. In the small German town of Herford, a modern art museum 
designed by the American star architect Frank Gehry, dubbed MARTa, was completed 
in 2005. As in so many areas, MARTa involved an exchange of pragmatic legitimacy 
through Corporate Responsibility.201 First, the regional electricity company 
Elektrizitätswerk Minden-Ravensberg (EMR) managed to get planning consent for 
new electrivity infrastructure in exchange for generous support of MARTa. 
Interestingly, MARTa not only received sponsorship from large companies, but from 
numerous small private companies in the city and region. The CR contributions from 
these companies did not make a noticeable dent into the costs (which were very 
substantial for a city of 60 000), but it was nonetheless indispensable in securing the 
political legitimacy without which the museum could not have been built.   
                                                 
201 CR and not sponsorship, since the companies receive do not receive anything explicit in return for 
their support. 
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More recently, making the link between CR and economic reforms has become 
commonplace.  Andre Habisch and Martina Wegner’s (2005) contribution on 
Corporate Responsibility in Germany is titled “Overcoming the Heritage of 
Corporatism,” thus implying that the heritage of corporatism is an obstacle to the rise 
of CR. For Max Zeidler, the state must be rolled back if CR is to become dynamic in 
Germany: “due to high tax rates and an excessive state apparatus, the potential of 
innovative CR is limited, because there little space remains to engage oneself” (2003: 
142).  In his comparison of the state of corporate citizenship in the United States and 
Germany, Bernd Maier stressed the burdens faced by German firms through 
mandatory social security contributions, compared with their American counterparts, 
and the obstacle which this constitutes in the area of corporate volunteering:   
 
the American volunteering-initiatives of firms are not directly applicable to 
German circumstances. Due to the current institutional arrangements in the 
social safety-net and its extent in Germany, firms are already seriously 
burdened: 1998 the employers’ proportion of social security contributions was 
7,3% of GDP in Germany, compared with 3,5% in the US, not even half of the 
contributions of German firms. This leaves US companies with much more 
freedom for voluntary activities.... The aspirations of the German economy for 
more voluntary engagement thus face financial limitations.... the culture of 
social security in Europe and in Germany is very statist, so that citizens and 
firms are practically forced / compelled to contribute to the common good – 
there can be no talk of a depoliticization (2003: 227-229). 
Gunnar Still is in charge of CR at Thyssen Krupp, a manufacturer of premium steel. 
Still makes the case for deregulation:  
 
As a company we must have room to manoeuvre, that is a very important point 
for us. Our orientation is always to have as few laws as possible because they 
constrain the freedom action of the firm more and more. .... I am of the 
opinion, one should make as few laws as possible because the more one passes 
the worse it is .... I think that the move from state-determined parameters to 
voluntary regulation is very important. It is fundamental (Still, interview, 2007)      
Government regulation may constrain businesses’ and entrepreneurs’ freedom of 
action as well as imposing costs on them. In addition, it may stifle innovation, prevent 
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the externalisation of costs onto others, or make it difficult to reap the reputational 
gains they could derive if CR was voluntary or ‘on top’ of less stringent minimum 
standards. Markets and regulation are not antithetical to one another; on the contrary, 
markets depend on regulation, freer markets especially so.202 But an excess of 
regulation perceived as onerous or burdensome by employers might tie down 
resources which could otherwise flow into other activities, including voluntary 
engagement. The case that German employers dislike the current level of regulation is 
supported by a 2006 index of the German employers’ research institute. This study 
places Germany in seventh-to-last place among twenty-two OECD countries ranked 
according to their regulatory density.203  
That the liberationist or libertarian interpretation of CR is alive and well in 
German business can be seen in Corporate Citizenship in Deutschland204 which is the 
most comprehensive volume on CR in Germany published to date. It provides an 
overview of state of Corporate Citizenship in Germany from a wide variety of 
perspectives. One of the most interesting themes running through the volume concerns 
the relationship between Corporate Citizenship and the transformations of German 
capitalism. In their introduction, Holger Backhaus-Maul, Christiane Biedermann, 
Stefan Nährlich and Judith Polterauer observe that social partnership and some of the 
egalitarian and redistributive functions of the German social market economy model 
are eroding, and that the state is offloading social responsibilities onto society.  
This, they point out, is the context in which CR has risen to prominence in 
Germany. What role does CR fulfil in this context? The answers to this question vary. 
Many contributors see CR as a positive-sum cooperative enterprise between business 
and civil society that addresses social needs while benefiting business – without 
                                                 
202 Vogel (1996) 
203 Dominik H. Enste / Stefan Hardege (2006) 
204  Backhaus-Maul et. al (2008, revised edition 2009) 
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affecting the balance between business, the state, and civil society. By contrast, other 
contributors endorse CR while stressing the necessity of unburdening business from 
institutionalized social responsibilities, such as taxation and social insurance 
contributions, as a quid-pro-quo for their increased engagement. They clearly imply 
that the state should do less as responsible corporate citizens do more. Businesses 
should be unburdened from institutionalized social responsibilities such as taxation 
and social insurance contributions as a quid-pro-quo for their increased engagement. 
Responsibility? Yes, but in exchange for greater freedom. Stefan Nährlich, for 
example, writes:  
 
the citizen’s society [Bürgergesellschaft] is a conceptual alternative to the 
regulating and intervening welfare state …. Lowering the financial burdens for 
citizens and companies will increase the number of those who want to engage 
themselves … This requires a concentration of state activities on the essentials” 
(2008: 176)   
These themes are widespread. Reinhard Mohn’s book The social responsibility 
of the Entrepreneur is almost a classical liberal treatise, as it prescribes “as little state 
as possible – but more civil society engagement” (Mohn, 2003: 9). Paul Nolte claims 
that Germany must overcome its scepticism towards markets and commodification, 
while making up a deficit in Corporate Responsibility (Nolte, 2006: 253).  The recent 
book The Future of Civil Society,205 which prescribes CR, also has a libertarian, anti-
statist tone. Wolfgang Streeck (2009) mentions several examples of German capitalists 
liberating themselves from “uncomfortable social obligations.” Jürgen Schrempp, 
CEO of Daimler boasted publicly in the 1990s that Daimler Chrysler would pay no 
taxes in Germany for the remainder of the century. While the merger with Chrysler 
ultimately failed, Schrempp adopted a number of American practices, putting 
Daimler’s suppliers under severe cost pressures and raising the remuneration of 
                                                 
205 Dettling (2008) 
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management to American levels (Streeck, 2009: 81, 200). In sum, Streeck suggests 
that “there is strong anecdotal evidence that as German private firms are becoming 
more private, their perception of the social responsibility is changing in the direction 
indicated by Milton Friedman in his famous essay” (Streeck, 2009: 80).        
Yet CR is on the rise in Germany. Whether in part to assuage insecurities and 
material dislocations, or because of the soullessness and meaninglessness of the 
pursuit of profits for profits sake, Anglo-American CR practices such as corporate 
volunteering are booming. Thomas Baumeister is Director of Corporate Volunteering 
at Deutsche Bank in Germany. Baumeister describes that the question of Corporate 
Volunteering arose following Deutsche Bank’s entry into international investment 
banking following take-overs  of Banker’s Trust (in the US) and Morgan Grenfell (in 
the UK) during the 1990s. He stresses that the struggle for acceptance is waged on two 
levels: the blue frequency of professionalism and the red frequency of authenticity. As 
a global investment bank, Deutsche scores highly on the blue frequency but seems 
deficient in authenticity, for societal observers and employees alike. Baumeister 
describes how Corporate Volunteering can help to address this need for meaning, 
which has grown in the economic environment of the past decade: 
 
There I don’t talk about numbers, data or facts but about stories, pictures, 
experiences, emotions. The dimension of meaning can be addressed most 
effectively with Corporate Volunteering. There is a great need in this area. 
Because the world of work doesn’t offer this emotional home any more. The 
Deutsche Bank was an emotional haven [emotionaler Hafen]... You came to 
the Deutsche Bank and you stayed there your whole life. This changed in 1997, 
when we reorganized for the first time and took out an entire level of 
management (interview, 2006) 
Baumeister’s description is not easily categorized as pragmatic or moral 
legitimation. The importance of emotions and of meaning and the lack of an apparent 
rational or strategic calculus suggests that this may be an instance of moral legitimacy. 
What is lacking, however, is an an alter- or other-orientedness. Baumeister’s reference 
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to meaning appears to refer to employees’ own striving for meaning, as well as 
Deutsche Bank’s interest in legitimating itself as an employer – rather than others’ 
needs. This suggests that this is an instance of dispositional legitimacy (Suchman, 
1995: 578-579), a subset of pragmatic legitimacy.  
Hans Daniel of the Association of Chemical Industries VCI notes that the sense 
of meaning and identity generated through such activities can have a high utility for 
employees in the workplace, particularly during times of restructuring (Daniel, 
interview, 2006). The following section surveys German CRAs and a few initiatives at 
the firm-level, and links these with employers’ perception of their interests in the 
context of Germany’s institutional framework.   
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VI. German CR at the Network, Association and Firm-Level 
  
This section provides a gloss of German CR platforms, networks, and 
associations – principally Econsense, the Initiative Freiheit und Verantwortung (or 
‘Initiative for Freedom and Responsibility’), and CSR Germany (an internet platform) 
as well as Unternehmen: Partner der Jugend. As noted in chapter 1, CR associations 
can be seen as catalysts, facilitators or motors of responsible business practice. CR 
associations typically provide a platform for the exchange of ‘best practice’ among 
their corporate membership as ‘think tanks’ for the CR and community involvement of 
their members. In this sense, they may be seen as “regulating the self-regulation” of 
their members (Gupta and Lad, 1983: 416). To varying degrees, they challenge their 
members to attain ever-higher levels of ‘responsibility’ and social engagement, and to 
minimize negative and maximize positive externalities.  
The Initiative Freiheit und Verantwortung, or Freedom and Responsibility, 
was founded in 2000 by the economic newsweekly Wirtschaftswoche together with the 
four major German business associations (though interestingly, the Initiative is 
financed largely if not exclusively by the Wirtschaftswoche). It aims to persuade 
businesses to take on responsibility and engage themselves for collective benefit, and 
awards prizes for the most engaged/responsible enterprise in three categories each 
year.   
What is distinctive about the Initiative Freiheit und Verantwortung is its 
emphasis on freedom. Wirtschaftswoche issue 39 (2000), which announces the 
founding of the organization, is full of references to the bloated state and the burdens 
it imposes on companies as well as citizens. “We want to push back the regulating 
welfare state,” the author Christian Ramthun quotes Harald Wiedmann, then head of 
accounting and auditing firm KPMG in Germany (Ramthun, 2000: 26). Otto Graf 
Lambsdorff of the Liberal Democrats (FDP) remarks that “With an end to the 
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collectivisation of responsibility in the welfare state, Germany can become number 
one again in regulatory policy [Ordnungspolitik]” (Lambsdorff, 2000: 42). In his 
contribution, Friedrich Merz, a leading apostle of the market-liberal wing of the CDU 
until his departure from national politics, refers to CR as an integral element of a new 
social contract (Merz, 2000).  
As Christian Ramthun, the founder of the Initiative, explained to me: “one has 
to be able to voluntarily choose to accept responsibility. In Germany there is too much 
compulsion ... We want no legal regulation (of responsibility), no compulsion” 
(Ramthun, interview, March 13, 2006). Freer markets, Ramthun seems to imply, will 
lead business to take on more responsibilities.206 The initiative freedom and 
responsibility serves to facilitate this paradigm change. For “he who (with good 
reasons) wants to push back the welfare state,” so Wirtschaftswoche-Chief-Editor 
Baron, “must also be willing to fill the (morally intolerable) gaps which arise as a 
consequence.” Citizens that get more freedom must also take over more 
responsibilities. The same is true of companies. For them, President of the Federation 
of German Industries BDI Rogowski provides the motto: “We want more freedom. 
We are willing to assume more responsibility” (Ramthun, 2003: 95). The above 
quotations imply that businesses are willing to shoulder a greater share of social 
responsibilities in return for the increased freedom they are getting. However, this 
relationship may be more complicated, as the following excerpt from a speech given 
by Dieter Philipp, President of German Trade Confederation, at the 2004 Initiative 
prize-giving Convention, shows: 
 
Of course it is right that citizens and companies assume more tasks, assume 
greater self-responsibility as the state pulls back from areas. There is no 
question about this.  
                                                 
206 By contrast, the mission of the UK’s leading organization for CR, Business in the Community, was 
simply “to create a public benefit by inspiring companies to improve the positive impact of business in 
society” in 2006.  
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But: companies are not gap-fillers for misguided state developments. The topic 
of Corporate Citizenship should not be misused to burden firms with tasks that 
the state can no longer fulfil.  
 
It is no coincidence that our initiative is called ‘freedom and responsibility.’ 
Responsibility yes, but also the corresponding freedom connected with fewer 
burdens, out of which social engagement can arise on a voluntary basis 
(Philipp, 2004: 4-5) 
Business must be freed not only be freed from (institutional) constraints, it must be 
unburdened (financially) as well. It is striking how entrenched economic liberalism is 
among representatives of German peak interest associations, including CR interest 
associations. As president of the BDI from 2000-2004, Michael Rogowski was 
involved in both Econsense and the Initiative Freiheit und Verantwortung. Rogowski 
is also Chairman of Voith, a specialized family-owned machine-tool manufacturer in 
Heidenheim, the south-west of Germany. Rogowski’s orientation is unmistakably 
market liberal:  
 
A regulatory renaissance on the basis of competition, freedom and 
responsibility is the imperative of the hour. More market and less state, more 
freedom and less egalitarianism, more individual responsibility and less 
patronizing [welfare] provision, more competition and less regulation are the 
ways into the future … This is the axiom of liberalism, for all I care also of 
neo-liberalism, to which I am fully and wholly committed (Rogowski, 2004: 
37-38)     
  
In my interview with Rogowski, two things became clear. On one hand, Voith 
practices an awful lot of CR: voluntary engagement for employees, the city and the 
region. Voith goes far beyond the already stringent statutory requirements. And in 
fact, Voith’s CR enagement is more extensive in Heidenheim than in any other of the 
firms’ plants worldwide: “the engagement is many times greater here than elsewhere,” 
he states.  
On the other hand, Rogowski is adamant in his admiration for Anglo-American 
style state-society and state-economy relations: “I think that we still have much too 
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much state and state influence. The state should restrict itself to inner and external 
security and should not involve itself [unnecessarily] in the economy” (Rogowski, 
interview, 2007). More even: “I would defend the claim that the greater the freedom 
entrepreneurs have, the greater their moral obligation and their willingness to engage 
themselves as Corporate Citizens” (Rogowski, interview, 2007). Despite the fact that 
for Voith, competitiveness, economic success and CR are all compatible with the 
prevailing institutional framework, Rogowski insists on the need for far-reaching 
reforms.207 As we will see, these views are typical of German corporate officials and 
CRA representatives.     
CSR Germany is an internet platform financed and established jointly by the 
Federation of German Employers’ Associations (BDA) and the Federation of German 
Industry (BDI) in 2004. Günther Shall, an official at the Federation of German 
industry (BDI), explains: “The core idea is to pose the question ‘what does 
responsibility mean?’ In requesting responsibility from firms, we are also demanding 
freedom for them. ‘Responsibility’ [in Germany] is usually brought into connection 
with compulsion rather than with freedom.” CSR Germany aims to change this, he 
remarks. In order to provide more credibility for these demands for increased freedom 
and competition, “it is important to show that businesses are responsible players, not 
bad guys.” Vis-à-vis politics, it is important to show that “you can’t only demand from 
us, you also have to give us the freedom to fulfil our responsibilities” (Shall, 
interview, 2006).  
This emphasis on freedom is typical of German industry associations. In an 
unpublished paper, Volker Leinweber, chief economist for the federation of Bavarian 
employers VBW summarizes the preferences of the association as: “more market, 
                                                 
207 In his interview with me, he insisted that while rhetorical surplus is necessary “to get noticed in this 
media-driven society,” his views on institutional reforms were not an instance of rhetorical 
exaggeration (Rogowski, interview, 2007).   
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more competition, more freedom, more openness – that is the way to more growth, 
employment and prosperity (VBW, 2005). Politicians also associate unburdening 
business with increased CR engagement. Hans-Martin Bury, Minister of State in the 
Bundeskanzler’s office under Gerhard Schröder, says that his government has  
 
undertaken reforms to adjust the balance of public and political responsibility. 
Citizens and businesses are also freed from taxes and non-wage labor costs to 
free resources for more engagement. Because only s/he who gets more freedom 
can also assume more responsibility (Bury, 2001: 6)        
CRAs were late to arrive in Social Market Economies such as Germany, and they are 
less well-developed there than in LMEs. But they have sprouted and they are growing. 
Econsense, an acronym which stands for ‘economic and ecological in consensus’ is 
the leading CRA in Germany. It is unusual for national-level CRAs to have an 
explicitly environmental/sustainability focus; in fact, Econsense is one of only a small 
handful of such organizations across Europe. The environmental / sustainability 
orientation of this association is a reflection of the prominence of ecological issues in 
Germany during recent decades. This network or think-tank for sustainable 
development was founded by nineteen of the largest Germany-based companies on 
July 19th, 2000. As Reinhold Kopp, formerly the chair of Econsense’s supervisory 
board, writes:  
 
One of the main motives of the founders was to no longer leave the topic of 
sustainability to politics and NGOs but to reclaim it for business...In addition, 
the superseded equation of sustainability and environmental protection should 
be replaced with a triple bottom line (economy – environment – social 
[engagement])” (Kopp, 2008c: 433-434).   
Through 2008 (when Vodafone joined the network), membership in Econsense was 
reserved for nominally German firms and associations. Anglo-American firms were 
not welcome! This is unusual if not singular in the European context: all other CRAs 
have a high proportion of foreign and Anglo-American firms in their membership. 
Econsense’s erstwhile stance against these Anglo-American firms underlines the 
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peculiarities of CR in Germany. But even in Germany, this front could only hold for 
so long. In 2009, it crumbled. That year, Deloitte and PriceWaterHouseCoopers 
joined, and DuPont and Ernst and Young followed in 2010.208    
Econsense’s staff is housed in the same building as the BDI or Confederation 
of German Industry, rather than in the association of German employers federations 
(BDA), the chambers of commerce (DIHK), or the crafts association (ZDH). 
Econsense’s connection with the BDI rather than the BDA209 can be taken as evidence 
that CR in Germany is associated not with the old German model of social partnership, 
but with the new liberal-voluntarist market-liberal order. Econsense understands itself 
as a network or think-tank which enjoys financial and operational autonomy from the 
BDI’s day-to-day lobbying activities, allowing it to concentrate on longer-term 
objectives. As an Econsense Grundlagenpapier, a paper laying out the foundational 
orientation of the organization, remarks:  
 
The forum has the objective of establishing itself as a think tank of business 
that bundles competence and can recognize, analyse and influence trends in the 
sustainability debate. The forum will also provide a platform in order to 
develop new ideas in discourse and evaluate their chances of realization in 
practice. As a dialog platform, the forum will discuss the demands that will be 
made on business and politics, in a national, European and global context.  
 
The main goal of the initiative is to create a climate which enables and 
facilitates innovation. The basis for this is a balanced evaluation of economic, 
ecological and socio-political questions (Econsense, 2002: 2) 
Econsense has twenty-eight of the largest publicly traded companies in Germany in 
membership. What Econsense lacks in terms of membership numbers, it compensates 
in economic weight. These firms comprise the vast majority of companies which 
                                                 
208 This is interesting in that unlike many of their nominally German counterparts, these companies have 
comparatively few employees in Germany. In 2009, Ernst and Young had just 9,000 employees in 
Germany. Siemens had 128,000. 
209 The BDA is in charge of social partnership and collective bargaining relations with unions. During 
recent decades, the BDI has been a much more outspoken advocate of market-liberal reform than the 
BDA.   
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constituted the now defunct ‘Deutschland AG,’ the dense network of banks and 
companies bound together through cross-shareholding and overlapping supervisory 
boards. Since the 1990s, these companies have become increasingly shareholder-value 
oriented. In fact, Econsense was founded at one of the key periods in the decline and 
dissolution of the Deutschland AG.210 Many of the key firms in the now-largely-
dissolved “Germany Inc” networks of cross-shareholding and interlocking directorates 
are members in the new CRA, which suggests that the personnel networks of 
“Germany Inc” may be more durable than the more formal institutional linkages.   
 Paul Windolf provides a useful characterization of the corporate networks of 
organized capitalism. According to Windolf, “compared with the anarchy of the 
market,” the corporate networks of organized capitalism “represent a ‘higher’ form of 
organization, which enables the business world to impose collective self-regulation” 
(Windolf, 2002: 7). Jürgen Beyer and Martin Höpner emphasize the non-liberal, 
market-correcting nature of these institutions: 
     
Corporate governance in the ‘organized’ German economy was characterized 
 by structures of company control that limited the influence of shareholders and 
 distributed power among managers, employees, investors, regional authorities, 
suppliers, customers, creditors and cooperating companies; deep linkages 
between industrial and financial companies that could be used as a mechanism 
to achieve common goals; sheltered infrastructural sectors such as 
telecommunications, energy and transport, in which competition was limited to 
a minimum and state ownership and influence were high; and political 
regulation that promoted a dispersion of power among shareholders and other 
interests and protected the company from invasion from outside (Beyer and 
Höpner, 2003: 179) 
Since the mid-1990s, Germany has liberalized, and its networks of board interlocks 
and capital ties (cross-shareholding) eroded and dissolved. Both the quantity and the 
                                                 
210 For information on the disintegration of Germany, Inc, see Streeck (2009: 79) and Höpner and 
Krempel (2004). 
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strength of links diminished.211 Beyer and Höpner trace the “break with organized 
capitalism” and rise of shareholder-value orientation to the mid-1990s:  
  
The cohesion and density of the German network of interlocking directorates 
and ownership ties decreased significantly in the late 1990s, which has 
drastically undermined opportunities for coordinating economic interests. In 
the past it was said that managers acting in the centre of this network were 
capable of controlling economic and political processes far beyond the borders 
of their own companies. The term Deutschland AG (Germany Inc.) was often 
used as a label for this special feature of the German economy. It implied that 
the managers involved pursued not only the economic interest of their own 
companies but also considered general interests of the national economy 
(Beyer and Höpner, 2003: 183) 
     
The authors of this passage run the risk of idealizing Germany Inc212: managers in 
Germany Inc. may not have been more beneficent than their counterparts elsewhere 
and their successors; they were simply more constrained. Over time,   Germany’s 
network of interlocking directorates213 and the capital ties between financial and 
industrial companies dissolved and gave way to an increasingly shareholder-value 
oriented economy.214  
Interestingly, Econsense’s composition overlaps significantly with the core of 
Germany Inc., which was in advanced state of dissolution in the year 2000. Many 
firms that played important roles in Germany Inc. are also found in Econsense, 
including: Allianz, Deutsche Bank, DaimlerChrysler, ThyssenKrupp, Siemens, RAG, 
RWE, BMW, Preussag, Gerling, Ruhrgas, or most of the publicly traded DAX 
heavyweights found in the German Inc. company network. Perhaps Germany Inc. is 
                                                 
211 Socio-grams of the dissolution of the German company network in two-year increments from 1996 
until 2006 can be found in the Appendix.  
212 I am grateful to Arndt Sorge for this point.  
213 Windolf (2002) 
214 Beyer and Höpner (2003). Heemskerk and Schnyder (2008) come to similar conclusions for the 
disintegration of Swiss and Dutch board interlocks. 
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more resilient than conventionally thought: capital ties have disappeared but the 
personnel networks remain.215  
 What are the political implications of the decline of the old institutions (in this 
case, Germany Inc.), and the rise of CR networks? The erosion of the old institutions – 
or more to the point, the distributional consequences of their erosion – has led to a 
crisis of legitimacy in public perception. Corporate Responsibility networks have 
arisen along with a wide array of innovative and dynamic practices. The problem is 
that these networks and practices – quasi institutions – are not functionally equivalent 
to the institutions which preceded them. Responsibility can entail shouldering 
uncomfortable burdens. Yet as we have seen able, German CRA representatives are 
pushing to unburden themselves. CRAs cannot fill the legitimacy deficit which their 
principals, many of the leading firms of global capitalism, have wittingly or 
unwittingly helped to engender. 
Figure 3.1 (derived from Höpner, 2003: 62) lists the forty German firms with 
the highest shareholder-value orientation in the late 1990s from greatest to least. I 
have shaded the companies which became members of Econsense in grey.216 A high 
proportion of the firms with the highest shareholder-value orientation become 
members.       
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
215 Further research will be necessary to determine whether CRAs in other countries encompass the 
“inner circle” of the national corporate elite like Econsense; and if they do, what advantages these 
personnel networks provide for CRAs.  
216  For companies which later merged or changed their name, I have included their new name/identity 
in square brackets. 
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Firm Index 
Bayer AG   1.61 
VEBA AG [E.ON]  1.48 
SAP AG  1.33 
Hoechst AG [Sanofi-Aventis]  1.20 
BASF AG  1.14 
Mannesmann AG [Vodafone plc]  1.11 
Henkel KgaA  1.09 
Daimler-Benz AG  1.02 
RWE AG  0.90 
Siemens AG  0.86 
Schering Ag [Bayer AG]  0.74 
Metallgesellschaft AG  0.72 
Degussa AG  0.55 
Viag AG  0.55 
Preussag AG [TUI AG]  0.45 
MAN AG  0.36 
Deutsche Lufthansa AG  0.28 
Linde AG  0.22 
Continental AG  0.21 
Thyssen AG [ThyssenKrupp AG]*  0.17 
Deutsche Telekom AG  0.16 
Krupp AG [ThyssenKrupp AG]   0.16 
Buderus AG  0.04 
Agiv AG  0.00 
Beiersdorf AG -0.17 
Volkswagen AG -0.26 
Rheinmetall AG -0.31 
BMW AG -0.43 
VEW AG -0.46 
Metro AG -0.70 
AVA AG -0.81 
Deutsche Babcock AG -1.08 
Deutz AG -1.18 
Karstadt AG -1.23 
Bilfinger + Berger AG -1.25 
Spar AG -1.28 
Südzucker AG -1.30 
Axel Springer Verlag AG -1.70 
Holzmann AG -1.90 
Strabag AG -2.29 
Figure 3.1: Shareholder-Value and CR Among German Firms in the Late-1990s 
(Firms that went on to become members of the CRA Econsense are shaded in 
grey)Chart source: Höpner (2003: 62) 
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As we know, a significant proportion of Econsense’s membership derives from the 
DAX 30, the blue chip market index for the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, composed of 
the exchange’s 30 most valuable publicly listed corporations. A high proportion of 
Econsense’s membership derives from this group, which suggests that for these large 
publicly-listed companies, shareholder-value-orientation and CR go hand. The 
argument could go as follows: a large size and high shareholder-value orientation 
increases the pressure on firms to legitimate themselves and engage in compensatory 
activities including, but not necessarily restricted to, CR.  
One of the peculiarities of the German system of corporate governance is that 
co-determination gives employees a powerful stake, a voice in management. This 
raises the question of co-determination vis-à-vis shareholder value and CR. Martin 
Höpner (2003) finds that co-determination has not in fact stood in the way of 
shareholder value orientation, and Sigurt Vitols (2004) coins the term “negotiated 
shareholder value” to characterize this co-existence of co-determination and a 
managerial orientation towards shareholder-value. Is the relationship between co-
determination and CR similar to the one between co-determination and shareholder 
value?  
 Figure 3.2 shows the results of a logistic regression with membership in 
Econsense as a dependent variable, and shareholder value and co-determination as 
independent variables.217 The data-set is small, containing only twenty-three firms: 
sixteen Econsense members and seven non-members. This is due to the small size of 
Econsense’s membership and to limited data availability.218  
  
                                                 
217 I am grateful to Martin Höpner for this hypothesis.   
218 The data for this regression derives from Höpner (2001), for the shareholder value index, and from 
Höpner and Müllenborn (2010), for the co-determination index. 
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The Relationship Between Corporate Responsibility Association Membership 
in Econsense, Shareholder-Value Orientation, and Co-Determination 
 
Variable CRA (Econsense) Membership 
 
Co-
Determination 
 
 
.50      
(-.70, 1.70) 
 
Shareholder 
Value 
 
2.55    
(.22, 4.87) 
 
Constant 
 
-.25    
(-3.14, 2.65) 
Observations 23 
 Note: 95% confidence intervals in parentheses 
 
Figure 3.2: CR, Shareholder-Value, and Co-Determination 
Although these results are not statistically significant, they suggest a strong positive 
relationship between shareholder-value and Econsense and – this is the surprise – a 
weaker positive relationship between co-determination and CR (using the proxy of 
Econsense membership). Co-determination has not stood in the way of CR. Is this 
disconfirming evidence for my hypothesis H2? Maybe, but it is hard to say on the 
basis of the positive association of these variables alone. My claim that CR and ISS 
are inversely related on the whole certainly does not imply that they are inversely 
related in every specific instance. Without this information, it is only possible to 
speculate. Are worker representatives using co-determination to shape, influence, and 
instrumentalize CR in these profitable companies? Or are workers’ representatives 
merely tolerating management’s CR policies? If they do play an active role, how 
widespread and representative is this? Further research will be necessary to determine 
the relationship between CR, shareholder-value, and co-determination.  
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What were the motivations behind the founding of Econsense? As Joachim 
Ganse, who spearheaded the creation of the organization, recalls, the background was 
that firms “felt cornered, under pressure from politics as well as from the public” 
(Ganse, interview, 2006). In response to these legitimacy pressures, the intention was 
to build up a think tank to advise policymaker with the considerable expertise which 
the private sector, and perhaps to create a business counter-weight to the Council for 
Sustainable Development (Rat für Nachhaltige Entwicklung) created by the Federal 
government. Because of its autonomy from the BDI, Econsense could develop and 
cultivate more progressive and long-term views within business. This path was not an 
easy one. “At the beginning,” Ganse remarks, “everyone wanted to leave 
[Econsense],” and the organization faced opposition from BDI members. Ganse 
stresses the challenge of getting large companies to change their course, describing 
them as “tankers” rather than “speedboats” (Ganse, interview, 2007).  
Some firms did leave. Two of the founding companies, the chemicals 
manufacturer Henkel and Münchener Rück, one of the worlds’ largest reinsurers, left 
the association at the end of 2003 (Gerling, the third member, left because of financial 
trouble). Apparently these firms, widely considered ‘leaders’ in various aspects of CR 
at the time, felt that the association was moving too slowly; that it would not allow 
them to profile themselves as they desired; and that they could use their resources 
elsewhere. In addition, Kai von Bargen of Henkel reports that “there were specific 
incidents ... which suggested that Econsense was not behaving very responsibly in 
certain areas” (von Bargen, interview 2006). This cryptic formulation does not allow 
us to draw any conclusions except that CR in Germany is contested.   
 Among Econsense’s numerous activities is a Laboratory of Demographic 
Change. This initiative, part of the European Alliance for CSR, is being conducted in 
cooperation with the Max-Planck-Institute for Demography in Rostock. Econsense has 
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been touring across Europe to provide information about Europeans’ mounting 
demographic challenges, as well as to discuss possible solutions with businesses, 
policymakers and other stakeholders. In terms of political objectives, Econsense’s 
mandate is to facilitate as much as possible the development and exchange of ‘best 
practice’ solutions among its members and other stakeholders, while at the same time 
fending off attempts to introduce burdensome legislation. In addition, Econsense tries 
to contribute towards the public’s understanding of what globalization means 
(Boßmeyer, interview, 2006).  
Germany’s regulatory density is a recurrent issue for Econsense and its 
members. Wolf Michael Iwand, a member of Econsense’s steering committee, 
proclaims: “we’re defending ourselves against regulation!” (Iwand, interview, 2007). 
Former executive director Reinhold Kopp and managing director Thomas Koenen 
writes: “Particularly in Germany, where despite attempts at deregulation, there is a 
high regulatory density, the framework and the understanding of CSR differ from 
other countries (Kopp and Koenen, 2007: 214). Reinhold Kopp, who served as 
chairman of the board of Econsense for a number of years, makes it unmistakably 
clear that deregulation is among Econsense’s foremost priorities: “The integration of 
CSR also aims to push back [reduce] the level of regulation” (Kopp, 2008a: 46). “A 
good CSR performance is a prerequisite for successful socio-political lobbying against 
overly demanding/stringent regulation and bureaucratic constriction of efficient 
entrepreneurial solutions” (Kopp, 2008b: 110)  
Ganse concurs, noting that German firms implemented the practices that count 
as CR elsewhere twenty years ago, but because these are legally mandated, they 
receive no praise or recognition (Ganse, interview, 2006). At the 5th anniversary 
ceremony of Econsense in Berlin on October 18th, 2005, the president of the BDI 
Jürgen Thumann, who was also President of Econsense, repeatedly emphasized the 
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theme of voluntariness and self-regulation: ‘we want to be responsible, but in order for 
this to be possible, the conditions have to be right.’ In other words, German firms have 
to be at least partially freed from their institutionalized responsibilities (co-
determination, taxation, burdensome regulation) in order to engage voluntarily in 
corporate responsibility like their colleagues and competitors in Britain and the United 
States. The same theme was pressed by then-president of the BDI, Michael Rogowski, 
in 2004: “for more responsibility there has to be the freedom and the financial room to 
manoeuvre. To wage freedom, to break through constraints is the challenge …. If one 
is tied down like Gulliver, one can’t spit in one’s hands and get to work” (Rogowski, 
2004: 10-11). Similarly Klaus Mittelbach, the then-managing director of Econsense: 
“Free competition on corporate responsibility is an important guarantor of sustainable 
development; it deserves to be supported in every way possible: through deregulation 
and flexibilization, wherever this is possible” (Mittelbach, 2004: 31).  
According to Kopp and Koenen, Econsense understands itself as a “catalyst, 
communications platform and consultant” (Kopp and Koenen, 2007: 215).  
Stakeholder dialogues, which bring together business representatives, politicians, and 
civil society to discuss specific topics, are one way in which Econsense promotes CR. 
Political lobbying, though not one of Econsense’s central activities is another. In 
declassified lobbying correspondence dated 3 November, 2004, addressed to the then-
Minister for the Economy and Work, Wolfgang Clement, the Director of the 
Executive Board of Econsense Reinhold Kopp writes: 
 
We observe at Econsense – Forum Sustainable Development of the German 
Economy, that in Germany the Ministry for the Environment has appropriated 
the topic of Corporate Social Responsibility ... At the same time we have the 
impression that the ministry for Commerce and Work is too restrained and 
passive in this area, leaving it too be defined by others. With this letter I would 
like to sensibilize you for this topic …. As businesses we are concerned that in 
the medium- to long-run, at the EU-level as well as in some member states, 
[CSR] regulations will be initiated that are not in our interests (Kopp, 2004)      
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A letter on BDA and BDI letterhead dated 23 January 2007 and addressed to Michael 
Hofmann of the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 
[Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung] reads as follows:  
 
Dear Dr. Hofmann,  
 
At its annual conference, the Council for Sustainable Development presented 
the paper ‘Corporate Responsibility in a globalized world – a German Profile 
for Corporate Social Responsibility.’ We have attached the position of the 
BDA and BDI to the recommendations of the council. 
 
BDA and BDI welcome the attention given by the Council for Sustainable 
Development to this important topic. Businesses’ responsibility 
(unternehmerische Eigenverantwortung) is an important building block for 
sustainable development. The good examples of German businesses are 
obvious and are explicitly acknowledged by the council.  
 
In the view of BDA and BDI, responsibility and freedom are inseparable. A 
strengthening of corporate self-responsibility presupposes commensurate 
corporate liberties. Some of the Council’s recommendations are not conducive 
to the voluntary engagement of companies (anonymous, 2007)  
Before proceeding, I will reflect on Econsense’s activities within the broader context 
of the German political economy. Representing some of the largest publicly traded 
companies in Europe, Econsense’s members must remain at the forefront of 
innovation to remain competitive. Seen from this perspective, these companies’ push 
for self-regulation and flexibilization, and to acquire legitimacy to pursue new product 
development in hitherto uncharted areas (such as nanotechnology) makes perfect 
sense. But at the same time, there appears to be an asymmetry between these activities 
and the institutional reforms which Econsense and segments of German industry (the 
New Social Market Initiative, the BDI) push for. If Econsense member companies are 
re-embedding themselves in certain areas – for example, through innovations in 
environmental technologies – they are at the same time dis-embedding themselves in 
other areas (especially social relations), which may be at least as salient for these 
companies’ public legitimacy. 
  
 
200
  
 Given that Econsense is housed in the BDI, the industry lobby association that 
is not tied to unions through collective bargaining, one may wonder to what extent 
Econsense’s market liberal stance is representative of the member companies’ views. I 
asked Renate Hornung-Draus, who is Director of EU and international social policy in 
the BDA, the association of German employers’ federations, about the BDA’s 
relationship to Econsense:  
 
the BDA has a good and collegial relationship to the BDI and to Econsense. In 
terms of content and substance, the BDA and Econsense stand on the same 
feet. Differences in terms of nuance can arise out of the fact that Econsense 
collects a limited number of multinational ‘CSR front-runners,’ while the BDA 
represents the whole German economy. But to focus on these differences 
would not do justice to the good cooperation and the broad cooperation 
between the two organizations in terms of substance” (Hornung-Draus, 
interview, 2008)   
Econsense is typical of business-led CR initiatives in seeking to pre-empt new 
regulations through lobbying and self-regulation. In the case of Econsense, this stance 
appears to be particularly pronounced, which may be attributable to the organization’s 
close connections with the BDI and its lack of direct state support. Thus, business-led 
CR initiatives add an additional level to the anti-regulatory arsenal of business and 
employers’ associations which – as one of its representatives has said – are 
“instinctively – one could say genetically – against everything that looks like 
regulation“ (Ottenheinrich Freiherr von Weitershausen, BDA, interview, 2008). 
Sabine Baun, who is responsible for CSR in the Ministry for Employment and Social 
affairs under the SPD-CDU coalition government, confirms that “there is an incredible 
fear [among businesses] of any kind of regulation” (Baun, interview, January 22, 
2008). The notion that CR is a defensive mechanism presupposes a stable or constant 
baseline standard of regulation over time. Is this a reasonable assumption?  
German unions have used CR to address labour standards in developing 
countries, but fear that employers could use voluntaristic CR arrangements to further 
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undermine the institutionalized industrial- and labour-relations framework, 
exacerbating the existing trend towards decentralization. Christoph Ehlscheid of the 
metalworkers union IG Metall remarks that Corporate Responsibility “is not charity or 
hand-outs, but an obligation. More and more firms want to abscond from these 
obligations” (Ehlscheid, personal communication, June 3, 2005). Tomas Nieber of the 
union IGBCE: “For us as German unions this [Corporate Responsibility] has a certain 
ambivalence … in Germany many aspects of CSR were and are covered by the 
traditional industrial relations between employers and unions.” Management, he 
reflects, has changed, both in terms of the people and their self-understanding: “there 
are more and more managers who lack an understanding for the social market 
economy with all of its institutions – or who want to want to cancel or exit from those 
arrangements. When I talk about co-determination, that is not at all understood 
[anymore]” (interview, July 3, 2007). German unions fear that German employers 
could CR as a tool to criticize co-determination and recommend that it be replaced 
with more flexible arrangements. Apparently, ‘CSR Germany’ went online only a few 
days after a BDI/BDA commission had recommended the retrenchment of co-
determination (Seyboth, 2005: 4).  
However, Reinhard Thannish of the German trade union federation DGB notes 
that these fears are unfounded: Corporate Responsibility has not become a tool of the 
Mitbestimmungskritiker (co-determination critics) (interview, July 17, 2008). Despite 
these fears, and in spite of the erosion of trade-union power and the institutions upon 
which it is grounded, the idea of CR retains a certain seductiveness. Thus, one 
monograph sponsored by the Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, the research institute of the 
German trade union confederation, praises the potential of firm-level sustainability 
initiatives in the context of the weakening of the associations of German collective 
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bargaining (Brandl, 2006). Unions are not entirely sceptical of CR. For that matter, 
who could be entirely dismissive of such noble ideals?        
One might surmise that works councils, another central institution of the 
German model of industrial relations, are less at odds with CR because of their 
increasing co-management orientation during the past decade. Available evidence 
suggests a lack of engagement between CR initiatives and works councils.  Julia 
Egbringhoff and Gerd Mutz find that works councils and CR are often like ships 
passing in the night: CC is often conducted without the knowledge or involvement of 
works councils. Given this lack of engagement, they conclude that CC has an 
ambivalent, if not contradictory, quality from the perspective of employees’ 
representatives. The works council of the tire manufacturer Continental in Hannover 
has no involvement with Continental’s CR practices (interview, 2007). In the eyes of 
works councils, CR does not seem important or relevant.   
Econsense’s, CSR Germany’s, and the Initiative für Freiheit und 
Verantwortung’s  liberationist orientations are not the only parallel to UK’s CR 
associations discussed above in Chapter 2. There are also German CRAs that promote 
entrepreneurship in theory and practice. BMW’s Eberhard von Kuenheim foundation, 
founded in 2000 and named after Eberhard von Kuenheim, chair of BMW’s board of 
directors from 1970 to 1993, does precisely this. According to Kuenheim, “many 
entrepreneurs have stopped contributing to the solution of society’s problems. That 
has to change.”219 Von Kuenheim describes Germany’s challenge as follows: 
 
Our country is [fesselt sich selbst]. Germany is affording itself walls, ditches 
and Huerden, entrepreneurship is an obstacle course in this country. But there 
are enough people who – once freed – would be willing to start. They are 
trained and Tuechtig hard-working, ausdauernd and foll of motivation. I’m 
talking about our elites. If we hinder them more, they will work elsewhere – 
and we are loosing them more and more in Germany. We must also realize that 
                                                 
219 This is the quotation from the inside cover of Glaser and Wessely (2006).  
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not only entreprenurs want to leistung erbringen – scientists, students and 
artists do too. It isn’t about protection [Schutz]. Protection leads to weakness; 
and in a globalized world it isn’t possible. It is about enabling; it is about the 
freedom to play the game – and to win. That is the state’s responsibility in our 
democracy. For global competition, deregulation on the surface is not enough. 
It has to follow the worldwide tact, or rather, be the trend-setter. In the end, it 
will be punished if we do not acknowledge this reality (Kuenheim, 2001: 24)     
The Kuenheim foundation has sought to promote an ‘enterprise culture’ – not 
altogether unlike efforts in the United Kingdom to do so with Enterprise Agencies 
twenty years earlier. The Kuenheim foundation has supported a number of projects 
designed to (re-) kindle the German entrepreneurial spirit and serve as examples for 
others. One example is an old bankrupt glasswares plant, which was re-opened with a 
new business model (Glaser and Wessely 2006). Another of the foundation’s goals is 
Elitenförderung or the promotion and support of elites and leaders. Here, too, there are 
parallels to the U.K. case. As Kuenheim’s managing director Mirijam Storim explains, 
the foundation’s activities don’t fir easily into the order of things: 
 
it’s difficult because supporting entrepreneurs brings us into an area that isn’t 
necessarily associated with non-profits and the common good. According to 
German statutory law, model airplane construction, dog sports fall under these 
categories but promoting entrepreurship does not. What is the common good? 
It promotes the common good if people find employment. We try to create free 
spaces so that people can act entrepreneurially (Storim, interview, 2007)    
An overview of the German CR organizational landscape would not be complete 
without mentioning Unternehmen: Partner der Jugend, which was founded in 1995 in 
Dresden. Against a background of tight state finances and growing social problems, 
this organization was founded to activate the resources of companies for the non-profit 
sector. UPJ works predominantly with small and medium-sized enterprises. Diethelm 
Damm and Bernhard von Mutius, the two founders of UPJ, founded the organization 
against the background of right-wing extremist violence, unprecedented levels of 
youth unemployment in post-reunification Germany, and dismal prognoses for social 
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cohesion in the twenty-first century.220 Might it be possible, they thought, to address 
some of these problems by involving the private sector?  
 Armed with the idea of advancing this cause by building bridges between firms 
and the non-profit sector, von Mutius sought support from the corporate sector for 
some initial outreach and publicity work – and found none. Eventually, the 
International Partnership Initiative provided nine pages of its journal space (in May 
1994) to publicize the initiative – still, with no resonance. In fact, of the 170 people 
who attended UPJ’s inaugural meeting in Dresden, only twelve people represented the 
corporate sector. In its initial phases at least, UPJ’s bridge was uneven, tilted towards 
the non-profit side (Damm and Lang, 2002: 15-16).  
Diethelm Damm, whose background includes working with social movements 
and organizations aiming to help disadvantaged youth get vocational training and start 
up their own businesses, asks: “who is the problem-solving-oriented, well resourced 
and motivated coalition partner? If you actually want to get something done in the 
world then there’s no way around companies” (interview, 2007)221. Bernard von 
Mutius, a consultant and management strategist, had reflected on the dynamic 
potential which could arise from new forms of social cooperation between the 
business and non-profit sectors – two social sub-systems which had been relatively 
autonomous from one another under the German corporatist system: “In the long run 
man, one could deregulate, lower taxes etc., everything that the neoliberals want, if 
                                                 
220 The report in question was an UN prognosis that by 2030, only 25 percent of Europe’s population 
will have a secure and qualified job; another 25 percent will have low-skilled and poorly remunerated 
work; and the other 50 percent will experience periodic unemployment.  
221 The following excerpt expresses the spirit of pragmatism which is the motor of many people’s 
engagement in CR. During previous decades, Damm reflects, unions had been critical of his 
unemployed-youth-training activities, telling him that “you’re saying that they [the unemployed youth] 
should open up their own companies? In other words you’re training them to become an entrepreneur, 
the class-enemy? You shouldn’t train unemployed youth to become the class enemy, you should protest 
against business with the unemployed youth!” In Damm’s view, “that won’t help them though!” 
(interview, 2007) 
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genuinely functioning social cooperation structures could be constructed” (interview, 
2007).   
During the past decade, UPJ has worked with companies to conceptualize and 
execute a wide range of CR activities in cooperation with the public and voluntary 
sectors. In Germany as in other countries, the power of business vis-à-vis other 
societal sub-systems has increased during recent years. UPJ strives to engage business 
in positive-sum cooperative endeavors with other societal groups, rather than 
univocally or unilaterally defining the agenda. While other CRAs push for the retreat 
of the state, “this has never been an UPJ position. We want to gain companies as an 
additional partner for the state” (Damm, interview, 2007). Of UPJ’s objectives since 
1996, one of the most interesting and noteworthy has been the attempt to convince 
corporations of the importance of investing in the social infrastructure to promote 
Corporate Responsibility. Reinhard Lang, one of UPJ’s Directors, reflects that 
member firms, and companies in general, are willing to invest in individual projects in 
which they are involved, but the infrastructure upon which these projects depend is 
another matter. Lang remarks that over time, he and his colleagues have succeeded in 
convincing several entrepreneurs that the state, non-profit organizations and 
intermediaries such as UPJ are structures worth investing in. The hesitance of German 
businesses to invest in this infrastructure may be attributable to their continued 
investment in other institutional structures.  
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Figure 3.3: UPJ and the Public Purse 
Source: UPJ 
It is worth mentioning that UPJ’s activities would have been impossible 
without state monies. As can be seen in the figure 3.3, the public purse contributed 
over ninety percent of UPJ’s operating expenses in the mid-1990s, but this has 
declined to 30% by 2007. This is attributable to the founding of UPJ’s  subscription-
based corporate membership network, Unternehmen: Aktiv im Gemeinwesen, in 2003. 
Thus, according to the criteria used in this thesis, UPJ became a CRA that year. Martin 
Schenkel, of the Federal Ministry for Family, Youth, Seniors, explains that state 
support for UPJ was initially project-based, to bring Germany, the developing country 
in Corporate Cititzenship, up to speed in CC matters. But more recently, Schenkel has 
become convinced:   
 
One cannot steer directly anymore, one has to establish an infrastructure, 
opportunity structures for evolution. UPJ is a virus that I send into the 
economy to instrumentalize it … The state cannot do everything alone 
[anymore] so we need networked political structures. We are witnessing the 
collapse and transformation of the traditional nation state (Schenkel, interview, 
2007)  
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Next, I discuss two firms’ CR activities. These examples exemplify the dynamism and 
ambivalences of CR in contemporary Germany. 
According to Christina Büchler, the history of Henkel’s MIT initiative – which 
stands for ‘Miteinander im Team,’ or ‘with each other in a team’ – reaches back to the 
early 1990s. Büchler recalls that in the aftermath of the collapse of the eastern bloc, 
German reunification, and the carnage in ex-Jugoslavia, requests for help from civil 
society organizations increased from 4-5000 per year to 10-15000 per year. Over the 
next few years, the Board considered various ways to allocate the firm’s limited 
resources, and decided that supporting employees’ domestic and international social 
engagement would be the way to go. Every Henkel employee across the world has the 
opportunity to request support for his or her cause in the form of money, materials, 
and (paid) time off work. 
As can be seen in figure 3.4 below, the MIT-Initiative has grown rapidly since 
1998. One of the things which is especially notable about this example of ‘Corporate 
Citizenship’ is that it appears to solve a problem which bedevils many Corporate 
Citizenship initiatives by large firms: although corporations have varying degrees of 
legal personhood, Corporate Citizenship should nonetheless be understood as a 
metaphor: corporations are not real citizens but profit-maximizing entities. By 
supporting the civic engagement of individual employees who are in fact citizens, 
Henkel’s MIT Initiative exemplifies the growing number of innovative and dynamic 
CR initiatives in Germany.    
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Figure 3.4: Henkel’s MIT Initiative, 1998-2006 
CR encompasses many aspects of corporate activity; in theory, it is all-encompassing. 
However, not all aspects of corporate activity are weighed equally: activities which 
were central to Rhenish capitalism are oftentimes peripheral to CR, which is not so 
surprising given CR’s Anglo-American provenance. The following example illustrates 
this gap. Germany’s system of vocational training has been praised as one of the 
pillars of German industry’s success in international markets. If a firm provides 
vocational training for more employees than it needs, it is providing a positive 
externality – a classic case of responsible corporate conduct. The system of course 
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vulnerable to short-termism and poaching: businesses that are unwilling to incur the 
expense of training and who instead hire staff trained by other employers.  
Figure 3.5 shows the percentage of trainees as a proportion of the total 
workforce of Mannesmann AG from 1980-2000 and of Vodafone Germany since 
2000. It is impossible to overlook the downward trend over time. While the proportion 
of trainees has hovered around 3% since the take-over of Mannesmann by Vodafone 
in 2000, the steepest decline took place not under Vodafone but under Mannesmann 
beginning in the mid-1990s, which according to Jürgen Bayer and Martin Höpner was 
when “[t]he break with organized capitalism” took place (Bayer and Höpner, 2003: 
180). In addition, the high shareholder-value orientation of Mannesmann during this 
period may have played a role (Höpner, 2003: 62). Lest this give a misleading 
impression, I should emphasize that Mannesmann was very engaged in CR matters. In 
fact, Bernhard Lorentz, responsible for CR at Vodafone, states that while the nature of 
CR engagement has changed (comparing Vodafone with Mannesmann), the budgets 
have remained constant, not increased, since Vodafone’s takeover (Lorentz, interview, 
2006).    
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Figure 3.5: Percentage of Employees in Vocational Training at  
Mannesmann / Vodafone in Germany, 1980-2006  
 
Source: Mannesmann Personal- und Sozialberichte dating back to 1980 (Mannesmann Archiv). I am 
grateful to Manfred Humpert, director of Vocational Training at Vodafone Germany, for the data for 
2000-2002. 
One must be cautious about generalizing from this one single case. After all, it is far 
from clear that the German system of vocational training as a whole is in terminal 
decline. It may be more instructive to look elsewhere, at indicators people aren’t 
talking about. Figure 3.6 shows the wage ratio, profit ratio, and membership growth of 
Econsense since 2000. 
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Figure 3.6: Econsense and the Growing Profit Ratio 
It is striking that the share of national product going to employees declines just as the 
profit ratio increases and Econsense is founded. Again, it would be unwise to interpret 
too much into these findings, except that there appears to be a gap between the gap left 
by liberalization and the gap filled by CR.     
 
 
VII. Conclusion and Outlook 
 
In this chapter, I have described the rise of Corporate Responsibility in 
Germany since the mid-1990s and have sought to explain its retarded development on 
one hand, and rapid rise on the other. Since the mid-1990s and increasingly since 
2000, CR has risen to prominence in Germany. CR’s rise thus coincides temporally 
with the erosion of the ‘German’ or ‘Rhine’ model of capitalism through institutional 
layering, drift, conversion, displacement and exhaustion (Streeck, 2009; Streeck and 
Thelen, 2005). The orientation of German businesses towards Corporate 
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Responsibility was initially characterized by high levels of ambivalence, both within 
Germany and in the European / international arena, and I have attributed this to the 
perception that CR would entail burdens for business on top of the weight of 
Germany’s Durkheimian post-war institutions.   
As employers sought to free themselves from these shackles, as the process of 
liberalization has gained momentum, this ambivalence has declined. I have tried to 
show that many business representatives see economic liberalization and the growth of 
CR as interconnected, as going hand-in-hand. In the German context of stringent 
standards of binding regulation and corporate governance arrangements which 
empower unions and employees, the appeal of CR is obvious. Indeed, there is a 
striking affinity between the market-liberal and voluntaristic orientation of many CR 
associations and the New Social Market initiative, which aims to pave the way for the 
acceptance of market-liberal reforms in the population. It follows from this framework 
that as liberalization proceeds apace and social disparities increase, the distinctively 
libertarian meaning which German CR took on during its initial phases – 
responsibility yes, but in exchange for greater freedom – will give way to an emphasis 
on social compensation as the erstwhile Durkheimian institutions diminish in 
significance or are converted for the purposes of management or shareholder-value, 
leading to increasing social disparities.  
By placing the rise of Corporate Responsibility squarely in the context of 
economic liberalization, my accords greater prominence to conflict than is found in the 
CR literature. In a statement that is representative of the latter, André Habisch writes: 
“as part of civil society, socially engaged firms neither can nor want to replace state 
activities” (Habisch, 2008: 110).222 If one restricts one’s analysis of analysis to 
                                                 
222 Habisch notes that “the societal engagement of companies cannot replace state activities across the 
board. A leader of a food bank that distributes food to needy people free of charge, said the following in 
a hearing of the Enquette Commission of the German Parliament: ‚we can’t replace the state’s social 
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activities that are nominally in the realm of CR – for example, the activities of 
Econsense – without recognizing that Econsense’s members are doing in the BDI, then 
one is missing a very important part of the picture, one that can also help to explain 
the public’s ambivalence about CR. This has arisen because whatever the appearances, 
German managers and entrepreneurs have been freeing themselves from 
“uncomfortable social obligations” (Streeck, 2009) at the same time as they endorse 
and practice Corporate Social Responsibility.   
As noted in chapter 2, much of the literature treats CR in its various 
incarnations (CSR, Corporate Citizenship etc.) as synonymous with responsible 
corporate behaviour (see for example Campbell 2007, Campbell 2006). This leads to a 
paradox: in Germany, at the  same time as we have seen an increase in CR at the firm 
level, institutionalized forms of solidarity have eroded. On the basis of process-
tracing, we can posit that the ‘old embeddedness’ of welfare stateness and social 
partnership, and the ‘new embeddedness’ of CR are substitutes rather than 
complements. Nonetheless, I must caution readers about the limitations of my 
argument in this chapter. CR has many different faces. The line of argument 
developed in this chapter applies very well to social affairs, but has its limitations 
when it comes to the environment. German firms are leaders in environmental 
technologies precisely because of, and not despite, stringent regulation.  
The fact that Corporate Responsibility has arrived late and has been taken on 
with initial hesitation by German employers can be taken to support the ‘common 
stimulus, mediated response’ model that has become orthodox in political analysis: 
domestic structures and “national ideologies” guide corporations, even in today’s 
                                                                                                                                            
assistance because we are notoriously unreliable. That means: as voluntary organizations, food banks 
cannot ensure that needy people receive adequate support!’ What then is the special element that 
characterizes firms’ engagement in contrast to state engagement? Here, in the limited area of one 
project, innovative solutions for well-known or new social challenges are charted out ..... In contast to 
the state, [Corporate Responsibility] has an innovation and pathfinder function“ (Habisch, 2005: 43)  
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globalized world (Doremus, Keller, Pauly and Reich, 1998). While one might view 
this as a matter of economic culture, I argue that in the last instance, such cultures 
have their basis in social institutions, and in the case of the economy, in economic 
interests. In this respect, I agree with Hans-Olaf Henkel, who became president of the 
BDI in the mid-late 1990s after serving as a long-time manager for IBM. When asked 
how to explain the different levels of voluntary engagement in the UK/USA versus 
Germany, Henkel remarked: “I think that those are purely institutional framework 
conditions [Rahmenbedingungen]. Of course it takes a while until it changes” (Henkel, 
interview, 2008).   
How much of Germany’s distinctive political-economic institutions and 
economic culture will persist given the developments outlined in this chapter is open 
to question. It appears that Germany will become increasingly liberal, both in terms of 
its institutional framework and in terms of its embrace of Corporate Responsibility. If 
that is the case, CR may open up new arenas of cooperation, negotiation and 
contestation that were foreclosed by the institutions of the Rhine model of capitalism. 
While CR in Germany has yet to reach the levels in the UK, the supply of and demand 
for firms’ legitimacy, and of Corporate Responsibility, one of firms’ means for 
attaining this end in market liberalism, will likely continue to increase. Even so, it is 
hard to avoid comparing the new era of market-liberalism plus CR to the system 
which preceded it. At this point, it seems like idle speculation to wonder to what 
extent the market-constraining institutions of Rhine capitalism were seen as merely 
constraining, or also as constitutive of employers’ identities.       
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 Conversion, Contestation, Ambivalence:  
The Rise of Market Liberalism and Corporate Responsibility at the EU-Level, 
1995-2007 
  
I. Introduction 
    
 Corporate Responsibility arrived on the “EU” agenda in the mid-1990s. Before 
then, not a whisper about firms’ voluntary engagement for social and environmental 
ends could be heard in the halls of the European Commission, the hemicycle of the 
European Parliament, and in the meeting rooms of European business lobbies, trade 
unions, and NGOs. That has changed. Corporate Responsibility has come of age in 
Brussels: later than in some, but earlier than in many EU member states.223 More than 
a dozen EU Council Presidencies have taken up this new cause, and significant 
resources have been devoted towards it. But how and why did Corporate 
Responsibility become a salient issue in Brussels? Who are the players in EU-level CR 
politics, and what’s at stake in these contests? This chapter seeks to answer these 
questions by telling the story of the rise of Corporate Responsibility at the EU level. 
 In this thesis I argue that that liberalization and CR are complements, and that 
institutionalized social solidarity and CR are substitutes. This chapter applies this 
argument to the EU-level. My findings are four-fold. First, there is a temporal 
coincidence of Corporate Responsibility and market-liberal policies at the EU-level. 
The European Commission has simultaneously advanced agendas of market-
liberalization and Corporate Responsibility. Thus, EU CR substitutes for the erosion 
of institutionalized social solidarity within EU member states, itself an effect of 
European institutions. Second, stakeholders and interest groups have contested the 
                                                 
223 How early depends on whether one considers EU CR to have started in the mid-1990s or in 2001, a 
point I discuss below. Among EU members, the UK (1981), Scotland (1982), France (1986) and 
possibly Sweden (1987) got CR before the EU. In addition, a number of countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe (including Poland and the Czech Republic) followed in the early 1990s.    
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meaning of CR at the EU-level: voluntary or legally binding, market-liberal or social 
liberal? Initially, EU CR was social-liberal; over time, it has been converted to market-
liberal. This political contestation is an important corrective to functionalist 
interpretations of my argument.  
 Third, I argue that firms’ propensity to engage in EU-level CR is determined 
not only by a company’s size, sector, and market niche, but also by its national origins. 
Thus, I underscore the focus on nation-states and countries-of-origin as relevant units 
of analysis in the study of CR. Fourth, I argue that in its meaning and normative 
evaluation, EU CR is ambiguous and ambivalent. Ambiguous because different 
stakeholders have different interpretations and understandings of CR. There are also 
discrepancies between the understandings of CR by national business constituencies 
and the enactment of CR at the EU-level.  EU CR is ambivalent because of its 
association with market liberalism: it appears to be both part of the solution to 
pressing problems in the European Union, and part of the problem itself.      
 This chapter begins with an overview of the Europeanization of CR across 
Europe. Sections follow on Managed Globalization and Social Europe; 
Institutionalized Social Solidarity at the EU-level; the Genesis of EU CR; and on the 
Conversion of European CR. A discussion of EU CR association membership is 
followed by a section on the Political Economy of the EU, and a Conclusion. 
 
II. Background: The Europeanization of Corporate Responsibility across Europe 
 
 The importance of Europeanization for EU member states should be 
obvious.224 According to various estimates, between 10-20 and 80 percent of the 
                                                 
224 According to Claudio Radaelli, “the concept of Europeanization refers to: Processes of (a) 
construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy 
paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things,’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and 
consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of 
domestic discourse, identities, political structures, and public policies (Radaelli, 2003: 30).  
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national legislation in member states has its origins in EU-level institutions.225 Even in 
areas governed by ‘soft’ rather than by ‘hard’ law, the European Union is having “an 
increasing impact on the allocation of values and norms in Europe” (Hix, 1999: 70). 
The European Union has transformed the politics of European policymaking. 
Consequently, it is inadvisable to study politics in EU member states without taking 
Brussels into account. This is especially true when it comes to political-economic 
affairs including Corporate Responsibility.  
  
There are only a handful of accounts of EU Corporate Responsibility politics 
to date, almost all of them by scholars of law or management.226  Political science can 
learn valuable lessons from Corporate Responsibility at the EU-level. Tanja Börzel, 
for example, claims that “network governance, which systematically involves private 
actors, is hard to find. EU policies are largely formulated and implemented by public 
actors” (Börzel, 2010: 191). Exceptional they may be – but EU CR is an example of 
network or private governance. Moreover, some aspects of EU CR seem akin to what 
Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin desribe as “experimentalist governance” and 
“deliberative polyarchy”: decentralized collaboration and learning 
 framework goals and measures for gauging their achievement are established 
 by joint action … Lower-level units … are given the freedom to advance these 
 ends as they see fit. Subsidiarity in this architecture implies that in writing 
 framework rules the lower-level units should be given sufficient autonomy 
 in implementing the rules to be able to propose changes to them. But in 
 return for this autonomy, they must report regularly on their performance, 
 especially as  measured by the agreed indicators, and participate in a peer 
 review in which their results are compared with those pursuing other 
                                                 
225 Estimates range as high as 80% according to Simon Hix (2005: 4), and as low as 10-20% according  
to Andrew Moravcsik (2005: 17). Annette Elisabeth Töller (2010) criticizes these studies and argues 
that we need – and do not yet have – “an instrument to measure and compare the Europeanization of 
public policy, defined as the scope and extent to which European law and policies shape national 
decisions on public policies, across policy fields, across time and across countries (Töller, 2010: 421).  
226 De Schutter (2008); MacLeod (2005, 2007); Wouters and Chanet (2008).  
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 means to the same general ends. Finally, the framework goals, metrics, and 
 procedures themselves are periodically revised by the actors who initially 
 established them, augmented by such new participants whose views come to be 
 seen as indispensable to full and fair deliberation (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2008: 
 273-274) 
 
The point of this chapter is not to assess the scope or extent of the Europeanization of 
Corporate Responsibility across Europe. Rather, I am interested in the origins and 
changing content of EU CR policy. I take it as given that the EU is a significant actor 
in this arena. I refer to the charts below to establish the plausibility of this claim. 
These charts illustrate two dimensions of the spread of CR across Europe. Figure 4.1 
shows the number of Corporate Responsibility associations – national non-profit 
organizations with a voluntary corporate membership and a mandate to advance the 
cause of CR in their respective jurisdictions and beyond – across Europe between 
1980 and 2007.227 Figure 4.2 shows the total number of firms in the membership of 
nineteen Corporate Responsibility associations across Europe.228  
                                                 
227 This chart excludes the UK CR association Business in the Community because BITC’s large  
membership would make it difficult to see the trends in other European countries. In 1990, BITC had  
approximately 400 members, and in 2008, it had over eight-hundred – nearly as much as all other  
firms combined.  
228 For reasons of data availability, the data in the two graphs is not entirely congruent: the membership 
data in chart 2 is derived from a subset of associations in chart 1.   
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The Timing of the Establishment of CR Associations 
Across Europe, 1980-2007
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Figure 4.1: The Spread of CRAs across Europe 
Source: author’s own compilations 
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Figure 4.2: The Growth of CRA Membership across Europe 
Source: author’s own compilations 
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Both slopes have the shape of an S- curve typical of diffusion processes. What   
role has the EU played in this diffusion? For our present purposes, we will restrict our 
attention to the relationship between the timing of EU CR initiatives and the outcomes 
in figures 4.1 and 4.2. EU-level CR engagement began in earnest in 1995/1996. In 
2001 and 2002, the Commission issued influential Green and White Papers on CR. 
The EU thus began its activities before the diffusion of CR had really gained speed, 
and provided important impulses at the curve’s inflection point. Admittedly, 
correlation is not causation. While it would be wrong to impute the growth of CR 
association membership to EU activities alone, these charts provide prima facie 
evidence of their impact. If we follow Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett (2008) in 
distinguishing between coercion, competition, learning and emulation, the diffusion of 
EU-level CR would seem to be an effect of the latter three processes and not of 
coercion. There have been no EU regulations or directives on CR.  
 
III. Corporate Responsibility, Managed Globalization and Social Europe 
 
The rise of Corporate Responsibility at the EU-level is interesting in and of itself. It is 
also relevant to broader debates in the political economy of Europe relating to the 
balance between the expansion and deepening of markets on one hand, and social 
protection and compensation on the other. What is the relationship between the rise of 
market liberalism – the expansion, deepening and freeing of markets – and Corporate 
Responsibility at the EU level? Are they complements or substitutes? The evidence in 
this chapter, I argue, supports the claim that liberalization and CR are complements, 
and that institutionalized social solidarity and CR are substitutes.  
 CR in Brussels thus speaks to debates about the status of “managed 
globalization” and its unmanaged opposite, market liberalism. Corporate 
Responsibility’s position in this conjuncture is ambiguous. Corporate Responsibility 
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and market liberalism have arisen concurrently and co-evolved at the European level. 
In its early phases, CR was integral to the EU’s program of “managed globalization.” 
Over a period of over a decade beginning at the turn of the millennium, employers 
have converted EU CR, transforming its meaning and content. My argument contrasts 
with views according to which CR is a genuine alternative or countervailing force to 
market liberalism. Instead, it is an integral part of it. Beginning with Jacques Delors, 
the Commission has been a vigorous proponent of both Corporate Responsibility and 
of market liberalism. Recent EU-level CR initiatives, such as the European Alliance 
for CSR, complement a far-reaching push for liberalization and a re-structuring of 
domestic political institutions by the European Commission. Rather than a genuine 
alternative that reveals the power of political agency vis-à-vis market based 
alternatives, Corporate Responsibility is part and parcel of the market liberal economic 
trend in Europe.   
 By emphasizing this point, political scientists can make a distinctive 
contribution to the study of Corporate Responsibility at the EU-level. Legal scholars 
lament the market-conforming – as opposed to market-correcting – character of 
European CR. By and large, management scholars do not remark on these dynamics at 
all, taking them as given in order to focus on firm-level variables. Critique has its 
place, yet analysis should be based on a sober assessment of political-economic 
realities. Legal scholars fail to realize that rather than a genuinely countervailing force, 
the liberalization of European economies and social protection measures including CR 
have been tightly connected from the very start. Market-conforming policies are the 
equilibrium. This does not mean that EU CR is devoid of experimentation and 
contestation. In fact, there has been considerable contestation over European CR 
politics since the 1990s not only from civil society, but within the European 
Commission, between the European Commission and the business community, and 
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within the business community itself.  Both business and the European Commission 
attempted to construct integrative, institutionalized or coordinated frameworks for CR 
at the pan-European level that differ significantly from the current market-liberal 
norm. Over time, these attempts failed, as business converted these social-liberal and 
institutional initiatives to market liberal ends: they became less social and institutional 
and more and more corporate.   
 The fact that EU CR politics have been the object of contestation suggests two 
things. First, EU-level CR politics is nothing to scoff at. Actors would not devote time 
and resources to contest things that they thought were trivial or meaningless. Second, 
this process of searching and contestation – which takes place within and between the 
European Commission, the EBNSC/CSR Europe, the European Parliament, business-, 
trade-union, civil-society organizations, is a useful corrective to overly functionalist 
interpretations of the relationship between liberalization and CR.229 In the end, 
employer-favored market liberal interpretations of CR carried the day. But this 
outcome was the result of political struggle, not a straightforward outcome of 
functional necessity.230  
    
                                                 
229 George Ross acknowledges the sway of economic interests in EU-policymaking. But he rejects the 
notion  
that policy can be reduced to these interests: “The needs of capital, whether systematically or  
organizationally constructed, do not automatically or obviously translate into political strategies. 
Beyond  
this, government bodies must simultaneously seek answers to other kinds of questions. The answers 
which  
are ultimately found usually transcend and feed back on economic matters in crucial ways. The success 
or  
failure of capital may be as contingent upon the problem-solving skills of politicians as the decisional  
autonomy of politicians is constrained by economics” (Ross, 1995: 8)   
230 My stance is similar to Lisbet Hooghe’s. Hooghe “does not deny a role for functional imperatives – 
the weight of neoliberal ideas and institutions, an economic logic having to do with reaping joint gains 
and reducing transaction costs, or a policy logic of efficiency and effectiveness.” But she “emphasizes 
that the link between them and policy outcomes is political” (Hooghe, 1998: 474). 
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IV. Institutionalized Social Solidarity, Liberalization, 
and Corporate Responsibility at the EU-Level 
 
 In preceding chapters I argued that declining institutionalized social solidarity 
and CR co-evolve: CR both paves the way and compensates for declining 
institutionalized social solidarity. This framework works for CR at the level of nation-
states, but it must be modified for application to the EU’s system of multi-level 
governance. Whether the EU has something akin to institutionalized social solidarity 
at the national level is debatable. The candidates are the Common Agricultural Policy 
and the Structural Funds and Cohesion funds. I will begin with the agricultural 
subsidies. There are unquestionably needy farmers in Europe – but it is not apparent 
that the CAP is particularly well targeted to help them: the agricultural subsidies of the 
CAP go largely to privileged farmers. Structural Funds and Cohesion Funds, on the 
other hand, provide support for infrastructure development in the poorer regions of 
Europe. They therefore qualify as social solidarity and are seen as such, according to 
Lisbet Hooghe: “cohesion policy has been the flagship of proponents of regulated 
capitalism” (Hooghe, 1998: 474).  
With regard to expenditure levels, neither the CAP nor the Structural Funds 
and Cohesion Funds have seen much in the way of retrenchment. While the CAP 
budget is slated to decrease over the coming years, the funding for Structural and 
Cohesion Funds is slated to increase.231 Since the Structural Funds and Cohesion 
funds are more plausible candidates for institutionalized social solidarity than the 
Common Agricultural Policy, it does not appear that the EU’s institutionalized social 
solidarity has eroded. However, it is essential to point out that even if EU’s 
                                                 
231 The infrastructural deficiencies of the new Eastern European EU member states were a powerful 
motivator for this policy.  
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institutionalized social solidarity has weathered the storm or expanded somewhat, its 
level is very modest.232  
Most of Europe’s institutionalized social solidarity is located in individual 
member states, rather than at the EU level. It is here that institutionalized social 
solidarity has eroded. This erosion has resulted from endogenous processes of 
liberalization at the national level;233 from international competitive pressures; from 
the asymmetry of market liberalization and social compensation in European 
institutions; and from the EU’s push to restructure non-liberal institutions.234 CR has 
(primarily) served to legitimate EU actors and institutions, and (to a lesser extent) to 
compensate for the fallout of liberalization within EU member states. Though Brussels 
is well connected with EU-member states and with corporate management, policies 
decided in Europe’s capital are not put into practice there; they are delegated to other 
actors and institutions who put them into practice.  The section below discusses the 
origins of CR at the EU-level.  
 
 
V. Liberalization and Social Compensation: The Genesis of CR at the EU-Level 
 
Liberalization and social compensation have been inscribed at the core of European 
CR politics from its beginnings in the 1990s. Many scholars trace the rise of EU CR to 
2001, when the Commission issued its Green Paper on CSR. In fact, European 
Corporate Responsibility originated almost a decade earlier, in the context of the 
economic slump, industrial restructuring and impasse in European integration in the 
mid-1990s. It did not originate as an automatic or functional response to the 1992 
                                                 
232 From 2004-2006, 15.9 billion € in Cohesion funds were available. The total size of the EU economy 
was  
approximately 11 trillion € in these years.   
233 Streeck and Thelen (2005); Streeck (2009) 
234 Höpner and Schäfer (2010) 
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single market.235 A legitimacy crisis of European integration ensued following the 
Maastricht treaty.236 Danish voters rejected the Treaty and French voters approved it 
with only a razor-thin majority. Europe’s economies entered an economic slump with 
unemployment rising above 10%. Armin Schäfer describes the situation:  
 
 There was a widespread notion that integration was too exclusively focused on 
 market integration, disregarding unemployment as the most pressing problem 
 (cf. Deppe/Felder 1993). The permissive consensus supporting integration was 
 at risk.  In this moment of crisis action had to be taken to prove that 
 governments cared for unemployment without, however, granting more power 
 to ‘Brussels bureaucrats’ (Schäfer, 2004: 8) 
 
Although the words “Corporate Responsibility” and “CSR” only entered EU-level 
discourse at the turn of the millennium, labels must not be confused with content. The 
European Business Network for Social Cohesion was established in 1995. Together 
with its member companies and its network of national partner organizations, this 
organization has been instrumental, perhaps even indispensable for advancing the 
cause of CR in Europe.237 EU-Commission President Jacques Delors appealed to 
business to help overcome Europe's structural problems of unemployment and social 
exclusion. Delors’ years as Minister of Finance under President François Mitterand 
“represented a continuation of his activity and reputation as a ‘modernizer’ of the 
French left, acting within liberal capitalism, and standing aside from the class struggle 
of the traditional left” (Drake, 2000: 44). As President of the European Commission 
from 1985 until 1995, Delors sought to simultaneously promote social protection and 
market liberalization at the EU-level. Social-dolorisme, a term coined by a French 
                                                 
235 In his pioneering study on CR by MNCs in Europe in the early 1990s, David Logan establishes “that 
the emergence of the Single Market has not led to a surge in transnational giving projects in Europe” 
(Logan, 1993: 5). 
236 Schäfer (2004): 8 
237 Indeed, the EBNSC and CSR Europe have played an important role in the creation of a number of 
National  
Partner Organizations, national catalysts for CR, across Europe. 
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newspaper, was “characterized from the beginning by a basic reformist attitude and its 
affirmation of the market mechanism in combination with social responsibility” 
(Ziltener: 56). Delors was convinced that the market had to be tamed because this was 
the right thing to do. According to Delors, justice, participation and the dignity of 
every person are values that the market as such can neither create nor preserve 
(Delors, 2000: 103, quoted in Aust, Leitner and Lessenich, 2002: 286). If moral 
legitimacy was one important motivator, the project of social Europe was also 
expedient to secure political support for the integration process. Delors is famous for 
his quip that: “On ne tombe pas amoureux d’un grand marché” – “One does not fall in 
love with a big market.” Hence the need for social Europe. In an early article, Juliet 
Lodge describes “Social Europe” as a complement to liberalization:  
   
 The realization of the Single European Market (SEM) is supposed to be 
 complemented by the creation of a Social Europe. This is part of a program 
 designed to give the EC a credible ‘human face’ This aim is a central element 
 of the People’s Europe program launched in 1985 whose goals interface and 
 overlap with the commitment to realizing the EC’s ‘social dimension’” (Lodge, 
 1990: 135) 
For Delors, European integration and the EU’s social dimension are not antitheses. 
They are integral to each other: “The EU’s social dimension is often discussed as a 
corrective to market-building, but it has proceeded instead as a part of the market 
building process itself” (Leibfried and Pierson, 1995: 51). As Delors liberalized 
markets through key contributions such as the Single European Act and the Maastricht 
Treaty, he took aim at social exclusion. Jacques Delors’ aim has been 
 
 To consolidate integration in order to save the European model of society, a 
 political economy in which competitive firms in a mixed economy thrive in a 
 broader social setting characterized by negotiation and a willingness to assume 
 the burdens of solidarity through a humane system of social services (Ross, 
 1995:  15) 
 
Liberalization was integral to this project from the very beginning: “Successful state  
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building required regenerating European economic activity; it was necessary to ‘bring  
capital on board’ before taking on the job of consolidating the European model of 
society” (Ross, 1995: 15). The political-economic challenges of the past twenty years 
provide ample evidence that this is not a cakewalk. If bringing capital on board is 
necessary to sustain the European social model, doing so could compromise or 
undermine that very model. According to George Ross, this is precisely what 
happened with Delors’ “Russian dolls” strategy: “If market building succeeded but 
state building faltered, Community Europe could end up an even less ‘organized 
space’ than it had been prior to the Delors presidency […]. This, in fact, is close to 
what happened” (Ross, 1995: 287). If this assessment is correct, it leaves open the 
question of whether this outcome could have been anticipated, given Delorism’s spirit 
of “creative new action”:   
 
   The heart of Delorism is the defensive belief that what is genuinely distinctive 
 in modern European society can only be saved by creative new action at 
 European regional level. Secondly, Delorism, unlike nostalgic, strongly 
 corporatist social democracy, recognizes the need for genuine economic 
 liberalization. The sine qua non of confronting globalization is a large and 
 dynamic European market, open to the world. Delorism’s third fundamental 
 principle is that this market must be ‘organized.’ It needs regulation and public 
 goods, unified economic and monetary policies, regional redistribution, 
 innovative industrial and educational programs, and a coherent European 
 international political position to create maximum prospects for economic 
 success and preserve Europe’s social uniqueness …. Finally, a liberalized but 
 organized market society is the way to consecrate Europe’s unique systems of 
 social solidarity, the ‘European model of society.” On these issues Delorism’s 
 Left Catholicism parts company with social democracy. Solidarities are to be 
 negotiated among social partners, but not by giant lumbering 
 organizations. Bargained exchanges between groups with different interests, 
 reached in constant “social dialogue,” have to take place in the decentralized 
 way appropriate to the new economic situation. The “passive solidarities” of 
 the postwar boom have to give way to “active” ones, rigid bargains to “rolling” 
 ones (Ross, 1995: 243)    
 
CR was part of this fresh new wind, this departure from the well-trodden paths of  
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the post-war order. Inventiveness and ingenuity were paired with political expediency. 
Unemployment had risen to worrying heights by the mid-1990s. In January 1995, 
Delors and Commissioner Padraig Flynn invited a group of managers to sign a 
“European Declaration of Businesses against Social Exclusion.” It draws attention to 
the “17 million unemployed, 53 million living below the poverty line and between 3 
and 5 million in inadequate housing” in the EU-15 (1).  This exclusion is a “major 
challenge” which will “not disappear automatically” with renewed economic growth. 
The “signatory businesses and business organizations wish to express their willingness 
to take part in the joint efforts to prevent and combat social exclusion” (2). The report 
outlines three areas of action by business: “promoting integration on the labour 
market”; “helping to improve vocational training”; “avoiding exclusion within the 
business and minimizing redundancies or providing for appropriate measures where 
they are inevitable”; “promoting the creation of new jobs and businesses”; and 
“contributing to social integration in particularly deprived areas and of particularly 
marginalized groups” (3-4).  
 The Declaration led to the creation of the European Business Network for 
Social Cohesion – the EU-level CR association, renamed CSR Europe in 2000.238 
Thus, EU-level CR was initiated not by business, but by government, as Alan Christie, 
one of the key figures in the EBNSC, remarks (interview, 2006).239 Indeed, the EU 
Commission played an indispensable role in the creation of the EBNSC.  It provided 
not only “the spark” but also most of the money to fund the European Business 
Network for Social Cohesion. By funding the network’s entire budget for its initial 
five years (membership fees were not instituted until the network as re-named CSR 
                                                 
238 The re-naming of the network in positive (“cohesion”) rather than negative (“exclusion”) terms is  
typical of CSRspeak.   
239 Christie “was there before it [the EBNSC] was created and chaired the executive  
committee until 2004 I left when I left Levi’s” (Christie, interview, 2006). 
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Europe in 2000), the Commission greased the wheels of collective action. In turn, the 
Commission’s support for the cause of CR helped legitimate the Commission. “The 
Commission is a strong advocate of finding the right balance between economic 
advance and social progress,” as Commissioner Padraig Flynn for DG Employment 
and Social Affairs put it in an EBNSC conference address in 1997.  
The European Business Network for Social Cohesion was created only after 
attempts to advance the Commission’s agenda with UNICE, the European Federation 
of Employers Associations, proved unsuccessful. This indicates an interesting parallel 
with the CBI and BITC, discussed above in chapter 3. UNICE was perceived to be 
against Commission initiatives; there was suspicion in business quarters that the 
Commission was aiming to impose hard law in the area. These suspicions were 
heightened by the leadership of the Corporate Responsibility file by DG Employment 
and Social Affairs.240 Renate Hornung-Draus, who was director of Social Affairs at 
UNICE at the time, recalls that Delors had strived for a binding regulation / agreement 
between the Commission and UNICE. Hornung-Draus recalls that “we did not find 
that [suggestion] very sensible at the European level.” How could binding legislation 
do justice to Europe’s diversity, not only at the national level but at the regional level 
as well? UNICE “had no mandate to sign such an agreement.” In the opinion of 
UNICE and its member firms, Delors’ initiative was “misguided,” whereupon Delors 
sought to advance its cause through the EBNSC and its member companies (Hornung-
Draus, interview 2007). The network’s initial emphasis was heavily influenced by the 
agenda of social exclusion, as Christie recalls: 
 
 social exclusion was the #1 political item on the European agenda. The idea of 
 a growing European underclass was scaring politicians. What Delors said to 
 the business community is: where the hell are you guys? You are the 
 economy? Where’s your contribution? A few companies jumped up and down 
                                                 
240 Murray (2003) 
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 saying we are  good guys but in fact it was very patchy and it was very 
 individualistic; it was all about individual companies pursing an agenda. There 
 was certainly no coherent thought on a pan-European basis (Christie, 
 interview, 2006) 
The European Declaration of Business against Exclusion changed this. The 
Declaration laments the “extent of exclusion and poverty within the European Union” 
(European Declaration, 1995: 1), explaining that  
 
 Exclusion can be found in the fields of employment, housing, health care and 
 education and also in access to certain services and the law. It takes on many 
 different forms: the districts and urban areas in crisis; marginalization of the 
 long- term unemployed; the helplessness of young people with few 
 qualifications; the persistence of barriers to the integration of migrants and 
 minorities; the slide into poverty of over indebted households; the rise in the 
 number of homeless people. All of these situations are structural in essence; 
 they result neither solely nor primarily from an individual’s disabilities or 
 failings, but from the economic, social and technological changes occurring 
 throughout European societies (European Declaration, 1995: 1).   
The report’s outlook and diagnosis differs from market liberal orthodoxy. Not lazy or 
unemployable individuals are to blame, but socio-economic structures. Structures and 
institutions are also part of the solution. The report identifies five “areas for action by 
businesses”: labor market integration; improving vocational training; minimizing 
redundancies; helping to create new jobs and businesses; targeting deprived areas and 
marginalized groups (European Declaration, 1995: 3-4). While emphasizing the 
importance of company discretion – “it is up to each business, depending on its 
particular characteristics and its resources, to identify the most suitable ways of 
applying its sense of responsibility to the fight against exclusion and its prevention” – 
the goal was not a patchwork of initiatives, but a movement: “The signatories 
therefore invite all businesses … and all business organizations to take this 
Declaration into account.” The signatories also call for the development of “a network 
for the exchange of information and experience” – CR associations, in essence. The 
report concludes with a vade mecum, a how-to-guide for implementing these 
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objectives in practice. This was essential in an economic environment characterized by 
mass-layoffs, of which the French auto manufacturer Renault’s “shock 
announcement” of its decision to close plant in Vilvoorde, Belgium (Voiculescu, 
2007: 266).     
 In its initial phases, CR at the EU-level can be likened to what Abdelal (2007) 
and Abdelal and Meunier (2010) call “managed globalization.” These authors argue 
that Europeans were in fact champions of liberalization. But unlike the preferred route 
of their American counterparts – ad hoc globalization – Europeans preferred 
multilateral, rule-based, “managed” globalization. For Delors, according to Nicholas 
Jabko, market integration was “not an end in itself, but a means to a higher yet more 
remote goal” (Jabko, 2006: 50). Managed globalization “made great progress toward 
combining market freedom with bureaucratic capability and responsibility” (Abdelal 
and Meunier, 2010: 351). Most of these authors’ attention is devoted to the 
international realm. But managed globalization cannot be meaningful or politically 
effective without being perceived as legitimate within Europe. Corporate 
Responsibility is one such underpinning, an integral, core element of the EU’s social 
dimension. Just as  
Jacques Delors was the central figure in the rise of the Single Market, he 
initiated Corporate Responsibility at the EU level – and he was a central figure in the 
evolution of managed globalization (Abdelal, 2007; Abdelal and Meunier, 2010; 
Hooghe and Marks, 1999241). Before the term “managed globalization” came into 
widespread use, scholars used the term “regulated capitalism” to refer to this project. 
In the words of Lisbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, the project of regulated capitalism 
“has laid the foundation for an alternative to market liberalism based on positive 
                                                 
241 Lisbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (1999) distinguish between the neoliberal and regulated capitalist 
projects of European Integration, and view Jacques Delors as “the most influential advocate” of the 
project of European regulated capitalism (Hooghe and Marks, 1999: 86).  
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regulation of market activity, economic redistribution, the extension of liberal 
democracy to the European level, and collaboration among public and private actors” 
(Hooghe and Marks, 1999: 96). The structures which have been erected on this 
foundation have not been particularly significant. Hooghe and Marks’s statement in 
the late 1990s that “the achievements of the coalition for regulated capitalism seem 
unimpressive by comparison with the current social regulation in central and northern 
European states” (Hooghe and Marks, 1999: 91) rings true more than a decade later. 
Some scholars attribute the EU’s lackluster public legitimacy to a perceived or real 
imbalance between the EU’s market promotion and social compensation activities.  
 In its initial stages, EU-level CR was like many initiatives in their founding 
phases – plenty of lofty ideals, but weak in terms of pragmatic enactment. Christie 
recalls that how the European Declaration “was one of these wonderful statements 
we’re in favor of good and against evil. It was no more than a declaration of good 
faith,” without a pragmatic base. “At the risk of being too cynical there wasn’t too 
much substance there” (Christie, interview, 2006). “The ideal was to create some kind 
of learning organization … [it] was always a bit haphazard. The members decide how 
much effort to put in that was hugely varied.  The idea that there was a single 
movement or a single voice was fantasy.” Only one of the founding companies was 
American – Levi Strauss, represented by Alan Christie. Christie recalls that the 
initially low membership levels of American companies “may be a reflection of the 
inherent European bias against all things American. Because it was Delors there was a 
slight French bias; there was a manifesto that had been circulated signed by dozens, a 
classic Gallic socio-political exercise” (Christie, interview, 2006). The EBNSC 
eventually took the form of a CR association with a voluntary corporate membership – 
but not after alternatives had been considered. Christie recalls: 
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   Our initial thinking was that we shouldn’t base this on corporations rather we 
 should base it on national business platforms really acknowledging that in 
 different countries there are different traditions. What [we thought] we needed 
 to do is to acknowledge and strengthen that and look for any synergies at the 
 pan-European level to further develop our thinking. What we need to do is 
 encourage and strengthen that and look for synergies at the European level 
 (Christie, interview 2006)  
This alternative model resembles Jacques Delors’ attempts to advance his objectives 
through binding agreements with UNICE. Presumably, it would have been organized 
around national business associations, not-for-profit intermediary organizations, and 
institutional frameworks: core elements of the European social model. A 1997 
publication “Partners in Corporate Initiatives: stimulating job growth, improving  
employability and tackling social exclusion” illustrates a few elements of this model. 
The core elements are “organizations which work with private enterprise on tackling 
social exclusion.” The brochure pays tribute to “the social security and welfare 
systems” which “provide the context within which these initiatives are taking place” 
(Griffiths, 1997: 12). The acknowledgement of different historical traditions, national 
level institutions, non-profit intermediary organizations and a framework at the pan-
European level with which to integrate and synergize these institutions contrasts with 
the current understandings of CR which privilege individual, firm level activities and 
discretion. One might characterize this alternative as a Coordinated or Integrative 
version of Corporate Responsibility. This path was not taken:  
  
 …what we discovered is that there were practical almost systemic glitches … 
 partly because I suppose we were talking about national organizations that 
 were very jealous of their own thing and wanted to be very careful about 
 whatever European level and were cautious about the involvement of the 
 corporations in their separate identities. The corporations were their national 
 members. A company like ours [Levi Strauss] might be a member of 3 national 
 platforms around Europe. How would an EU-level organization fit in to this 
 configuration? Would it upset the formal equality between them? That was 
 messy it was difficult to find common ground … and what we also came to 
 realize was that the real opportunity to change lay in the practice of the 
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 individual corporations so we set  up a network for the exchange of good 
 practice among companies 
 
Christie suggests that organizational egoism torpedoed these attempts in three ways. 
First, Europe was perceived as a threat to national business organizations’ interests. 
Second, Europe was perceived as a threat to the formal equality between different 
national subsidiaries of multinational enterprises; and third, individual firms were 
perceived as a threat to corporatist institutions. Maybe Europe’s institutional diversity 
made finding a common denominator difficult if not impossible. In retrospect, the 
second fear appears ill-founded. As the chapter on Europe’s transnational CR 
networks will show, there does not seem to be a tension between firms’ membership in 
the EU-level and in national CR associations. While limited budgets may force some 
firms to choose between membership in one or the other, many companies are 
members in both. Whatever the cause, Coordinated or Integrative CR died a stillborn 
death, and gave way to today’s market-liberal variant. Market-liberal or not, the 
EBNSC has evolved from an effect of Commission agency to its own autonomous 
cause, advancing CR through its own initiatives and riding the rising tide of CR across 
Europe:  
 
 In 2000 we said we would have a 5th anniversary event that would demonstrate 
 the strength of the CSR movement in Europe we hired a theatre in Brussels it 
 seats 400 people we’ll have this over 2 days and a plenary and exhibition 
 people. Are you mad? Where on earth will we find 400 delegates? In the end 
 we had over 600 registrations it demonstrated to the business community 
 maybe there’s an idea here it also impressed the commission. The fact that we 
 had this level of interest clearly got their attention (Christie, interview, 2006) 
 
Later that same year at Lisbon, the Council of Ministers adopted the Lisbon Agenda. 
For the first time, it included a statement on the role of Corporate Responsibility in 
achieving the Lisbon goals: “39. The European Council makes a special appeal to 
companies' corporate sense of social responsibility regarding best practices on lifelong 
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learning, work organization, equal opportunities, social inclusion and sustainable 
development.”  “CSR Europe drafted the paragraph. That was a big damn deal,” 
Christie recalls. Since that time, 
   
 CSR Europe has been very closely aligned with the Commission in the 
 development of its policies in this whole area we’ve been at the table we’ve 
 had the opportunity to engage. How much impact we’ve had how often they’ve 
 listened and ignored us [is another issue] … the important thing is that they’ve 
 heard us we were very much a part of the round table (Christie, interview, 
 2006) 
Without the Commission, which provided approximately 250,000 € per year to CSR 
Europe between 1996 and 2006 (Anonymous EU Commission official, personal  
communication, October 2, 2006), CSR Europe could not have succeeded: “without 
the money and the [Commission’s] willingness to engage, the organization would 
have died a very rapid death.” But CSR Europe itself exerted an influence on the 
entity that had created it, helping to “instill a sense of realism in the commission” on 
matters of CR:  
 
 There’s been a huge development in business practice and in government 
 understanding of business practice and the role that it can and cannot play. It 
 was not so long ago that ‘we thought well we have a problem we’ll get the 
 private sector to solve it’ (Christie, interview, 2006) 
  
In sum, Christie concludes: 
  
 I’m terribly proud of CSR Europe simply because this whole thing has been 
 evolutionary we’ve gone from unreconstructed philanthropy through to 
 something that is much more about shaping government and company policy. 
 That’s been hugely important. CSR Europe has played a central role in making 
 that happen (Christie, interview, 2006) 
 
How did different interest groups react to this new entity? EU-level social partners, i.e. 
employers and union representatives, were apprehensive that CR could threaten their 
entrenched interests and positions. NGOs and unions were fearful that CR could be 
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used to bolster the power of business and substitute traditional institutions of social 
embeddedness such as collective bargaining with CR.  Business groups perceived CR 
as a potential threat, potentially furthering bureaucratization and costly red-tape. To 
cite one example, the paper “Social Labels: Tools for Ethical Trade” was 
commissioned by the European Commission and written by Simon Zadek, Sanjiv 
Lingayah, and Maya forstater of the New Economics Foundation in 1998. Although 
this study was far from an EU Directive, employers’ representatives at UNICE and 
ERT perceived it as such, and panicked. Despite its corporate membership, CSR 
Europe steered a middle course between these extreme positions, thus helping to 
advance the cause of CR in Europe. British socialist MEP Richard Howitt echoes this 
view. Howitt is the European Parliament’s champion for CR, and no apologist for 
market-liberal solutions, as we will see below. Howitt describes CSR Europe as “The 
best show in town in Brussels in terms of having a business-led organization that is 
interested in CSR policy initiatives …  they are attempting to make a difference” 
(Howitt, interview, Strasbourg, 2007).  
The path that CSR Europe embarked has embarked on since the late 1990s is 
market-liberal: enterprises adopt responsible practices through ‘soft law,’ learning and 
the benchmarking of best practice, not through binding ‘hard’ regulations. Though not 
without resistance, EU institutions, and the vast majority of those involved in CR have 
adopted this market liberal view. The next section tells how this came to be.   
 
VI. The Conversion of European CR 
 
 The evolution of the EU CR policy from the EBNSC to the European Alliance 
can be seen as a process of ‘conversion.’ Through their structural, lobbying and 
rhetorical power, European employers have given European CR an indelible market-
liberal imprint and orientation. Conversion stresses actors’ strategic activism to 
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“interpret [an institution’s] rules in their own interest (or circumvent or subvert rules 
that clash with their interests)” (Streeck and Thelen, 2005: 27). James Mahoney and 
Kathleen Thelen note: “lacking the capacity to destroy an institution, institutional 
challengers may be able to exploit its inherent ambiguities in ways that allow them to 
redirect it towards more favorable functions and effects” (Mahoney and Thelen: 2010: 
18). The systematic ambiguity of CR was instrumental, if not invaluable for this 
conversion.  As De Schutter puts it: 
 
 The polysemy of the concept of CSR has facilitated its instrumentalisation in 
 the course of the European-wide debate on its significance, and that the end 
 result has been the diversion of CSR from its original ambition …. While CSR 
 may have been initially an idea about the scope of the responsibility of 
 business towards its environment, it ended up becoming a process in which the 
 representatives of the business community have come to occupy the central 
 role, and from which politics essentially retreated (De Schutter, 2008: 205)    
The shift in the meaning of European CR did not begin with the Commission’s 2001 
Green Paper or with the Multistakeholder Forum of 2002. It took place earlier. With 
the renaming of the European Business Network for Social Cohesion as CSR Europe 
in  2000, the European CR agenda was simultaneously broadened and narrowed. 
Broadened because CSR Europe embraced the whole gamut of issues relating to 
Corporate Responsibility. These reach far beyond social cohesion and are reflected in 
the organization’s new name. Narrowed because the organization’s new service-
oriented corporate agenda reflected the diminished prominence of previously 
championed social goals. The EBNSC’s initial orientation towards “social cohesion” 
receded into the background as CSR Europe became increasingly business-driven and 
reliant on its members rather than on the European Commission for financial support. 
As it did so, it changed from an advocacy and awareness-raising to a service-delivery 
organization. According to Pierre Echard, then at CSR Europe, “We came to reflect 
whether raising awareness is our role. We decided it had been our role but [that] it was 
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time to move on and close the doors a bit. Companies need a comfort zone to say these 
are our weaknesses. CSR Europe focuses on internal CSR processes” (Echard, 
interview, 2006). In part, this change reflects the maturation of CR: there is no need to 
advocate for what is accepted and taken-for-granted. But the change in emphasis is 
important. Whereas European CR had begun as a “Declaration of Business against 
Exclusion,” five years later, the organization’s publications were titled “For an 
Entrepreneurial and Inclusive Europe.” Whereas a 1997 ENBSC Publication “Partners 
in Corporate Initiatives: Stimulating Job Growth, Improving Employability and 
Tackling Social Exclusion” lists 75 partner organizations in 8 member states, 
including ones such as the Dutch Labor Foundation (Stichting van de Arbeid) and the 
Danish Federation of Trade Unions (LO). Ten years later, CSR Europe had 
approximately seventy-five corporate members, and trade unions were not among 
them. CSR Europe did not abandon goals of inclusiveness; they were supplemented by 
business objectives. As time has progressed, the latter have become increasingly 
prominent relative to the former.  
Amidst CSR Europe’s turn towards the market, the Commission was not yet 
willing to give up the cause of labels and binding transparency standards for CR. In 
July 2001, the European Commission issued a “Green Paper on Promoting a European 
Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility” to “launch a wide debate and seek 
views on corporate social responsibility at a national, European and international 
level.” The paper defines CSR as “a concept whereby corporations integrate social and 
environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their 
stakeholders on a voluntary basis.”242 While broadly conforming to the business case 
for CR, the Green Paper envisions an important role for public authorities:  
 
                                                 
242 COM (2001) 366 final (July 18, 2001), p. 7, p. 8. 
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The main contribution of a European approach will be to complement and add 
value to existing activities by: 
– providing an overall European framework, aiming at promoting quality and 
coherence of corporate social responsibility practices, through developing 
broad principles, approaches and tools, and promoting best practice and 
innovative ideas, 
– supporting best practice approaches to cost-effective evaluation and 
independent verification of corporate social responsibility practices, ensuring 
thereby their effectiveness and credibility243   
  
Sorcha MacLeod charges that “from the outset, the Green Paper constricted any debate 
by relying on a very limited, and business-oriented, definition of CSR … The 
Commission has continued to maintain this approach” (MacLeod, 2007: 680). This 
paints a crude and a potentially misleading picture: the role the Green Paper envisions 
for public authorities in verifying and certifying CR differs from the market-liberal 
solution of letting the market decide. While “business-oriented,” the Commission’s 
Green Paper also specifies that CR should “not be seen as a substitute to regulation or 
legislation concerning social rights or environmental standards, including the 
development of new appropriate legislation.”244  
One of the virtues of Olivier De Schutter’s discussion is that he clearly 
pinpoints the different emphasis of the Commission’s work under the Directorate-
General for Employment and Social Affairs and the market-liberal position of 
employers associations such as UNICE. “[W]hile CSR, bring voluntary in nature, was 
conceived as something distinct from, and not a substitute for, the adoption where 
necessary of appropriate legislation, an active role was envisaged for the public 
authorities in the promotion of CR” (De Schutter, 2008: 207). Rather than simply 
leaving CR to the marketplace – the market-liberal stance – public authorities would 
construct an “overall European framework,” provide “independent verification” 
thereby assuring CR’s “credibility.” MacLeod is not the only commentator who 
                                                 
243 COM (2001) 366 final (July 18, 2001), p. 6. 
244 COM (2001) 366 final (July 18, 2001), p. 10.. 
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overlooks the difference between the EU’s CR policies under the leadership of 
Dominique Bé in DG Employment and Social Affairs and employers associations’ 
positions on CR. De Schutter’s account provides a corrective. De Schutter points out 
that the European Commission’s 2002 communication on “Corporate Social 
Responsibility: A Business Contribution to Sustainable Development” stressed the 
need to go beyond purely market-based approaches: 
the proliferation of different CSR instruments (such as management standards, 
labeling and certification schemes, reporting, etc) that are difficult to compare, 
is confusing for business, consumers, investors, other stakeholders and the 
public and this, in turn, could be a source of market distortion. Therefore, there 
is a role for Community action to facilitate convergence on the instruments 
used in the light of the need to ensure a proper functioning of the internal 
market and the preservation of a level playing field245  
Or as an anonymous Commission official put it:   
 
We accept it is based on voluntary commitments but we don’t want this to be a 
blank cheque we want accountability about the outcomes of what they do …. If 
you don’t have standards you also have free-riders you have false advertising. 
The logical step for the commission would have been to establish transparency 
rules. We need to have proper information, transparency and accountability; 
that’s where companies said no (Commission official, interview, 2006) 
From the 2001 Green Paper until the establishment of the European Alliance for CSR 
in 2006, DG Employment drove the CR file in terms of initiatives, spending 
approximately 3 million € per year on it. “The money is part of the visibility of the 
file,” remarked an anonymous EU official (interview, 2006). As De Schutter points 
out,  
by confirming its view that CSR tools would only function effectively if they 
are transparent and based on clear and verifiable criteria and benchmarks, 
implying that a public policy was required to lend credibility to such voluntary 
initiatives, the Commission was in fact stating its disagreement with the 
position of employers’ organizations (De Schutter, 2008: 208)  
 
                                                 
245 COM (2002) 347 final (July 2 2002): 8 
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Employer’s organizations, such as the British Chambers of Commerce, the 
employer’sassociation UNICE (now: businesseurope) and the European Roundtable of 
Industrialists, made their preference for voluntary and market-driven approaches 
unmistakably clear. De Schutter quotes Philippe de Buck, then Secretary General of 
UNICE, as stating that challenges to business including as “calls for convergence, 
transparency and accountability” “will and have to be addressed through market-
driven responses. There is no room at this stage for prescriptive responses.” Wim 
Philippa, Secretary General of the ERT, stresses that European standardized 
approaches would endanger both the innovation and dynamism of CR and the 
competitiveness of European firms (De Schutter, 2008: 213).  
 The position of CSR Europe is ambiguous. CSR Europe is a business network 
or platform for exchange and learning that lies in-between the market-liberal stance of 
business lobby groups and the pro-active stance of the European Commission. CSR 
Europe has sought to simultaneously serve two masters: the Commission and its own 
corporate membership. As Pierre Echard, formerly with CSR Europe, remarks, “We 
are very influenced by the European agenda on CSR.” On the other hand, “We make 
sure that the practices of companies are taken into consideration make sure that these 
are taken into consideration by the key policymakers in the commission” (Pierre 
Echard, interview 2006). CSR Europe “warmly welcomed” the Commission’s Green 
Paper, while urging the EU  
 
to adopt a flexible approach in promoting CSR, to accommodate local 
requirements and encourage proactive voluntary contributions. Force-fitting a 
prescriptive or mandatory framework is liable to inhibit the creativity and wide 
stakeholder dialogues which have been at the heart of CSR’s success to date” 
(CSR Europe, 2001: 3)  
 
Regulation comes at the expense of flexibility and innovation. By definition, CR 
cannot be regulated:  
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It is illogical to speak of regulating CSR activities, if they are simultaneously 
to be encouraged as activities that lie beyond regulation. It may also not be 
practical. A CSR practice that lies beyond compliance in one country may be a 
legal requirement in another. This is bound to arise in a community that has a 
principle of subsidiarity (CSR Europe, 2001: 7).  
 
The fear by parts of the European business community during the 1990s that the 
EBNSC was pursuing Commission interests at the expense of business seems hard to 
sustain in light of these statements. Nonetheless, while defending business interests, 
CSR Europe has pursued a line that is not simply market-liberal: “legislation has a 
wholly valid role to define minimum standards on specific matters of widespread 
social concern…. Companies should fully meet all their legal obligations.” Legislation 
enabling or facilitating transparency, as for example in the UK case where pension 
funds disclose whether they take non-financial criteria into account, is looked on 
favorably (CSR Europe, 2001: 7).  
  After receiving the responses to the Green Paper, the Commission convened 
the European Multistakeholder Forum from 2002 until 2004. Employers, unions, and 
civil society representatives from across Europe took part in this attempt to get 
stakeholders’ views closer together through deliberation. This attempt failed. And in 
the end, employers’ voice proved decisive. De Schutter states that, owing to pressures  
from European business, who may have made this a condition of their participation, a  
regulatory approach was practically ruled out from the start: “the objective of 
‘identifying and exploring areas where additional action is needed at the European 
level’ was abandoned” (De Schutter, 2008: 213). Employers did not budge on their 
position. Neither did NGOs, who continued to insist on a regulatory approach. As a 
result, “no consensus was reached” at the end of the EMS Forum (De Schutter, 2008: 
214).  
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Although the presentation of the Commission’s next communication on 
Corporate Social Responsibility had originally been announced for the spring of 2005, 
it did not come until the establishment of the European Alliance for CSR on 22 March 
2006. With the establishment of the European Alliance for CSR, a loose alliance of 
UNICE / business europe, ERT and UEAPME, the chief responsibility for the 
Commission’s CSR file moved from DG for Employment and Social Affairs to DG 
Enterprise. This shift is significant. Since the 1990s if not earlier, segments of 
European business have been wary that the Directorate-General for Employment and 
Social Affairs was pursuing an anti-business regulatory agenda. By contrast, DG 
Enterprise is the Directorate-General for business. Thus, DG Enterprise tends to view 
policy from the perspective of business, rather than from the perspective of other 
social constituencies. That is the structural affinity of DG Enterprise towards 
employer-friendly policies. There is also a behavioral dimension. Pieter Boewen 
recognizes that “interest group activity is clearly not evenly distributed across the 
different DGs” (Boewen, 2009: 24). According to a study by Broschield and Coen, the 
level of interest group activity is much higher in DG Enterprise than for any other DG, 
and approximately 50% higher than in Health and Consumer affairs, the DG with the 
second highest level of interest group activity (Broschield and Coen, 2007, quoted in 
Boewen, 2009: 24). EU CR has a different quality under the leadership of DG 
Enterprise than it did under the leadership of DG Employment and Social Affairs.   
 In his “Report on corporate social responsibility: a new partnership,” Labour 
MEP Richard Howitt describes the lead-up to the European Alliance. While the Green 
and White Papers and the European Multistakeholder Forum “succeeded in fostering 
an EU-wide debate on CSR,” they 
 
largely failed to address what the EU could itself do to 'add value' to the 
debate, or to take concrete actions to promote responsible business …. There 
followed successive delays by the Commission in publishing its response over 
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two years, caused by an unwillingness to confront the fundamental polarization 
between those amongst business and other stakeholders who want to see CSR 
subject to transparency requirements laid down through external verification 
and/or legislation with an explicit role for stakeholders, and those who want to 
see CSR as a business-only led exercise which should evolve without public 
policy input beyond speeches, press conferences and awards ceremonies. 
  
The Commission ultimately decided to opt-out from the debate, producing a 
Communication firmly backing an anti-regulation approach. Commissioners 
held a series of private meetings with selected company representatives to 
negotiate on the text of the Communication, then described it as "agreed" by 
business, and only met personally with interested NGOs to discuss its contents 
following on from publication. The key Commission official responsible for 
CSR appears to have been moved from his job, perhaps to make way for this 
new 'consensus'. A leaked memo from the European employers organisation 
UNICE described the Communication as a "true success" because "concessions 
to other stakeholders... will have no real impact". This has cast doubt on the 
sincerity of a last-minute change to reconvene the CSR Multistakeholder 
Forum, and suggests the Commission may have allowed excessive corporate 
lobbying in contradiction to its own Transparency Initiative of November 2005 
(Howitt, 2006: 17-18) 
 
If the Commission’s CR initiatives had previously been anything but unfriendly to 
business, the European Alliance aligned them much more closely with the positions of 
business interest organizations such as UNICE / businesseurope, the European 
Chambers of Commerce and the European Roundtable of Industrialists. In its 2006 
Communication, the Commission explicitly “acknowledged” that “enterprises are the 
primary actors in CSR” and that therefore “the Commission has decided that it can 
best achieve its objectives by working more closely with European business.” The 
Alliance, the report explains, “is a political umbrella for new or existing CSR 
initiatives by large companies, SMEs and their stakeholders. It is not a legal 
instrument and is not to be signed by enterprises … It is a political process to increase 
the uptake of CSR” (COM (2006) 136 final: 2). As Thomas Conzelmann remarks, 
“The earlier ambitions of the Commission (expressed in the 2002 Communication 
discussed above) to ‘facilitate convergence of the internal market and preservation of a 
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level playing field” vanished completely but for a short reference to “examine, in 
consultation with all relevant stakeholders, the need for further voluntary actions to 
achieve the objectives of transparency and information for consumers” (Conzelmann, 
2008: 137-138). DG Enterprise has “a considered policy line designed to let business 
to do more” (Dodd, interview, 2007) – but on the whole, the Alliance’s position seems 
akin to that of Lisbet Hooghe and Gary Marks’ neoliberals:  the institutional “status 
quo” (Hooghe and Marks, 1999: 85).  
  An official from the European Commission remarks that “From 2000-2005 
[the view was that] sustainability [is] very important [and] competitiveness will 
follow.” By contrast, the Commission that came in in 2005 had a new approach:  
“competitiveness at any cost hopefully it will not hurt sustainability” (interview, 
2006). Rather than an independent objective with justification in its own right, the new 
agenda sees CR is a means to the end of liberalization and competitiveness. Although 
the Commission’s communication announcing the creation of the European Alliance 
for CSR concludes with an appeal to the European social model: “The Commission 
strongly believes that CSR matters to each and every European, since it represents an 
aspect of the European social model” (2006: 9), the credibility and seriousness of that 
appeal are questionable for some observers, though not in the eyes of most firms and 
business associations. Indeed, representatives of DG Enterprise have no qualms about 
distancing themselves from UNICE. Thomas Dodd, in charge of CSR in DG 
Enterprise, states that Commission policy is “heavily influenced” by “hard lobbying at 
a high level” by UNICE. This has resulted from the Commission’s desire to “build a 
reputation of being business friendly.” As a result, the Commission went “even further 
[in the direction of business] than we would have had to have gone.” Both the 
Commission’s stance and UNICE’s political activism “made the Commission seem 
more business friendly than it is” (Dodd, interview, 2007).     
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 The position of business lobbying groups on CSR is easily summarized: 
companies’ CR is companies’ business. Binding regulation in the area of CR would be 
counter-productive or contradictory. Business interest organizations in general, and 
UNICE246 in particular, has played a weighty and, from the point of view of NGOs, 
obstructionist role in the politics of EU-level CR. Weighty because business Europe 
represents forty employers’ and industry associations across Europe. Obstructionist 
because finding a common position among these diverse constituencies is difficult, as 
Justin Greenwood tells us: “the size of the constituency [business-wide organizations] 
makes coming to common positions difficult, and there may be a natural tendency 
toward ‘lowest-common-denominator’ positions” (Greenwood, 2002: 116). This is 
especially true of business Europe, which represents the interests of the whole of 
European industry “vis-à-vis the institutions of the EU” (Greenwood, 2002: 120). 
Whereas the failure to come to a common position weakens trade union 
representatives, employers’ failure to come to a common position on CR (other than 
market-liberal voluntarism) does not necessarily weaken European employers. If 
anything, it strengthens them.247 Moreover, powerful theoretical arguments are 
available to support the market-liberal position: since CR is voluntary, it by definition 
cannot be regulated. Natscha Waltke, responsible for CR in the employers’ association 
UNICE, remarks that “With regard to the positions there is no evolution in our views. 
The debates about more social and environmental legislation are absolutely valid 
debates but they are not debates about CSR. CSR is about what companies do beyond 
legislation. By definition it is voluntary” (interview, 2006). Thus, regulation is 
counter-productive: “it doesn’t make sense to put it in a regulatory structure if you 
                                                 
246 the Union of Industrial and Employers Confederations of Europe, renamed business Europe in 2007 
247 Offe and Wiesenthal (1980) 
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want to do CSR do it this way otherwise it’s not CSR. You’ll kill CSR. The company 
will have no interest in it at all” (Waltke, interview, 2006).  
 Businesseurope / UNICE are not the only major business interest group in 
Brussels. Others include the ERT (European Roundtable of Industrialists), 
Eurochambres (chambers of commerce), and UEAPME (the association of small, 
medium-sized, and craft enterprises). I will focus here on the positions of ERT and 
UEAPME. The European Roundtable of Industralists is a very different organization 
than businesseurope / UNICE. Whereas businesseurope has an extremely 
heterogeneous membership, the ERT’s membership consists of just forty corporate 
executives from Europe’s most valuable companies and brands. If the ERT is more of 
a think-tank than a narrow lobbying organization,248 this has not diminished its 
influence. Delors credited the ERT with providing decisive support for the project of 
European integration, and other studies attribute major influence on EU policy to the 
ERT.249 Membership is by invitation only. According to club theory,250 a small group 
of leading companies should have different institutional and regulatory preferences 
than a large, heterogeneous and diverse membership: “this lean, flexible, membership-
driven structure, together with its cohesiveness and ability to come to rich common 
positions, is much admired elsewhere” (Greenwood, 2002: 134). Does the ERT have a 
different stance on European CR than businesseurope / UNICE? Apparently not. I 
have copied an excerpt of the ERT’s response to the Commission’s Green Paper 
below:    
 
 The Green Paper suggests that it would be beneficial to standardise reporting 
 of social performance. ERT strongly rejects this suggestion: it is not logical on 
 the one hand to acknowledge the benefits of individually tailored voluntary 
 approaches, and then to try to fit these to an externally imposed reporting 
                                                 
248 Greenwood (2002: 130) 
249 Greenwood (2002): 132; Cowles (1995) 
250 Potoski and Prakash (2009) 
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 standard. Companies need the freedom to focus on the issues and areas of most 
 relevance to their operations,  and to determine an appropriate approach 
 according to their circumstances (including culture, stakeholder relations, 
 etc.). A voluntary, company-developed approach is more likely to engender 
 management support and motivation, and to become an intrinsic part of 
 corporate behaviour throughout the organization ….. The ERT strongly rejects 
 the proposal in the Green Paper to standardise verification of performance and 
 reports (ERT 2001: 2, 5) 
 
ERT members may be world-leaders of CR at the level of their own companies. But 
their stance on the question of CR’s institutional framework is no different than 
UNICE’s.  
Small- and medium sized businesses comprise the majority of firms and 
employment across Europe. UEAPME, the European association for small and 
medium sized enterprises, claims to represent more than twelve million enterprises, 
employing over fifty-five million people across Europe.251 Luc Hendrixx is 
responsible for CR at Ueapme. Hendrixx confirms the large-firm bias of Corporate 
Responsibility politics. CR is not especially salient to small-and medium-sized 
enterprises, and these companies are not at the forefront of European CR policy. 
Hendrixx remarks: 
   
 The concept CSR comes from Anglo-Saxon countries. There the definition is  
 everything that goes beyond legal obligations. One of our main remarks is that 
obeying the law is responsible. Especially for SMEs there are so many 
obligations try to stick to the legislation is hard. In the US there is less social 
protection there is more room for maneuver to show socially responsible things 
(interview, 2007) 
 
Notwithstanding UEAPME members in certain EU member states who favor CR  
certification schemes, small and medium-sized enterprises are averse to the hard- or 
binding regulation of CR. Regulatory standards are hard to conform to as it is; CR 
would only add to this burden. Interestingly, according to unconfirmed reports, the 
                                                 
251 www.ueapme.com, accessed in march 2010. 
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European Commission took the initiative to have UEAPME join the European 
Alliance for CSR, presumably to increase this initiative’s legitimacy.   
 CSR Europe’s role in recent European CR politics has been ambivalent. On 
one hand, CSR Europe has been in the thick of European interest group politics. Many 
of the association’s member companies are weighty actors in EU-level lobbying 
initiatives and in industry lobby organizations including the European Roundtable and 
UNICE. Their lobbying is shrewd and strategic. Like other membership based CR 
associations, CSR Europe is structurally dependent on its membership. Thus, one 
would think that pragmatic legitimacy or strategic bargaining would be an important 
element of CSR Europe’s activities – and it is. The market liberal European Alliance 
for CSR was not issued against the protests of CSR Europe. It was jointly issued by 
CSR Europe, the European Commission and other business associations; and 
apparently, representatives from CSR Europe were party to the negotiations leading up 
to the Alliance. CR is a quid-pro-quo for business-friendly policy, as Pierre Echard of 
CSR Europe put it to me: “The European Commission is committed to creating a more 
business friendly environment for companies as long as these companies demonstrate 
CSR” (Echard, interview, 2006).  Resistance to market liberalism looks different.   
 While this may seem to leave precious little space for ‘ideal interests’ and 
moral legitimacy, it is almost certain that the cause of responsible business in Europe 
would be less advanced if it wasn’t for the actions of CSR Europe. Thus, although 
norm-driven action or moral legitimacy is diminished at the EU-level because of the 
distance between representatives and pragmatic service delivery on the ground, CSR 
Europe is replete with idealists. This became clear in my discussion with staff. At one 
point, the question arose of the role of CSR Europe in the sharing and dissemination of 
best-practice examples of responsible business conduct. As a service provider, as the 
node through which firms learn the state of the art in CR, CSR Europe would seem to 
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have an interest in amplifying and strengthening its role and payoffs in this process. 
Yet Ben Davies of CSR Europe stated that “The organization [CSR Europe] exists to 
put itself out of business” through a wide, if not universal dissemination of CR 
(Davies, interview, 2007). Members of CSR Europe’s senior management do not shy 
away from veiled criticism of the European Alliance. When queried about the role of 
CSR Europe in advancing CR advocacy, Ann   Vandenhende, who has been with the 
organization since the start, reflects on the issue of CR advocacy. Since the launch of 
the Lisbon Agenda, the organization has turned towards service delivery and away 
from advocacy. If CSR Europe is to engage in advocacy again, Vandenhende remarks 
that “it would have to be a multi-stakeholder model” that explicitly incorporates 
stakeholders other than business (Vandenhende, interview, 2007). This contradicts the 
primacy of firms over other actors enshrined in the European Alliance for CSR.  
My discussion would be incomplete without a brief discussion of the relationship 
between CSR Europe’s governance structures and “experimentalist gocernance.”  
 The Open Method of Coordination and other newfangled modes of EU 
governance rely on ‘soft law,’ “benchmarking, peer pressure and emulation of ‘best 
practices’” (Idema and Keleman, 2006: 109). And so does CR. Furthermore, the 
internal structures of the EU-level CRA CSR Europe resemble what Chuck Sabel and 
Jonathan Zeitlin call “experimentalist governance,” a decentralized, reflexive mode of 
governance: 
 
The possibility or scope for the emergence of experimentalist governance 
appear  to be twofold. The first is strategic uncertainty. Under strategic 
uncertainty actors by definition have to learn what their goals should be, and 
while learning how to achieve them. This learning necessarily involves 
cooperation, since any actor able to fix a strategy independently would do so, 
and not be in a state of strategic uncertainty. The second and closely related 
condition is a multipolar or polyarchic distribution of power, in which no 
single actor has the capacity to impose her own preferred solution without 
taking into account the views of others. If any actor could impose the full costs 
of her mistakes on the others, ignorance would be costless, and there would be 
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no need to learn, or indeed to fret about strategy at all (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2010: 
9)  
Lucio Baccaro and Konstantinos Papadakis summarize experimentalist governance as 
entailing:  
 
the devolution of decision-making prerogatives to lower-level units, recursive 
framework goalsetting by upper-level units, lower-level engagement in 
decentralized problem solving and public justification of discretionary choices 
in light of the experience of similarly situated peers (Baccaro and 
Konstantinos, 2009: 249)  
  
In addition to its own corporate membership, CSR Europe maintains a network of 
National Partner Organizations (NPOs) – nationally based CRAs with their own 
national membership including Business in the Community, Econsense, and over 
twenty others. In addition to CSR Europe’s annual general assembly, CSR Europe has 
a Board of Directors, composed of member companies and NPOs. Like the member 
companies, NPOs pay annual membership fees, and three of them are elected to sit on 
the Board at any given time, along with nine companies. Composed of two different 
types of organizations – firms and associations – from across Europe, CSR Europe’s 
Board is diverse and heterogeneous. Consequently, the organization’s governance is 
less straightforward than it is for nationally-based elites and CRAs.  Innovative CSR 
Europe’s governance undoubtedly is, this chapter seeks to show that this 
experimentalist governance has definite limitations. In short, as I will discuss in 
greater detail below, for all the innovativeness of the experimentalist trees, we should 
not lose sight of the market-liberal forest.252 
 When it comes to EU-level CR politics, the European demos has to be 
reckoned with. The European Parliament – and one European Parliamentarian in 
particular, UK MEP Richard Howitt – have given an important impetus to European 
                                                 
252 Lucio Baccaro and Konstantinos Papadakis similarly point out that “coordination through 
deliberation is unlikely to occur in formal settings, where discourses are mostly about the 
accommodation of existing interests” (Lucio Baccaro and Konstantinos Papadakis, 2009: 245).  
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CR politics. More recently, EU-level civil society organizations have joined the 
debate. But contrary to popular perceptions, neither democratic nor social movement 
pressure were the proximate causes of the establishment and initiation of CR at the 
European level. No elected politician has had a greater influence on EU-level politics 
than Howitt, British Labor MEP for the East of England since 1994. Howitt was the 
European Parliament’s rapporteur on corporate responsibility in 1999, 2002, and 2007. 
On the question of business’s aversion to regulation, Howitt stresses that some firms 
are sympathetic to regulating CR: “In my experience many people in the business 
community share that view and are relaxed about appropriate regulation and even 
people who feel that it is in their interest.”  The French retailer Carrefour is one of 
those “who feel it’s [regulation’s] preventing other companies from saving costs by 
acting irresponsibly.” However, Howitt views business organizations as 
“obstructionist”:  
 
 However those two examples are very few examples of corporations that are 
 willing to go on the record saying this publicly. Companies are extremely 
 concerned about inappropriate regulation (so they’re willing to say it privately) 
 so we spend most time talking about what we don’t want to do rather than what 
 we do want to do … Trade associations and employers associations are 
 excessively obstructive of this agenda. There is a law: the further from the 
 company you go the more negative the company representation goes (Howitt, 
 interview, 2007) 
 
As noted above, the European Alliance appears to have been the outcome of heavy  
lobbying by business interest organizations: “the commission has been so pressed by 
the associations business Europe being a key one.” Howitt has sought to de-polarize 
the debate between constituents favoring and opposing regulation on CR, as well as 
trying “to get companies to call their associations to account” (Howitt, interview, 
2007). Strictly speaking, Howitt is right: the outcome is what matters, not whether it 
was attained through hard or soft law. Yet if employer representatives are 
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dogmatically opposed to regulation, such a balanced, mixed approach will not be 
possible. So far, Howitt’s attempts have been unsuccessful. The Commission’s 
position is summarized by the following quote by Commissioners Günter Verheugen 
and Vladimir Spidla: “The Commission’s basic position has been and remains that CR 
per se should not be regulated at the EU level” (JP/ls – A-2308/D(2007)948: 2). 
Underlying this policy are not only strategic and instrumental interests but normative 
beliefs: when I queried about the regulation of Corporate Responsibility, he 
responded, asking “how it is possible to regulate something that is voluntary? How 
should this be possible?” (Verheugen, personal communication, June 17, 2010).     
     The EU-level NGO organization European Coalition for Corporate Justice (or 
ECCJ) was formed in the aftermath of the EU Multistakeholder Forum, in 2005. The 
Dutch coalition MVO platform played a leading role in its establishment. The DG 
Employment and Social Affairs approved an application for funding made by the 
NGO coalition following an earlier, unsuccessful application for Commission funding. 
While the success of the ECCJ’s application surely bears some relationship to the 
merits of its application, other considerations may be involved. NGOs and civil 
society organizations may be necessary to legitimate the European CR process. A 
contrasting perspective views DG V’s funding for the ECCJ as a form of protest, a 
way for DG V and Dominique Bé to counterbalance the European Alliance for CSR – 
it was clear from the outset that that ECCJ’s push for a regulatory framework on CR 
would not fit well with the Commission’s new agenda.   
  European Trade Unions have had their difficulties with CR.253 They 
approached the topic wearily, fearing hat it could be used to weaken or undermine 
workers’ rights and social protections. As one anomymous EU official put it,  
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In the early days trade unions said what you are doing is dangerous. We are 
opening pandora’s boxes. They wanted to keep legislation and social dialogue. 
This alternative road would weaken those instruments …. Up to the year 2000 
the stakeholders of companies were trade unions trade unions were afraid they 
would lose their exclusivity with companies that’s why first they did not want 
to hear about CSR quickly they realized they could not deny it they started to 
participate  
The ETUC’s position can be situated in between the Commission and the NGOs. The  
Commission insists that CR must be voluntary; NGOs insist that CR must be 
mandated. In this respect, the ECCJ sides with the Commission. However, this 
voluntary activity must take place against the background of inviolable collective 
bargaining and workers’ rights. The European Alliance for CSR precipitated conflict. 
In the view of Rainer Hoffmann, then Deputy General Secretary of the ETUC, the 
Commission was endorsing firms’ unilateral leadership over CR. Rather than 
legitimating companies in this manner, the Commission should “stay away” from the 
issue and relinquish its competence over this area. In the leadership up to the Alliance, 
Hoffmann recalls that the Commission had intended to make an announcement in 
support of the Alliance that included some firms with explicitly anti-union 
orientations. After Hoffmann threatening that he would publicize that the Commission 
is making CR policy against unions, they backed down (Hoffmann, interview, 2007).  
The European Alliance suggests that the EU’s claims to advance an agenda of 
managed globalization must be interpreted with caution. Over time, Corporate 
Responsibility has been subject to declining, rather than constant or increasing levels 
of management. EU CR has been successively liberalized or de-managed. In the eyes 
of some NGO activists, the European Alliance does not seem far from Europe’s 
neoliberal project’s attempt “to insulate markets from political interference by 
combining European-wide market integration with minimal [political] integration” 
(Lisbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, 1999: 75). The European Alliance leads many 
authors to pessimistic conclusions. For Jaan Wouters and his co-authors, “few of the 
  
 
255
  
European Commission’s and Parliament’s early ambitions remain, and no progress has 
been achieved in the establishment of a regulatory framework” (Wouters and Chanet, 
2008: 278). “The EU CSR policy seems conditioned by a concern not to alienate 
business, member states or developing countries, and this has debilitating 
consequences on its effectiveness …. CSR is regarded by the Commission as a 
fundamentally business-driven voluntary movement, enforced by the market in certain 
circumstances” (Wouters and Hachez, 2009: 113). Richard Hyman critically remarks 
that “what Soros (1998) has called ‘market fundamentalism’ and Dore (2003) the 
‘market mindset’ has become part of a growing  
consensus at the heart of EU governance (Hyman, 2006: 244). Hyman draws attention 
to a “familiar” discrepancy, if not an inverse relationship, between the popular 
legitimacy of EU institutions supporting a re-embedding of the economy, and the 
political power of these institutions. The European Parliament, “the most reliable 
supporter of an effective social dimension to European integration, is also the most 
limited in its powers.” The Commission “is at best an ambiguous supporter of the 
European social model(s).” And within the Commission itself, the DG Employment 
and Social Affairs “is subordinate to that of the many Directorates-General with a 
primarily market-making mission” (Hyman, 2006: 246).   
 
VII. The Politics of CR Association Membership at the EU-Level 
 
What companies join the EU-level CR association EBNSC / CSR Europe, a 
membership that comes with a 17,500€ annual price tag, and why do they do so? This 
section disaggregates the membership of the EBNSC / CSR Europe and explains its 
composition. Are country-of-origin effects of any relevance in international CR 
initiatives? Do firms from certain countries join more than others? If so, why? It is not 
obvious that nationality should matter when it comes to political activity at the EU-
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level. In their investigation of EU-level corporate lobbying, Patrick Bernhagen and 
Neil J. Mitchell find that “a modified profit-seeking model of corporate political 
behaviour is generalizable to corporate lobbying in Brussels … theories emphasizing 
nationally distinct types of interest intermediation find little support in the data” 
(Bernhagen and Mitchell, 2009: 155).  
 I argue that firms’ propensity to engage in CR at the European level is 
determined not only by a company’s size, sector, and market niche, but also by its 
national origins. While I do not challenge the “profit-seeking model,” I do seek to 
establish that national origin does matter for participation in EU-level CR. I first 
discuss the relationship between lobbying and CR before proceeding to a breakdown 
of CSR Europe’s membership.  
 Some motivations for joining apply equally for all members, and other reasons 
apply selectively to some members and not others. I will begin with those that apply to 
all.  It is well established that CR involves reputation risk management. CR is thought 
to help protect corporate reputations. Since CSR Europe is one of the leading CR 
associations, companies with valuable brands, reputations and large consumer markets 
may be inclined to join CSR Europe in order to improve their own practice and benefit 
from the association with a well-regarded institution. This is commonly known as the 
“business case” for CR. Another dimension of pragmatic legitimacy is also relevant.  
Because of its closeness to the European Commission, the EBNSC / CSR Europe is 
useful for firms with particular lobbying objectives, and for those seeking favours 
from the Commission. This raises the question of the relationship between firms’ 
lobbying and CR activities. Are firms with a significant EU lobbying presence active 
in EU-level CR?  Figure 4.3 derived from Daniel Cohen (2009), shows the breakdown 
of public affairs offices in Brussels in 2003.    
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Firms with public affairs offices at the EU Level 
in 2003
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Figure 4.3: The National Origins of Corporate Lobbyists in Brussels 
Source: Coen, 2009: 155 
 
It turns out that there is a high correlation (0.78) between countries’ contingent of 
members in CSR Europe and their proportion of public affairs offices at the EU-level 
in 2003. American, French, and British firms have the highest proportion of public 
affairs offices, and they also have large membership contingents in CSR Europe.  This 
correlation suggests that CR is part of the corporate lobbying arsenal not only at the 
associational level (of businesseurope, for instance), but at the level of individual 
firms as well. CR’s contribution to firms’ lobbying is an indispensable part of 
‘pragmatic legitimacy.’ Firms with significant EU-level activities at the EU have an 
interest in engaging in CR because of the reputational benefits it provides. Given that 
“a firm’s effectiveness in influencing policy directly continues to be determined by its 
ability to establish a positive reputation in the European political process” (Coen, 
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1997: 100), and CR’s positive reputational benefits, the relevance of the EBNSC / 
CSR Europe is obvious. Even if CR itself, being ‘soft’ and voluntary, differs from 
‘hard’ lobbying over EU Directives, it can be a means to these ends. The above quote, 
which suggests that CR is a quid-pro-quo for a business-friendly institutional 
environment, speaks to this point.  
 Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show the membership composition of the EBNSC / CSR 
Europe from 1996 until 2007, with companies coded according to their home country / 
country of origin.254  Figure 4.4 shows the membership breakdown according to 
percentage of the total. The EBNSC / CSR Europe has members from over sixteen 
countries. Figure 4.4 shows absolute membership numbers of firms from five large 
countries. In order from greatest to least, these countries are: the United States, France, 
Italy, the UK, and Germany.    
 
EBNSC / CSR Europe's Corporate Membership Broken Down 
By Percentage of Total and Country of Origin, 1996-2007
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Figure 4.4: CSR Europe’s Membership By Country of Origin 
                                                 
254 Establishing a company’s home country is easier in some cases than in others. It is easiest for 
companies with clear national headquarters. It is difficult for companies with dual nationality, such as 
Shell or Unilever; and it is nearly impossible for limited liability partnerships and consultancies, such as 
KPMG, PriceWaterHouseCoopers, and Deloitte. For this reason, I have created a separate, non-national 
category for the big four auditors.   
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 Figure 4.5: Membership of Firms from Large Countries in CSR Europe  
When it comes to the membership of specific national contingents in the organization, 
no shortage of idiosyncratic, nationally specific explanations suggest themselves. In 
the case of France, the fact that the initial impetus came from a 1991 Manifeste 
Français des Entreprises contre l’Exclusion, which preceded the European Declaration 
of Business Against Social Exclusion, as well as from a French president of the 
Commission (Jacques Delors), is surely significant. CR in general, and the EBNSC 
specifically, was seen as a French project. In the case of American companies, other 
factors spring to mind (these are discussed in detail in chapter 7). The United States 
has a large number of large MNCs; engagement in CR is positively associated with 
firm size. The liability of foreignness is an identity variable that may be especially 
relevant for American corporations, given the widespread negative sentiment towards 
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the United States and American capitalism in Europe.255  Corporate Responsibility in 
general, and CSR Europe specifically, can help these firms to overcome the liability of 
foreignness by legitimating them in the public eye and vis-à-vis EU policymakers. 
Engagement in the EBNSC/CSR Europe is one way for American companies to show 
that they are European. An American MNC that joins CSR Europe is less likely to be 
perceived as foreign, and subjected to negative stereotyping, than one that doesn’t.   
 The above points suggest (partial) explanations for firms’ engagement in EU-
level CR, but they are not very useful when it comes to firms’ lack of engagement. 
German companies’ initially large, then rapidly decreasing membership in charts 4.4 
and 4.5 is conspicuous. German firms’ membership in 1997 was five firms or 
approximately 22% of the total – more than any other country at the time. By the year 
2000, Germany only had one firm in membership, less than 3% of that year’s total. In 
the pages below, I tell how this came to be. CR is ambiguous, amorphous and plastic; 
firms’ perception of their interests within their national institutional environment has 
shaped how they understand and approach CR in the European arena.   
   German firms and business associations have been consistent and 
unwavering supporters of the European Union and of European economic integration. 
When one comes to Corporate Responsibility at the EU level, however, the picture 
changes. According to some scholars (Antal, Oppen and Sobczak, 2007: 6) and 
according to measurable indicators, the level of engagement is low; as in the domestic 
realm, the orientation of German firms towards CR has been ambivalent, puzzling 
even some observers in Germany.256 This section discusses German firms’ stance in 
the EBNSC and briefly touches on the consultation process for the international 
responsibility standard ISO 26 000. The argument is that the stance of German 
                                                 
255 Katzenstein and Keohane (2007) 
256 see for example Aktion Gemeinsinn (2001: 16) 
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business in the European and international realm “can be understood only if domestic 
factors are systematically included in the analysis,” as Peter Katzenstein has argued 
(Katzenstein, 1976: 1).   
My focus is on the relations between EBNSC and German business 
representatives as well as on the German membership in the EBNSC over time. I 
maintain that this indicator is a useful proxy for companies’ engagement in CR at the 
European level. When surveying German involvement in CSR Europe and the EBNSC 
since the mid-1990s, one confronts a puzzle.  German companies initially joined in 
substantial numbers in the mid-1990s, before leaving just as suddenly a few years 
later. The number of German companies as a proportion of total membership has been 
low over the years, at the level of small European countries and far below the level of 
the US, France, and the UK. However, this was not always the case: the proportion of 
German companies increased to 22% of total membership in 1997 when it included 
Siemens, Daimler-Benz, VW, Bayer, RWE. The very fact that German firms joined 
the EBNSC in large numbers is interesting. While the EBNSC’s focus included 
vocational training, on the whole, its focus on social compensation seems at odds with 
traditional elements of the German model, such as social partnership and the welfare 
state. Germany’s share of membership declined to 2-3% after all firms except VW left 
membership by the end of 1999. This is the most precipitous decline of any national 
contingent of firms since the establishment of the EBNSC. What led the German 
companies to withdraw en masse from the network?  
 German firms’ disengagement from the EBNSC during the 1990s contrasts 
with the proactive engagement of LME firms at the EU level and of firms more 
generally in LME environments. German firms disengaged from the EBNSC because 
the organization’s activities did not make sense to them from the perspective of 
Germany’s domestic political-economic institutions. Renate Hornung-Draus, who was 
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director of social affairs at UNICE (now: Business Europe) at the time, remarks that 
“German firms felt very uncomfortable” in the network (Hornung-Draus, interview, 
2008). Regine Mathijesen, who represented Philips in the organization and was one of 
the key actors on the industry side during the 1990s, recalls that the departure of the 
German firms from the network “was a political decision” (interview, June 23, 2008).  
 The German firms had endorsed the 1995 European Declaration of Business 
against Exclusion and its agenda to promote employment-related social cohesion. 
However, differences between the German and Anglo-American firms soon became 
apparent in the network’s meetings. Meinhard Stindt, who represented Bayer and 
played an important role among the German members, recalls: “when collecting and 
comparing examples [of responsible corporate conduct] we had an uneasy feeling.” 
The increasing commercialization and marketization of CR-related activities led Stindt 
to believe they were “a show with little substance” (Stindt, interview, April 28, 2008). 
Mathijesen shares this perception of the perils of “commercial opportunism” 
(Mathijesen, interview, 2008).   
 From the perspective of German business representatives, the expansion and 
broadening of EBNSC’s agenda during the 1990s was perceived to be a problem. The 
organization was seen as going too far. Unlike French companies, which increased 
their membership in the EBNSC over these years, German companies suspected that 
the EBNSC might have a hidden regulatory agenda – after all, they were being funded 
by DG Employment and Social Affairs. According to Mathijesen, “DG Employment 
and Social Affairs wanted to be in charge.” Yet “companies have to have their 
freedom” to determine their engagement according to their own needs and capabilities 
(Mathijesen, interview, 2008).     
 Join they did, but German firms’ ambivalence became unmistakable. A 
member of the staff of the EU Commission recalls: “the most negative companies vis-
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à-vis CSR have been in Germany.” What explains this disposition? The same official 
continues: “‘we already have so much, we do not want another layer,’ whereas UK 
companies did not think that they would loose in the process” (interview, 2006). Alan 
Christie had the sense that “German companies were puzzled” by the organization’s 
activities (Christie, interview, 2006). By the end of the 1990s, the EBNSC was felt to 
be impinging on the jurisdiction and authority of powerful European industry 
organizations such as UNICE, in which German business associations were weighty 
players. For Ann Vandenhende, senior director of CSR Europe,  
 
Their [German companies'] role in the EBNSC was not compatible with the 
role they were playing in these organizations ….  When it came to expanding 
the agenda [to CSR] there was a perception that this is not something that 
companies should be dealing with. It wasn't perceived from a German 
perspective that this is something business should deal with (Vandenhende, 
interview, 2007)  
These tensions erupted in an open clash between Etienne Davignon, who was chairing  
the EBNSC, and the chairman of UNICE. It culminated in the withdrawal of the 
German companies (except Volkswagen) from the network. It is not clear to what 
extent this withdrawal was the result of indifference, the failure to sustain interest, or 
of programmatic differences. Mathijesen gives the following justification for the 
German firms’ departure: 
 
 what is coming on the table now is an American hype which we don’t wish to 
follow because in Europe we have social legislation which regulates these 
questions to the great satisfaction of our employees. This is not the case in the 
United States. We tried to make it clear that here in Europe, we have the 
welfare state (interview, June 23, 2008)257  
 
                                                 
257 Given that different actors stress different reasons for German firms’ leaving this network, an 
additional factor should not be left out: from its founding until the end of the 1990s, no membership 
fees were charged by the European Business Network for Social Cohesion. This changed when the 
organization was re-named CSR Europe in 2000, and the membership fees may have been an additional 
impetus for the German companies to leave the network, though it is hard to imagine that they were the 
primary motivation.   
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Similarly, in the the mid-1990s, the chairman of Siemens Heinrich von Pierer 
remarked that: “We can't deny that we have a different culture, a different history, a 
very different social environment. We have co-determination and, of course, we have 
a social market economy' Von Pierer” (FT. i6. 2.1996:16) (Coen, 1998: 92). Business 
as patriots of the welfare state and the European social model? This view is in tension 
with market-liberal CR, or so it would seem.  At the same time as German companies 
were adopting market-liberal positions on corporate governance (such as shareholder 
value orientation), they  viewed CR not as a correlate and complement to market-
liberalism, but rather as a burdensome package of expansive social obligations. The 
departure of Bayer, RWE, Siemens and Daimler-Benz from the network was followed 
by attempts to recruit others, which failed until BASF came on board in 2004 (SAP 
joined in 2008). The logo of one German company, Deutsche Telekom, was printed on 
the back of the May and September 2001 editions of CSR Europe Magazine which 
lists the network’s supporters. Evidently, the company had expressed interest in 
joining. But Deutsche Telekom did not in fact become a member of the network and 
the company’s logo disappeared from subsequent editions of the magazine. Ann 
Vandenhende, a senior manager of CSR Europe, remarks that this example of a 
company nearly joining and then withdrawing is singular in the history of the 
organization (personal communication, June 18, 2007). And what are we to make of 
Volkswagen, the one German company that remained in membership from 1997 
onwards? Unlike the other German joiners, Volkswagen is not a member of the BDA, 
the Federation of German Employers’ Associations. This suggests that the employers’ 
association may have played a role in these companies’ decision to leave.    
 Lest one thinks that above example of the EBNSC / CSR Europe is 
unrepresentative of German firms’ stance regarding Corporate Responsibility in the 
international arena, one can look to other membership-driven Corporate Responsibility 
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organizations – such as Business in the Community and the International Business 
Leaders Forum, discussed in the previous chapter – for data. It is no secret that large 
German firms had offices and representations in many countries, including in the UK, 
during the 1980s and 1990s. And in fact, looking at membership lists of BITC and the 
IBLF over these years, one can find the odd German company in membership – there 
was evidently interest in what these organizations were doing. The striking thing, 
however, is that these firms vanished from the lists soon after joining. My sense from 
interviewing some relevant representatives is that they the managers / entrepreneurs in 
question either could not figure out what these organizations were about, or decided 
that they weren’t for them.     
German businesses’ ambivalent relationship to CR is not restricted to the 
IBLF, BITC, or CSR Europe. It can also be seen in the negotiations over the new 
global standard for responsibility in organizations devised by the International 
Standards Organization: ISO 26 000. According to Udo Pretschker, who directs CR 
activities in the German Ministry for Employment and Social Affairs, German 
industrialists and employers had threatened to boycott the ongoing ISO 26 000 
negotiations in their early stages: “in other countries it [employers stance] is not so 
drastic and dramatic. German employers federations had considered leaving the 
process altogether. Fears that are seen as grave by the Germans are not seen to be as 
serious by other participants” (interview, 2007). Sebastiano Toffaletti, Standardization 
product manager at NORMAPME, explains that the German system is “traditionally 
and culturally” against certification:   
 
The Anglo-Saxon idea of certification ex post is not very accepted in the 
Germanic world. ISO certification is an Anglo-System: you certify ex post that 
a company is capable of doing something whereas they have a system which is 
ex ante. Germany and Germanic countries are typically against these things 
(interview, July 7, 2008)  
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Bernard Schwager, Responsible for Corporate Responsibility at Bosch, 
remarks on ISO 26000 from a German perspective: “Now a different language area 
has moved itself forward and is starting to make comparisons … This set of problems 
is hitting us like a train because we have a different framework paradigm” (interview, 
2007). While a majority of participants voted in favour of ISO 26 000 in 2009/2010, 
the German industry delegation abstained.  
What explains German businesses’ reticence to engage in the European and 
international CR arenas? In this section I have argued that this behaviour relates to 
German businesses’ perception of their interests in their domestic regulatory 
environment. Germany’s domestic institutional framework appears to have a 
systematic impact on German companies’ CR stance in the international arena. This 
implies that changes in Germany’s political-economic framework and in particular 
trends towards the liberal market will have an impact on Germany’s stance in the 
European and international CR arenas. If this account is correct, it is ironic that 
German companies have now come to clothe themselves in the mantle of CR. As 
Richard Marriott, non-executive director of Siemens UK remarked, “They’ve only just 
joined Business in the Community it wasn’t a German thing to do. Putting it right up 
there as a stakeholder approach is very new I don’t think it was there before but I 
could be doing them a disservice” (Marriott, interview, 2007). Stakeholderism has 
arrived in Germany, in the aftermath of organized capitalism and the emasculation of 
its traditional stakeholders! 
Although political-economic or institutional explanations work well in the 
German case, a glance at the UK data in figures 4.4 and 4.5 exposes their limitations. 
The radically liberalized and dynamic CR environment would lead us to suppose that 
UK firms would be among the best-represented contingents in CSR Europe’s 
membership. But in fact, the UK is only in third place, far behind the US and France, 
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and roughly on par with Italy. This suggests that political-economic and institutional 
explanations, though necessary, are not sufficient. Without further data, it is 
impossible to know whether British Euro-sceptic attitudes258 is at play, whether UK 
firms believe that their reputation among EU authorities is strong enough without 
membership in CSR Europe.     
 
VII. The Political Economy of the EU 
 
The rise of Corporate Responsibility in Brussels relates to broader trends and 
debates in the political economy of the EU. Thus, it is fruitful to place CR in the 
broader context of EU political economy scholarship and policymaking. A vigorous 
debate has developed over the relationship between market-making and social-
embedding at the EU-level. This section situates my argument within these debates. 
The claim advanced is that there are some strong parallels between certain trends in 
EU social policy and the aforementioned rise of EU CR.  
Is Polanyi in Brussels – or Hayek? In what guise do they appear?259 Is 
European law being Americanized, or not? EU political economy debates are divided 
between those who see Polanyi in Brussels, and those who think that he is a mere 
specter among Brussels elites; between those who see evidence of the Americanization 
of European law, and those who think this evidence is over-rated. With reference to 
Karl Polanyi and John Gerard Ruggie, James Caporaso and Sidney Tarrow claim that 
through its recent rulings, the European Court of Justice has contributed towards 
“building a tissue of embedded liberalism” (Caporaso and Tarrow, 2009: 615) and 
extending social rights at the EU-level by giving non-nationals access to national 
social transfers. Martin Höpner and Armin Schäfer charge that Caporaso and Tarrow’s 
                                                 
258 See Foster (2002) and Foster (2007) 
259 See Caporaso and Tarrow (2009), whose article bears this title; and Höpner and Schäfer’s forceful 
and impassioned rebuttal.   
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empirical evidence is “selective, and the main effect of European integration is still 
overwhelmingly to set markets free rather than to constrain them. Caporaso and Tarrow 
are waiting for Polanyi while the setting is Hayekian”260 A similar debate has arisen 
between R. Daniel Kelemen and Eric C. Sibbitt on one hand, and Robert Kagen on the 
other over the Americanization of European law.   
     Kelemen and Sibbitt argue that “economic liberalization and political 
fragmentation have undermined traditional approaches to regulation and have 
generated functional pressures and political initiatives toward American legal style” 
(Kelemen and Sibbitt, 2004: 103). Robert Kagan thinks this claim is over-stated. 
According to Kagan,  
 
  Law and legal practice in Europe may well come closer to resembling 
 American styles of contracting, corporate financial regulation, and controls on 
 private pension funds – partly because they are well adapted to a competitive, 
 privatised economy. Yet due to national traditions of ‘bureaucratic legalism’ 
 and parliamentary government, increases in law, litigation, and judicialisation 
 in Western Europe do not imply comparable increases in American-style 
 adversatial legalism. In substantive law, any drift towards American-style neo-
 liberal labour, social welfare law, and tax law traditions is likely to be limited 
 by the broad political interests entrenched by years of solid welfare state and 
 worker protective policies (Kagan, 2008: 28-29). 
 
While I lack the expertise to comment on the nuances of European jurisprudence, I 
believe that there is much evidence to support the claim that there is a fundamental 
asymmetry between market-making and social compensation in Brussels and, by 
                                                 
260 Höpner and Schäfer’s more elaborated argument is that Caporaso and Tarrow’s “empirical focus is  
extremely narrow, as they exclusively focus on individual social rights that the ECJ grants to labor 
migrants  
and their families. Investigation of other lines of ECJ case law, such as the one on tax competition, on 
the  
right to strike, or on the member states’ right to impose labor standards on posted workers would have 
led  
to quite different conclusions about the very same research question. Therefore, a well-balanced 
evaluation of the market-embedding or disembedding effects of European integration 
 has to rely on a much broader empirical base” (Höpner and Schäfer, 2010: 24). 
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extension, across Europe. Moreover, the rise of CR itself parallels the rise of the 
market across the EU.  
Armin Schäfer and Simone Leiber observe that during “the period from 
Maastricht to the end of the 1990s, we observe a heyday of social dialogue and social 
policy directives.” Since the end of the 1990s, by contrast, we have seen “the turn to 
non-binding coordination in employment and social policy.” The most recent period 
has been characterized by “the turn to non-binding coordination also in the realm of 
social dialogue” that the authors term “double voluntarism” (Schäfer and Leiber, 
2009: 4). The initial, social-liberal phase of EU CR corresponds to the “heyday of 
social dialogue and social policy directives.” The turn to non-binding coordination and 
double voluntarism coincide with the rise of market-liberal CR. The purpose of this 
section is to shed some light on this political-economic context. I begin by describing 
this dynamic and conclude by discussing how these developments relate to the rise of 
EU-level CR. 
For our purposes, the most important dynamic of the European political 
economy takes place between the EU – in particular, the European Commission and 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) – and its member states. Many scholars have 
identified a fundamental asymmetry in European integration between market-making 
and social protection/compensation: the former agenda is promoted aggressively by 
EU institutions, and it is much stronger and more dynamic than the latter agenda, 
which remains under the purview of EU member states. Georg Menz observes that 
“market liberalization proceeds in great strides and at a jet-like pace” whereas “social 
and labor market policy follows at a horse-and-buggy pace” (Menz, 2005: 198). For 
Maurizio Bach, European integration has entailed “market integration without social 
integration,” a universalization of market relations, competition, and rights of free 
movement – which leads to the erosion of existing levels of social integration within 
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European states (Bach, 2008: 19). Analysts agree that this asymmetry is embedded in 
the political economy of the EU.261 They disagree over its institutional locus, and over 
whether it is structural or political.  
 Wolfgang Streeck and Fritz Scharpf have forcefully articulated the structural 
view. In 1995, Wolfgang Streeck argued that EU social policy was characterized by 
“neo-voluntarism.” The EU is fundamentally unlike national welfare states, as it is 
“confined by its dependence on the voluntarism of both sovereignty-conscious 
Member States and interest-conscious private market participants.” However, the 
absence of a supranational welfare state “does not, however, mean that integration 
leaves the latter unaffected” (Streeck, 1995: 58). Competitive pressures exert 
downward pressures on national social policy regimes, leading them to be 
“fundamentally transformed” by the pressures unleashed by European integration 
(Streeck, 1995: 58). The following excerpt by Claus Offe nicely captures the transition 
from “markets in states” to “states in markets”:    
 
 what used to be, within the framework of welfare states as relatively self-
 contained nation-states, exogenously established and enforced social policy 
 institutions is now endogenized into the game itself: status, security, and 
 solidarity does itself become contingent upon contractual voluntarism. 
 Accordingly, the game is no longer a game under rules, but increasingly one 
 about rules. The national welfare state can no longer constrain the market and 
 impose a regime of decommodification upon the market. To the contrary, now 
 it is being left to the market to decide which arrangements are in fact 
 affordable and employment- enhancing, and which ones must be dropped as a 
 competitive liability (Offe, 2003: 463)  
 
The competitive dynamic unleashed by European integration have “substantially 
contributed to the dissolution of class-corporatist structures” as well as the weakening 
of unions in member-states, according to Armin Schäfer and Wolfgang Streeck 
(Schäfer and Streeck, 2008: 204).  
                                                 
261 Holman (2004) 
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 While the structures of institutionalized social solidarity are weakened or 
dismantled at the national level, this does not mean that they are constructed or 
uploaded to the European level (Schäfer and Streeck, 2008: 233). As Giandomenico 
Majone remarks, “the available evidence … in no way suggests widespread support 
for delegating to Brussels relevant competencies in the social field” (Majone, 2009: 
1290. Compared with the dynamism and vigor of market integration via the Single 
Market and EMU, “efforts to promote employment and social policy at the level of the 
European Community have come . . . late and seem feeble” (Scharpf 1999: 2). 
European politics is most effective when it comes to negative integration, and is 
“weakest in areas where existing market-correcting regulations at the national level 
have come under pressure through competition.” European integration has thus 
reduced the options of politics at the national level without uploading them to the 
European level (Scharpf, 2008: 82). Scharpf stresses the “asymmetric” relationship 
that has resulted  
  
 as economic policies have become progressively Europeanized, while social-
 protection policies remained at the national level. As a consequence, national 
 welfare states are constitutionally constrained by the ‘supremacy’ of all 
 European rules of Economic liberalization and competition law. At the same 
 time they must operate under the fiscal rules of monetary union while their 
 revenue base is eroding as a consequence of tax competition and the 
 need to reduce non-wage labour costs (Scharpf, 2002: 665-666).  
  
In Scharpf’s view, attempts to Europeanize social policy “are politically constrained 
by the diversity of national welfare states, differing not only in levels of economic 
development and hence in their ability to pay for social transfers and services but, 
even more significantly, in their normative aspirations and institutional structures” 
(Scharpf, 2002: 666). EU consensus building has never been easy, and despite the rise 
of Qualified Majority voting, it is especially difficult in areas relating to member 
states’ national social policies.  
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 The aforementioned accounts can be summed up as follows: the primacy of 
negative integration corrodes EU member states’ institutionalized social solidarity. 
But these competitive, market-induced dynamics are not the end of the story. 
According to Martin Höpner and Armin Schäfer, European integration has recently 
moved into a ‘post-Ricardian’ phase. The above accounts cast doubt on whether 
comparative institutional advantage has ever sufficed to shore up institutionalized 
social solidarity. But even if it did in the past, it has recently come under threat due to 
the political activism of the European Commission and the European Court of Justice 
for market liberal ends:  
 
 In this third, ‘post-Ricardian’ phase, Commission initiatives no longer create a 
 level playing field among EU countries or simply strive for unhindered 
 competition between national welfare and production models ….. in order to 
 deepen European integration, the Court and the Commission apply the 
 principles of mutual recognition and of non-restriction to services, capital 
 markets and free establishment. They thereby directly affect member states’ 
 institutions and push them towards the Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism 
 (Höpner and Schäfer, 2010: 350, 362) 
 
Fritz W. Scharpf’s newest work supports Höpner and Schäfer’s findings. Scharpf finds 
that “A European SME [Social Market Economy] cannot come about, and SMEs at 
the national level will be destroyed, unless the politically uncontrolled dynamics of 
(negative) ‘integration through law’ can be contained” (Scharpf, 2010: 244). Given 
these gloomy assessments of the effect of European integration on institutionalized 
social solidarity, one can’t help but wonder what Abdelal and Meunier mean when 
they refer to the EU as advocating a course of “managed globalization.”  
 Höpner and Schäfer’s case material – the Services Directive, the Takeover 
Directive, and Company Law and the European Court of Justice – derive from recent 
years, and none from before 2002. Core elements of EU economic integration, such as 
the Single European Act and the Maastricht convergence criteria for EMU, came into 
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effect in the 1990s. There is thus a temporal coincidence between the EU’s 
intensification of liberalization and the rise of EU-level CR from the mid-1990s 
onward: the intensification of European integration coincides with the rise of CR, and 
the post-Ricardian phase of European integration coincides with the European 
Alliance for CSR.    
 As I have alluded to above, the rise of CR coincides temporally and 
substantively i.e. in terms of content with the EU’s turn towards soft modes of 
governance, such as the ‘Open Method of Coordination’ (OMC). As EU CR rose, the 
OMC came into being. The Open Method of Coordination is “an attempt to reach 
common European goals, without uniform, legally binding rules or targets, through 
cross-national benchmarking and exchange of experiences” (Heidenreich, 2009: 10).  
OMC instruments “do not use formal, typically legal, sanctions (that is, they are ‘soft’ 
rather than ‘hard’) – but involve codes of conduct, benchmarking and inter-state ‘co-
operation’ or ‘open co-ordination’ rather than the construction and enforcement of 
formally binding laws” (Wincott, 2003: 535). In the place of hard law, the OMC prizes 
“deliberation and power sharing with stakeholders,” coordination “while permitting 
diversity, and increased reliance on informal, flexible guidelines” (Scott and Trubek 
2001, cited in Idema and Keleman 2006). The affinities of CR and the OMC are as 
clear as can be. CR is by definition voluntary.262 Both the OMC and Corporate 
Responsibility are ‘soft.’ Both rely on peer-pressure, the exchange of best-practice, 
and naming and shaming, rather than on ‘hard law.’ Both are prototypical forms of 
market-liberal governance. Thus, the deficiencies Timo Idema and Daniel Kelemen 
                                                 
262 The relationship between voluntary ends and involuntary means is more complicated than it may 
appear at first sight. Indeed, there is no logical reason why involuntary means short of absolute coercion 
cannot be used to promote the uptake of voluntary practices. Transparency or disclosure requirements 
are a good example. These would not stipulate that firms engage in CR. Instead, they would require that 
firms disclose their engagement in CR.   
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attribute to the OMC are equally applicable to EU CR.263 The glass on EU CR is not 
empty, but it is also far from full.  
 
VIII. Conclusion: The Political Economy of CR at the EU-level 
 
EU Corporate Responsibility is unmistakably political. While it is 
commonplace to associate CR with firm-level objectives such as reputation or risk 
management, EU-level Corporate Responsibility has been associated with legitimating 
economic liberalization from its beginnings. Not unlike the co-evolution of CR and 
declining instututionalized social solidarity in Britain and Germany, there has been a 
co-evolution of liberalization and CR at the EU level. Both the European Commission 
and European business have used CR in their attempts to legitimate political projects. 
Under Jacques Delors, EU-level business was enlisted to tackle social exclusion, 
which was thought to constitute a political liability for economic integration. In this 
phase, EU CR had a social liberal coloration. Over time, this changed as EU CR has 
been converted from its initial social-liberal to an increasingly market-liberal 
orientation. CR has been wielded as a quid-pro-quo for market liberal policies: the 
Commission will ensure a more business-friendly economic environment provided 
that European businesses practice CR. This market-liberal conversion of EU CR is a 
reflection of the power and political potency of European business. Of course, the 
association of CR and market-liberalism does not imply an absence of interpretation, 
experimentation or contestation: the evolution of EU CR policy has seen plenty of 
this. These processes take place not only between business and or vis-à-vis other 
stakeholders (the conventional view), but within business itself. Thus, while this 
                                                 
263 According to Idema and Keleman, “the OMC and other flexible, informal ‘new’ modes of 
governance are unlikely to enhance the legitimacy of EU governance” (Idema and Kelemen, 2006: 
118). 
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chapter has used Germany as an example to underscore nationally and institutionally 
specific CR trajectories, none of this implies an absence of political contestation.  
 In conclusion, one is apt to speculate about the normative status of EU CR, as 
well as about paths not taken. The normative status of EU CR is ambiguous if not 
ambivalent. Taking account of externalities and taking action to constructively address 
social problems beyond the purview of innermost core business activities seems 
eminently preferable to not doing so. This chapter contains little evidence to support 
the claim that CR was indispensable for the Commission’s market-liberal aims. 
Interpretations according to which EU CR is a subtle and sinister attempt to undermine 
positive integration are problematic, as there is little evidence that EU CR has been 
decisive in undermining attempts at positive integration. If anything, the failure of 
positive integration is over-determined. Even though CR is far cry from a European 
welfare state, it is better than nothing. 
Nonetheless, EU CR is linked to a market-liberal agenda that corrodes or 
dissolves institutionalized social solidarity, institutions that one says are dear to many 
Europeans. In the words of Wade Jacoby and Sophie Meunier, “In the eyes of most 
European citizens, the EU owes its legitimacy partly to being able to protect them 
from the negative side-effects of globalization while shaping aggressively a 
globalization in Europe’s image” (Jacoby and Meunier, 2010: 367). According to this 
yardstick, the trajectory not only of EU CR, but of European integration more 
generally can be questioned. The challenge is significant:  
 
in order to maintain popular support for both the deepening of (“ever closer”) 
European integration and the widening of its scope (“Eastern Enlargement”), 
Europe must present itself to its citizens as a credible project of social security 
and protection, and certainly not as a  threat to established social status rights. 
At the very least, and after the EU is still evidently deficient (relative to the 
member state polities) in terms of its democratic legitimacy, pro-European 
consensus and identification among nonelites is likely to dwindle, 
strengthening the forces of populist re-nationalization, in case a loss is 
  
 
276
  
perceived to take place not just in terms of democratic legitimation, but also of 
social protection and security (Offe 2003: 457) 
 
In the aftermath of the failure of multiple referenda relating to the European 
Constitution, European integration and the EU itself faces an open legitimacy crisis.264 
Corporate Responsibility, as hitherto conceptualized and practiced at the EU-level, 
seems inadequate for restoring and re-instating the legitimacy of this  process and of 
the EU itself. Though arguably inadequate to address the functional and legitimacy 
deficit resulting from the asymmetry between the EU and national social policy, let 
alone creating a welfare state at the EU-level, one wonders whether integrative, 
institutionalized or coordinated Corporate Responsibility could go part way towards 
addressing this it. Moreover, institutionalized, integrative or coordinated CR would 
not necessarily constitute a genuine threat to employer interests. In order to secure the 
political legitimacy that is indispensable for the political viability of European 
integration, employers may once again have to make notable concessions, as they did 
in the post-war system of “embedded liberalism.”  
                                                 
      264 Van Apeldoorn (2009) 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Varieties of Capitalism, Institutionalized Solidarity, and the Spread 
of Corporate Responsibility across the OECD:  1982-2007 
 
I. Introduction 
Chapters 3 and 4 make the case that there is a parallelism or co-evolution of Corporate 
Responsibility and market liberalism in the U.K. and Germany. Chapter 5 argues that 
this argument extends to the EU-level. But how far does it reach, how generalizable is 
it? This chapter sets out to assess whether the tensional or inverse relationship between 
institutionalized social solidarity and CR holds across Europe and the OECD. I 
measure two principal dimensions of CR: timing and quantity. My explanatory 
variables are twofold: Varieties of Capitalism and Institutionalized Social Solidarity 
(ISS). Applied to Varieties of Capitalism, I hypothesise that market-liberal Varieties of 
Capitalism tend to get CR earlier, and get more of it, than Social Market / Coordinated 
Varieties. Applied to institutionalized social solidarity, I hypothesise that lower 
(absolute) levels as well as (relative) decreases of ISS will be related to increases of 
CR.  
This chapter is based on a new data set, compiled by the author, comprising 
twenty-five OECD countries from 1982-2007. Virtually all of the existing comparative 
CR literature is cross-sectional.265 Comparing the performance of different countries 
on particular CR measures is a plausible research strategy; but it is biased in its neglect 
of temporality and history. To get at this dimension of the institutionalization of CR 
over time in a number of countries, I use a novel proxy: business-led Corporate 
Responsibility Associations (CRAs). As noted in chapter 1, I argue that CRAs are 
barometers for the state of CR in the country in which they are located. The existence 
of a CRA, and the fact that firms are willing to join it, is evidence that the idea of CR 
                                                 
265 Apostolakou and Jackson (2009); Gjølberg (2009). 
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has ‘come of age’ in a given jurisdiction.266 I will be paying close attention to the 
varying establishment dates and membership levels of these associations.  
The explanatory variables encompass Varieties of Capitalism and various 
dimensions of institutionalized solidarity. We can make a first cut by using typologies 
from the comparative capitalism literature. LMEs will tend to have lower levels of 
institutionalized social solidarity than Coordinated- or Social-Market economies. As 
useful as these nominal categories are, they are static. Gradations of membership are 
not possible. A country is either an LME or a CME. These simple categorizations do 
not allow us to get at processes of liberalization or at the co-evolution of CR and ISS 
over time. Therefore, in a second step, I expand the explanatory variables to comprise 
other dimensions of institutionalized social solidarity, such as corporatism/the 
centralization of wage bargaining and statutory tax rates on capital. The results suggest 
a negative or inverse relationship between selected aspects of institutional 
‘embeddedness’ and the incidence of CR, measured both in terms of the presence of a 
CRA and its membership levels over time. Having charted the co-evolution of 
economic liberalization and market liberalism in chapters three and four, I test the 
following three hypotheses here:  
 
H2. Institutionalized social solidarity will be inversely related to CR: the higher the 
level of institutionalized social solidarity, the later the onset, and the lower the 
quantity of CR. The lower the level of institutionalized social solidarity, the earlier the 
onset of CR, and the greater its quantity.  
 
H3.  Liberal Market Varieties of Capitalism develop Corporate Responsibility earlier 
than Coordinated/Social-Market Varieties of Capitalism  
 
H4. Liberal Market Varieties of Capitalism have more Corporate Responsibility than 
Coordinated/Social-Market Varieties of Capitalism 
  
                                                 
266 Since CRAs are membership-led, an association will not be viable without a minimum or critical 
mass of firms. 
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Before proceeding to the empirics I discuss some relevant literature. Then I proceed to 
the operationalization of my dependent variable.  
 Scholars have only recently begun to theorize the relationship between CR and 
different Varieties of Capitalism.267 Is CR a complement or a substitute for 
institutionalized solidarity, Coordinated/Social Market Economies, and “embedded 
liberalism”? Very few articles to date address this question. Alte Midttun, Kristian 
Gautesen and Maria Gjølberg (2006), Gjølberg (2009) and Androniki Apostolakou 
and Gregory Jackson (2009) are exceptions. 
For Alte Midttun and Maria Gjølberg (2006), CR is a complement to 
institutionalized solidarity.268 “The increasing engagement in corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) potentially indicates an attempt to “re-embed” the economy in a 
wider societal context, following a period of neoliberal market exposure, deregulation, 
and separation of commercial and societal concerns.” Midttun, Gautesen and  
Gjølberg’s findings “support the idea of a symmetric relationship between the ‘old,’ 
politically driven embeddedness and the ‘new,’ industry-driven embeddedness” of CR 
(Midttun, Gautesen and Gjølberg, 2006: 369). The underlying assumption here is a 
positive-sum world, a variable if not expanding “market for virtue” in which 
Corporate Responsibility is a ‘mirror’ or reflection of the prevailing institutional 
framework (Apostolaku and Jackson, 2009).  
Maria Gjølberg (2009) argues that countries’ CR performance can be 
explained by “globalist” and “institutionalist” hypotheses. According to the “globalist 
hypothesis,” “CSR emerges as a functional response to anti-globalization and anti-
corporate sentiments …. the proportion of ‘CSR companies’ in a country is predicted 
                                                 
267 Apostolakou  and Jackson, 2009; Chapple, Gond, Louche and Orlitzky, 2008; Gond, Ergi, Bowen, 
Ralston, Maignan and Griffith, 2008; Gjølberg, 2008, 2009; Matten and Moon, 2008; Midttun, 
Gautesen and Gjølberg, 2006 
268 See also Gjølberg, 2009a, Gjølberg, 2009b 
  
 
280
  
to coincide with the proportion of global companies in the country’s economy” 
(Gjølberg, 2009: 608; 609). According to Gjølberg’s “institutionalist hypothesis,”  
“stronger institutions for the social embedding of the economy … result in stronger 
CSR performance” (Gjølberg, 2009: 609). By contrast, Androniki Apostolakou and 
Gregory Jackson (2009) investigate whether CR is mirror or substitute for 
institutionalized forms of stakeholder participation. Using firm-level data from the 
Sustainable Asset Management group, Apostolakou and Jackson find that CR “may be 
associated with the attempts to firms to compensate for institutional voids or substitute 
for formal institutions” (Apostolakou and Jackson, 2009: 387).  
This chapter contributes to the debate between these scholars using a novel 
dependent variable, CRAs, to track the timing and quantity of the institutionalization 
of CR in different countries. While Midttun and Gjølberg’s work supports the 
“symmetric embeddedness hypothesis,” my findings support the opposite claim, the 
“business-driven detachment hypothesis”: “stronger social embedding of the economy 
... results in a reduced need and role for business-driven CSR.... CSR and more 
traditional socio-political initiatives to embed the economy socially are completely 
decoupled or even inversely related” (Midttun, Gautesen and Gjølberg, 2006: 370). 
Maria Gjølberg (2009) argues that firms located in Coordinated Market Economies 
have a comparative advantage in CSR, which I also challenge in this chapter.269 
 
                                                 
269 The differences in our findings are attributable in part to the fact that Gjølberg and I understand CR 
differently. Gjølberg focuses on Global CSR initiatives with a predominantly North-South orientation, 
whereas CRAs are more focused on patriotic concerns or firms’ responsibilities towards domestic 
stakeholders (though these initiatives hardly exclude global CR initiatives). When these differences are 
taken in to account, Gjølberg’s and my findings are compatible. Indeed, in a recent article on CR in 
Nordic countries, Gjølberg states that “all interviewees perceive CSR as largely irrelevant and 
superfluous in a domestic context. Interviewees from government, business confederations, and trade 
unions describe their countries as well-regulated with high levels of social and environmental 
protection. CSR is perceived as relevant only when domestic countries operate abroad” (Gjølberg, 
2010: 221).  
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II. Corporate Responsibility Associations 
CRAs are my proxy of CR at the national level. Virtually every OECD country 
has such an organization; some countries have more than one. I argue that CRAs are 
indeed a proxy – an imperfect indicator, by no means the only indicator, but a 
plausible indicator nevertheless – for the state of CR in a given country at a certain 
time.270 Much attention has been paid to CR at the sub-national (firm) level and the 
supranational level (of global initiatives such as the UN Global Compact), but the 
national level encompassed by CRAs has been ignored. As collective entities, CRAs 
are intermediaries and brokers between business, civil society, the state and the 
broader public; they serve their members’ interests as well as those of wider 
society.271 CRAs may thus be understood as an element of the (hitherto understudie
‘social case’ for CR. CRAs can be seen as catalysts, facilitators and motors of 
responsible busines
d) 
s practice.  
                                                
To recall our discussion in chapter 1, CRAs provide a platform for the 
exchange of ‘best practice’ and function as ‘think tanks’ for the CR activities of their 
members. To varying degrees, they challenge their members to attain ever-higher 
levels of ‘responsibility,’ social engagement, and minimization of negative and 
maximization of positive externalities. The staffs of such associations are typically 
composed of institutional entrepreneurs who see it as their duty to make the world a 
better place. The fact that association members support the associational infrastructure 
for Corporate Responsibility in general, including the CR activities of their 
 
270 This indicator is obviously inadequate to account for local, regional, and supranational 
developments. Its usefulness is obviously premised on the assumption that states remain important loci 
for determining the institutional environment of business. As Colin Crouch (forthcoming, quoted in 
Amaeshi 2008) observes: “Local specialisms that depart from the logic of a national system … suggest 
that the nation state is not necessarily the most important level for determining the institutional 
environment of business.”  
271 William J. Baumol argues that “for business firms [the provision of public goods] is often a matter 
which can only be dealt with collectively, by volunteer groupings of firms rather than by the individual 
enterprises. For it is only such groupings of firms that can provide resources sufficient to make the 
difference” (1970: 19).   
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competitors, strengthens the case for viewing associational membership as one 
element (among many) of responsible corporate conduct. The overwhelming majority 
of companies that score highly in the CR league tables are members of CRAs, and 
CRA’s membership often comprises the “inner circle” of national and international 
business elites.   
In sum, CRAs are barometers for the state of CR in the country in which they 
are located. Such associations depend on firms being willing to join them and pay 
membership dues. Thus, the existence of such an association provides some indication 
that that the idea of CR has ‘come of age’ and acquired legitimacy in a given country. 
Readers may query whether cross-national comparisons on a single variable or 
indicator – CRAs – bias the findings. To the extent that no single indicator can be 
equally salient across a wide diversity of contexts and capture the entirety of CR, 
perhaps.272 Yet CRAs are uniquely embedded in their national contexts. If institutional 
entrepreneurs do not frame their association’s mission so that it resonates with 
businesses and government, their association will not come into being, let alone 
survive or grow. In this sense, CRAs acquire a specific national, cultural, contextual 
coloration. When it comes to measuring CR’s national embeddedness or currency in a 
particular country, CRAs are superior to other indicators such as firms’ membership in 
global CR initiatives including the UN Global Compact, the Global Reporting 
Initiative, or the World Business Council for Sustainable Development.273  
 The founding dates of CRAs vary considerably across Europe and the OECD 
– from the trailblazer UK at the beginning of the 1980s to Germany at the turn of the 
                                                 
272 Indeed, as an indicator CRAs may contain an inherent bias toward central and away from federal 
states.   
273  The UN Global Compact does not specify in any detail what members must do, other than report on 
their progress on a variety of dimensions. How any company reports, and the initiatives these reports 
describe, is left open-ended. However, the reference frame is global, rather than national, as it is in the 
case of CRAs. In practice, CR is almost invariably a mixture of local, national and global, hence these 
differences may not be of much consequence.   
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millennium and Luxembourg in 2007. To provide one illustration of the use of 
associations as proxies, a comparison of U.K. and German CR associations reveals the 
following differences: the U.K. CRA ‘Business in the Community’ was founded in 
1981/1982, whereas the corresponding German CRA ‘Econsense’ was founded nearly 
two decades later, in 2000. The founding dates of these CRAs confirms 
pronouncements made in above chapters, and in assorted the secondary literature, 
about the U.K.’s status as a European if not global CR ‘leader,’ and of Germany’s 
status as a CR ‘laggard.’  
We will begin with CRAs’s founding dates. The founding dates of CRAs vary 
considerably across Europe and the OECD – from the beginning of the 1980s in the 
UK to 2007 in Luxembourg. When there is more than one CRA in a given country, I 
use the founding date of the earliest association. Figure 5.1 shows a list of countries’ 
CRA establishment dates, along with Varieties of Capitalism categorizations, which 
will be relevant for our subsequent discussion.  
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COUNTRY YEARS TO FOUNDING 
(1980=0) 
YEAR WHICH VARIETY 
OF CAPITALISM?  
UK 2 1982274  LME   
France 6 1986 MME   
Sweden 7 1987275 CME   
USA 12 1992 LME 
Hungary 12 1992 MME    
Czech Republic 12 1992 MME   
Canada 15 1995 LME 
Italy 15 1995 MME   
Norway 16 1996 CME   
Slovakia 17 1997 MME   
New Zealand 18 1998 LME   
Bulgaria 18 1998 MME   
Spain 19 1999 MME   
Ireland 20 2000 LME   
Germany 20 2000 CME 
Netherlands 20 2000 CME   
Switzerland 20 2000 CME 
Finland 20 2000 CME   
Greece 20 2000 MME   
Poland 20 2000 MME   
Belgium 21 2001 CME 
Portugal 22 2002 MME   
Austria 25 2005 CME 
Australia 25 2005 LME 
Luxembourg 27 2007 CME   
Denmark 31 2011276 CME   
Figure 5.1: CR’s Timing by Country / Variety of Capitalism 
 
                                                 
274 Business in the Community, the UK’s leading business-led Corporate Responsibility coalition, was 
incorporated on 01 June 1981 and fully registered as a company limited by guarantee on 2 March 1982. 
275 Sweden can be coded as either 1987 or 2004, as I discuss below.  
276 Denmark does not yet have a CRA. The Copenhagen Center, a CSR-oriented think tank established 
in 1998, does not qualify since it was entirely government-funded and did not have any corporate 
members. Thus, I have coded Denmark as 2011, the earliest year that this country could get a CRA. In 
all further calculations, I code Denmark as 2011.   
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Not every OECD country has a CRA.277 Glancing at the timing of the establishment of 
CR in table 5.1, there is a great deal of diversity, even within the categories of 
Varieties of Capitalism. For example, within the category of LMEs, the UK’s main 
CRA Business in the Community was founded at the beginning of the 1980s, while 
the Australian CRA Australian Business and Community Network was founded in 
2005. There is also a great deal of diversity within CMEs: dates range from 1987 (if 
Sweden is coded as 1987),278 to 2005 for Austria and 2007 for Luxembourg, and 2011 
in Denmark (since there is no Danish CRA to date).   
Figure 5.2 below shows the number of OECD countries with a CRA 
established between 1980 and 2007 to give us a sense of the distribution over time.279   
                                                 
277 A very small number of countries lack CRAs. Denmark, for example, is missing from chart 7.1 
because my dependent variable does not work there. There is no CRA which meets the criteria of the 
above definition. The Copenhagen Center, a CR think tank and policy institute established by the 
Danish government in 1997 (and disbanded/reconfigured in 2007/2008), fulfills some of the criteria of a 
CR association, but it had no corporate membership. This, I wish to emphasize, is a peculiarity of using 
national CRAs as an indicator. It is not to be confused with the claim that Denmark has no Corporate 
Responsibility. 
278 Sweden is a difficult case to code. Swedish Jobs and Society began operating with a corporate 
membership (principally Volvo) in 1987, and CR Sweden was founded in 2004 as an initiative of 
Swedish Jobs and Society. Like Business in the Community in the UK, after which it was modeled, 
Swedish Jobs and Society promotes entrepreneurship and job creation in economically depressed areas. 
From its earliest years, Business in the Community had a broader focus. BITC became involved with a 
myriad of Corporately-Responsible activities, whereas Swedish Jobs and Society remained exclusively 
committed to job creation, a narrower mandate than is customary for other CRAs and indeed CR more 
generally. Nonetheless, because Swedish Jobs and Society qualifies as a CRA according to my 
definition, I code Sweden as both 1987 and 2004 in the following figures.     
279 This figure is identical to figure 1.1 in chapter 1.  
  
 
286
  
 
 
Figure 5.2: CR’s Spread across the OECD 
Data source: author’s coding, see table 5.1 above. 
The clustering of different countries on the year 2000 suggests strong prima 
facie support for the salience of isomorphism and diffusion. While figures 5.1 and 5.2 
present a view of the timing of the institutionalization of CRAs across the OECD, data 
on multiple CRAs per country is lost in them. But a number of countries including the 
UK, France, Italy, Spain, and Hungary have two CRAs each.280 Figure 5.3 shows the 
total number of associations founded per year between 1981 and 2007, which includes 
multiple associations per country. Clearly visible are the forerunners in the early 
1980s, mid-1980s and early 1990s. However, the bulk of CRAs were founded between 
1995 and 2005. The distribution, while not entirely normal, is symmetrically centered 
on the year 2000.  
 
                                                 
280  This brings the total number of CRAs in the data set to thirty.  
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Figure 5.3: CRAs over Time, Including Multiple CRAs per Country 
In the year 2000 a total of seven national CRAs were founded – seven countries ‘got’ 
CR this year. What makes this year so important for CR? Several important events 
took place.281 The clustering of CRAs established in the year 2000 confirms the 
established wisdom on the growth and spread of CR since the mid-1990s.282 What this 
literature misses – and this thesis contributes – is the insight that CR was already 
underway in the 1980s and early 1990s. Nearly one-quarter of the total distribution of 
CR, as measured by CRAs in figure 5.3, is ignored by existing scholarship. With this 
overview of the timing of CRAs, the section below considers the timing of Corporate 
Responsibility in different Varieties of Capitalism.  
 
III. The Timing of CR in Different Varieties of Capitalism 
 
Does the timing of CRA establishment vary in different varieties of capitalism? 
Existing literature is cross-sectional, and neglects the dimension of ‘time.’ The present 
chapter is the first empirical treatment of this question. I hypothesize that liberal-
                                                 
281 The EU Commission became increasingly active in the area of CR, both directly (in its preparations 
for the Green Book, which first outlined the Commission’s CR agenda in 2001), and indirectly, through 
the European Business Network for Social Cohesion, which got a fresh breath of life and programmatic 
energy when it was renamed CSR Europe in 2000. The UN Global Compact was established this year. 
In addition, preparations for the UN’s international year of volunteers (in 2001) in were underway. It is 
possible that the Battle of Seattle in late 1999 provided an additional impetus. 
282 For example Vogel (2005); Ruggie (2003, 2004, 2007) 
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market or market-based economies are more likely to have CR, and to have more of it, 
than Social Market or Coordinated Market Economies; as the latter liberalize, they are 
increasingly likely to ‘get’ Corporate Responsibility. This implies that LMEs get CR 
sooner than CMEs. Figure 5.4 below shows the time to CR in Liberal and Coordinated 
Market Economies as defined by Peter Hall and David Soskice (Hall and Soskice, 
2001). Following Hall and Soskice, I have included Mixed Market Economies, a 
residual category composed of countries in Mediterranean and Eastern Europe and in 
Asia which do not clearly fit into Hall and Soskice’s binary categorization of CMEs 
and LMEs. 
 
Time to Corporate Responsibility using Hall and Soskice's 
'Varieties of Capitalism' Categorizations
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Figure 5.4: Varieties of Capitalism and CR 
A divide is apparent between LMEs and Mixed Market Economies on one hand and 
CMEs on the other. With 1980 as year 0, Liberal Market Economies get CR after 15.3 
years. Mixed Market Economies get CR after 16.1 years.283 And Coordinated Market 
                                                 
283 The category of Mixed Market Economies is very heterogeneous, as it is composed of many 
countries that do not straightforwardly fit in Hall and Soskice’s LME and CME categories. My 
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Economies get CR after 20.8 years. On average, CR is institutionalized more than four 
years earlier in LMEs and MMEs than in CMEs – in the mid-1990s rather than at the 
turn of the millennium. This evidence appears to support hypothesis H3, the claim that 
Corporate Responsibility arises earlier in LMEs than in SMEs/CMEs.  
 Though widely discussed, Hall and Soskice’s categorization of advanced 
capitalist countries into Liberal and Coordinated Market Economies has been 
criticized on a number of different grounds. One critique is that the LME/CME 
dichotomy is insufficiently nuanced to account for the diversity of modern capitalism. 
The category of Mixed Market Economy is particularly problematic, as it seems to 
consist of no more than countries that do not fit in to the pure categories of CME or 
LME.284 Scholars have therefore sought to come up with alternative and more 
inclusive categorizations.  
 I assess the robustness of the above relationship using two alternative 
typologies. The findings should not be sensitive to legitimate differences in scholarly 
opinion. And they aren’t: categorizations by Pontusson (2005)285 and Amable 
(2003)286 suggest a persistent and significant difference in the timing of the 
                                                                                                                                            
explanation for this category’s quickness to get CR is as follows. First, Eastern Europe (comprising a 
significant proportion of MMEs) experienced a significant erosion of ISS following the collapse of 
bureaucratic collectivism. Second, France, a unitary and centralized state (discussed below), lowers the 
MME average. Third, Mediterranean countries including Italy and Spain have an affinity for CR: both 
of them get CR during the 1990s and have two CRAs each. Some MME have experienced significant 
deregulation (see figure 5.6 below), which is compatible with the argument of this thesis. On the other 
hand, the quickness of France and Italy is puzzling, given the higher level of ISS in these countries 
compared with LMEs.     
284 Amable (2003) 
285 Jonas Pontusson’s (2005) typology is more fine-grained than Hall and Soskice’s. Pontusson 
distinguishes between Nordic Social Market Economies, Continental Social Market Economies, and 
Liberal Market Economies with no residual category. In Liberal Market Economies, Corporate 
Responsibility is institutionalized after 15.3 years. Continental Market Economies come in at 20.2 
years, nearly five years later. Again, the evidence supports H3. The timing of Nordic SMEs varies 
between 19.33 and 25 years depending on the coding of Sweden, discussed below. (If Denmark is 
omitted, Nordic SMEs jump to an early 14.6 years and a late 20.3 years). 
286 Amable divides advanced capitalist countries into Market-based, Asian, Mediterranean, Continental 
European and Social Democratic capitalism. Using Amable’s fine-grained five-fold categorization, 
market-based capitalism is once again the forerunner. With 1980 as year 0, CR is institutionalized in 
Market-based economies after an average of 13.5 years, followed by Mediterranean capitalism with 19 
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institutionalization of Corporate Responsibility between Liberal- and Coordinated, 
Liberal- and Social Market, and Market-Based and Continental European capitalist 
economies. In fact, these categorizations provide stronger support for H3 than Hall 
and Soskice’s categorization. If Midttun, Gautesen and Gjølberg (2006), as well as 
Gjølberg (2009a, 2009b) are interpreted as implying that a comparative advantage in 
Corporate Responsibility means that these same countries get it earlier than others, this 
provides disconfirming evidence.   
 Before proceeding, it is necessary to ensure that the results are robust to 
outliers in the CRA data set. More specifically, we will probe the following 
possibility: how sensitive are the results to the UK as a first mover?287 Is the temporal 
gap between Liberal and Coordinated/Social-Market/Continental European economies 
driven disproportionately by one observation – the UK?288 My response to this 
challenge involves both concessions and defences. I summarize the four possible 
codings in figure 5.5:  
 
LMEs without UK LMEs with UK 
18 15.33 
CMEs with Sweden as 1987 CMEs with Sweden as 2004 
20.8 22.5 
Figure 5.5: The Effect of Different Codings on the Timing of CR 
 
The difference between LMEs and CMEs is sensitive to coding. When it comes to the 
timing of CR, it is unclear whether LMEs as a whole have a significant lead over 
CMEs as a whole. If we take the UK out, LMEs come in at 18 years. The difference 
between LMEs and CMEs then hinges on the coding of Sweden, discussed above in 
                                                                                                                                            
years and Continental European Capitalism at 19.33 years (if Sweden is coded as 1987) or 25 years (if 
Sweden is coded as 2004). Thus, in Amable’s schema, the gap between the onset of CR in Market-
based economies and their Continental European counterparts grows to 6 years, proving even stronger 
support for H3 than Pontusson’s or Hall and Soskice’s categorization.  
287 Compare Robert W. Jackman’s (1987) claim that Lange and Garrett’s (1985) results are driven by 
the outlier Norway.    
288 I am grateful to Christopher Way for bringing my attention to this issue.  
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footnote 15. The most unfavorable coding leaves out the UK and codes Sweden as 
1987. In this case, LMEs lead over CMEs shrinks to just 2.8 years. The evidence 
clearly refutes the claim that CMEs get CR faster than LMEs. But it provides at best 
qualified support for H3. 
 In my view, eliminating the UK from the analysis while coding Sweden as 
1987 stretches the limitations of plausibility. Simultaneously omitting one observation 
while unfavorably coding another changes the results of a small-n analysis. All other 
codings, for example omitting the UK and coding Sweden as 2004, are more 
favourable to my argument. In this case, the gap between LMEs and CMEs is 4.5 (18 
vs. 22.5) years. If the UK had not embarked on the path of CR as it did, the Swedish 
CRA would almost certainly not have been founded in 1987. Harry Goldman, who 
founder of the Swedish CRA Jobs and Society, says that his CRA was an attempt to 
copy the UK CRA BITC’s job creation initiatives in Sweden (Goldman, interview, 
2006). This is equally true of the French CRA founded by Claude Bébéar, the CEO of 
AXA in 1986. Thus, if the UK CRA had not existed, it seems unlikely that these 
countries would have gotten CR when they did. If eliminating the UK from the 
analysis is questionable, eliminating the UK while coding Sweden as 1987 is even 
more implausible.289 And as can be seen from the table above, only this coding 
reduces the differences between LMEs and CMEs to insignificance. Yet I cannot deny 
this troubling fact: once the innovation of CR had has been invented, it spreads only 
marginally faster to LMEs than to CMEs. The sensitivity of my results to alternative 
coding does not invalidate my findings, but it suggests qualified rather than strong 
support for hypothesis H3.  
                                                 
289 Positing that Sweden had CR in the mid-1980s while the UK did is implausible for anyone with a 
cursory knowledge of these cases. It is hard to imagine a world – even a hypothetical one – in which 
Swedish firms are able to overcome the obstacles of powerful and militant trade unions, an expansive 
welfare state and a dense regulatory environment to overtake their British counterparts when it comes to 
voluntary engagement for domestic social and environmental ends.   
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 My rebuttal is that my argument is really about the co-evolution of Corporate 
Responsibility and the erosion of Institutionalized Social Solidarity. Non-liberal 
Varieties of Capitalism can be taken as proxies for Institutionalized Social Solidarity, 
but these static categorizations do they permit degrees of membership, nor do they get 
at change over time. Yet countries and their institutions aren’t static, they are in 
constant motion. For Hall and Soskice, the UK is a paradigmatic LME. Yet chapter 2 
makes clear that the UK’s LMEness was politically constructed. Only the radical 
changes of the 1980s made the UK a clear LME. In the remainder of this chapter, I 
incorporate the temporal dimension in two ways. First, I use a more nuanced measure 
of my dependent variable – the number of firms in a country’s CRA over time. 
Second, I also use continuous and fine-grained measures of ISS as my explanatory 
variables. In my discussion below, I will explore the implications of alternate codings 
of the UK and Sweden for my findings. Before I do so, figure 5.6 provides a glimpse 
of countries’ movement on the independent variable. Based on product-regulation 
density data compiled by the OECD, it ranks countries’ product market regulation 
from the least-regulated to the most-regulated for three years: 1998, 2003, and 2008.  
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 Timing to CR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD PMR indices (2009) 
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Figure 5.6: Timing to CR and Product Market Regulation  
in LMEs, CMEs and MMEs 
LMEs remain the least regulated group over the ten year period between 1998 and 
2008, clinching the three least-regulated spots throughout. However, the distribution 
becomes increasingly dispersed over time. Although CMEs as a group do not overtake 
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LMEs, selected CMEs do so. Interestingly, this time period is precisely many of these 
countries ‘got’ CR. The next section adjudicates H2, the quantity of CR in different 
varieties of capitalism.  
   
IV. The Quantity of CR in Different Varieties of Capitalism 
   
From the preceding section, we have seen that Corporate Responsibility tends to arise 
earlier in LMEs than in CMEs/SMEs. But given that all of the 25 countries in my 
analysis have now gotten CR, quantity may be more relevant. Is CR more widespread 
in LMEs than in SMEs/CMEs, as I suggest in hypothesis H2? Before proceeding to 
the data, a few remarks about its interpretation are necessary.   
The membership levels of national CRAs are one barometer for the level of 
interest in CR in a given country at a given time. The criteria for membership in these 
associations vary significantly, both over time and across the countries included in this 
study. Annual membership dues, for example, range from a few hundred dollars to 
tens of thousands of Euros annually. At some level, it seems reasonable to expect the 
cost of membership to have an adverse effect on membership levels. Moreover, it is 
obviously problematic to attribute an association’s membership level exclusively to 
external societal or institutional factors. The quality of a CRA’s leadership and 
services will affect firms’ propensity to join it; and they too vary across time and 
across CRAs. Thus, strictly speaking, one cannot make the assumption of unit 
homogeneity,290 the assumption that a CRA member in one jurisdiction has the same 
weight as an association member somewhere else, or the assumption that membership 
at time t1 is the same as it is at time t2.  
To illustrate this point: the German CR association Econsense had only 
twenty-four corporate members in 2007, but many of these are among the weightiest 
                                                 
290 Hall (2003) 
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publicly traded companies in Germany, including Deutsche Bank, BASF, Siemens, 
DaimlerBenz, and Volkswagen. Despite their small number, Econsense members have 
more combined economic muscle than the collected membership of some other CRAs 
with higher levels of aggregate membership. Furthermore, declining membership 
levels do not necessarily indicate a declining interest in, or societal legitimacy of CR. 
The US CRA Business for Social Responsibility’s membership declined from 
approximately five-hundred a decade ago to three-hundred in 2007, due to an increase 
of membership fees and a shift of focus from small and medium sized firms to large 
publicly traded multinationals. The membership data should therefore be interpreted 
with caution.  Notwithstanding the aforementioned qualifications, my claim is that the 
level of firms in the membership of national CR associations does say something about 
the state of CR in a country. In general, the higher the membership in a given 
jurisdiction, the greater the currency of CR in that jurisdiction.291 While all other 
things are rarely equal in practice, they are equal enough, and our state of knowledge 
on CR’s trans-national variation is so poor that this data can be insightful. Figure 5.7 
displays the aggregate membership data for twenty-three CRAs across the OECD from 
the early 1980s until 2007.292 (Readers seeking a graphical representation of this data 
organized by country are advised to the Appendix).     
 
                                                 
291 Do CRA membership levels bear any relationship to other CR indices? Do countries with high 
membership levels tend to score higher in CR ratings than countries with few members? To assess this 
relationship, I correlate the CR index from Androniki Apostolakou and Gregory Jackson (2009: 382-
383) with the raw membership of thirteen CRAs (excluding the US and UK) for 2007. The covariance 
is 0.52.    
292 Including CRAs from the following jurisdictions: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 
Scotland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States     
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Figure 5.7: CRA Membership across the OECD 
 
The data resemble a distorted S-curve, the shape typical of diffusion processes.293     
 
Corporate Responsibility Membership in Liberal- and 
Social/Coordinated Market Economies
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
Year
N
um
be
r o
f M
em
be
r F
irm
s 
in
N
at
io
na
l C
R
 A
ss
oc
ia
tio
ns
LMEs
excluding
the US and
England 
CMEs
BITC total
BITC total
(continued)
BITC
National
 
FIGURE 5.8: Corporate Responsibility: LMEs versus CMEs 
                                                 
293 These aberrations from an S-curve are due to the dramatic membership fluctuations (rapid increase 
and decrease) of the US CRA BSR during the first decade of its existence (1992-2002). As noted 
elsewhere, BSR initially had very high membership levels and negligible membership fees. As BSR’s 
membership moved away from small- and medium-sized companies and towards business consulting 
with large MNCs, BSR 
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Figure 5.8 distinguishes between three groups of firms: LMEs excluding the US and 
England; CMEs; and national and total membership levels in the UK CRA BITC. 
BITC’s membership levels are extraordinary, and exceed those of all CMEs by a 
factor of two. CMEs’ aggregate membership seems to exceed LMEs excluding the US 
and England. But does it really? Figure 5.8 contains the membership data of only five 
CRAs in five LMEs: Ireland, New Zealand, Scotland, Australia and Canada. By 
contrast, the CME data derives from eleven CRAs in nine CMEs: Luxembourg, 
Norway, Finland, Switzerland, Austria, Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
Germany. These CME countries have roughly twice the population of these LME 
jurisdictions. With twice the population and more than twice the number of CRAs, we 
would expect this group of CMEs to have significantly higher membership levels than 
this group of LMEs. This is clearly not the case. Instead, we find that the membership 
level of these groups is roughly the same. Whether per capita or per CRA, LMEs have 
a higher level of CRA membership than their CME/SME counterparts. The data 
support hypothesis H4, the claim that LMEs have more CR than CMEs.  
 Figure 5.9 compares the membership of LMEs, including the UK but 
excluding the US, with all CMEs/SMEs (the same as above) over time. The US is 
excluded on the grounds that the two groups of countries should be roughly equal in 
size for the purposes of comparison: in general, the greater the population, the larger 
the greater the number of firms and CRAs. Although the CME group contains 
significantly more CRAs than the LME group, the two groups are now much closer in 
terms of population.294 Yet CMEs have no where near the depth of LMEs.  
      
                                                 
294 According to 2009 estimates, the CMEs have a population of roughly 144 million, the LMEs of 
roughly 122 million. 
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Figure 5.9: CRA Membership in LMEs and CMEs 
Given the UK’s extraordinary high membership levels, readers may wonder whether 
there is omitted variable bias. Are UK firms joiners in general, and not necessarily in 
CR? If this is the case, UK firms should exhibit unusually high membership levels in 
other, non-CR initiatives. To examine this possibility, let us examine two indicators, 
the management standards ISO 9000 (for quality) and 14000 (for the environment). 
ISO 9000 and 14000 are the international if not global standards in their respective 
areas. According to Isin Guler, Mauro F. Guillén, and John Muir Macpherson (2002), 
the UK had an extraordinarily high number of ISO 9000 certifications during the 
1990s – over 58 000 in 1998. Germany, by comparison, had only 24 000 (Guler, 
Guillén, and Macpherson, 2002: 219), less than one-half the UK level. According to 
Charles J.Corbett  and David A. Kirsch (2001), the ratio for ISO 14000 is similar, with 
the UK having approximately twice as many certifications as Germany (Corbett  and 
David A. Kirsch, 2001: 330). According to a more recent paper by Martí Casadesús, 
Frederic Marimon, and Iñaki Heras (2008), however, the number of ISO 9000 and 14 
000 certifications in the UK, though high (and higher than Germany), is lower than the 
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number of certifications in countries such as Italy, Spain, and Switzerland. According 
to these authors, the UK’s involvement in these management standards is not on a 
different order of magnitude from other countries, as it is for CR using the metrics in 
this chapter. From this brief survey, it is unclear to what extent British firms are 
joiners in general, rather than for CR for the reasons explicated in this thesis. And 
even if they are, it could be that this propensity is endogenous, integral to 
financialized, liberalized, deregulated and internationalized market-liberalism. Future 
research is needed to resolve these questions.  
 Before proceeding, it may be worth putting the above membership in a broader 
context. I have not standardized the number of member firms in CR associations as a 
proportion of total employees or firms in the country for two reasons. First, given the 
quantity of data, doing this would be very time-consuming. Second, and more 
importantly, it would not show much. While there is considerable variation in different 
countries numerator (membership), the magnitude of this variation diminishes 
considerably when placed in relation to the denominator, the economy as a whole. To 
illustrate: Business in the Community, the leading CRA based in the UK, has a 
membership of over eight-hundred, including 80% of the FTSE 100 (100 largest 
publicly listed companies in the UK), in 2007. Yet according to BITC’s own 
admission, the association and its membership represent just “one in five” workers in 
the UK’s private sector workforce. BITC is a ceiling, an upper limit for CR in this 
study. All other national CRAs represent a smaller proportion of their country’s total 
number of firms and employees.  
 Following David Vogel, there is indeed a “market for virtue,” but it is clearly a 
niche market (Vogel, 2005). What Vogel fails to acknowledge is that not just activist 
pressure and consumer demand, political-economic and structural-institutional 
variables have a systematic effect on firms’ propensity for voluntary engagement. 
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Figure 5.10 draws together some of the above strands by exposing the relationship 
between product market regulation density as measured by the OECD on one hand, 
and CRA membership levels on the other. Low levels of product market regulation 
density are a necessary, though insufficient condition for high levels of CRA 
membership.295   
Product Market Regulation Density (PMR) and 
Corporate Responsibility Association Membership
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Figure 5.10: CRA Membership and PMR Density 
 I will now summarize and connect this discussion with the above debate 
between  Midttun, Gautesen and Gjølberg (2006), as well as Gjølberg (2009a, 2009b) 
on one side,  and Apostolakou and Jackson (2009) on the other. The above evidence 
regarding the timing and quantity of CR in CR associations across Europe shows that 
LMEs get more CR earlier than SMEs/CMEs. This evidence provides disconfirming 
evidence for Midttun, Gautesen and Gjølberg, and support for Apostolakou and 
Jackson. CR appears to be a substitute rather than a complement for institutionalized 
solidarity. There is, however, a point of agreement between my findings and 
Gjølberg’s. One of Gjølberg’s central findings is that the Nordic countries are high 
                                                 
295 A brief explication of the country distribution is in order. The data points in the upper-left are the 
UK and the USA; data points between the regression line and the x-axis include Italy and Germany, as 
well as small European countries.  
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Corporate Responsibility performers; in fact, they occupy the top rankings in Midttun, 
Gautesen and Gjølberg (2006), and in Gjølberg (2009a, 2009b). These assertions can 
be reconciled with my data if Sweden is coded as 1987. In that case, Sweden is among 
the front-runners when it comes to the timing of CR. In terms of quantity, although I 
have not included a summary measure for the Nordic countries, they appear to fare 
relatively well given their small size, at least in comparison with the continental 
Europeans. The next section examines the relationship between CR and two measures 
of institutionalized social solidarity.  
   
V. Institutionalized Social Solidarity and Corporate Responsibility 
Varieties of Capitalism are plausible but imperfect proxies for institutionalized 
social solidarity. CMEs tend to have more highly developed solidaristic institutions 
than LMEs, but these categories do not account well for the institutional diversity 
within each category. The LME Canada, for example, has significantly higher rates of 
unionization and lower levels of income inequality than its southern neighbor. Both 
CMEs and LMEs contain solidaristic institutions, to varying degrees. They are mixed, 
not pure categories.296 To determine whether the posited relationship really holds, it is 
necessary to supplement these macro-typologies with more fine-grained indicators. 
Labor power and the top statutory taxation rates on capital are two such proxies of 
institutionalized social solidarity. I will begin my discussion with wage bargaining 
centralization.  
In the preceding chapters, I have suggested that labor power and Corporate 
Responsibility are material and symbolic substitutes. The centralization of wage 
bargaining is an imperfect but acceptable proxy for the power of organized labor and 
related social outcomes. According to Andrew Glyn, “there is a robust correlation 
                                                 
296 Crouch (2005); Becker (2009) 
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between earnings inequality and the decentralization of wage bargaining” (Glyn, 2006: 
169). Organized labor has historically pushed for wage bargaining centralization as it 
has gained strength and influence. On the other hand, a completely decentralized wage 
bargaining system is one in which labor has no collective interest representation, in 
which each worker is competing with every other worker to sell her labor.   
In terms of the timing of CR’s institutionalization, our expectations are as 
follows. If Corporate Responsibility is complementary to wage bargaining 
centralization, CR will arise earlier at higher levels of wage bargaining centralization. 
If CR is a substitute for centralized wage bargaining, it will arise earlier in 
decentralized wage bargaining systems than in centralized ones. Hypothesis H2 
implies an inverse relationship between institutionalized social solidarity and wage 
bargaining centralization: If CR is a substitute for wage bargaining centralization, it 
should arise earlier in countries with decentralized wage bargaining systems than in 
countries with centralized ones.  
Figure 5.11 shows the relationship between the centralization of wage 
bargaining and the founding dates of Corporate Responsibility associations in 25 
OECD countries between 1980 and 2007. It provides a snap-shot of the degree of 
wage bargaining centralization at the time of the establishment of CRAs. For each 
country, wage-bargaining centralization is measured for the year when that country’s 
CRA was founded. Following our discussion above, the results may be sensitive to the 
coding of Sweden and the inclusion/exclusion of the UK. Figure 5.11 includes the UK 
and codes Sweden as 1987. 
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Corporate Responsibility and Centralization of Wage Bargaining in 25
OECD Countries (including the UK and with Sweden coded as 1987)  
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Figure 5.11: Wage Bargaining Centralization and CR 
 
The data for the centralization of wage bargaining are from the Data Base on Institutional 
Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts in 26 countries 
between1960 and 2006 (ICTWSS) by Jelle Visser, Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies 
AIAS, August 2007.  
While it is clear that the centralization of wage bargaining is not the only influence on 
the institutionalization of CR, there does appear to be a relationship.  Corporate 
Responsibility tends to be institutionalized earlier in countries with decentralized wage 
bargaining systems than it is in countries with centralized wage bargaining systems. 
With the possible exception of Sweden, all countries with centralized wage bargaining 
systems are slow to get CR.   
 We will briefly examine the impact of alternate coding on the above results. 
Figure 5.12 shows the slope, intercept, and percentage of variance accounted for by 
including/excluding the UK and coding Sweden as 1987 and as 2004.  
CENT   
 Sweden as 1987 Sweden as 2004 
with UK y = 0.0081x - 15.793 R2 = 0.1101 y = 0.0126x - 24.703 R2 = 0.2581 
without UK y = 0.0088x - 17.161 R2 = 0.093 y = 0.0161x - 31.757 R2 = 0.2811 
Figure 5.12: The Effect of Different Codings  
on Wage Barganing Centralization 
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As we can see from figure 5.12, the steepness of the slope – the sharpness of the trade-
off between wage bargaining centralization and CRA establishment – varies 
significantly depending on the coding of Sweden. The relationship is notably stronger 
with Sweden coded as 2004 than it is with Sweden coded as 1987. The steepness of 
the slope increases by one-half with a 2004 coding for Sweden; and it doubles if 
Sweden is coded as 2004 and the UK is excluded. These results suggest that if 
anything, scatter-plot in figure 5.12 underestimates the trade-off between ISS and CR.  
Next, we will examine the relationship between statutory tax rates on capital 
and the timing of CR association establishment in 21 OECD countries. One can 
plausibly argue that taxing capital for the provision of collective goods and 
redistributive goals is integral to ISS. It is well-known that the top statutory tax rate on 
internationally mobile capital has declined as capital’s power and exit options have 
increased over the past decades.297 But is there a systematic relationship between 
statutory tax rates and the institutionalization of Corporate Responsibility? Figure 5.13 
shows the top statutory tax rates on capital in twenty-one OECD countries for the year 
in which that country’s CRA was founded.  
                                                 
297 There is some disagreement over the extent to which this has lowered aggregate revenues from 
capital taxation.  
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Corporate Responsibility and Statutory Tax Rates in 21 OECD 
Countries (including the UK and with Sweden coded as 1987)
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Figure 5.13: The Taxation of Capital and the Timing of CR across the OECD  
 
These STR data are from Michael Overesch and Johannes Rincke (2008)," The Dynamics of Corporate Tax Setting 
in Europe, 1984-2006", paper presented  at the CESifo Venice Summer Institute - Workshop Taxation of 
Multinational Firms',  17th July 2008, Venice. The smaller number of countries as compared with the wage 
bargaining figures above is due to STR data availability. 
  
High statutory tax rates do not prevent countries from getting CR. Indeed, five 
countries (including the UK) had top rates in excess of 50 percent at the time of CRA 
establishment. Nonetheless, declining statutory tax rates are correlated with the 
institutionalization of CR: as CR has been institutionalized in more and more 
countries, STR rates have declined. 5.14 shows the impact of different coding on the 
results. Coding Sweden as 2004 flattens the slope and leaving out the UK sharpens it.  
  
STR   
 Sweden as 1987 Sweden as 2004 
with UK y = -1.1719x + 2378.6 R2 = 0.4527 y = -1.0103x + 2055 R2 = 0.3914 
Without UK y = -1.2853x + 2605.2 R2 = 0.4119 y = -1.0332x + 2100.9 R2 = 0.2963 
Figure 5.14: The Impact of Different Codings on STR 
 
The above scatter-plots provide support for hypothesis H2, the claim that ISS and CR 
are inversely related. They also underline the limitations and shortcomings of relying 
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exclusively on VoC categories. Thus, excluding the UK case, a textbook case for H1, 
the co-evolution of market-liberalism and CR, does not necessarily lessen the trade-off 
between ISS and CR. This underlines the complexity of the underlying relationships. 
Before examining some regression output, we’ll consider the case of the United States.  
 Although the United States is widely acknowledged as the ‘pioneer’ of CR,298 
the American CRA Business for Social Responsibility (BSR) was founded only in 
1992, a decade after the U.K.’s Business in the Community. This may be surprising, 
since according to statistics from the Luxembourg Income Survey, the United States 
has the most unequal income distribution and the highest levels of child poverty in the 
entire OECD.299 Moreover, there is widespread agreement that rates of income 
inequality and associated social pathologies increased dramatically in the decades 
following 1979.300 BSR’s founding date seems late in light of these institutional 
deficiencies; but it is important to remember that CR arises and thrives when ISS is 
being eroded. CR is not simply a correlate of the absence or dearth of ISS.   
 There are multiple candidate explanations for the US’s laggard status. First, 
CRAs are national-level associations, giving centralized unitary states an advantage 
over decentralized, federal states. In fact, comparing the founding dates of CRAs from 
unitary and federal states in figure 5.1 yields a startling contrast. On average, unitary 
states301 get CR after 16.94 years, whereas the average for federal states is 19.71, 
almost three years later. All three first-movers – the UK, France, and Sweden302 -- are 
unitary, not federal states. Thus, the US’s lateness to get CR in part reflects America’s 
decentralized federal structure. National-level CRAs by definition cannot account for 
                                                 
298 See Bowen (1953)  
299 Glyn (2006: 168-169); Pontusson (2005: 160-161).  
300 Pontusson (2005: 6) 
301 Including Denmark. 
302 If Sweden is coded as 1987. 
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the plentiful regional and state-level CR initiatives in the US.303 Additional 
considerations include the following: levels of ISS have always been comparatively 
low in the United States. Thus, in the US, there was less institutionalized social 
solidarity to attack and dismantle than in the other countries in this study. Following 
Werner Sombart’s influential treatise Why is There No Socialism in the United 
States?,304  the country’s historical evolution, identity and ideological self-
understanding305 undoubtedly also play a role. In spite of the social problems which 
plague the United States, this country’s steadfast and deeply-entrenched capitalist 
mentality diminishes the need to legitimate the system, whether through CR or by 
other means, compared with less pro-business countries.     
 
 
VI. Regressions as Robustness Checks 
To assess the relationships between the presence / absence of a CRA, the 
membership levels of CRAs and wage bargaining centralization, as well as between 
CRA membership levels and product market regulation, I ran three regressions: 
multilevel random effects models with country and year dummies. In each of these 
cases, I coded Sweden as 1987 to provide a more rigorous test of the relationships in 
question. The results are summarized in figure 5.15. 
                                                 
303 In Minnesota, clubs of firms that commit themselves to give 5% and 2%, respectively, of their pre-
tax profits to charitable causes served as examples for BITC’s PerCent Club founded by Hector Laing 
and discussed in chapter 2.    
304 Sombart (1979 [1906]).  
305 Including the frontier (Sombart’s thesis); a variety of ideological tropes including the country’s 
tradition of rugged individualism; and the character of political competition. I would like to thank my 
special committee members for clarifying these points for me.  
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The Relationship Between Corporate Responsibility, Wage Bargaining 
Centralization, and Product Market Regulation 
 
  
Issue Area 
 
Variables Wage Bargaining 
Centralization 
Wage Bargaining 
Centralization 
Product Market 
Regulation 
 
The Presence / 
Absence of a 
CRA 
 
 
-28.11   
(-58.75, 2.53) 
 
  
 
  
 
CRA 
Membership  
 
  
 
-3.73    
(-5.42,-2.04) 
 
-118.63    
(-213.43, -23.83) 
 
Constant 
 
-.34  
(-14.02, 13.35) 
 
5.76    
(4.89, 6.63) 
 
 
300.09     
(104.34, 495.84) 
 
Observations 
Number of 
Countries 
486 
19 
175 
18 
53 
20 
Rho  .98    .25    .84    
Note: 95% confidence intervals in parentheses.   
Figure 5.15: CR, Wage Bargaining and PMR 
Our first regression is logistic, since the dependent variable – the presence or absence 
of a CRA – is dichotomous. Wage bargaining centralization has the expected negative 
sign: it is negatively associated with the presence of a CRA (csr1). As expected in H2, 
wage bargaining centralization and CR association establishment move in opposite 
directions, and this relationship is statistically significant at the p<.10 level.  Next, I 
assess the relationship between CRA membership and the centralization of wage 
bargaining. As hypothesized in H2, the relationship is negative and statistically 
significant at the p<.001 level. Finally, we regress product market regulation on CRA 
membership. Because the OECD has only calculated the product market regulation 
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index for three years (1998, 2003, 2008), it does not seem reasonable to assume a 
linear decline of this index to compute the values for the intervening years, the data set 
is small in size. As a result, statistical significance does not reach the p<.10 percentile 
confidence interval.306 However, the sign and size of the coefficient suggest that the 
relationship is significant.      
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
This chapter moves beyond country case-studies to capture the contours of the 
distribution of Corporate Responsibility across the OECD during the past thirty years. 
It is the first empirical analysis for this subject matter using a novel dependent 
variable, business-led Corporate Responsibility Associations (CRAs). The evidence 
provides qualified support for hypothesis H3, the claim that Liberal Market 
Economies get CR earlier than Social- or Coordinated Market Economies. The 
evidence provides strong support for H4, the hypothesis that LMEs have more CR 
than CMEs. Indeed, according to the metric of CRA membership, Anglophone 
countries have vastly more depth in CR than their continental European counterparts. 
Looking at measures of Institutionalized Social Solidarity, countries with centralized 
wage bargaining regimes tend to get CR considerably later than decentralized wage 
bargaining systems. In addition, the international spread of CR is correlated with a 
decline in the top statutory tax rates on capital. Both of these findings support H2, the 
hypothesis that there is an inverse relationship between ISS and CR.  
These findings provide suggestive support for my argument that Corporate 
Responsibility co-evolves with economic liberalization and market liberalism, and 
functions as a substitute for institutionalized forms of social solidarity. With the 
exception of Apostolakou and Jackson (2009), this claim goes straightforwardly 
                                                 
306 See Stephen Ziliak and Deidre McCloskey (2008) for an impassioned and powerful warning against 
“The Cult of Statistical Significance.”  
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against the received orthodoxy of the field. We should, however, be cautious about 
being too strident about this claim or too categorical about the imputed trade-off. The 
trade-off between institutionalized social solidarity and CR which I have inferred from 
this data seems to be especially acute when it comes to the continental Europeans 
versus Anglophone comparison. Nordic countries may fare better; and Hall and 
Soskice’s residual category of Mixed Market Economies does surprisingly well, 
despite higher levels of ISS than LMEs. The greatest shortcoming with the analysis in 
this chapter is that the static nature of the data. My argument is really about 
liberalization episodes, about responses to changes. Further research is necessary to 
find indicators of liberalization episodes that will allow us to assess the effect of 
market-liberal reforms and declining institutionalized social solidarity on countries’ 
propensity to get Corporate Responsibility.   
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
Whither Capitalism and Corporate Responsibility? 
 
I. Introduction 
When Mike Pocock delivered his Ashridge Lecture in 1977, market-liberalism 
was heretical. By 2007, it had become the dominant orthodoxy. But market liberalism 
did not rise unaided. Rather, as Pocock himself prescribed, it was accompanied and 
facilitated by Corporate Responsibility. CR and market-liberalism co-evolve. That is 
the core argument of this thesis, and it gives CR a paradoxical if not ambivalent 
quality: “responsible” business dismantles institutionally mandated responsibility.307 
My argument implies that the public’s lack of confidence and trust in CR is not 
because CR initiatives at the firm and association level are cynical public-relations 
facades devoid of substance.308 Instead, the problem is that they are no match for the 
wave of economic liberalization that has swept across the world, with profound 
impacts on many spheres of life. Although Corporate Responsibility is an expansive 
business agenda, CR is not a genuinely countervailing force against the unfolding of 
economic liberalism. CR is no comparison for the structures of institutionalized social 
solidarity which it in effect substitutes for; and CR appears deficient and inadequate to 
confront the challenges that confront societies in contemporary capitalism. If 
“Corporate” and “Responsibility” are partners, they are very unequal partners. Rather 
than simply summarizing my findings, this conclusion reflects on the limitations and 
generalizability of my argument; on agendas for future research; and on the 
implications of the financial crisis for CR. 
                                                 
307 As Donald Levine points out, the classics including Marx, Durkheim, Simmel, Weber and 
Mannheim were deeply attentive to these issues: “progress begets misery, crime promotes morality, 
intimate acts are socially induced, conflict enhances cohesion, cultural growth creates culturally 
impoverished persons, and rationality both derives from and stimulates irrationality” (Levine, 1978: 
1278-1279).  
308 Although I do not deny that there are such cases, exceptions prove the rule: there are many examples 
of progressive and visionary Corporate Responsibility programs and initiatives at the firm- and 
association level.    
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 It is essential to be clear about of the limitations of my argument. CR’s rise is 
due to the rise of market liberalism and assaults on ISS; but CR’s rise is not 
attributable exclusively to these factors. As with any complex macro-social 
phenomenon, a lot of causal factors are at work, many of them embedded in the 
narratives of chapters 2-5. Many of these complement and supplement the argument of 
this thesis; some of them mitigate it. Figure 6.1 summarizes these factors:  
 
Shoring Up Legitimacy of Capitalism in 
the Context of the Assault on / Decline 
of ISS   
Civil Society Activists and Social 
Movements309 
Reputation and Risk Insurance and other 
Selective Private Benefits310 
Norm Entrepreneurship / Pure  
Moral, Ethical and Religious Motivation 
Federalism312 The Ideological Climate towards 
Business311 
Diffusion, Emulation and Mimicry313 The Intensity of Market Competition314 
 Figure 6.1: The Argument of this Thesis and Alternative Explanations 
Readers may also wonder about the scope conditions of my argument. The macro-
level indicators in chapter 5 associate CR, market-liberal Varieties of Capitalism and 
lower levels of Institutionalized Social Solidarity. But such abstract indicators cannot 
capture the complex co-evolution of CR and market-liberalism on the ground. The 
following section looks briefly at six shadow cases: France, Sweden, Belgium, 
                                                 
309 Civil society activism and social movements may become active in opposition to market-liberalism 
and assaults on ISS. Rather than an alternative, this explanation complements the argument of this 
thesis.  
310 For example advantages in the recruitment and retention of staff.  
311 A very business-hostile ideological climate may engender CR even in the absence of institutional 
reforms. On the other extreme, CR is redundant in a free-market utopia without externalities.  
312 As noted in chapter 5, countries with unitary states tend to get CRAs earlier than federal ones.   
313 The policies of market-liberalism and assaults on ISS (connected with CR) are subject to emulation; 
but CR may also be subject to pure mimicry, unrelated to market-liberalism and erosions of ISS. 
314 The argument here is that competitive markets force firms to find new ways to differentiate 
themselves from their competitors. One way to do so is through CR. In practice, competitive and 
deregulated markets and market liberalism are closely related. But as Jonas Pontusson (2009) has 
argued, deregulated and competitive product markets needn’t be incompatible with ISS. For a more 
cautionary skeptical interpretation of the compatibility of deregulation and ISS, see Amable (2009)  
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Austria, the United States and New Zealand. The first four support my argument, New 
Zealand points beyond it.   
 In chapter 5, France looks strange. Why is France among the first countries to 
get a CRA (in 1987)?315 Claude Bébéar, one of France’s foremost business patricians, 
has been central to both CR and the liberalization of the French economy. Founder and 
long-time CEO of AXA,316 Bébéar has been called the “Godfather of French 
capitalism.” But Bébéar is not just a central figure in French business. He is equally 
central for the development of CR in France. In 1986, just after François Mitterrand 
abandoned his left-wing economic policies and engaged in a “strong Thatcherite 
program,”317 Bébéar founded France’s first CRA. Modelled on BITC, the fondation 
pour le mécénat humanitaire318 now has nearly two-hundred French and multinational 
companies in its membership. In taking the initiative to advance CR not only within 
his company but more broadly within French business and society, Bébéar has 
assumed an important role in the promotion and advancement of CR in France.319 Yet 
Bébéar and AXA have also been at the forefront of the push to liberalize French 
capitalism, as François Morin has shown.320 Bébéar’s repeated statement that he saw 
no value in long-term strategic shareholding is “widely regarded (retrospectively) as 
                                                 
315 As mentioned in chapter 5, France has a unitary and centralized state structure – as do the UK and 
Sweden, the other two early movers.   
316 France’s largest insurer and one of the world’s largest companies 
317 This remark was made by Bruno Amable at a workshop at the Harnack-Haus of the Max-Planck 
Institute for the Study of Societies in Berlin, Germany, on June 4 2010. 
318 The organization is currently known as IMS Entreprendre pour la cite. It was initially called 
“fondation pour le mécénat humanitaire,” then “institut du mécénat de solidarité (IMS)” and then “IMS-
entreprendre pour la cite.” This non-profit organization is committed to improving its member 
companies’ social policies, their relations with their stakeholders, and helping the disadvantaged and 
socially excluded. Bébéar and IMS have launched initiatives for diversity and against the discrimination 
of “visible minorities” in the workplace. CVs should be anonymized to counter discrimination in hiring. 
319 Patrick d' Humières, Alain Chauveau and Claude Bébéar (2001); Sylvère Piquet et Jean-michel 
Tobelem (2006)  
320 In 2000, Morin remarked that AXA, the “key actor and central fulcrum in the French financial 
network  … is deliberately neglecting its power of coordinating and regulating economic  activities … 
Only some investments will still be regarded as truly strategic. The remaining shareholdings will from 
now go into the portfolio of group activities to be managed financially according to Anglo-Saxon 
profitability norms” (Morin, 2000: 41)   
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the moment the system broke down” (Culpepper, 2005: 196).321 Further research will 
be required to determine whether Bébéar has articulated an explicit connection 
between liberalization and CR like his counterparts in the preceding chapters.  
 Sweden, a country with powerful trade unions and comparatively high levels 
of ISS, should be an unlikely case for CR. And it is, according to this representative of 
the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise: 
  
 We are fighting extremely hard to keep CSR corporate and not make certain 
 CSR concepts compulsory for companies. We are extremely militant on 
 keeping CSR voluntary. In another regulatory environment than the Swedish 
 one the companies’ attitudes and our attitudes may be quite different…. [but in 
 Sweden] the room and need for voluntary commitments in the area of social 
 affairs is very small (anonymous, interview, April 03, 2007)  
According to my argument, CR’s limited development within Sweden322 is 
attributable to Sweden’s comparatively high levels of ISS.       
                                                
 The Belgian Employer’s Federation FEB has integrated CR into its lobbying 
agenda. According to the FEB’s Geert Vancronenburg, “the link with CSR is mainly 
in terms of lobbying.” While membership in CRAs is normally reserved for firms, the 
FEB has itself taken out a membership in the Belgian CRA Belgian Business and 
Society. While the latter helps “to sensiblize companies to focus attention on CSR, to 
share information, to exchange good practices,” the FEB’s task is “to monitor that the 
actions the government is taking are corporate friendly. That’s not the task of business 
and society, that’s our task” (Vancronenburg, interview, 01 February 2007). In this 
instance, corporate do-gooders and corporate lobbyists/strategists are different people. 
In this division of labour, the CRA pushes CR while the industry association uses CR 
to facilitate and legitimate its lobbying efforts.  
 
321 See also Schmidt (2002) 
322 I am thinking here especially of the narrow focus of Sweden’s first CR, Swedish Jobs and Society 
(founded in 1987), on job creation, to the neglect of other CR issues. Only Sweden’s second CRA, CSR 
Sweden (founded in 2004), took on the whole CR agenda. But CSR Sweden’s focus is primarily, 
though not exclusively, on the activity of Swedish firms in the developing world.   
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 The connection between CR and industry lobbying is also apparent in Austria. 
“CSR Austria” was founded in 2003 by the Industriellenvereinigung (IV), Austria’s 
large and powerful industry lobby organization,323 and the Austian Chamber of 
Commerce. As Wilhelm Autischer (the first director of CSR Austria) explains, the 
organization’s purpose was to capture and shape the ecological agenda before NGOs 
and trade unions could do so, thereby threatening business interests (Autischer, 
interview, 2007). Even after CSR Austria’s restructuring into RespACT (a CRA in 
which individual companies have membership) in 2005, the IV remains a member, 
contributing (with the Chamber of Commerce) two-thirds of RespACT’s operating 
budget (Mesicek, interview, June 14 2007). When I asked for the IV’s membership’s 
position on CR I was referred to RespACT.324 While this CRA lobbies its members to 
be responsible and sustainable corporate citizens, the IV and Chamber of Commerce 
lobby hard and deep for market-liberal policies.  
The American CRA Business for Social Responsibility (BSR) illustrates the 
impotence of CR in the public policy arena. BSR was founded in 1992 in response to 
progressives’ perception of a “roadblock by the organized business community in 
Washington” against “progressive legislation.” As Bob Dunn, formerly president, 
chairman, and CEO of BSR recalls, the idea was “to galvanize business to influence 
public policy.”325 BSR’s legislative agenda put it in opposition to the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce and the White House Council on Competitiveness: BSR’s top priorities 
included “equitable tax laws and stiffer environmental legislation,” “jobs in the inner 
city” and “the 38 million Americans living below the poverty line” (Strauss, 1992: 
                                                 
323 Similar to the Confederation of German Industry or BDI (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie), 
discussed in chapter 3,  
324 Industriellenvereinigung, personal communication, June 14 2007.  
325 As David C.D. Jacobs remarks, “many of the founders of BSR hoped that it would become an 
alternative to the Chamber of Commerce, lobbying on business issues from a more progressive 
perspective” (Jacobs, 1999: 92). 
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1B).326 BSR testified to secure the passage of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 
1993 (FMLA). But then it ran into problems.   
BSR’s finances were shaky and membership dues were generating little if any 
revenue. In Bob Dunn’s view, these organizational challenges necessitated a more 
fundamental change of course: “in some sense it was more important to influence the 
decisions that were made every day inside of companies and through their networks 
than it was to worry about providing a counter voice on a handful of public policy 
issues” (Dunn, interview, March 10 2010). BSR changed course to focus on the CR 
activities of large companies. Public policy washed out of the system. Not unlike the 
aforementioned Belgian case, Dunn recalls that this new agenda is compatible with 
and complementary to business’s existing public policy objectives: 
 
As we worked with more and more large companies they said they have 
lawyers we’re members of trade associations if you want to be useful don’t tell 
us what you’re doing on public policy we’re covered there if you want to do 
something on CR if that’s a niche you want to fill we’re willing to pay and join 
(Dunn, interview, March 10 2010)  
Dunn’s description summarizes BSR’s transition from an activist CRA composed of 
small owner-operated firms to a cutting-edge professional consultancy focusing on 
designing CR strategies for large, publicly traded firms. The case of BSR can be read 
in different ways. It shows the indeterminacy of structure and the importance of 
agency. In the early 1990s, BSR’s activists saw CR and ISS as complements and 
lobbied for more stringent regulatory standards for all market participants. But it also 
exposes the limitations of agency. It turns out that one can’t get institutionally 
mandated Corporate Responsibility. BSR failed to establish itself as a progressive 
alternative to established business lobbying organizations and raise the level of ISS. 
                                                 
326 “‘We’re tired of hearing the same litany from the old traditional business organizations living with 
antiquated agendas, like the Chamber of Commerce,’” says Arnold Hiatt, one of BSR’s outspoken 
proponents: “We feel using lobbyists just to get special tax breaks, or to defer safety standards and 
pollution control, is the narrow and parochial approach” (Reynolds, 1993: 41-42). 
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These activists were no match for the powerful vested interests and the unruliness, 
restlessness and subversiveness that characterize market liberalism. After this episode, 
BSR changed course. Membership shifted from small, activist, privately-owned firms 
to large, publicly traded ones. With a membership of approximately three-hundred 
such behemoths, BSR has established itself as one of the leading think-tanks and 
professional consultancies on CR in the US and beyond. But it has done so on the 
coattails of market-liberalism, rather than by reigning in the market.     
 Even so, is it not true that market liberalism with CR is better than market 
liberalism without CR? This question arises throughout the thesis, and the answer 
seems clear. If it were not for the actions of Hector Laing and his fellow campaigners 
in Business in the Community, the impact of market liberalism on workers and 
communities would be much worse.327 Of course one must remain cognizant of CR’s 
limitations. For example, BITC’s latest efforts may well make a difference in the 
struggle against the obesity epidemic in the UK. But in comparison with the influence 
of economic insecurity and liberal welfare regimes, two legacies of Thatcherism, 
hallmarks of the market-liberal model and structural/institutional determinants of 
obesity,328 the impact of BITC’s initiatives will be modest. But even if Corporate 
Responsibility is inadequate to fill the gaps left by the erosion and dismantling of 
Institutionalized Social Solidarity, it is better than nothing. But is it really? The 
following section examines the case of New Zealand, which suggests otherwise.  
 
II. The Lessons of New Zealand 
The case of New Zealand challenges the claim that economic liberalization necessarily 
entails CR. It is the empirical justification for formulating my argument in terms of 
elective affinities rather than in straightforward causal terms. Beginning with trade and 
                                                 
327 The same can be plausibly argued for each of the Corporate Responsibility Associations that are the 
primary focus of this thesis. 
328 Offer, Pechey and Ulijaszek (2010) 
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capital account liberalization in 1984 and accelerating with labor market reform and 
welfare state retrenchment beginning in 1991, New Zealand underwent an economic 
transformation that was, according to John Huber and Evelyn Stephens, “the most 
radical implemented in any industrial democracy” (Huber and Stephens, 2001: 300). 
John Reardon and Tim Gray state that NZ’s market-liberal turn involved “a 
programme of privatization that was faster, deeper, and broader than either Reaganism 
in the USA or Thatcherism in the UK” (Reardon and Grey, 2007: 447).329 For Georg 
Menz, “New Zealand is a paradigmatic or ‘textbook’ example of adopting the policies 
of the New Right, restructuring and fundamentally reshaping the structure, function, 
and aims of the state” (Menz, 2005: 66, 58). As Jack H. Nagel remarks:  
 
Between 1984 and 1993, New Zealand underwent radical economic reform, 
 moving from what had probably been the most protected, regulated, and state-
 dominated system of any capitalist democracy to an extreme position at the 
 open, competitive, free-market end of the spectrum …. The pace and extent of 
 systemic economic change in New Zealand during the reform years was 
 breathtaking (Nagel, 1998: 223; 229) 
The reforms resulted in “a clear upward trend of absolute poverty rates during the late 
1980s and early 1990s” and an increase in inequality of 6.1 percent as measured by the 
Gini Index, as compared with the OECD average of 1.4 percent between the mid-
1980s and mid-1990s (Starke, 2008: 149, 150). Ian Grant notes that during the period 
of market-liberal reforms, “the business community revelled, uninhibitedly, in a 
climate of economic freedom never experienced in New Zealand before” (Grant, 
personal communication, November 21, 2008). These radical reforms were facilitated 
by one of the most concentrated systems of political authority and representation in the 
liberal democratic world.  
                                                 
329 The intellectual inspiration for New Zealand’s economic reforms came from thinkers including 
Mancur Olson, Ronald Coase, and James Buchanon, and from theories including public choice theory, 
agency theory, and transaction cost economics (Darwall, 2003: 63). 
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 The implications of my argument for the New Zealand case are clear: such an  
extreme example of market-liberal reform should be accompanied by the rise of CR, 
as happened in so many other countries with less radical reforms. However, “the most 
thoroughgoing economic reform in the OECD” (Kelsey, 1995: 8) was accompanied by 
hostility rather than endorsement of CR by the New Zealand business community until 
the late-1990s – a substantial time lag.330 Ian F Grant, who has covered CR in NZ 
extensively over the past twenty years, reports that he 
 
 was surprised …how little had been written about business ethics and 
 corporate responsibility until the late 1990s. In fact, I found no articles – a 
 good sign of both any initiatives and levels of consciousness in any major 
 business publications until the first series I wrote in 1990-1991, a good half 
 decade after the ‘freeing up’ of the NZ economy under ‘Rogernomics’ (Grant, 
 personal communication, November 21, 2008)   
During the harshest years of economic adjustment, there was no CRA in New 
Zealand.331 Only in 1998 did CR arrive, at last. Dick Hubbard, an Auckland-based 
breakfast cereal manufacturer, committed £22,000 of his personal funds to launch 
New Zealand Business for Social Responsibility, New Zealand’s first CRA. 
Hubbard’s justification for CR reads like countless others in preceding chapters: 
Hubbard “said that economic power has been transferred to the private sector. With 
power, comes a moral obligation to be socially responsible.”332     
New Zealand shows that CR does not necessarily accompany liberalization. 
While this thesis shows that the rise of CR tends to accompany the erosion of ISS in 
most OECD countries, even in very different institutional environments during the 
                                                 
330 According to Juliet Roper, “the terms ‘social responsibility’ or ‘business responsibility’ were not 
even publicly considered prior to 1998, although the general public wanted changes in policy that 
would restore a balance of social and economic perspectives. The fact that business fought moves to 
bring about those changes was a reflection of the almost complete dominance of neoliberal free-market 
ideology at that time” (2004: 22) 
331 According to Mike O’Massey, “there were no significant business groupings looking at [CR] during 
the 1980s” (Mike O’Massey, personal communication, June 30, 2008). 
332 “Soul Business” NZ Business 30 September 1998, p. 7 
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past decades, New Zealand powerfully shows that it does not invariably do so, even in 
the most extreme case. In the UK, Germany, and elsewhere, Corporate Responsibility 
was embraced by the business community to provide credibility for the corporate 
takeover bid of utility and social service provision, and to legitimate and secure 
business against unfavorable sentiments from the general population. And crucial for 
the argument of this thesis, CR was not only embraced for these instrumental reasons, 
it also provided a strong normative foundation for the reformers. Why did this not take 
place in NZ? New Zealand attests to the contingent and ideationally-mediated333 
relationship between businesses’ institutional and regulatory environment on one 
hand, and the rise of CR on the other. 
There are at least three explanations for CR’s late arrival in New Zealand. 
Firm-size may play a role: New Zealand’s economy is composed of small, privately 
owned firms.334 Economic circumstances are relevant. Severe recessions can deprive 
companies of the resources they need to practice CR; and the recession of the early 
1990s was especially severe. But most interesting for our present purposes is the 
dogmatic ideological fervor of the market-liberal reformers, which made CR 
redundant (in their eyes) for the purposes of pragmatic legitimation.335 As Ian Grant 
remarks, “the new right politicians and business ‘leaders’ of the 1980s-90s were quite 
fanatical in their pursuit of the Chicago School of Economics agenda” (Grant, personal 
communication, November 24, 2008).  
                                                 
333 See Abdelal, Blyth and Parsons (2010) 
334 as opposed to large and publicly traded firms. Small, privately owned firms are less likely to 
communicate their CR activities than their large publicly traded counterparts. As Gordan Duncan 
remarks, “Over 90% of NZ business are small in scale - with under 20 employees.  Generally these are 
privately owned and connected to their local communities.  Typically they are called on to donate 
products or services for raffle prizes etc for schools, churches etc and often respond generously.  
Farmers for example will often drop around a bit of meat or produce to help a person in need.  These 
gifts are often deliberately not acknowledged, partly due to an innate reserve or modesty on the part of 
many such operators but also because if acknowledged their worry was they would be inundated with 
other requests from worthy causes” (Dunan, personal communication, February 11, 2009).     
335 On the other hand, New Zealand’s openness to foreign capital and dependence on foreign markets 
should have fostered the adoption of CR by NZ business. 
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The New Zealand Business Roundtable (NZBR) was at the forefront of the 
market-liberal revolution in New Zealand from 1984 until the mid-1990s.336 The 
NZBR has spoken out against CR on numerous occasions. For example, NZBR co-
organized, with the Institute of Economic Affairs, the UK’s pre-eminent market-
liberal think-tank, and published a much-cited denunciation of CR by David 
Henderson titled Misguided Virtue: False Notions of Corporate Social 
Responsibility.337 Roger Kerr, Executive Director of the NZBR, has publicly 
denounced CR on several occasions.338    
 This dismissal is puzzling in light of the fallout precipitated by NZ’s market-
liberal reforms. In a 1993 referendum, following the harshest dose of shock therapy 
and welfare retrenchment in the OECD, NZ voters voted to replace the simple 
plurality / first-past-the-post with a Mixed-Member Proportional Representation 
(MMP) electoral system.339 This shift has ushered in an era of moderate, centrist 
political-economic and social policy in NZ. The MMP system has been criticized by 
Kerr for leading to “paralysis” rather than market-liberal policy (Kerr, 2005). My 
argument implies that if NZ business hadn’t chosen this rocky path – if they had 
mitigated some of the fallout from liberalization with CR, as did their counterparts in 
Thatcher’s Britain – then the backlash may not have been as great. Whether CR’s 
impact would have been sufficient to take the wind out of the sails of initiatives for 
                                                 
336 Ian Grant, Personal Communication, November 24, 2008.  
337 Henderson (2001) 
338 Kerr states, for example, that CR “in the form criticized by David Henderson seems to have been a 
passing fad in New Zealand” (Kerr, personal correspondence, September 16 2008). See also Kerr 
(2004, 2010) and Wolf (2004). Wolf makes a number of good points, stating for example that 
“Companies cannot save the planet by voluntary action. They should not pretend they can” (Wolf, 
2004: 14).  
339 Like the one used in Germany. While the simple majority system produces large majorities, strong 
government mandates and quick decisions, but at the possible cost of leaving many political voices and 
constituencies unrepresented. MMP represents a greater plurality of societal groups and interests, but 
this greater stability may be offset by the negotiations and consultation that typifies coalition 
governments. Since the switch to MMP, NZ governments have steered a much more moderate course 
than during the 1980s-1990s. 
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electoral reform is impossible to know for sure. Yet there is suggestive evidence that 
CR could have been effective.340 CR preserves a business-friendly climate of market 
freedoms while mitigating some of the market’s negative side-effects. NZ business 
representatives’ ideological fervour and their dogmatic their insistence on 
complementarity as similarity rather than as difference ended up being costly for the 
market-liberals.341 
 The NZ case striking not only for the non-coincidence of CR and radical 
market-liberal retrenchment, but also because institutional reforms following 
liberalization have actually strengthened ISS. As Peter Starke observes, “MMP has 
changed New Zealand politics” (Starke, 2008: 125). As Iversen and Soskice show, the 
divide between Proportional Representation and majoritarian systems is politically 
salient: center-left parties are more powerful in PR systems, center-right parties are 
more powerful in majoritarian systems; PR systems are more redistributive and 
majoritarian systems less so. And Starke confirms: NZ’s coalition politics following 
the switch to MPP are much less conducive to retrenchment.342 Since 1999, “the 
overall theme of social policy in New Zealand has not been retrenchment but 
reconstruction and, in some areas, expansion (Starke, 2008: 131). Income inequality in 
New Zealand increased markedly between 1983 and 1998. But the period following 
the switch to MMP saw a decrease in inequality343 and a “reversal of past 
                                                 
340 Against the background of a highly-regulated and authoritarian system of ISS, NZ’s newly-found 
“climate of [economic] freedom” enjoyed legitimacy. Mike O’Massey speaks of “the authoritarian 
regime which had preceded that and the new found ‘freedoms’ coming out of the changes” (O’Massey, 
personal communication, June 30, 2008). 
341 Although the NZ labor government (in power from 1984-1990) combined radical economic policies 
with “at least some left-wing social and foreign policies” (Reardon and Gray, 2007: 451) and viewed 
the welfare state as a necessary buffer to compensate for the negative consequences of Rogernomics” 
(Sarke, 2008: 149)4 the inattention to the economic sphere ended up being costly for NZ market 
liberals. My intention is not to provide advice on how to implement market-liberal reforms that can put 
a lasting lid on institutionalized social solidarity.  
342 Starke (2008: 124) 
343 See Hyslopw and Marez (2005) for the period from 1983-1998 and Hyslop and Yahanpath (2006) 
for the period from 1998-2004. 
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retrenchment initiatives” in some areas (Starke, 2008: 124). Although these reforms 
fall short of restoring New Zealand’s pre-1991 welfare state,344 they have strengthened 
it.345  
 The New Zealand case underlines the importance of agency and the 
indeterminacy of political-economic structures and institutions. Liberalization does not 
invariably co-evolve with CR, even with very high values of the former. And radical 
liberalization and a delayed onset of CR can have beneficial consequences, leading to 
a strengthening of ISS, a true “re-embedding” of the economy and society. It is 
unclear whether this pathway is generalizable, and it seems hazardous to counsel 
against CR on the basis that doing without it will be sufficient to raise ISS. And if 
market-liberalism without CR does not lead to a strengthening of ISS, CR is indeed 
“second-best,” better than nothing.   
 
III. The Agenda for Future Research 
 
 However successful this thesis is at linking CR, liberalization and market-
liberalism, it leaves many questions unanswered. What do firms actually do when they 
practice CR? What is the relationship between CR and ISS in the Global South, where 
levels of institutionalized solidarity are much lower than across Europe and the 
OECD? As important and pressing as these questions are, it is prudent to strengthen 
existing foundations before erecting new bridges. This section lays out a research 
agenda that emerges from my existing work.  
  Apart from brief discussions in chapters 2 and 4, this thesis has little to say 
about firms and transnational processes at the macro-level. This section lays out a 
research agenda into transnational power structures using transnational intra-firm 
networks as units-of-analysis. There are two justifications for a transnational network 
                                                 
344 Starke (2008: 120) 
345 New Zealand shows that a modest strengthening of ISS is compatible with the rise of CR.  
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perspective. First, although it would be foolish to discount the importance of national 
political-economic institutions for economic performance and distributive outcomes, 
methodological nationalism misses a lot of important developments in a world of 
porous borders and states-in-markets. These developments cannot be accounted for 
with states or national-level developments as the units of analysis. Second, it is 
necessary to shed more light on the firms that practice Corporate Responsibility, if 
they are indeed “driving forces for the transformation of capitalisms in different 
national settings,” as Andreas Nölke suggests (Nölke, 2009: 30).  
 The research agenda for trans-national power structures emerges from an 
original data set, compiled by the author, comprising the annual membership data of 
Europe’s CRAs since 1990. Although CRAs are typically nationally-based 
organizations,346 not all CRA members are indigenous. There are a handful of 
companies that are simultaneously members in many different CRAs across Europe 
and the world. Borrowing a term from Eelke Heemskerk, I call these firms “Big 
Linkers.”347 Though small in number, I argue that these firms are powerful actors, and 
can be seen as part of the “leading edge” of contemporary CR.348 Following a highly 
influential distinction between compulsory, institutional, structural and productive 
power, by Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, I propose that an examination of 
these intra-firm networks can expose Corporate Responsibility’s trans-national power 
structures.349   
                                                 
346 The majority of the British CRA Business in the Community’s membership is British, the majority 
of the German CRA Econsense’s members are German, the majority of IMS Entreprendre’s 
membership is French. 
347 Hemmskerk (2007) 
348 This term is used by Michael Useem (1984) to characterize “a politicized leading edge of the 
leadership of a number of large business firms … [which] has come to play a major role in defining and 
promoting the shared needs of large corporations in two of the industrial democracies, the United States 
and the United Kingdom.” Useem’s inner circle is “rooted in intercorporate networks through shared 
ownership and directorship” (Useem, 1984: 3), which does not apply to the transnational CR networks 
in this chapter.  
349 I am grateful to Peter Katzenstein for this suggestion. I should note that my analysis differs from 
Barnett and Duvall’s in some respects. Barnett and Duvall use the example of the UN Global Compact 
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 What is interesting is that the “Big-Linkers” of European CR have something 
in common: both firms and CRAs with high network centrality are overwhelmingly 
market-liberal or Anglo-American: they have their headquarters in the UK or the 
US.350 The following figures, excerpted from an unpublished paper,351 illustrate the 
centrality of Anglo-American CRAs and firms. Network centrality refers to how well 
connected each entity is to the others in the network. Figure 6.1 shows the network 
centrality of the fifteen most central firms in the network of European CRAs in 1990 
and 2007, ranked from greatest to least. 
  
                                                                                                                                            
to suggest that CR illuminates the connections between compulsory, institutional, and productive power 
(Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 61). My working assumption is that Barnett and Duvall commit the common 
error of overestimating the salience and coercive power of protestors and civil society organizations, 
and underestimating the unruliness, restlessness and subversiveness of capital and capitalism vis-à-vis 
societal institutions. According to this view, CR is a hybrid of institutional, structural, and productive 
power. 
350 The big-four auditors and professional service firms constitute a smaller but important sub-group. 
351 Kinderman (2010) 
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1992 2007 
KPMG KPMG 
BP Coca-Cola 
PriceWaterHouseCoopers Johnson & Johnson 
British Gas Microsoft 
Barclays Orange / France Telecom 
ICI  Deloitte 
IBM IBM 
Shell PricewaterhouseCoopers 
Grand Met / Diageo Ernst & Young 
American Express Danone 
3M Vodafone 
Coca-Cola Shell 
Credit Suisse GlaxoSmithKline 
Axa Diageo 
DHL Citigroup 
Grey Background = Anglo-American  
Figure 6.1: 
 15 Firms with the Highest Network Centrality in European CRAs  
Data source: Kinderman (2010) 
In 1990, eleven of the fifteen most central firms were Anglo-American. In 2007, nine 
of the fifteen most central firms were Anglo-American. Only a small number of firms 
(two in 1990 and another two in 2007) are from Coordinated- or State-led economies. 
This evidence dovetails with hypothesis H2, the claim that Corporate Responsibility is 
a market-liberal substitute for institutionalized social solidarity.352 One-fifth of the 
total are auditors / professional services firms organized as limited liability 
partnerships. In 2007, all of the “big four” global auditing and professional service 
firms353 were among the top ten firms with the highest network centrality in Europe’s 
trans-national CR networks. The prominence of these auditing and professional 
service firms is striking and demands further research.354    
                                                 
352 If one accepts the argument that there is something distinctively liberal / LME-like about the 
(frequently cutthroat) corporate culture of auditing, professional service and consulting firms, the 
argument is further strengthened.  
353  KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young, and Deloitte. 
354 In 1994, Michael Power remarked that “the word audit is being used in the UK with growing 
frequency …. There is a real sense in which 1990s Britain has become an ‘audit society’” (Power, 1994: 
1). In his highly acclaimed work on the “audit society,” Power makes the connection with market 
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 Although Anglo-American firms only constitute a very small proportion of the 
total membership of CRAs across Europe, they occupy positions of very high network 
centrality, comprising 58% of the network of “Big Linkers.” When it comes to CRAs, 
the picture is hardly less striking. Although Anglo-American CRAs comprise only five 
of twenty-four or approximately one-fifth of the total number of CRAs for which 
membership data is available, these CRAs comprise 38% of total network 
centrality.355 These summary statistics are useful because socio-grams of large 
networks can be difficult to interpret. Figure 6.2 shows the full network of European 
CR for 2007, with Anglo-American firms and CRAs in red, accounting firms in grey, 
and all other firms and CRAs in black. Only firms with high network centrality, those 
with memberships in at least two CRAs, are shown. A node’s size indicates its 
eigenvector centrality, its connection to the well-connected or centrality in the network
as a whole.  The greater the size, the h
 
igher the centrality.356  
                                                                                                                                            
  
liberalism unmistakably clear: “political demands for greater accountability of public service providers 
became  tightly coupled to a neo-liberal preference for exercising economic control at a distance 
through the managerialist instruments of accounting, budgetary control, auditing, and quality assurance. 
In short, the audit explosion emerges from a broader set of changes under the label of ‘new public 
management’” (NPM) (Power, 2003: 191). The audit explosion is associated with financialization, and 
took place in the 1980s in the UK (Power, 2003: 193). Auditing is integral to the economic culture of 
market liberalism, and the market for professional auditing and accounting firms is correspondingly 
large. 
355 See the Appendix.  
356 Unlike degree centrality, which is simply a measure of the numbers of links of a given node, 
eigenvector centrality takes into account that not all links are equal. So a node (or firm) with a lower 
number of links to other well-connected actors may have a higher eigenvector score than a node (or 
firm) with a higher number of links to more peripheral nodes (Bonacich, 2007)  
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Figure 6.2: The Transnational Networks of CR in Europe, c. 2007 
  
 
329
  
Judging by the prominence of Anglo-American firms and CRAs in these transnational 
networks, it seems that market-liberal institutional environments have prepared these 
actors to play significant roles the international CR arena of liberalizing Europe.357 
Future empirical research will be needed to determine what role the highly central 
Anglo-American firms and the big four auditors play in constructing facts, resolving 
disagreements and setting the programmatic agenda of CRAs and of CR more 
generally.358 Causal mechanisms359 may prove useful for analyzing these processes. 
Causal mechanisms are usually conceptualized and operationalized at the micro-level, 
where they could bring greater clarity into businesspeople’s motivations for CR 
engagement.360 But causal mechanisms can also operate at the collective level,361 
making them especially relevant for the interactions between Anglo-American firms, 
CRAs, and the broader CR environment.  
  
                                                 
357 CR is part of American firms’ self-understanding and practice in the domestic context, and it is an 
understanding they self-consciously wield abroad. This understanding is functional, in that the social 
deficits caused by the lack of an extensive welfare state are much greater in the United States than in 
continental Europe. Paradoxically, the US’s low-level of institutionalized social solidarity, which may 
be sub-optimal not only from an equity but also from an efficiency point of view (Pontusson, 2005), 
puts American companies in a strong position to play a leading role in Europe. The American 
institutional framework plays an essential role in these firms’ self-understanding (Tregaskis, Edwards, 
Ferner and Marginson: 2010).  
358 I am grateful to Richard W. Miller for his suggestion to investigate Big Linkers’ role in situations of 
discord within CRAs.     
359 See Elster (1998); Gerring (2001: 195-196; 2011); Hedström, 1998, Hedström and Swedberg, 1998;  
MacAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001, Tilly (2001; 2003). Qualitative Comparative Analysis and Fuzzy-
Sets offer a related, and equally promising approach. See Ragin (1987; 2000; 2008).  
360 Causal mechanisms can be thought of as the “glue” that links cause and effect at the micro-level. For 
Jon Elster, mechanisms show the “cogs and wheels” of the internal causal machinery (Elster, 1998). 
Elster defines causal mechanisms as “frequently occurring and easily recognizable causal patterns that 
are triggered under generally unknown conditions or with indeterminate consequences” (Elster, 1999: 
1). Although mechanisms are not to be confused with intentionality, the two are interrelated, as Elster 
argues: “the individual action guided by some intension” is the most basic element of explanation in the 
social sciences (Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 85; Elster, 1983: 20). The methods used to establish causal 
mechanisms include process tracing. (Gerring, 2001: 195; George and Bennett 2005), and often take the 
form of a motive (Gerring, 2001: 196) and structured individual agency (Little, 2009: 171; 169) 
361 I am grateful to Peter Katzenstein for pointing this out to me. See Sil and Katzenstein (2011) and 
Tilly (2001). 
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IV. Corporate Responsibility, the Financial Crisis, and Capitalism 
 
What does the financial crisis imply for CR? According to my analysis, the effect of 
the financial crisis on CR will depend on the effect of the financial crisis on 
Institutionalized Social Solidarity (ISS). If the financial crisis leads to a “re-
embedding of markets” and a strengthening of ISS, then CR will tend to diminish. If 
the financial crisis has no impact on ISS, then its impact on CR is indeterminate: 
current trends should persist. If the financial crisis leads to a retrenchment of ISS, CR 
should increase. At the time of writing and in the wake of the financial crisis, no 
significant “re-embedding” or strengthening of ISS can be discerned. The persistent 
dearth of ISS suggests that CR is here to stay.  
 Interpretations according to which the financial crisis has ushered in the end of 
market liberalism face the problem that policymakers seem intent on reviving the 
ailing patient. To be sure, “the crisis has led to an unprecedented return of state 
involvement in the economy, including the redrawing of the rules for global finance” 
(Zimmermann, 2010: 136).362 But according to one interpretation, this not a departure 
from market liberalism tout court as an ideological or organizational paradigm. 
Rather, these regulations will help to make market liberalism work again. They signify 
a shift from an ideological to a more pragmatic form of market liberalism.  
                                                 
362 Although Bruno Amable remarks that “considering the seriousness of the crisis, surprisingly little 
has been done by way of regulating the international financial system” (Amable, 2010: 538). Amable 
views “the financial and economic crisis is an interesting test of the ‘power of ideas.’ As an ideology, 
the doctrine of deregulation and market self-regulation was brutally devalued with the crisis; one should 
expect, on the basis of the force of rational arguments alone, a significant turnaround in the ideological 
mood and a break with the priority given to neoliberal reforms. However, if one is more skeptical about 
the power of ideas and more confident in the power of (economic, social, military etc.) power, one is 
inclined to be less convinced about the reality of the ‘return to Keynesianism’ or the ‘return of the 
state.’ The neoliberal reforms that were implemented more or less comprehensively in developed and 
developing countries over the last three decades were not so much the result of the scientific superiority 
of neoliberal ideas but rather the outcome of a social and political struggle between social groups. The 
social forces that were powerful enough to impose liberalization are not very likely to make amends 
following the near-collapse of the world financial system” (Amable, 2010: 538). 
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The extent to which re-regulation is connected with an agenda to socially 
discipline the market is unclear at best. State ownership of banks is necessary to 
prevent the collapse of global financial markets, but it is viewed as something to 
dispense with and get out of as quickly as possible. Despite the precipitous collapse of 
finance, deviations from the market-liberal norm are viewed from within a market-
liberal value-system. Those who hastily proclaim the passing of market-liberalism 
have forgotten that “varieties of market liberalism” include both German state-
interventionist Ordoliberalism and Anglophone market liberal varieties. If the current 
crisis involves a transition from the latter towards the former, we remain firmly within 
the market liberal camp.363 Many things are now on policy agendas that were not on 
the table three years ago, but a significant strengthening of ISS is not one of them.364 
There is at present no politically potent alternative ideology to market-liberal 
capitalism. In the depths of its deepest crisis since the 1930s, market-liberal capitalism 
is hegemonic.365 How did this extraordinary state of affairs come about? The answer 
has partly to do with the lack of any real or perceived alternative to market liberal 
forms of economic organization, but also with the tenaciousness of market liberalism 
itself: radical contingency looks different. As I have argued in the chapters above, CR 
has played an important role in normalizing and legitimating this regime. In view of 
the grave fiscal, structural and legitimacy problems facing advanced capitalist states 
and the global economy, market liberalism is not loved. But it has no serious rival. 
The financial crisis has not dented market-liberalism in the policy realm. 
                                                 
363 See Mirowski and Plehwe (2009)   
364 In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the EU Commission convened a series of workshops on 
companies’ environmental, social and governance (ESG) information. These workshops culminated in 
five scenarios, ranging from the status quo / no change to far-reaching mandatory ESG disclosure. See. 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sustainable-business/corporate-social-responsibility/reporting-
disclosure/swedish-presidency/files/summaries/6-final_workshop_en.pdf  
365 It is useful to recall Colin Leys in the context of Thatcherism: “for an ideology to be hegemonic, it is 
not necessary that it be loved. It is merely necessary that it have no serious rival” (Leys, 1990: 127). 
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The financial crisis has dramatically increased deficits and public debt across 
the OECD – so much so that it is appropriate to speak again of a “fiscal crisis of the 
state.”366 In many cases, a further retrenchment of ISS will be unavoidable. Thus, far 
from reducing CR, the financial crisis will likely lead to an increase of CR in many 
countries as a compensatory response to the reduction of public services in advanced 
capitalist states.367 Once again, the UK provides a good example.  
On October 20, 2010, UK Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne 
unveiled his plans for laying off half a million public sector employees and cutting 
public sector spending by £81bn over the next four years. Unlike Margaret Thatcher, 
Prime Minister David Cameron’s Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition 
government has shied away from direct attacks on organized labor.368 But Cameron’s 
public sector cuts are on a larger scale than those initiated by Thatcher. Unsurprisingly 
given his ideological and political commitments, Cameron has sought to enlist 
companies to contribute towards the Tories’ “Big Society.” In return for tackling 
social problems, business will be rewarded with business-friendly legislation and 
deregulation. On October 21, 2010, Stephen Howard, chief executive of the UK CRA 
BITC, gave his opinion on the biggest spending cuts since the 1970s:369 
  
 While it is too early to know exactly how the impact of yesterday’s settlement 
 will be felt, we can be sure that there will be some pretty big changes to the 
 status quo. This presents businesses and organizations like Business in 
 Community with challenges to overcome but, more importantly, with 
 opportunities to work in new and exciting ways and re-examine their core 
 practices. We believe businesses are uniquely placed to capitalize on some of 
 the possibilities afforded by a reduction in some activities run by the state. 
                                                 
366 O’Conner (1973) 
367 Reinhard and Rogoff (2009) 
368 The persistent weakness of labor in post-Thatcherite and Blairite Britain has obviated the need for 
such attacks. See Daniels and McIlroy (2009).  
369 There is scarcely better evidence of the bi-partisan support for CR than the UK. CR began under 
Callaghan’s Labor government, flourished under Thatcher and Major’s Conservatives, continued its rise 
under Blair and Brown, and no change is in sight under Cameron’s Conservative/Lib Dem coalition.   
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 Indeed we have been mobilising our member companies to work 
 collaboratively in the most disadvantaged communities over the last 28 years  
Stephen Howard and BITC’s 850+ members will be keeping very busy trying to 
mitigate the fallout from this retrenchment; and Cameron’s government will face the 
difficult task of maintaining corporate discretion and freedom of maneuver in the face 
of escalating societal demands. What Howard does not acknowledge in his address is 
that the scale and sheer quantity of ensuing social problems will almost certainly 
outstrip the resources and capacities of BITC, the oldest, largest, and most advanced 
CRA in the entire OECD. But this gap has been a persistent, if variable, feature of the 
market-liberal order, and to date it has not led to a fundamental questioning of either 
CR or of the market-liberal order.     
Irrespective of the current crisis, capitalism is here to stay for the foreseeable 
future. And at the core of capitalism are capitalists: unruly, restless, and subversive 
vis-à-vis the constraints of societal institutions. As Streeck remarks, “Institutionalized 
social obligations in a capitalist economy are permanently in danger of being 
subverted, if not at once, then slowly and incrementally” (Streeck, 2009: 245). CR, 
then, is eminently useful for capitalism: it is at minimum a “spirit” or “economic 
ethic” that allows businesspeople to appease their conscience while scaling back ISS 
(as need be); and at maximum a way to moderate the destructive consequences of the 
“widening and deepening of market relations” (Streeck, 2008: 9). Moreover, CR does 
these things in conformity with the system, rather than by subduing it, as does ISS. CR 
relieves some of market liberalism’s morbid symptoms, but these efforts and effects 
are limited by CR’s fundamental alignment with market liberalism.   
 
V. Conclusion 
 
The findings of this thesis are unsettling; this conclusion reflects on some of its 
implications. As the UN Special Representative on Business and Human Rights, John 
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Ruggie has pioneered initiatives to protect human rights using CR during the past 
decade. As part of his policy advocacy, Ruggie has articulated positions that serve as a 
useful foil for my argument. Ruggie’s scholarly fame and notoriety derives in large 
part from his coining of the term “embedded liberalism.”370 Ruggie suggests that CR 
is a means to resurrect the embedded liberalism compromise, for “taking embedded 
liberalism global” (Ruggie, 2007: 34).371 This is a laudable policy objective; but this 
statement cannot be taken as a description of the way the world actually works.372 In 
fact, the opposite is the case. Instead of re-embedding global liberalism, CR has been 
associated with the disembedding of global liberalism, with the erosion and 
dismantling of the domestic institutions of Institutionalized Social Solidarity in Europe 
and across the OECD.  
 What about David Vogel’s widely-discussed thesis of a “Market for 
Virtue?”373 Vogel suggests that there is a market for corporate virtuousness, just as 
there is a market for corporate vice. For Vogel, CR is real, but it’s a niche market. This 
thesis suggests that Vogel’s notion of a market for virtue is insufficiently institutional 
and insufficiently political. The market for virtue is determined not only by limited 
consumer demand and civil society activism but also by political struggles over where 
to place the “fences” that delimit the sphere of market behavior.374 Thus, the loss of 
power by champions of ISS, such as trade unions,375 expands of the market for 
                                                 
370 Ruggie (1982) 
371 Ruggie states that “Haltingly and erratically, something akin to an embedded liberalism compromise 
is being pulled and pushed into the global arena, and the corporate connection is a key element in that 
process” (Ruggie, 2003: 118). 
372 At least in Europe and the OECD, the focus of my thesis. However great the erosion and dismantling 
of ISS in these countries, human rights are largely intact here. The situation is very different in the 
developing world, the primary focus of Ruggie’s work.  
373 Vogel (2005) 
374 Finn (2006) 
375 “The challenge for labour is to prevent CSR from becoming a substitute for the proper role of 
governments and trade unions” (Justice, 2002: 1). This thesis underlines the salience of these remarks 
by Dwight Justice.  
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virtue.376  
 What is the alternative to CR and market-liberalism? It is here that critiques of 
CR run out of steam. In developing countries, Vogel points out that CR “should be 
compared not to an ideal world of effective command-and-control regulations in 
developed countries but to real-world alternatives” (Vogel, 2008: 276). In northern 
Europe, comparisons to the status quo ante of powerful trade unions, expansive 
welfare states and market-correcting legislation are more easily made. Here I am 
inclined to agree with Avner Offer, who remarks that “The solutions of the past, which 
relied on mandatory participation, public management, and an explicit social contract, 
have done a reasonably good job in their time, and have a good deal to teach us still”  
(Offer, 2006: 372). At present, no one knows whether it will be possible to put the cat 
of market liberalism back in the bag; or whether it will be possible or what it would 
take to transition from CR and Williamsonian market-liberal institutions to more 
Durkheimian ones. In any case, CR would seem to be highly ambivalent, given its 
inadequacy for confronting the central challenges facing societies in contemporary 
capitalism, and given that many of these most pressing problems will be impossible to 
solve on voluntarist terms. 
 
 
 
                                                 
376 John Campbell (2006) argues that institutionalized forms of social solidarity promote responsible 
corporate behavior and CR. He is right about the former but wrong about the latter. Work on CR must 
make clear and fine-grained distinctions between Corporate Responsibility as voluntary corporate 
conduct on one hand and aggregate social outcomes on the other.   
  
 
336
  
APPENDIX 
 
Interviews 
 
Adou, Julia. Ford (2006). Cologne. February 2. 
Altmeppen, Johannes (2007). Vattenfall. Berlin. June 6.  
Angerler, Eva (2007). Gewerkschaft der Privatangestellten. Vienna. June 15.   
Ahrens, Jessica (2007). Deutsche Bahn. August 2.  
Anonymous EU Commission Official (2006). Brussels. October 19.  
Anonymous MP (2006). London. November 22.  
Arnold, Michael (2006). Philias. Zurich. March 10.  
Autischer, Wilhelm (2007). Austrian Ministry of the Environ. Vienna. June 14. 
Bachmann, Günther (2008) German Council for Sustainable Development. Berlin. 
February 12.  
Barber, Samantha (2007). President SBC. Edinburgh. April 25.  
Barnard, Linda (2006). Bank of England. London. November 26.  
Barry, Mike (2007). Marks and Spencer. London. July 24.  
Baumeister, Thomas (2006). Deutsche Bank. Frankfurt. August 16. 
Baun, Sabine (2008). Berlin. Ministry for Social Affairs. January 22.  
Baxter, Celia (2007). Bunzl. July 19.  
Bergstein, Wolfgang (2007). Degussa. Essen. June 18. 
Bergström, Åsa-Pia Järliden (2007). LO. Stockholm. April 3. 
Bishop, Helen (2006). Rolls-Royce. London. November 29. 
Boler, Bill (2007). BITC. July 20. 
Borthwick, George (2007). Chair of SBC. Edinburgh. April 25.  
Boßmeyer, Caroline (2005). Econsense. November 11.  
Boyd, Stephen (2007). Scottish Trades Union Confederation. June 23.  
Bradley, Dugdale (2007). SBC. Edinburgh. April 17. 
Brew, Peter (2006). IBLF. London. November 22. 
Brittan, Samuel (2007). Financial Times. London. July 25. 
Brockmann, Rainer (2007). EON Westfalen-Weser. May 15.  
Bullock, Christopher (2007). London. July 24.  
Bürsch, Michael (2006). German MP. Berlin. April 27. 
Casals, Ruth (2007). European Coalition for Corporate Justice. Brussels. May 4. 
Castor, Tanja (2007). BASF. Ludwigshafen. May 10.  
Cavelle, Kate (2007). Deutsche Bank. London. November 23.  
Christie, Allan (2006). EBNSC / CSR Europe. London. November 20.  
Cleverdon, Julia (2007). CEO of BITC. London. July 17. 
Cooke, James (2007). CEO of Special Programs Unit. London. July 13. 
Cress, Bryan (2006). CBI London. November 23.  
Damm, Diethelm (2007). UPJ. Wiesbaden. January 16.  
Daniel, Hans (2006). VCI. Frankfurt. August 8. 
Davies, Ben (2007). CSR Europe, Brussels. May. 02.  
Davis, Peter (2007). London. July 18. 
Doane, Deborah (2006). London. November 23. 
  
 
337
  
Dodd, Thomas (2007). DG Enterprise. Berlin. June 11. 
DTI. Department of Trade and Industry (2006). London. November 24.   
Duffner, Elmar (2007). Poggenpohl Furniture. Herford. May 11.  
Dunn, Robert H. (2010). Synergos and formerly CEO of BSR. May 4. 
Dworetsky, Daniel (2007). CSR Sweden. Stockholm. April 4.  
Echard, Pierre (2006). CSR Europe. Brussels, Oct 19.  
Fickel, Brigitte (2007). HeidelbergCement. Heidelberg. January 31.  
Fischer, Jürgen (2007). Münchener Rück. February 8.  
Frommholz, Dirk-Walter (2007). Frommholz Furniture. Herford. May 15.    
Gade, Henning (2007). Confederation of Danish Employers. June 27. 
Ganse, Joachim (2007). Econsense/Deloitte. Berlin. March 12.  
Giarmana, Virginie (2006). European Coalition for Corporate Justice. Brussels. Oct 
25. 
Goldman, Harry (2007). Swedish Jobs and Society. April 2.  
Hahn, Carl (2008). Former CEO of VW. Wolfsburg. June 10.  
Halley, David (2006). BITC. London. March 24. 
Hamblin, Janet (2007). Baker Tilly Edinburgh, SBC. Edinburgh. April 23. 
Hansen, Ole (2007). Confederation of Danish Industries. June 28. 
Heseltine, Michael (2006). Ex-MP. London. July 6. 
Hendrickx, Luc (2008). UEAPME. Brussels. July 7.  
Hendrickx, Luc (2007). UEAPME. Brussels. May 4.  
Henkel, Hans-Olaf (2008). Ex-President, BDI. Berlin. February 7. 
Heuberger, Frank (2007). Chancellery of Rheinland-Pfalz. Wiesbaden. May 31. 
Heumann, Lucas (2007). Association of Wood and Furniture Industry in Westfahlen-
Lippe. Herford. May 25. 
Hilgenstock, Marita (2006). RWE. Essen. August 14.  
Hoffmann, Marieke (2007). Samenleving & Bedrijf. Utrecht. 
Hoffmann, Rainer (2007). ETUC. Brussels. August 8.  
Hornung-Draus, Renate (2008). Berlin. April 24. 
Howitt, Richard (2007). MEP. Strassbourg, June 20.  
Hüls, Claudia (2008). DIHK. German Chambers of Commerce. May 15.  
Hüls, Claudia (2006). DIHK. German Chambers of Commerce. January 24.  
Itschert, Patrick (2007). General Secretary of the European Trade Union Federation: 
Textiles, Clothing, Leather and Footwear. Brussels. February 2. 
Iwand, Wolf Michael (2007). TUI. Hannover. June 7.  
Jacobs, Jan Ole (2007). Lufthansa. Berlin. June 6.  
Jacobs, Nelleke (2007). MVO Nederlands. Utrecht. July 5. 
Kasner, Magnus (2007). MARTa. Herford. May 25.  
Kelly, Mike (2007). KPMG. London, July 16. 
King, Tom (Lord King of Bridgwater). Former Conservative MP. London: Nov 21. 
Kirkelund, Ole (2007). Copenhagen Center. Copenhagen. June 27. 
Kopp, Reinhold (2008). Econsense. Berlin. July 21.  
Laing, Hector (2006). BITC London. July 6.  
Laing, Mark (2007). Simmers of Edinburgh and SBC. April 23.  
Lang, Reinhard (2006). UPJ. Berlin. May 22. 
  
 
338
  
Lavaud, Patricia (2009). ORSE. Paris. July 20.   
Linderholm, Christina (2007). Företagarna. Stockholm. April 4.  
Lorentz, Bernhard (2006). Vodafone. Düsseldorf. May 25.   
Lüth, Arved (2007). IFOK. July 18.  
Marriott, Richard (2007). London. July 25. 
Martin, Leo (2006). Good Corporation. London. November 20. 
Mathar, Ursula (2007). Bayer. Leverkusen. June 5.  
Maltesen, Ib. LO Denmark. Copenhagen. June 28.  
Mathijesen, Regine (2008). Philips. Eindhoven. June 23.  
Meier-Preschany, Manfred (2007). Formerly of Dresdner Bank. June 12.  
Menninger, Oswald (2006). Berlin. December 12.  
Mesicek, Roman (2007). RespACT. Vienna. June 24. 
Meurer, Hans-Peter. RWE (2006). Essen. August 14. 
Møller, Ken John (2007). Danish Comm. & Comp. Agency. Copenhegen. June 27.   
Molderez, Ariane (2007). Belgium Business and Society. Brussels. February 2.  
Moorhouse, John (2007). SBC. Edinburgh. July 12. 
Münderlein, Jobst (2007). MICSR. Munich. February 8.  
Nejedlo, Tomáš (2007). Czech Business Leaders Forum. Prague. May 30.   
Nieber, Tomas (2007). IGBCE. Hannover. July 3. 
O’Brien, Stephen (2006). BITC. London, July 11.  
Olson, Eric (2010). BSR. San Francisco. August 10. 
Palmqvist, Hans (2007). IF Metall. Stockholm. April 4.   
Palz, Doris (2007). Center for Corporate Citizenship Austria. Vienna. June 15. 
Peat, Caroline (2006). BITC. London. November 29. 
Pehl, Christine (2007). Betapharm. Augusburg. February 14. 
Pelling, Anthony A. (2010). BITC. Washington, D.C. September 6.  
Prätorius, Gerhard (2007). Volkswagen. Wolfsburg. January 22. 
Raabe, Stephanie (2007). SAP. Walldorf. May 8.  
Raath, Dieter (2002). INSM. Cologne. July 11. 
Ramthun, Christian (2006). Wirtschaftswoche. Berlin. March 13.  
Rendall, Adam (2007). Shell & BITC.  Hook. July 26. 
Richardson, Jane (2007). ORACLE. Edinburgh. April 23. 
Riechers, Daniel (2007). Hettich Holding. May 25.  
Rohmer, Bradford (2007). European Coalition for Corporate Justice. Brussels. Feb. 2 
Rogowski, Michael (2007). Ex-President of the BDI. Heidenheim. July 4.  
Rudolph, Jochen (2007). Degussa. Essen. June 18. 
Rudeberg, Sverker (2007). Confederation of Swed. Enterprise. Stockholm, Apr. 3.  
Russell, Charles (2007). SBC. Senior Executive Program, SBC. Edinburgh. April 23.   
Schenkel, Markus (2006). Ministry for Family Women and Youth. Berlin. Dec 11.  
Schneider, Andreas (2007). Austrian Chamber of Commerce. Vienna. June 14. 
Schöffmann, Dieter (2006). Vis-a-Vis. Cologne. January 12. 
Schuler, Verena (2007). BMW. Munich. June 13.  
Schwager, Bernhard (2007). Bosch. Stuttgart. January 31.  
Sealey, Barry (2007). Archangel Investments. Edinburgh. July 12.  
Sheppard, Allen. (2006). Diageo & BITC. London. November 26. 
  
 
339
  
Sieff, David (2006). BITC. London. July 10.  
Skovgaard, Rune Gottlieb (2007). Copenhagen Center. Copenhagen. June 27. 
Sollbach, Marion (2007). Metro. Berlin. February 27.  
Spandau, Lutz (2007). Allianz. Munich. February 8. 
Still, Gunnar (2007). Thyssen-Krupp. Duisburg. January 20.  
Stindt, Meinhard (2008). BKU. Cologne. April 28.  
Storim, Mirjam (2007). Eberhard von Kuenheim Stiftung. Munich. February 14. 
Svensson, Mats (2007). IF Metall. Stockholm. April. 4  
Taylor, Andy (2007). Ford UK. London. July 23.  
Tewes, Nicolai (2007). Allianz. Munich. February 8.  
Thannisch, Reinald (2007). DGB, German Trade Union Confederation. July 17. 
Tietmeyer, Hans (2006). President of the Bundesbank. Frankfurt. July 26.  
Timms, Stephen. Minister. London. July 16.  
Toffaletti, Sebastiano (2008). NORMAPME. Brussels. July 7.   
Trippier, David (2007). Ex-MP. July 18.  
Vancronenburg, Geert (2007). FEB. Brussels. May 4.  
Vandenhende, Ann (2007). CSR Eurpe. Brussels. July 5.  
Von Bargen, Kai (2006). Henkel. Düsseldorf.  
Von Mutius, Bernhard (2007). Frankfurt. January 16. 
Von Weitershausen, Ottenheinrich Freiherr (2008). BDA. Berlin. April 24. 
Williamson, Janet (2006). TUC. London. November 29.   
Waltke, Natasha (2006). UNICE / BusinessEurope. Brussels. October 19. 
Williamson, Janet (2006). TUC. London. November 29.  
Wismeth, Stephanie (2007). KPMG. Berlin. March 13. 
Wolfenden, Lesley (2006). BITC. London, November 20. 
Wötzel, Uwe (2007). Verdi. Berlin. July 9.  
Wright, Brian. (2007). LENTA. London. July 25.  
Zimmermann, Carsten (2007). Deutsche Telekom. Bonn. June 26.   
Zuche, Michael (2007). Chambiz and UPJ. Frankfurt. June 17. 
Zwick, Yvonne (2008) German Council for Sustainable Development. Berlin. Feb 12.  
 
Archives Consulted 
 
Business in the Community internal archives. London, UK. 
Mannesmann Archive. Mülheim an der Ruhr, Germany.  
Rheinisch-Westfälisches Wirtschaftsarchiv. Cologne, Germany.   
Scottish Business in the Community internal archives. Edinburgh, UK.  
Stiftung Westfälisches Wirtschaftsarchiv. Dortmund, Germany.  
The Modern Records Centre. University of Warwick. Coventry, UK. 
The National (UK) Archives. London, UK. 
Volkswagen company archives. Wolfsburg, Germany.  
  
 
340
  
  
 
341
 
  
The German Company Network in 1996 
 
The German Company Network in 1998 
 
  
 
342
  
The German Company Network in 2000 
 
The German Company Network in 2002 
  
 
343
  
 
The German Company Network in 2004 
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The German Company Network in 2006 
 
 
The Network Centrality of European CRAs, c. 2007 
ID Mode Degree Betweenness Eigenvector
UK: BITC LME 76 4436.701 0.224
France: ORSE MME 47 2335.694 0.12
USA: BSR LME 40 1344.966 0.116
EU: CSR Europe 27 699.666 0.094
Hungary: HBLF MME 27 575.441 0.093
France: IMS MME 28 662.239 0.083
Ireland: Business in the 
Community Ireland LME 25 562.382 0.082
UK: SBC LME 20 218.315 0.066
Czech Republic: Business 
Leaders' Forum MME 18 345.057 0.063
Belgium: Business and Society 
Belgium CME 19 421.24 0.06
Netherlands: Samenleving & 
Bedrijf CME 13 204.432 0.049
Italy: Sodalitas MME 18 417.703 0.043
Greece: Hellenic Network for 
CSR MME 11 109.982 0.042
UK: IBLF LME 13 282.198 0.041
Sweden: Swedish Jobs and CME 8 63.962 0.033
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Society 
Portugal: RSE Portugal MME 9 199.99 0.031
Sweden: CSR Sweden CME 9 74.426 0.031
Switzerland: Philias CME 8 50.828 0.026
Spain: Club de Excelencia en 
Sostenibilidad MME 11 151.633 0.025
Finland: Finnish Business and 
Society CME 5 156.739 0.019
Germany: Econsense CME 17 720.21 0.018
Germany: UPJ CME 9 199.547 0.015
Luxembourg:IMS Luxemburg CME 3 3.651 0.01
 
Legend: 
LME 
CME 
MME 
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The Network Centrality of Firms in European CRAs, c. 2007 
ID Mode Degree Betweenness Eigenvector
KPMG PSF377 14 525.129 0.192
Coca-Cola LME 11 331.412 0.191
Microsoft LME 11 275.688 0.19
Orange / France 
Telecom MME 9 213.94 0.171
Deloitte PSF 8 145.105 0.157
IBM LME 10 196.517 0.156
PricewaterhouseCoopers PSF 11 330.337 0.154
Ernst & Young PSF 7 115.105 0.142
Danone MME 6 93.784 0.139
Vodafone LME 7 122.958 0.136
Shell LME 7 87.916 0.134
GlaxoSmithKline LME 6 64.012 0.133
Diageo LME 7 71.521 0.13
Citigroup LME 6 79.866 0.126
Unilever LME 6 87.963 0.125
McDonald's LME 6 71.46 0.122
DHL CME 6 86.914 0.121
Axa MME 6 122.449 0.118
GE LME 5 81.922 0.117
BT LME 5 43.786 0.117
ABB CME 7 88.635 0.116
Toyota CME 6 75.788 0.116
Ford LME 4 62.547 0.109
Accor MME 4 48.316 0.104
Total MME 4 48.316 0.104
Sodexho Alliance MME 4 43.591 0.099
Starbucks LME 4 38.86 0.097
Nike LME 5 69.363 0.093
Philip Morris LME 4 41.929 0.093
Oracle LME 4 18.559 0.093
Tesco LME 4 18.559 0.093
Hewlett Packard LME 3 43.809 0.092
Adecco CME 4 54.611 0.091
BP LME 4 31.652 0.09
American Express LME 4 37.981 0.089
Skanska CME 6 187.053 0.087
Siemens CME 5 154.805 0.086
Dell LME 4 37.796 0.086
 
Legend: 
LME 
CME 
                                                 
377 PSF stands for Professional Services Firms or the Big Four Auditors.  
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